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
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THE ĀGAMASA STRA OF GAUDAPĀDA

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EDITED, TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED
BY
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TO
THE REVERED MEMORY
OF
GURUDEVA
RABINDRANATH TAGORE

bhedo yasya na vastuto'sti bhuvane prāci pratīcili vā
mitratvam̄ prakālikṛtam̄ ca satataṁ yenātmānaḥ karmaṇā |
viśvam̄ yasya padam̄ prasiddham̄ aniśam̄ satye ca yasya sthitir
bhūyāt tasya jayo raver anudinam̄ tenāstu ṭṛptam̄ jagat ||

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PREFACE

Introductory

It was in July, 1919, that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Visvabharati, Santiniketan, I had to read the *Upaniṣads* anew: and in doing so when I, now with a little acquaintance with Buddhism, began to study the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapādā, popularly known as the *Gauḍapādakārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this quite in a different light. I found there something new. In 1922, in the Second All-India Oriental Conference held in this University, which was presided over by my esteemed friend, Prof. Sylvain Lévi, then the first Visiting Professor of the Visvabharati, I read a paper on the subject, in which I said that a book under the title of *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, embodying the result of my studies in it, would shortly be ready for the press. But, unfortunately, it could not be done earlier than now. However, I wrote some stray articles in English and Bengali on the subject. While they arrested the attention of certain scholars trained on modern lines, they gave rise to adverse criticism mainly from the orthodox section of my friends strictly following the indigenous interpretation of the *Upaniṣad*, given by Śaṅkara, the commentator of the present work.

Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Śaṅkara and his followers, or some other teachers I have attempted in the following pages to present to the readers my own interpretation of the work as I have understood. But in no way do I claim that my interpretation is *the* interpretation, i.e., the interpretation intended by Gaudapāda himself. Gaudapāda has not appeared to me and said that mine is the true interpretation, nor has God told me anything to the effect, nor am I an omniscient being. It is quite natural and well-known to all that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different persons owing to a variety of circumstances. It would be sheer foolishness on my part, I am perfectly conscious, if I pretend to claim by writing the following pages any superiority to the commentator, whether he is or is not identical with the great author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, who is known by the same name, Śaṅkara. I have simply put down my views here and I request my readers only to see if the text can be explained also in the way I have followed here.

I may say here in the following words of Yaśomittra (AKV¹, p. 2):

yuktā ced grāhyeyam na ced ato 'nyathā vidhātavyā |
na hi viṣame 'rthe skhalitum na sambhaven mādṛśām buddhiḥ ||

On points related to Buddhism, which are frequently raised in the course of my explanation, I have in many cases quoted in support of my views more passages than one, though a single passage could serve the

purpose; having meant them specially for those of my readers who are not adequately acquainted with Buddhist thoughts or have no easy access to Buddhist works.

In the present volume I have given a new edition of the text of the *Āgamaśāstra* based on a number of MSS and different editions as described below, followed by an English translation. After this comes my annotation.

At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, Variants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the *Āgamaśāstra*, and different Indexes as the Contents will show.

Manuscripts

Let us give here a description of the MSS. referred to above:

1. A¹. Adyar Library. No. IX. G. 52. It is in folios 20-28 of the codex. Written in Devanāgarī on paper in black ink, punctuated with red marks, and bounded on either side by double lines. Size 12.5"×4.8". Eleven lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. In this MS we have the MāU and the GK.

2. A². Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 99. Fols. 30-39 of this codex contain the MāU and GK. Size 10"×6". Number of lines on each page 12 or 13. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper, punctuated and bounded on each side by a double line. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

3. A³. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 130. Fols. 38-53 of this codex, too, contain MāU together with the GK. Written in modern Devanāgarī on paper, bounded on each side by a triple line. Size 10.1"×5". There are 8 or 9 lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

4. A⁴. Adyar Library. No. IX. B. 181. It is written on hand-made paper in Sāradā script. There are 30 folios. Size 9"×6". Each page has 18-25 lines. The borders of the MS are completely worn out, and last 12 folios are torn and destroyed in the middle. It is written in black ink, but the numbers of the folios are given in English figures in red one. No date is to be found, but from the worn out condition of the codex it seems to be not less than two hundred years old. The name of the scribe is also not given.

This codex contains different Upaniṣads, 19 in all, the *Vedāntasāra* (*Śaivadarśana*), and the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, III. 10. 9-11. Here we have also the MāU and only the first *prakarana* of GK.

5. B¹. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 272 of 1879-80. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Size 10.5"×4.7". Originally it had 67 fols., but the first 15 fols. are missing, and so we have now only 52 fols. Each page contains 10 to 14 lines. It is dated as 1765 (*bāṇa-aṅga-aśva-avani*), but it is not known whether it is Samvat or Śaka era.

This MS contains only the last three Books of the GK beginning with the first kārikā of Book II,

6. B². Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 778 of 1891-96. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Fols. 45. Size 9"×5". Like the preceding one it, too, has only the last three Books of GK together with Śaṅkara's commentary.

The kārikās, specially those in the last Book are numbered very carelessly; thus the last kārikā of the last Book is numbered as 93 instead of 100. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

7. D¹. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper. Size 11.4"×6". There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. It contains MāU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara on both of them. Originally there were 42 fols., but fols. 18, 19, 30-35 containing kārikās 10-53 of the fourth *prakaraṇa* are missing. In three or four cases some letters are lost, the paper being torn or damaged. In this MS *b* is written for both *b* and *v*.

8. D². Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly on paper measuring 11.2"×5.6" and bounded on both sides by thick lines. There are 69 fols. It contains the MāU and the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary on both of them. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

9. D³. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Fols. 2-35. Size 12.2"×5.5". Written neatly on paper in Devanāgarī. It contains the first 7 passages of the MāU, first 14 kārikās of the first *prakaraṇa* of the GK and parts of Śaṅkara's commentary with Ānandagiri's *tikā*.

10. IO. India office. No. 2783. In this codex there are three MSS, viz., (1) *Prapañcasāravivaraṇa*, (2) *Laghukaumudi*, and (3) MāU together with the GK only up to the Book I. The ślokas of *māngalācarana* of Śaṅkara's commentary are given with GK. The script is Devanāgarī. No date, but it seems to be old. Almost correct.

11. K¹. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 290 (Cover No. 9). Written in Bengali character on paper. Size 9.2"×4.2". Fols. 24. Lines in each page 7. There is no date, yet it appears to be very modern. Writer's name is not given. There are mistakes and omissions. The MS contains both MāU and GK.

12. K². Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 163. This is a part of a bigger MS of which we have only 24 fols. (29-52). Size 12"×5". Each page has 9 lines. There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. This MS contains only the third Book of the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary. It is not quite correct. Some of the kārikās are here misplaced.

13. K³. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 13 (Cover No. 4). Size 14.3"×6.2". Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 10. Average number of lines in each page 13. Samvat 1907. Written at Vīndāvana. The scribe is not mentioned..

It contains the original text of the MāU together with the commentary called *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadarthapraṅkāśa*. Though the name of its author is not mentioned here he is no other than Kūraṇārāyaṇa, a follower of

the Rāmānuja school. This commentary is published in the Anandaśrama Series, No. 62.

14. K³. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 304 (Cover No. 9). It is the first 12 fols. of a bigger codex. Size 10.3"×5.4". Number of lines in each page 8. Written on paper in Bengali script. It extends up to the kārikā 12 of Book I together with Śaṅkara's commentary. No date. Appearance modern. No name of the scribe.

15. PU¹. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 948. Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 9. Size 12"×6". Lines on each page 13-18. Date about 1850 V.S.; as says one Bhojla I, a manuscript dealer and book-seller from whom it seems to have been secured.

It contains MāU up to prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām. atraite ślokā bhavanti, and the GK of Book I.

16. PU². The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 746. Script Devanāgarī. Fols. 142. Size 14"×7". Number of lines on each page varies from 13 to 18. No date; but said to be of about 1850 V.S. Obtained at Amritsar, and said to be of Kashmir recension. It contains the MāU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara followed by Ānandagiri's tīkā.

17. V^c. Visvabharati. No. 1317. It is written in Grantha character on palm-leaf. Fols. 58. Size 15.7"×1.3". Lines 7-8 on each page. It contains the following works: (1) Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā (fols. 1-29); (2) Īśopaniṣad (fols. 30^a), (3) Kenopaniṣad (fols. 30^b-32^a), (4) Kathopaniṣad (fols. 32^b-37^a), (5) Praśnopaniṣad

(fols. 37^a-41^a), (6) *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (fols. 41^a-44^a), (7) *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* with -GK (fols. 44^a-52^a), and (8) *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (fols. 52^a-58). This MS seems to be about 150 years old, but there is no date nor the name of the scribe.

18. V^a. Visvabharati. No. 1632. Written on palm-leaf in Devanāgarī. Fols. 13. Size 11.5"×4". Lines on each page 7-8. The scribe was one Vāsudeva Bhīde, the son of one Nārāyaṇa. It was written at Śrīpañcavatī in the presence of (god) Śrīrāma on the 7th day of the black fortnight of the month of Caitra in the Śaka era 1733 (*Prajāpati saṃvatsara*)=1811 A.D. It contains the MāU with the GK beginning with the benedictory Vedic ślokas, bhadram karṇebhiḥ^o (RV, I. 89. 8), and svasti na indra^o (RV, I. 89. 6) to which are added the first two ślokas, viz., prajñānāṁśu^o and yo viśvātmā^o of Śaṅkara with which he is said to have begun his commentary on the MāU.

As regards the relationship of the MSS described above it may briefly be observed that A¹ and A² are from the same family and have close connexion with A³, IO, PU¹ and PU². B¹ and B² are closely related and so are D¹ and D². V^e and V^a agree in many cases with A¹, A², D¹ and D².

Among the MSS mentioned above A¹ and A² are the worst giving very wrong readings. Yet, at least in one case (IV. 56^a) A¹ with IO gives the right reading. See Introduction, § 5. The Readings of the Text.

In addition to the MSS described above the readings collected from the thirteen MSS, utilized for the preparation of the second edition of the MāU and GK together with Śaṅkara's commentary and Ānandagiri's sub-commentary in the Anandashram Series, No. 10, have also been consulted. The MSS collected for that edition are mentioned here, where necessary, according to the abbreviations used there, viz., K, Kh, G, Gh, etc. Besides, such editions as of Maheśa-candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka era; of MM. Durgācarāṇa Sāṅkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331 Bengali era; and of Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S., have been consulted.

The most important readings are discussed in their respective places in the main work, while variants will be found in the Appendix II, pp. 229 ff. See Introduction, § 4.

Acknowledgment

I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the following Institutions, who have kindly given me on loan the MSS described above: Adyar Library, Madras; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; Government Sanskrit College, Benares; India Office, London; Panjab University Library, Lahore; and Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan.

I am thankful to my pupils Śrī P. Anujan Achān, Government Archæologist, the State

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In conclusion I must express the deep sense of my gratitude to the authorities of the University of Calcutta,

and specially to Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee, M.A., B.L., D.Litt., LL.D., Barrister-at-Law, M.L.A., President, Councils of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts and Science, under whose benign and sympathetic patronage the book is included in the publications of the University.

Brahmavihāra,

CALCUTTA.

May, 1943.

VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ā Ānandagiri.

AAA Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka (Prajñāpāramitās, Vol. I), Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXVII.

AAS Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha with Vibhāvanī tīkā, ed. Fernando and Silva, Colombo, 1898.

AK L'Abhidharmaśāstra de Vasubandhu traduit et ennoté par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1923-31.

AKB Abhidharmaśabhbāṣya (Tibetan Text), BB.

AKV¹ Abhidharmaśavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, Fasc. I-II, BB.

AKV² Abhidharmaśavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1932-1936.

AmK Amarakośa.

AN Aṅguttara Nikāya, PTS.

AO Acta Orientalia.

AP Abhidhānappadipikā, Colombo, 1900.

ĀŚ Āgamaśāstra of Gāudāpāda.

AS Āṭhāsālinī, PTS.

ĀŚ Ācāraṅga Sūtra, PTS.

ASP Āśtāśāśrikā Prajñāpāramitā, BI.

ĀSU Āśtottaraśāṭopaniṣad, ed. W. Laxman Shastri Pansikar, Nirnaya-sagar, 1917.

ĀGAMĀŚĀSTRA

AU Ātmopaniṣad.

AV Atharvaveda.

BA Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bl.

BAP Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, Bl.

BB Bibliotheca Buddhica.

Bbh Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. W o g i h a r a ,
Tokio, 1930. See BSB.

BBU Brahmabindu Upaniṣad.

BBV Bṛhadāraṇyakabhbhasyavārttika, Anandashram,
1892-94.

BCK Buddhacarita Kāvya, ed. Johnston, 1936.

BG Bhagavadgītā.

BI Bibliotheca Indica.

BJS Brahmajāla Sutta in DN, PTO.

BP Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

BS Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

BSB Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. W o g i h a r a ,
Tokio, 1930. See Bbh.

BU Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

ChU Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

CN Chullaniddesa, PTS.

CŚ Catuhśataka, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ed.
Vidhushekha Bhattacharya,
Visvabharati, Part II, 1931.

CŚ Catuhśatikā, ed. Haraprasad Shastri
in the Memories of the Asiatic Society of
Bengal, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 449-514.

CVP Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, ed. Prabhubhai
Patel, Visvabharati (not yet published).
See JASB, 1898.

DA Divyāvadāna, ed. Cowell and Nail, Cambridge, 1886.

DāV Der älter Vedānta von Max Walleser, Heidelberg, 1911.

DB Daśabhbūmikasūtra, ed. Rahder, Paris, 1926.

D^c The edition of the MāU by Durgācarāṇa. Sāṅkhyā-Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331, Bengali Era.

DN Dīgha Nikāya, PTS.

DP Dhammapada.

DPA Dhammapada Āṭhakathā, PTS.

DPP Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, by E. Obermiller, Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX.

DS Dharmasaṃgraha, ed. Kāswarā, Max Müller, and Wenzel, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series, Oxford, 1885.

DSn Dhammasaṃgaṇī, PTS.

DV Daśavaikālika Sūtra, Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhārasamiti, No. 47.

ERE Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, ed. Hastings.

Ex Expositor, PTS (Translation Series).

G^o The edition of the MāU from the Gītā Press, Gorakhpur, 1893.

GK Gauḍapādakārikā.

GM Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, ed. Bhimaseṇa Śarmā, Prayāga (Allahabad), 1894.

HU Hitopadeśa, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay, 1887.

HV Harivamśa.

IU Īśa Upaniṣad.

JM Jagadgururatnamālāstava of Sādāśiva -
brahmendra with the com. of
Ātmabodhendra Sarasvatī included in Vedāntapañcaprakaraṇi, Śrividya
Press, Kumbhakonam.

JS Jñānasārasamuccaya (Yes.śes.sñiñ.po.kun.las-
btus.pa), now only in Tibetan. Cordier, III.
p. 298.

JU Jābāla Upaniṣad.

KIU Kaivalya Upaniṣad.

KN Kūranārāyaṇa.

KnU Kena Upaniṣad.

KP Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. Baron A. Von
Staël-Holstein, Shanghai, 1926.

KtU Kauśitaki Upaniṣad.

KU Kaṭha Upaniṣad.

KV Kathāvatthu, PTS.

LA Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio,
Kyoto, 1923.

LC Laghucandrikā, Śrividya Press, Kumbha-
konam, 1893.

LV Lalitavistara, ed. Lefmann, Halle, 1902
and 1908.

MA Madhyamakāvatāra (Tibetan Text), BB, IX.
French translation by Poussin, Le
Muséon, 1907.

MAc Madhvācārya.

MAK Madhyamakālaṅkārakārikā of Sānti-
rakṣita, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Sa,
53a¹-56b⁸.

MāU Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.

MB Mahābhārata, The South Indian Text, ed.
T. R. Krishnamacharya and
T. R. Vyāsacharya, Kumbha-
konam, 1906-1914.

MBU Maṇḍalabrahmaṇopaniṣad.

MD Mīmāṃsādarśana.

M[•] The edition of the MāU by Maheśa-
candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka Era.

MHK Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of Bhāvya,
Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Dza, 1b¹-40b⁷.

MHKV Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāvṛtti Tarkajvālā¹
of Bhāvya, Tibetan, Sde.dge, Dza,
40b¹-329b⁴.

MK Mūlāmadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna,
BB, IV.

MKU Muktikā Upaniṣad.

MM Mahārthaṁāñjāri with commentary, Pari-
malā, TSS.

MN Majjhima Nikāya, PTS.

MNs Mahāniddesa, PTS.

MnU Mahānāradīya Upaniṣad (Minor Upaniṣads,
Adyar).

MnU Mānasollāsa of Suresvara, Nirnaya-
sagar Press, Bombay, 1959, V.E., 1825
S. E.

MP Manorathapūraṇī, Mahāmukutārajavidyālaya,
Siam, 2463 Buddha Era.

MPñ Milindapañha, ed. V. Treneckner,
London, 1928,

v
ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

MS or } Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, ed. Sylvain Lévi,
 MSA } Paris, 1907; French Tr., 1911.

MSBT, MVBT, or MVST, q.v.

MSt Mahāsaddanīti, ed. A. Seelana nanda
 Thera, Colombo, 1909.

MSV Mīmāṁsāślokavārttika, Chaukhamba Sanskrit
 Series, 1896.

MT Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā, ed. S. Yamaguchi,
 Nagao, 1934.

MU Maitrī Upaniṣad.

MuU Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.

MV Madhyamakavṛtti, ed. Louis de La
 Vallée Poussin, BB. IV.

MVBT Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭikā, ed. V.
 Bhattacharya and G. Tucci,
 Part I, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1932.

MVD Madhyāntavibhaṅga Discourse, translated from
 Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky,
 BB, XXX, 1936.

MVT Madhyāntavibhāga ṭikā of Sthiramati,
 édition per Susumu Yamaguchi
 Nagoya, 1934.

MVg Mahāvagga of Vinaya, ed. H. Oldenberg,
 London, 1879.

MVt¹ Mahāvyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, Japan.

MVt² Mahāvyutpatti, ed. Minae ff, BB.

MVu Mahāvastu, ed. E. Senart, Paris,
 1882-97.

N Nāgārjuna.

ABBREVIATIONS

xxv.

NAT Nyāyāmṛtaṭaraṅgiṇī of Rāmācārya,
ed. T. R. Krishnacharya,
Nirṇayasāgar.

NK Nyāyakandali on Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, 1895.

NPTU Nṛsiṁhapūrvatāpanī Upaniṣad.

NPU Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad.

NS Nyāyasūtra.

NSi Naiśkarmyasiddhi with Candrikā, ed.
G. A. Jacob, Bombay, 1891.

NSt Nirupamastotra in *Two Hymns of Catuhstava
of Nāgārjuna*, ed. G. Tucci, JRAS,
1932, pp. 309 ff.

Nt Nirukta of Yāska.

NUTU Nṛsiṁhottaratāpanī Upaniṣad.

P Puruṣottama.

Pāṇ Pāṇini.

PAS Prajñāpāramitārthaśaṁgraha of Diinnāga
as quoted by Obermiller in his
paper *The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā*,
Reprint from *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. XI.

PB Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. V. Dvivedin,
Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6,
Benares, 1895.

PD Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya.

PO Poona Orientalist.

PP Padma Purāṇa.

PS¹ Paramārthaśāra, of Ādiśeṣa, Trivandrum
Sanskrit Series, No. XII, 1911.

PS² —of Abhinavagupta, ed. L. D. Barnett, JRAS, 1910, pp. 707 ff.

PS³ —of Ādiśeṣa, Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes, ed. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Karnatak Publishing House, 1941.

PSP Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28, 1934.

PU Praśna Upaniṣad.

PV Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrtti, Tibetan Text. Cordier, III, p. 298.

PV^k¹ Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1938.

PV^k² Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrtti with Manoratha Nandin's Commentary, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna.

RPR Review of Philosophy and Religion.

RUTU Rāmottaratāpanī Upaniṣad.

RV Rgveda

Ś Śaṅkarācārya.

SāS Sāṅkhyasūtra.

ŚB Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.

SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Bl, 1858.

SK Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvara kṛṣṇa.

SKr Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra, Āgamodaya Samiti, 1917.

SMV Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyavārttika, ed. Ananta-krishna Sastri and Ashokanath Bhattacharya, Asutosh Sanskrit Series, No. 1, Calcutta, 1941.

ABBREVIATIONS

xxvii

SN Samyutta Nikāya, PTS.

SNS Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Texte Tibétain, édité et traduit per Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935.

SNt Suttanipāta, PTS.

SP¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, BB, 1912.

SP² Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, ed. U. Wogihara, 1934.

SR or SRS Samādhirājasūtra, ed. Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur and Pandit Sarat Chandra Sastri, Fasc. 1, Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, 1898.

SS Subhāśitasaṅgraha, ed. C. Bendall, Le Muséon, N.S. IV. 1903; V. 1904.

ŚS Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, BB, 1902.

SS Śaddarśanasamuccaya with Guṇaratna's Com., ed. L. Suāli, BI, 1905 ff.

SŚP Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. G. Tucci, Roma, 1923.

SSS Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha, ed. Premsundar Bose, Calcutta, 1919.

St. LĀ Studies in Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra by D. T. Suzuki, London, 1930.

ŚU Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, Anandashram, 1905.

ŚV Śivasūtravimarśini of Kṣemarāja, ed. J. C. Chatterjee, The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Vol. I, 1911.

TA Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, Anandashram, 1898.

TAI Tattvaratnāvalī of *Advayavajra*, in
Advayavajrasaṃgraha ed. Haraprasad
 Shastri, Gaekwad's Oriental Series,
 No. LX, 1927.

TAk Tantrāloka of *Abhinavagupta*,
 Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies,
 No. XXX.

TG Theragāthā, PTS.

TJ Tarkajvālā, See MHKV.

Tk Triṃśikā of *Vasubandhu*, ed. Sylvain
 Lévi, in the *Vijñaptimātrasiddhi*, Paris,
 1925.

TM Tattvamuktakalāpa and Sarvārthasiddhi of
Venkata nātha Desika with the
Anandadāyinī and the *Bhāvaprakāśa*,
 Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, 1933,
 1940.

TP Tattvaprakāśa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series,
 1926.

TS Tattvasaṃgraha of *Sāntirakṣita*,
 Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. XXX
 and XXXI, 1926.

TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa of *Vasubandhu*, ed.
 Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya,
 Visvabharati, 1939.

TSP Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of *Kamalasīla*,
 See TS.

TTU Tripurātāpanī Upaniṣad.

TU Taitirīya Upaniṣad.

TV : Tantravārttika of Kumārila as printed with the Śabarabhāṣya on the MD, Ananda-shram Series.

U or UP Upaniṣad.

UC : - Uttaracarita of Bhava bhatti

US Upadeśasāhasrī.

VāP Vāyu Purāṇa.

Vbh Vibhaṅgā, PTS.

Vc or Vch Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Max Müller, Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881.

VeS Vedāntasāra, ed. G. A. Jacob, Nirnaya-sagar Press, Bombay, 1894.

ViP Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

ViS Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1928-29.

ViV Vigrahavyāvartanī, ed. K. P. Jayswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, JBORS, XXIII.

Vk Viṁśatikā of Vasubandhu. See Tk.

VM Visuddhimagga, PTS.

VP Vinayapiṭaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-1883.

VS Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā.

VSN Viṣṇusahasranāma, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, No. 19.

VSt Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.

VV *Śrīvātulasūtravṛtti*, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. 39.

YB *Yogācārabhūmi* of Asaṅga, MS with the present author.

YS *Yogaśāstra* of Hemacandra, Bibliotheca Indica, 1907.

YS *Yogaśūtra*.

YV *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*, Nirṇayasāgar Press, 1918.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. *The Māndūkya Upaniṣad and its Extent*

What work or works are we to understand by the name of MāU? And what is its real extent?

It is generally believed that the MāU comprises only the twelve prose passages beginning with “om ity etad akṣaram”¹ and ending with “ātmānām ya evam veda” (see pp. 223-25).¹ It is also assumed that the kārikās of Gauḍapāda are mere explanation of these passages. These two works are thus separate, though related to each other very closely as text and commentary.

But this is not admitted on all hands. Some hold that the Upaniṣad is composed not only of the twelve prose passages referred to above, but also of the kārikās, twenty-nine in all, attributed to Gauḍapāda, as contained in Book I. Thus according to them those prose passages and the kārikās in Book I are regarded as *Upaniṣad* or *śruti*.² This view seems to have partly

¹ Of these passages the first seven are found with slight variations in some cases also in NPTU, IV. 1-2; NUTU, II; and RUTU, 5.

² In 1925 I had an occasion to write (IHQ, Vol. I, pp. 119ff.) with regard to the present subject that this view was at least as old as Maṭhaṇvācārya (1199-1274 A.D.), the great champion of the Dvaita school of the Vedānta philosophy. For, according to him and his followers, such as Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrinivāsa, both the prose passages and the kārikās referred to are handed down by Varuṇa in the form of a *maṇḍuka* ‘frog’ (see the commentary on the MāU by Maṭhaṇvācārya with Śrī-

been subscribed to by Śaṅkara, the commentator of MāU, who says in the introduction to his commentary

nīvāsiya, Kumbhakonam, pp. 2-3). In support of it Mādhyācārya quotes the following two passages from the PP and HV respectively:

- (i) dhyeyan nāīyaṇam devam prāvēna samihitah |
manḍukarūpi varuṇas tuṣṭava harim avyayam ||
- (ii) iti manḍukarūpi san dadaīta varuṇah śrutiṁ |

These lines are not found, so far as I know, in printed editions of the works.

Here Mādhyācārya writes (*ibid.*, p. 2) : manḍukarūpiṇā varuṇena cañūipo nāīyaṇo 'tra sītīyate. He regards the kārikās as *mantras* which are said to have been visioned by Brahman, the creator. On this he quotes the following couplet not yet traced in the same work (p. 8) :

brahmadiśīṭān aśo mantrān pramāṇam salileśvaraḥ |
atra ślokā bhavantīti cakāraivam pṛthak pṛthak ||

Vyāsatīrtha's ḥīkā, too, introduces the kārikās under *mantras*.

The commentator of NPTU, who is known by the name of Śaṅkarācārya and identical with the author of the *Prapañcasāra*, a Tantīc work (see my paper, *Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads*, in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, *Orientalia*, 2, pp. 101 ff. and against it Raghuvara Miśhulal Shastri : *Proceedings and Transactions, Fifth Indian Oriental Conference*, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 691 ff., as well as T. R. Chintamanī : *Proceedings and Transactions, Third Oriental Conference, Madras*, 1924, pp. 419 ff.) is also of the same opinion, though he does not give particulars as to whether the ḥī 'seer' of the Upaniṣad is Varuṇa or whether the kārikās are seen by Brahman, the creator. Kūrānārāyaṇa, another commentator of MāU belonging to the Rāmānuja school of the Vedānta maintains the same view taking the kārikās in Book I as *mantras*, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages form the original Upaniṣad. Appayya Dīkṣita (a person different from the celebrated author of the *Siddhāntaleśa*) who is a commentator of the one hundred and eight Upaniṣads, seems to subscribe to the same views, for his commentary on the Upaniṣad extends only up to the prose passages and the kārikās of Book I. See the Catalogue of *Sanskrit Manuscripts* in the *Adyar Library*, Vol. I, Upaniṣads, pp. 116, 287-8.

After what I wrote as above in 1925, so far as my information goes, it was B. N. Krishnamurti Sarmā who in 1931 took up the case in right earnest and advocated it very strongly. His first paper (*New Light on the Gaudapādākārikā*) appeared in RPR, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 35 ff. He wanted

on it that the first of the four sections (*prakarana-catusṭaya*) of the *Āgamaśāstra* begins with “om ity etad aksaram” (MāU, 1), though the question as to whether that particular section or all the sections are regarded as *śruti* or not is not raised by him. Leaving aside what is said by this Śaṅkara whose identity with the great author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is doubtful,³ it appears plausible that the view under discussion dates back at least from the time of Rāmānuja (1055-1137 A.D.), as he seems to quote in his commentary on BS, I. 1. 1, a kārikā of Gauḍapāda (I. 16) as *śruti*.

mainly to show that Madhvācārya cannot rightly be accused of holding the view that the kārikās in Book I are regarded as *śruti*, and form a part of the original MāU. In doing so he tried to demonstrate that teachers “of the three schools of Vedānta, such as Śaṅkara, Ānandagiri, Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda, Rāmānuja, Kūra-nārāyaṇa, Mahācārya, Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsācārya svāmin, Rāmācārya, etc.,” are of the same opinion. In the same journal (RFR, 1932, Vol. III, No. 1; 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2) he wrote two papers more on the same subject. His writings gave rise to an interesting and long controversy in which took part some scholars, such as Y. Subrahmanyam Sharma (RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 3), and A. Venkata Subbiah (PO, 1936, Vol. I, Nos. 1-2), B. N. Krishnamurti’s rejoinder being given in PO, 1936, Vol. I, No. 2, and 1937, Vol. II, No. 1. Besides, A. Venkata Subbiah wrote in IA, 1933, pp. 181 ff. an independent paper entitled *The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad and Gauḍapāda* which deserves to be mentioned in this connection.

³ Those who think that the two Śaṅkaras, the author of the *Śārīrakabhaṣya* on BS and the author of the commentary on ĀŚ, are one and the same should consider in the latter not only the question of *maṅgalācaraṇa*, the inferior quality of composition of the slokas, the defect of metre (Ānandagiri’s explanation can hardly be accepted), and the grammatical mistakes, but also the explanation offered of such kārikās as I. 10, II. 37, III. 25, and IV. 83 as to whether it is possible for the former. Cf. here his explanation of the words *bhūta* and *abhūta* in III. 23 with that in IV. 3; of *sambhūti* in III. 25 with that of IU, 12. See note 2.

He writes : jīvasyaiva hi nirodhaḥ śrūyate^o anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvah prabudhyata (I. 16) iti ca. By the word śrūyate evidently he regards the line as śruti.

B. N. Krishnamurti Sarm a thinks that the above date is to be pushed back to the time of Suresvara, the author of the BBV or even that of Śaṅkara, the author of the *Sārīrakabhāṣya* on BS. But in spite of what he has said in support of the view one can hardly accept it when the statements made by the above two teachers themselves are taken into consideration. Suresvara quotes ĀŚ, I. 11 (kāryakāraṇa^o) in his NSi, IV. 41, and tells us (*Op. cit.*, IV. 44) that it is said by the revered Gaudas.⁴ The word *Gauda* here refers to *Gaudapāda*. As regards Śaṅkara, he, too, quotes in his commentary on BS, II. 1. 9, a kārikā of *Gaudapāda* (anādimāyayā^o, I. 16), and says it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedānta,⁵ just as said by him in another case (BS, I. 4. 14) with regard to another kārikā of *Gaudapāda* (mṛḍloha^o, III. 15).⁶ Here Suresvara and Śaṅkara say in the clearest possible language that the kārikās referred to above are by revered teachers.⁷ Hence, according to them, they are not śruti.

⁴ evam gaudair drāviḍair naḥ pūjyair ayam arthaḥ prabhāśiḥ. This line, as in the printed text is metrically defective. The word *ayam* seems to be omitted here.

⁵ atroktam vedāntasampradāyavidbhīr ācāryaiḥ.

⁶ tathā ca sampradāyavido vadanti.

⁷ For detailed discussion of this question readers are referred to the scholars and their papers mentioned in note 2 of this section.

In the face of this clear statement, the passages from some works attributed to Śaṅkara, and as such of doubtful authority, which are quoted by B. N. Krishna murti Sarmā in order to support his view that the kārikās of the Book I are śruti, do not, as it appears to me, carry any particular weight.

Sureśvara's words, viz., *vedāntokti* with regard to GK, I. 14, and *āgamaśāsana* with regard to GK, I. 3, which are quoted by him for the same purpose from BBV, I. 4. 615 and 744 respectively, do not necessarily imply that the kārikās are śruti in the primary sense of the word, for the same author, Sureśvara, takes elsewhere, as we have already seen, one (I. 11) of the GK kārikās of Book I in which the above two kārikās are included, as a statement of Gaudapāda. We should remember here that the above phrases are applicable also to works of human origin dealing with the Vedānta or Āgama.

That this controversy is not new, but an old one is known from the words of Rāmācārya, the author of the NAT, p. 223, where with regard to the two kārikās of Gaudapāda, I. 17 and 18, he raises the question as to whether they are śruti, and arrives at the conclusion that they are really so.⁸

Thus we reach the conclusion that at least from the time of Rāmānuja, the author of the Śribhāṣya of

⁸ See RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2. It is interesting to note here that sometimes the kārikās of Book I of GK is referred to as *Gaudapādiyoktaśruti* (LC, p. 580), and *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadvivaraṇa-Gaudapādiyavārttika* (NAT, p. 123b). The reader may think over here as to how these two words are used here loosely.

BS, there were some authoritative teachers according to whom the kārikās of Book I of the GK were regarded as śruti and as such they formed a part of the MāU.

Speaking generally our old teachers were śraddhādeva, 'trustful,' to use the word of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (I. 1. 4. 15), with regard to the authenticity of our sacred or Sanskrit texts. Any work dealing with Upaniṣadic matter would readily be accepted by them as Upaniṣad.⁹ Remember the number of Upaniṣads and their language, subject matter and the way of treatment therein. Are they all Upaniṣads, though they are called so? The *Bhagavadgītā* is not an Upaniṣad in fact, yet, it bears the name. We all know its colophon in which occurs the following : *ili śrīmadbhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu*. And it is so only owing to the fact that it is *like* an Upaniṣad. The practice of taking what is actually not an Upaniṣad as an Upaniṣad appears to have been in existence from the time of Pāṇini, as says Satyavrata Sāmaśramin in his *Trayīparicaya*, Calcutta, 1893, p. 69. From his work (I. 4. 79)¹⁰ we may gather a word, *upaniṣatkṛtya*, which means 'having made *like* an Upaniṣad.' Does it not lead us to conclude as above? But grammarians differ here on the meaning of the word *Upaniṣad*, according to some it being *tattvajñāna*, the 'knowledge of reality,' while to others, *rahasya*, a 'secret' or 'secret doctrine'. Let us take here the case of Purāṇas. A Purāṇa is said to have 'five characteristics' (*purāṇam pañcalakṣaṇam*). But there are Purāṇas which are, in

⁹ See Śaṅkara on BG, II. 19 and 20 where he uses the words *yc* and *mantra* referring to the above two stanzas.

¹⁰ jīvikopaniṣadāv aupamye.

fact, not so, though they are known to us under the same name. Similar is the case with regard to Upaniṣads and other works. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is not only the Book I of GK but also the remaining three Books of it which are sometimes held to be Upaniṣads, as *Advaitaprakarana Up.*, *Alatasāntiprakarana Up.*, etc.¹¹

We have seen above that according to some authorities including specially Mādhyācārya only Book I of GK is śruti, and the last three books are not so, and as such they do not form any part of MāU, as does Book I. In other words, they form a separate work or works with which the former has no connexion. If it is not so, it will be very difficult to explain as to why the last three Books are not commented upon by those teachers. Why have they explained only the Book I? It cannot be said that these last three Books were not known to them or in their time, as their existence before them can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Śaṅkara who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on BS, I. 4. 14, a kārikā (III. 15) from one of those three Books.

The fact that they did not comment upon the last three Books can be explained in two ways. First, it might have been their honest belief that those three Books had no connexion whatsoever with the MāU which, according to them, comprised only the twelve prose passages

¹¹ See MSS labelled ZZE of BBRAS. Similarly each of the five chapters of the NPTU is regarded as a separate Upaniṣad. The case is the same with the TU, the three chapters (*Sikṣāvallī*, *Brahma*^o, and *Bṛigu*^o) of which are held to be three Upaniṣads.

and the twenty-nine kārikās of Book I of GK. Secondly, it might be said that they could not explain them, for the dominant thoughts therein, viz., *Advaitavāda* ‘absolute monism’ and *Vijñānavāda* ‘idealism’ would go against their own views, viz., *Dvaitavāda* ‘dualism’ or *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda* ‘qualified monism.’ The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three Books, too, were really included in or connected with the original Upaniṣad they would have undoubtedly explained them, as is done¹² by Puruṣottama, the grandson of Vallabhācārya, the great teacher of the Suddhādvaita ‘pure monism’ school of the Vedānta.¹³

§ 2. *The Relationship between the Prose Passages and the Kārikās in Book I*

As Madhvācārya says,¹ the twelve prose passages of the Upaniṣad are divided into four parts.²

¹² I have seen the commentary only on the first two Books as edited by Bhāṭṭa Rāmānātha Śāstrin and published from Puṣṭimārga-Kāryālaya, Bombay, Vikrama 1980. That Puruṣottama wrote or intended to write his commentary also on Book III (*Advaita Prakaraṇa*) is known from his own words (*advaitākhye vicārayiṣye*), p. 55. It seems that he commented or intended to do so also on the last Book.

¹³ It is known from the Tibetan sources that in about the first half of the eighth century A.D. the GK was regarded as an *Upaniṣat sāstra* (gsan bahi.bstan.bcos). For Kamalasīla, a disciple of Śāntirakṣita (705-763 A.D.) and the author of the *Pañjikā* of his MAK quotes some kārikās from Books II and III of our work which he calls *Upaniṣat sāstra*. It is to be noted that Kamalasīla’s remark cannot be considered with reference only to the above two Books.

¹ MāU with Śrīnivāsiyavṛtti, p. 8.

² Part I, passages 1-6; Part II, passages 7; Part III, passages 8-11; and Part IV, passage 12.

Just after each of them there is a line : *atraite ślokā bhavanti* ‘here are these ślokas.’ These introductory lines when compared with similar sentences in different *Upaniṣads*³ will show that the ślokas are quoted there only to support what has been stated before. And we have already seen that *Mādhyācārya* and others, specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or kārikās were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards.

This will be confirmed if we compare the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding kārikās. The comparison will further show that it is the kārikās on which the prose passages are based and not *vice versa*.

Supposing that the kārikās are explanations of the *Upaniṣad*, *i.e.*, of the twelve prose passages which are generally held to be so, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original, but it does not or should not omit the most important and difficult words or points in it. If these facts are borne in mind, it will be evident that it is the kārikās that should be regarded as the earlier work, and not the prose passages.

³ See *BU*, IV. 3. II, 4. 8: *tad ete ślokā bhavanti*; *Op. cit.*, II. 2. 3, IV. 4. 6, 7: *tad eṣa śloko bhavati*; *ChU*, II. 21. 3, III. 11. 1, etc.: *tad eṣa ślokaḥ*; *TU*, II. 1. 1, 2. 1, etc.: *tad apy eṣa śloko bhavati*; *ChU*, III. 12. 5: *tad etad ṛcabhyuktam*.

According to the general view, kārikās 1-5 are to be taken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-5.⁴ Now the words *saptāṅga* ‘with seven limbs,’ and *ekonavimśatimukha* ‘with nineteen mouths’ in the passages 3 and 4 are the most difficult and they are explained differently by different commentators⁵; but not even the slightest mention of them is made in the kārikās. Why should the kārikās which are supposed to have been written in order to explain the text, i.e., the prose passages, omit these two important words?

Again, in the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara* and not *viśva*, while in the kārikās (l. 1-4, 19, 23) there is only *viśva* and never *vaiśvānara*. Why is this discrepancy? A commentator is to explain what is actually found in the text, he is not allowed to take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words *vaiśvānara* and *viśva* identical or synonymous. It is difficult to account for this alteration. That it is owing to the exigency of metre is an absurd hypothesis.⁶

In this connexion, there are three words more, viz., *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapna*^o, and *suṣupta*^o in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively. But they are entirely omitted in the kārikās. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for, in order to

⁴ It is to be noted that the first two passages have nothing in the kārikās as we have them before us.

⁵ See S here and on NPTU, IV; Madhva, KN, and P on the passages; Vidyāraṇya on NUTU, 1; and Nārāyaṇa on RUTU, 3.

⁶ Note there is *prajñānaghana* in the prose passage 5, for which we have *ghanaaprajña* in kārikā 1.

understand the main thought of the passages the importance of these three stages, viz., wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, can in no way be ignored.

The fact is that the kārikās are older, and from them, as well as from some older Upaniṣads, the MāU, i.e., the prose passages to which that name is usually given is compiled or made,⁷ and in doing so some of the thoughts of these kārikās and of some older Upaniṣads are here in the prose passages simplified, modified or explained adding something new. Thus, it appears, in the present case, the author of the prose passages having found the word *viśva* in its special sense nowhere in the Upaniṣads⁸ seems to have substituted for it *vaiśvānara* which is used in such old Upaniṣads as ChU (V. 11. 12) and BU (V. 9. 1).⁹ Now the author of NUTU, I where the entire MāU is quoted with some slight variants,¹⁰ seeing both the words *viśva* in the kārikās and *vaiśvānara*¹¹ in the older Upaniṣads, has adopted both of them¹² and simplified the text to some extent.¹³ As to why these two terms are taken together in NUTU and what is

⁷ See pp. 223 ff., and Deussen : *Upaniṣads des Veda*, p. 574.

⁸ Excepting perhaps MU, VI. 7 which is not so old.

⁹ On the greatness of Vaiśvānara see RV, I. 59. 6; 98. 1; Nt, VII. 21-23; BS, I. 2. 32.

¹⁰ The MāU is almost entirely found also in NPTU, I.

¹¹ For a different view of Viśva-Vaiśvānara, Taijasa and Prājña cf. Iśvara and Prājña, Hiranyagaibha and Taijasa, and Vaiśvānara and Taijasa in PD, I. 16-29.

¹² Sthūlabhuk caturātmā viśvo vaiśvānaraḥ prathamaḥ pādah.

¹³ This is also with NPTU, I. For example, *sūkṣma* is substituted here for *pravivikta* in the kārikās. Here *sūkṣma* is undoubtedly simpler than *pravivikta*. For details the reader is referred to that Up.

their special significance is clearly shown by Vidyāranya in his ṭīkā on it and in PD I. 28-29. See also VeS, § 17.

Similarly the three states, *jāgarita*, *svapna*, and *susupta* in the prose passages (3-4) are later additions from BU, or ChU, or both for a clear exposition of the terms *bahiṣprajña*, *anṭahprajña*, and *ghanaprajña* in kārikā I.

That the MāU (*i.e.*, the prose passages) has drawn upon the kārikās and some other Upaniṣads can be gathered from the comparison of both the texts. In the kārikās we have simply *ghanaprajña* (1) and *ānandabhu* (3) or *ānanda* (4), while the prose passage (5) reads as follows (see p. 224):

yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmayate na kañcana svapnam paśyati (BU, IV. 3. 9) tat susuptam. *susuptasthāna ekibhūtaḥ*¹⁴ *prajñānaghana* (BU, IV. 5. 13) *evānandamayo* (TU, II. 5. 1) hy ānandabhu cetomukhaḥ prājñas tṛtyaḥ pādaḥ.

Which of these two, the kārikā and the prose passage, is the original, and which is the exposition, may now easily be ascertained.

The word *ghanaprajña* in the kārika is no doubt, identical with *prajñānaghana* in a somewhat different form, and to explain it the prose passage has introduced the word *ekibhūta* found, in fact, in the form of *ekibhavati* in different Upaniṣads.¹⁵

¹⁴ Cf. *ekibhavati*, BU, 6. IV. 4. 2 (seven times). See PU IV. 2 (twice); NPTU, IV. 1; NUTU, 1.

¹⁵ See note 14.

The kārikā I. 19 runs thus :

viśvasyātvavivakṣayām ādisāmānyam utkaṭam |
mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ||

And the corresponding prose passage (9) is this :

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kāraḥ prathamā mātrāpter
ādimattvād vā. āpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādiś ca bhavati
ya evam veda.

It means that Vaiśvānara whose sphere is the waking state is the first *mātrā* ‘measure,’ the letter *a*, on account of obtaining (or pervasiveness) or on account of its being the first (*āpter ādimattvād vā*). One who knows thus obtains one’s all desires and becomes first of all.

Now, if these two texts are compared it will at once be clear that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the Brāhmaṇas.

Here is one point more. In the first text the reason is advanced as to why Viśva (=Vaiśvānara of the second text) is to be regarded as the letter *a*. And the reason is *sāmānya* ‘similarity’—similarity between Viśva and the letter *a*. And this similarity is ‘beginning’ (*ādi*) or ‘obtaining’ or ‘pervasiveness’ (*āpti*). Now, according to the order of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, Viśva is at the beginning or first (*ādi*); just so is at the beginning or first the letter *a* of *a*, *u* and *m* of which Om is composed. Owing to this similarity Viśva is said to be identical with the letter *a*. The second similarity is *āpti* which by Śaṅkara is thus explained : As Viśva pervades all the visible world, so does the letter *a* all the speech. On account

of this similarity, too, Viśva is to be regarded as the letter *a*. The second text, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity of Viśva and *a*. For, while the first text says that owing to *both* the similarities of *ādi* and *āpti* they are identical, the second text clearly says that it is owing to *either* of them (*āpter ādimattvād vā*).¹⁶ All these seem to be later developments.

The case is exactly the same with kārikās 1. 20, 21 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11 of the Upaniṣad, to which the reader is referred.

There is one thing more to be noted with regard to the kārikā I. 21 and the corresponding prose passage 11 of the Upaniṣad. In the former one of the two similarities is *māna* 'measure' from $\sqrt{mā}$ 'to measure' while in the latter the word is not *māna*, but *miti* 'measure' from \sqrt{mi} . Similarly, while in the former we have *apīti* 'disappearance' from *api-* \sqrt{i} , in the latter there is *laya* 'disappearance.' There is, however, no difference of meaning, as shown, in the two cases. Yet, how far such divergency between an original text and its explanation in Sanskrit can be accounted for is to be considered seriously.

The conception of *ātman* as having four fourths or quarters (*catuspād*) is not so explicit in the words of kārikās¹⁷ as in those of the Upaniṣad, 2. This idea

¹⁶ One may, however, say that the word *vā* in the text may be taken in the sense of *ca* or *api*. But Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarānanda does not say so.

¹⁷ See I. 10-15 (where the fourth state is described), 24, and 29 (where Oṅkāra is described with or without *mātrā*).

is, however, fully developed in the Upaniṣad 2 from the very beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the kārikās.

The distinction between Turya or Turiya ‘fourth’ and the other three, viz., Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña, as made in the kārikās (I. 10-15), has nothing corresponding in the Upaniṣad, but the nature of Turya, which is expressed in a kārikā (I. 29) simply by two words, śiva ‘blissful’ and *dvaita-upaśama* ‘cessation of duality’ is thus elaborated in two passages, 7 and 12, of the Upaniṣad :

(i) nāntahprajñam na bahisprajñam nobhayataḥ-
prajñam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam
adṛṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam
avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayaśāram prapañcopaśamam
śāntam śivam advitam caturtham manyante. sa ātmā
sa vijñeyah.

(ii) amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapañcopa-
śamah śivo 'dvaita evam oīkāra ātmaiva. saṃviśaty
ātmanātmānam¹⁸ ya evam veda.

These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the kārikā, I. 29, and consequently appear to be later developments, as shows also the language used here.

Again, it is to be noted that though in the Upaniṣad (1) Brahman or Ātman is said to have four quarters (*catuspād*) which are explained there later on (3-6), there is no express mention of them in the kārikās which are supposed to be an explanatory work.

¹⁸ See VS, XXXII, 11 : ātmanātmānam abhisamviveśa.

Compare the kārikā I. 24 with the prose passage 8 of the Upaniṣad and it will be found that the former is explained in the latter in some detail and not *vice versa*.

The kārikā (l. 6) opening the discussion about the origin (*prabhava*) of all things may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the Upaniṣad : *prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām.*¹⁹ Here *prabhava* is described in the kārikās I. 6-9 at some length, but *apyaya* ‘disappearance’ is not even touched in the kārikās. This would hardly be possible if the kārikās were meant to explain the Upaniṣad.

All these considerations lead me to conclude as follows :

(i) The kārikās in Book I are not the exposition (*vyākhyāna*) of the MāU.

(ii) The MāU is mainly based on the kārikās,²⁰ and not *vice versa*.

(iii) And as such the MāU is later than the kārikās.²¹

Here we must remember what Mādhyācārya has said on the point. Serious charges may be and have been brought against him saying “that he is addicted to the fabrication of evidence and that he very frequently cites passages from books which do not and

¹⁹ It is taken from KU, II. 2.

²⁰ It has drawn much also upon some older Upaniṣads as will be seen from the text printed herewith, pp. 223 ff.

²¹ See Max Walliser: *Der ältere Vedānta*, p. 5. He says that the kārikās do not show that the Upaniṣad was before them.

did not at any time exist."²² Or Appayya Dikṣita in his *Madhvamatavidhvamsana* may give a list of such books, or may say of him :

tathāpy ānandatīrthiyam matam agrāhyam eva nah |
yatra vaidikamaryādā bhūyasy ākulatām gatā ||²³

Or, again, most of the authorities cited by him in his commentary on the MāU may not be traced; or one may or may not attach any value to the myth he has given us that Varuṇa having assumed the form of a frog received the *mantras*, i.e., the kārikās originally visioned by Brahman, the creator; yet, in the present case, we have to accept, as we have shown above, his view that the *mantras* or kārikās are older and on them is based our MāU.²⁴

§ 3. *The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamaśāstra*

It is generally held that the Āgamaśāstra has four *prakaraṇas* or Books, viz., *Āgamaprakarana*, *Vaitathya*^o, *Advaita*^o, and *Alātaśānti*.^o Here arise the following questions : Are these Books, in fact, four parts of the same work, or are they four independent treatises compiled in one volume? Again, is it that

²² A. Venkatasubbiah: IA, 1933, p. 189.

²³ See RPR, Vol. II, p. 51.

²⁴ This view was originally expressed by me long ago in IHQ, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 119-125, 295-302. Against this see S. K. Belvalkar's observation in his *Vedanta Philosophy* (Sreegopal Basu Mallik Lectures), Part I, pp. 192-193. But I do not think that the modification of my opinion is necessary.

while one or more of the Books form a work, the remaining one or ones constitute another work?

Sāṅkara, the commentator, with his followers, holds that the four Books are the different parts of the same work entitled *Āgamaśāstra*. And so, in order to show their mutual connexion first with reference to Books I and II, he writes just at the beginning of his commentary on Book II: “‘When (the Reality) is known there is no duality’—This is already said (I. 18d),¹ and it is supported by such *śrutis* as ‘There is only one without a second (ChāU, VI. 2. 1).’ This is, however, only a statement of scripture (*āgamamāṭra*). With a view to showing that the unreality of duality can be established also by reasoning (*upapatti*) Book II is begun with the words ‘*vaitathyam*,’ etc.”

Now, as regards the relationship between Books II and III S observes (III. 1): “The determination of

¹ S could easily refer here also to I. 16, 17 and 29. Moreover, in the manner which he has adopted in showing the relationship between the first two Books the following might also be added in his favour, as in his opinion the *Āgamaprakaraṇa* begins with “Om ity etad akṣaram ity ādi,” in other words, it includes the MāU. We read in the concluding kārikā (29) of Book I: dvaitasyopasamāḥ śivāḥ, which is in fact the same as prapañcopasamāḥ sāntām śivām and prapañcopasamo ‘dvaitah of the MāU, 7 and 12 respectively. This very thing is re-assured in Book II. 35 by a phrase which is exactly the same in sense as the above, i.e., prapañcopasamo ‘dvaitah. Again, in I. 10 we have advaitāḥ sarvabhāvānām, and the same thing in one or other form is seen in many places in Book II: tasmād advayatā śivā (II. 33); advaite yojayet smṛtim (II. 36), advaitāṁ samanuprāpya (II. 36). Cf. here also advaitāṁ paramārtho hi (III. 18). And this truth is established there (II. 1 ff.) by strong reasons showing the unreality (*vaitathyā*) of all things as in dream. Thus does it not show that these two Books are closely connected with each other?

Om is made only by a proposition (*pratijñāmātra*) : 'The Ātman is the cessation of expression, blissful and without a second, (MāU, 12).' It is also said that 'When (the Reality) is known there is no duality' (I. 29). There in the Book called Non-reality (*vaitathya*), i.e., II, the absence of duality is set forth by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-air, etc. (II. 31), by reasons such as the 'capability of being seen' (*dīsyatva*)² and 'the state of having the beginning and the end' (*ādyantavat्त्वा*),³ and also by reasoning (*tarka*). Now, it is asked : Is it that non-duality can be understood only by scripture or also by reasoning?⁴ The reply is : It can be done also by reasoning. How is it? For this Book III is begun."

Finally with reference to Book IV, Ś says in introducing it : "Through the determination of Om non-duality is proposed (*pratijñāta*). It is then established (*siddha*) by showing the non-reality of the different external objects (in Book II). Again, in Book III it is directly ascertained by scripture (*āgama*) and reasoning concluding that it is the highest truth (III. 48). At the end⁵ it is hinted that the Dvaitins 'Dualists' and Vaināśikas 'Nihilists' are opposed to this view of non-duality which is the meaning of the scripture (*āgama*), and their views are wrong views as they cause such evil passions as attachment and aversion, on

² Where is it in Book II?

³ II. 7.

⁴ advaitam kim रागमामत्रेण प्रतिपत्तव्यम् शोषवितर्केणपि.

⁵ In fact, it is not 'at the end' (*ante*), nor is it in any of the original kārikās. It is the commentator's own observation. See the commentary on II. 7.

account of their mutual contradiction. As there is no place of evil passions in it, the view of non-duality is the right view, and as such it is praised. Now, here (in Book IV) having shown in details that their views are not right being mutually contradictory they are to be thrown away, and by doing so the establishment of the view of non-duality is to be concluded by the method of inference called *avīta*⁶ ‘negative.’ For this, (the Book called) ‘The Cessation of the Fire-brand’ is begun.”

Let us now examine the above statement of Ś. By his observation regarding the connexion between Books I and II, he wants to mean that though it is said in Book I that there is no duality, yet, it is merely an expression of *āgama*, no reason being offered there in its favour. And so in order to support it by reasons Book II is written. But is it really so? Is it that there is no reasoning at all in Book I? None can give the answer in the affirmative. Certainly various reasons are advanced in Book II, but it cannot be said that Book I is altogether conspicuous by their absence. For, they are to be clearly found in *kārikās* 16-18, though not to that extent as in Book II. Here arises a question: If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Ś to be, then why is it that the author of Book II himself does not say so - just at its beginning, though he could do so easily? But instead of doing this he begins it without any reference to Book I, only alluding to the

⁶ Ānandagiri unnecessarily takes it as *āvīta* saying that *āvīta* is nothing but *avīta*.

opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book II. But he has not done so.

Let us consider here another point. We have already seen that in accordance with some teachers such as Mādhyācārya, the MāU is composed of the twelve prose passages and the twenty-nine kārikās in Book I. It is quite clear from it that, in their opinion, the work is a complete one having no connexion with any of the remaining three Books of the ĀŚ. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that its subject matter, i.e., the determination of Om, is here dealt with completely, as one can easily understand from the last two kārikās of Book I, after reading which one does not feel that anything more remains to be further discussed and elucidated; and, in fact, we see nothing directly of Om in the following Book or Books. Thus it follows that the treatise consisting of the kārikās of Book I has no relationship to any of the Books that follow. It is also to be noted here that the views of the teachers referred to above cannot be ignored altogether.

Further, if Book II is a continuation of Book I, it could be expected that the former should somehow or other presuppose the latter. But does it do so? If so, where? Moreover, what does one lose if one takes Book II as an independent work on the *advaita Vedānta*? Does one find in reading this Book in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming

its connexion with Book I? Or does one really feel that without Book I it appears to be incomplete?⁷ That it is complete in itself will be clear if we attentively read at least the concluding portion of it, i.e., kārikās 35-38.

Now with regard to the connexion between Books II and III let us remember what Ś says. His words, put briefly, would amount to this that non-duality can be understood not only by *āgamā*, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well. Consequently to exhibit the reasoning Book III is required. If that is so, we shall have to accept that according to Ś the object of both the Books II and III is one and the same, i.e., giving the arguments for non-duality. In that case, why should there be two separate Books instead of one in which all could be included? This leads one to think of a different object for which Book III must have been written. And what this object was will be clear if one examines the contents with some amount of care. Here at the beginning (III. 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajāti*) and having established it concludes in the end(III. 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta, and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśayoga* meant for the realization of the Truth.

It is not that there is no mention of non-duality in this

⁷ These questions with necessary modifications here and there should be put in discussing the relationship also of the following Books.

Book. It is there (III. 18),⁸ but only incidentally, and as such is not discussed. But can one say rightly that because of the mention of non-duality in this Book, Books II and III must have some direct connexion between them? If so, is it not that there will be no difficulty whatsoever in finding out a relationship between any two works on the same subject? But that relationship will certainly not be as that between the different chapters of the same work. It is to be noted that Š himself has not suggested such relationship. Thus it appears to me that there is nothing against one's thinking that Book III, too, is an independent work on *advaita Vedānta*.

We now come to Book IV. It has already been seen how Š wants to connect it with the preceding Books. He assumes that the views of Dvaitins and Vaināśikas⁹ are to be shown in details¹⁰ in this Book as wrong, and by doing so the conclusion is to be established that the theory of non-duality is right. First, we are to examine here as to how far this assertion can be accepted. Let us take for granted that, as he says, owing to their mutual contradiction the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are wrong and this is to be shown *in detail* in this Book. But where and how much is it done? Dvaitins are referred to by the word *vādīns* 'disputants' only in two places (IV. 3 and 6); but even there in

⁸ Book III. 18: *advaitam paramārtho hi* See Book I. 17: *advaitam paramārthataḥ*.

⁹ See III. 17.

¹⁰ Com. on IV. 1: *tad iha vistareṇa anyonyaviruddhatayā asamyag-darśanatvam pradarśya, tatpratiṣedhenādvaitadarśanasiddhir upasamphartavyā*.

the first place, though only their mutual contradiction is simply referred to, no detail of it is to be found. There is no allusion to Vaināśikas in this Book. But if by that word the Buddhists are meant, no mutual contradiction with the Dvaitins, (or among themselves,) is to be found of their views. On the contrary, the author of the ĀŚ has accepted or approved of them throughout the Book as the present writer has attempted to show. How is it then that in accordance with S, one can expect to understand from this Book that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are wrong and the view of non-duality is right? Thus one can hardly connect in this way the present Book with the preceding one or ones. We should also remember here the questions that have already been put in discussing the relationship between Books I and II. See p. lii.

Is there then no relationship of any kind between Books IV and others? How can it be so? Certainly there is a relationship and it is rather a close one, as the following lines will show. A careful reader will see that a large number of expressions in various forms in the first three Books are literally quoted or alluded to in Book IV. And it will be noticed that some matters dealt with in the former are done so again in the latter. For instance, I. 16^c=III. 36^a=IV. 81^a; II. 6-7=IV. 31-32¹¹; (cf. II. 1, 4 with IV. 33, and II. 2 with IV. 34¹²); III. 20-22=IV. 6-8¹³; III. 29-30

¹¹ See III. 2, 48; IV. 4, 5.

¹² The second half is, however, identical.

¹³ Here is a slight variation, and it is that for the word *bhāva* in the former there is *dharma* in the latter with regard to the first and the last kārikās.

=IV. 61-62¹¹; III. 48=IV. 71. Besides, such expressions or topics as the following are to be found in more than one Book: *jñeyābhinna jñāna* ‘the knowledge is not different from the knowable.’ is in III. 33 and IV. 1; *ajātivāda* ‘the theory of non-origination’ in III. 2 ff and IV. 3 ff. Such being the case it must be accepted that Book IV is rather closely related to other Books.

But this relationship is not such as between a work and its different chapters on the following grounds :

With reference to later Sanskrit works it is a well-known practice that their commencement is with a *maṅgalācarana* ‘prayer for success’ which includes a *namaskāra* ‘paying homage’ to one for whom the authors have regard. Now, as we have at the very beginning of Book IV a *kārikā* embodying *maṅgalācarana*, it naturally induces one to think that it is not a chapter of any work, but itself an independent work.

It is, however, true that *maṅgalācarana* is found not only at the commencement of a work, but also in other places of it, as in the case of the *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, or of the *Sañjīvanī* of Mallinātha on the *Raghuvamśa*. But it is to be noted here that in such cases it is done in each of the chapters, and not in any particular one, whereas in the present case, here in ĀŚ we have it

¹¹ With the following variations: For spandate māyayā manah in III there is cittam calati māyayā in IV, and for manah in III there is cittam in IV.

only in Book IV, so far as the extant editions and the MSS that are examined can show.¹⁵ Here we may remember a Buddhist work, *viz.*, the *Pañjikā* of Prajñākara-mati on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. It consists of nine chapters. Here the *maṅgalācarana* is only in the first¹⁶ and the last chapters, and not in others. Evidently the *maṅgalācarana* at the beginning of its chapter IX does not mean to say that it is an independent work. Considering the contents of this chapter of both the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and its *Pañjikā*, which deal with *prajñāpāramitā*, it appears to me that the only thing that can be said is this that the *maṅgalācarana* of the *Pañjikā* simply suggests a special importance of both the works, the *Pañjikā* and the BA. Thus the *maṅgalācarana* of Book IV cannot conclusively show that it is an independent work and not the continuation of the preceding ones. But here is a thing which should not be left unnoticed. Both at the beginning and at the end of Book IV there is a *maṅgalācarana* in the form of *namaskāra* ‘paying homage.’ Does it not imply that the Book is an independent work and complete in itself?

Let us discuss here another point. We have already seen that a number of kārikās in Books II and III

¹⁵ We have some ground to think that at the beginning of Book I a few kārikās are now missing. It is not improbable that there was a *maṅgalācarana* in those kārikās.

¹⁶ As the first folio of the MS, the basis of the present edition (*Bibliotheca Indica*) of BAP is lost, and the second one, in some parts illegible, is broken down, the beginning lines of BAP could not be printed. Hence it could not be ascertained from the edition as to whether there is any *maṅgalācarana* at the beginning. Yet, from its Tibetan version we know that it actually exists.

are repeated in Book IV. Why is this repetition? Moreover, certain things treated of before are discussed again in Book IV; e.g., *ajātivāda* ‘theory of non-origination’ discussed in III is discussed again in IV. But why? A point discussed and settled once in a chapter may, if necessary, be alluded to in a subsequent chapter, but why should it be discussed and settled again? Is it not useless? Why should the author of Book IV indulge in such a useless action? This leads one to think that Book IV is an independent work in which the author has incorporated certain things that are already dealt with by him elsewhere, while others are discussed again more elaborately or in a different way. The discussion of the *ajātivāda* is an instance on the point.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.

§ 4. *The Text of the Āgamaśāstra*

We are now to discuss a few points regarding the text of the *ĀŚ*, as we have now in the extant editions and the MSS examined for them. Here arises a question : Is it that the text is a complete one? It seems to me that the answer cannot be given in the affirmative. It will at once occur to the mind of a reader that the first *kārikā* of Book I has found its place there quite abruptly. Without any reference to the three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep as described in the

prose passages of the MāU this kārikā is not intelligible.¹ It appears therefore that one or more kārikās here are missing.²

It may be said that as in Book IV,³ so here, too, at the beginning of Book I, a *maṅgalācaraṇa* is expected, but it is not found. Hence it appears that originally at least one kārikā was composed here for it, but subsequently somehow or other it was lost. This point of *maṅgalācaraṇa* cannot, however, be much insisted upon. For, in the time of the author of the ĀŚ this practice of *maṅgalācaraṇa* was not so much persisted in as in later days. The great Śaṅkara, the author of the *Sārīraṇa-bhāṣya*, does not follow it, so far as his undisputed works are concerned.⁴ So it may be that the author did not like it at the beginning of Book I, though he actually followed it in Book IV. Thus this point is not of much importance.

Let one read kārikās 5 and 6 and say if there is any connexion between them. Kārikā 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden. The commentator Ś is silent here on their mutual connexion. Does this not lead one

¹ This fact should not, however, be taken as a reason for supposing the priority of the MāU to the kārikās refuted elsewhere on strong grounds.

² According to also those who hold that the kārikās of Gauḍapāda are written as an explanation (*vyaṅkyāna*) of the MāU, one might naturally expect at the beginning some words to that effect, but they are not found. In accordance with this theory also at least one kārikā is lost here.

³ The commentary on the *Saṅkhyakārikā* may also be added here, but it is not quite certain that its author and the author of ĀŚ, though both of them are known by the same name, Gauḍapāda, are identical.

⁴ It is disputed that the beginning slokas of the commentary on the TU, which go by his name are actually written by him,

to think that a kārikā or kārikās are missing here? They might have been in existence in the time of the commentator, and possibly they were commented upon by him, but all this was lost afterwards.

Undoubtedly Om is one of the subject matters of Book I which consists of 29 kārikās, but until kārikā 19 there is no mention whatsoever of the word. This does not seem to be quite proper. And here is one thing more to be borne in mind; it is this that without a knowledge of the fact that Om can be analysed into *a*, *u*, and *m* this kārikā (19) can hardly be understood, so one expects here something like the prose passage 8 of the MāU.

With reference to some of the kārikās it appears to me that their original order has been somehow or other changed, so that their proper elucidation has been difficult. Let us take kārikā II. 33. I am afraid, it does not fit well here after kārikā II. 32. Its right place seems to be after II. 30. Similarly in Book IV kārikās 38, 39, 40 and 41 appear to be 40, 38, 41 and 39 respectively, as is discussed in a foot-note on p. 146.

As regards IV. 77, it seems to me that between its two lines at least two more lines are lost, as will be seen from the discussion on p. 184, to which the reader is referred.

This consideration coupled with that of the variants that are supported by Ś in his commentary, as I have discussed in their places, shows that the original text of the ĀŚ of Gauḍapāda underwent some serious changes at least by the time of Ś, if not earlier.

§ 5. *Readings of the Text*

We may now speak here a few words with regard to the readings of the ĀŚ. The collation¹ of the MSS referred to above as well as of the different editions of the work has resulted in showing or suggesting true or better readings in many cases, which have mainly been discussed under the kārikās concerned, giving the grounds for the readings adopted. There are, however, other cases where I have not offered my reasons for selecting a particular reading, as they can easily be understood by the reader himself. Below will be found, for example, some notable readings that are chosen or suggested :

1. *dve tu* (I. 11^d) for *dvau tu*.
2. *saṃvṛlatvam na* (II. 4^d) for *saṃvṛlatvena*.
3. *'pi pratipadyate* (II. 7^d) for *vipratipadyate*. See IV. 32^b.
4. *'vyavasthitān* (II. 13^b) for *vyavasthitān*.
5. *nānyabhāvena* (II. 34^a) for *nālmabhāvena*
6. *sa-yathā* (III. 11^d) for *khaṇ yathā*.
7. *yad a°* (IV. 12^a) for *yady a°*. As we have *yadi* in ^b, it cannot again be expected in *a*; nor can it, in that case, be construed properly. Besides, the reading *yad a°* is actually found in V^e.
8. *'nādih* (IV. 23^a) for *'nādeḥ*, and *jātir^(d)* supported by PU¹ for *hy ādir*.
9. *samsāro nopalabhyate* (IV. 56^d) supported by A¹ and IO for *samsāram na prapadyate*.

For a detailed account see Appendix II, Variants, pp. 229-244.

10. *svabhāvena* (IV. 57^a) for *sadbhāvena*.
11. *saṃvṛtyā* (IV. 58^b) supported by V^u and Š for *jāyante*.
12. *paratantro 'bhi*^o (IV. 73^c) for *paratantrābhi*^o.
13. *paratantro 'bhi*^o (IV. 74^r) for *paratantrābhi*^o.
14. *dharmadhātūḥ svabhāvataḥ* (IV. 81^d) for *dharma dhātusva*^o.

§ 6. The Name of the Work

The present work popularly known as *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* (or ^o*kārikās*) or *Gaudapādakārikā* (or ^o*kārikās*) is traditionally called *Āgamaśāstra*. It is owing to this fact that the commentary on it by Š is called *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*.¹ Sometimes it is named also *Āgamagrantha* or *Upadeśagrantha* as some of the colophons show (p. 244), occasionally both of these names are used together (*loc. cit.*). It is also called or described as *Māṇḍūkyavārttika*,² or *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-gaudapādavyākhyāna*, or *Gaudapādiyakārikā*, or simply *Gaudapādiya* after its author, as is shown by some MSS. Again, sometimes it is referred to as *Māṇḍūkyasākhā*.³

¹ See the Colophons, pp. 231, 234, 236, 244.

² The word *vārttika* is not properly used here, as the present work has not the characteristics of a *vārttika*, for a *vārttika* is said to be a work which criticizes what is said, what is not said, and what is said wrongly in the original work, as says Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, GOS, No. I, 1916, II. p. 5: *uktānuktaduruktacintā vārttikam*.

³ Sāyaṇa on TA, VII. 1 (p. 483); VII. 2 (p. 570):

māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ !
iti māṇḍūkyasākhāyām śrutivākyam udāhṛtam ||

Here I. 17 of our text is referred to. For other two names see § 1, note 8, p. xxxv.

It may be noticed here that two MSS, D¹ and D², describe the work as *Vedāntamūla* ‘origin of the Vedānta’ which is very significant.

Now let us discuss as to why this book is called *Āgamaśāstra*. The word *āgama* among other things means ‘a traditional doctrine’ or ‘anything handed down and fixed by tradition’; and *śāstra* gives the sense in such cases as the present one, of ‘a religious or authoritative treatise.’¹ Thus the compound word, *Āgamaśāstra*, means a *śāstra* pertaining to *āgama*, i.e., authoritative treatise which deals with or is based on a traditional doctrine or doctrines. That the *Āgamaśāstra* is in fact of such character is fully borne out throughout the book itself, as the following few lines will show.

Besides the general meaning ‘to remember’ the root √smṛi figuratively means also ‘to hand down *memoriter*, declare,’ and so its past participle form *smṛita* is used in the sense of ‘handed down *memoriter*, or declared, mentioned,’ etc. Thus the sentence *śāstre smṛitam* means ‘it is handed down *memoriter* or declared in a scripture.’ And though the subject of the sentence is not expressed in this or similar cases, it is easily understood, it being a teacher or teachers or a similar person or

¹ For *āgama* see MV, pp. 268-9. For the Buddhist interpretation of the word *śāstra* one may be referred to MVST, p. 4 from which the following is quoted here:

yac chāsti ca kleśaripūn aśeṣān santrāyate durgatito bhayāc ca |
tac chāsanāt trāṇaguṇāc ca śāstram^o ||

It is quoted also in MV, p. 3. For a description of *śāstras* see Rājāśekhara, *Op. cit.*, II. For the significance and importance of the word *śāstra* (Tibetan *bstan.bcos*, Chinese *lun*) mark its use in Nāgārjuna’s fundamental work, *Madhyamakaśāstra*.

persons who may or may not have been mentioned before. Now with regard to our case the word *smṛta* is employed by our author not less than eleven times.⁵ This fact clearly shows that our author refers to or deals with some doctrine or doctrines handed down traditionally. This is clear also from his employment of the following phrases in the work :

1. *satām iti viniścayah* (I. 6); 2. *svapna āhur manīśinah* (II. 2); 3. *svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam* (II. 3); 4. *evam āhur manīśinah* (II. 5); 5. *dṛṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ* (II. 31); 6. *iti tattvavido viduh* (II. 34); 7. *°munibhir vedapāragaiḥ | nirvikalpo hy ayam dṛṣṭah prapañcopaśamo 'dvayah* || (II. 35); 8. *vādinah kecid* (II. 3); 9. *vivadanto 'dvayā* hy evam ajātim khyāpayanti te (IV. 4); 10. *khyāpyamānām ajātim taiḥ* (IV. 5); 11. *jātim icchanti vādinah* (IV. 6).⁶

§ 7. *The Author*

We have already seen,¹ as the great Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9, that the work was by an Ācārya ‘teacher’ to whom the tradition of the Vedānta was known. But the question

⁵ I. 1, 20, 26; II. 4. 7; III. 1; IV. 32, 46, 88, 90, 94.

⁶ Besides, the following words may be referred to here : 1. *anya* (I. 7); 2. *apara* (II. 26); 3. *āśramavid* (II. 27); 4. *kālacintaka* (I. 8); 5. *kālavid* (II. 24); 6. *guṇavid* (II. 20); 7. *cittavid* (II. 25); 8. (*dig-*) *vid* (II. 24); 9. *pādavid* (II. 21); 10. *prāṇavid* (II. 20); 11. *buddhivid* (II. 25); 12. (*bhūvana-*)*vid* (II. 24); 13. (*bhūta-*)*vid* (II. 20); 14. *bhokt̄ivid* (II. 22); (*bhojya-*)*vid* (II. 22); 15. *manovid* (II. 25); 16. *mūrtavid* (II. 23); 17. (*laya-*)*vid* (II. 28); 18. *lokavid* (II. 21); 19. *sūksmavid* (II. 23); 20. *sṛṣṭivid* (II. 28); 20. *sthitiivid* (II. 28).

¹ See *supra*, § I, notes 5 and 6, p. xxxiv.

is: who is that Ācārya? That he is Gauḍapāda² is well-known traditionally and found in the colophons of each of the four Books in MSS of the original and its commentary. He is sometimes called Gauḍapādācārya,³ Gauḍācārya,⁴ or simply Gauḍa.⁵ From this we may think that his real name is Gauḍa, the words -pāda, -pada, -carana, or -ācārya being added to it simply as honorific.⁶ That his actual name is Gauḍa is stated very clearly by Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (middle of the 17th century A.D.) in his SMV, p. 6, II. 9-12.

Now the question arises: Is the word Gauḍa his personal name or does it simply signify that he belongs to a country called Gauḍa?⁷ In Sureśvara's NSi, IV. 44, there are two words, *Gaudas* and *Drāvidas*, which refer to Gauḍapādācārya, the author of the present work and the great Śaṅkarācārya, the author of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, respectively, according

² Sometimes we have Gauḍapāda (JM, 10) and Gauḍacarana (SMV, p. 5, l. 23), most probably for metrical exigency.

³ Ś on ŚU, l. 8 (p. 30).

⁴ PD, II. 23; Sāyaṇa on TA, VII. 2 (p. 565).

⁵ NSi, IV. 44.

⁶ A Venkatasubbiah (IA, 1933, p. 193) is of the same opinion.

⁷ There is evidence to show that the country called *Gauḍadeśa* was once regarded as the land between 82° and 88° longitude and 25° and 28° latitude along with the adjacent districts of North Bengal (*Matsya P.*, XII. 30; *Kūrma P.*, Part I, 20.9; *Liṅga P.*, Part I, I. 65, 34; JASB, 1908, pp. 273 ff.). Recent researches show that the country is identical with North Bengal. See Haran Chandra Chakraborty: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 43 ff.

to the commentator, Jñānottama.⁸ It may be said that as Śāṅkara is referred to by a name related to his native country, Dravida (i.e., Kerala, the modern Malabar), and not by a personal name, so the case must have been the same with Gaudapāda; in other words, he, too, must have been alluded to by a name connected with his country which is Gauḍa. Otherwise, why should Suresvara mention him in a different way?

Walleseer (*op. cit.*, p. 3) is of opinion that by the two words of Suresvara, *Gaudas* and *Drāvidas*, we are to understand two Vedantic schools. If we are to know by the word *Drāvidas* a school founded by Śāṅkara in Malabar (the representative work of which is here said to be the *Upadeśasāhasrī*), we must take also the *Gaudas* as a native school established in North India in the land of Gaudas,⁹ which might have already been much advanced in culture. It is, however, immaterial, to my mind, to discuss as to whether the words actually refer to the two

⁸ It may be noticed here that in the second edition (*Bombay Sanskrit Series*, No. XXXVIII, 1906) of the NSi occurs the following line in Jñānottama's commentary on IV. 44: kevalānām api drāviḍatvaprasiddheḥ. Seeing this the editor, Colonel G. A. Jacob writes in his notes (p. 247): "Who are the *kevalas* referred to in the commentary?" The fact is that the word *kevala* is wrongly written, or read, or printed for *Kerala*, the ancient name of the country. The same mistake occurs also in the revised edition (1926) of the book, p. 193.

⁹ Walleseer thinks that the country might have been so named owing to much cultivation of sugar-cane (*gūḍa*). Cf. the word *pundra* for North Bengal, which also means 'sugar-cane' (of red variety).

representative teachers or to the two schools represented by them, both the interpretations being equally possible.

It may be pointed out here that merely the word *Gauḍa* cannot invariably refer to one who is an inhabitant of the Gaudadeśa. One may not actually be an inhabitant of it, yet, may be regarded as a *Gauḍa*. *A b h i n a n d a*, the author of the *Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra* or *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha*, though a Kashmirian, is called *Gauḍa*. Similarly *B r a h mān a n d a*, the well-known author of the *Laghucandrikā*, though not born in Gaudadeśa, has the epithet *Gauḍa*, probably as he was educated in Gaudadeśa, Bengal, being, as is said, a fellow student of *Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya*. One who has any connexion, past, present, or future, in respect of oneself or one's ancestors, with the Gaudadeśa may be a *Gauḍa*. On this one may be referred to MD, I. 3. 23 with Śabaravāmin's commentary in which it is said that a man who has set out for the city of Mathurā is regarded as a Māthura; similarly one who lives in the city of Mathurā, or one who has come out from the city of Mathurā is also called a Māthura.¹⁰

With regard to our author we should remember here the views of *Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī* already once referred to. He writes (SMB, p. 6, ll. 9-12): There was in the country of Kurukṣetra a river

¹⁰ mathurāyām abhiprasthito māthura iti. mathurāyām vasan mathurāyā nirgataś ca.

called Hirarāvatī.¹¹ On its banks there were some Gauda people, the pre-eminent of whom was our author, and as he was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his special name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the general one.¹²

Let us notice here the observations made by Waller (op. cit., pp. 6 ff.). He thinks there was none named Gaudapāda who is believed to have been the author of the present work. By the word *Gauda-pādas* we are to understand the four Books (*prakaraṇas*) of the work and *Gaudapādīyakārikā* is the name for the whole work, as found in MSS. This last title seems to be somewhat artificial and it can be guessed that the work was commonly known as *Gaudapādī* in the same way as the provincial expression *Bhadracarī* for *Bhadracaryā*. In fact both the titles *Gaudapādī* and *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa* have been shown by G. F. Hall in one of his contributions.¹³ Waller says further that the quotations from later works correspond to his opinion that no teacher known as Gaudapāda was the author of the book, but it

¹¹ It remains to be identified. It is doubtful if the name is correctly written by the scribe of the MS or read or edited accurately by the editors.

¹² gaudacaraṇāḥ kurukṣetra deśa gata-hirarāvatī-nadītirabhava gaudajātiśreṣṭhāḥ deśa viśeṣa bhava jāti nāma naiva prasiddhāḥ, dvāparayugam ārabhya iava samādhiniśhatvenādhunika janair aparijñātaviśeṣa bhi dhānāḥ sāmānyanāma naiva lokavikhyātāḥ.

¹³ Such practice is still very common in the country; e.g., *Vidyāsāgarī*, a ṭīkā by Ānanda pūrṇa Vidyāsāgara on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakāhādyā*; *Rāmabhadrī*, a ṭīkā on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* by Rāmabhadra; so are *Dinakarī*, *Rāmarudrī*, etc. etc.

existed among the contemporary people as a fundamental work of a school and not as a production of a definite author. He shows from the Tibetan sources¹⁴ that though the work was known to the Buddhist authors as a *Vedāntasāstra* in which the doctrines of the school are explained, nothing is known there of Gauḍapāda who is supposed to have composed it. Śaṅkara in his *Sārīrakabhāṣya* quotes twice, as shown above, from the work referring to our author (or authors) as those to whom was known the tradition of the Vedānta (*vedāntārthaśampradāyavid* or simply *sampradāyavid*). The commentator, Govindānanda in his *Ratnaprabhā* and Ānandagiri in his *Nyāyanirṇaya* introduce the above opinion of Śaṅkara as the 'approval of the old' (*vṛddhasammati*, BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9). Suresvara has quoted two kārikās (NSi, IV. 41, 42; our text I. 11 and 15 respectively) mentioning their author as Gaudas (*gaudaiḥ*),¹⁵ while he takes Śaṅkara as the representative of the Drāviḍa tradition. In the commentary on the NSi Jñānottara describes the quoted passages as *gauḍapādiya-vākyā*. We have already seen in the PD (II. 28) the *Gauḍa* teaching, but the commentator, Rāmākṛṣṇa, does not know

¹⁴ That is, the Tibetan translations of Śāntirakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṅkārakārikā* together with its commentary by Kamalasīla, as well as of Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and its commentary *Tarkajvālā* by himself. *Vide infra.*

¹⁵ It is, however, not true that Suresvara never mentions the name *Gauḍapāda*, for he uses it at least once in his BBV, IV. 4. 886 (p. 1866). In the same work he has also used the words *gauḍapādiya vacas* (I. 4. 389, p. 510) and *gauḍācārya* (II. 1. 386, p. 951).

the author, he describes the passage quoted as *ācārya-*¹⁶ *sammati*. Sādānanda quotes in his VeS, § 33, two kārikās, III. 44, 45, referring as *tad uktam*, and Nṛsiṁha Sarasvatī, the commentator, does not name their author simply alluding to them as *vṛddhasammati* ‘the opinion of the old.’ Rāmātīrtha, another commentator, says that it is a contemporary opinion. Again, if we examine Kāśmiraka Yati, the author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* (p. 277) we find no evidence that the *Gaudapādakārikā* was known to him as a work of a single author. Vijñānabhikṣu has quoted kārikās (II. 32, III. 5, 26) from the work in his *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, (I. 45, 47; 153; VI. 50). But there is nothing to show that Gaudapāda was taken to be their author. Wallese thus says that not a single passage¹⁷ can be quoted from all these texts which can make us believe that *Gaudapādī* had Gaudapāda as its author. We are told that Śaṅkara received instruction from Govinda who was a disciple of Gaudapāda with whom the former had a conversation and he had another conversation with Vyāsa himself. The same sort of contradiction is found also with regard to the residence of Govinda; one source gives it as the banks of the Narmadā and the other the Himālayas. This sort of things does not give us a historical clue.

¹⁶ Not *vṛddha-*, as writes Wallese.

¹⁷ Excepting, as he himself has pointed out, one passage from Ś's commentary on the SU, I. 8, where the following line occurs: *tathā ca śukaśiṣyo gaudapādācāryah*. But that the commentary is not by the great Ś is the view not only of Wallese but also of others including the present author.

Walleiser thus finally observes that the whole tradition is fabulous, and with this the last of the arguments in favour of the authorship of *Gaudapādi* by a certain *Gaudapāda* vanishes. And as one could not explain the word *Gaudapādi* one imagined a fictitious *Gaudapāda*. Now he adds that for the history of Vedānta we can gather from the preceding discussion that in a time considerably before the activities of Śaṅkara there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century. This school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and Upaniṣads in the form of a *śāstra*, i.e., a school doctrine and embodied it in a collection of sayings (*Spruchsummlung*) consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gaudapādakārikā*. Already in the time of Śaṅkara this text, the only older Vedānta text which has been preserved and perhaps the only one which was ever produced, enjoys high consideration quite independently of legendary traditions which connect Śaṅkara with Govinda and Śuka with *Gaudapāda*. The existence of the North Indian school at the beginning of the century preceding Śaṅkara seems well-established.

We are, however, to consider here the following without entering into a hair-splitting discussion. There is a text before us known as the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Gaudapādakārikā*, or passing under any other similar name; and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The

work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself, and not as his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet, it represents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one Gauḍa. When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible? Thus, as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is Gauḍa, or with the honorific word -*pāda* or *ācārya* added to it Gauḍapāda, or Gauḍācārya.

Much could be known of any author from the old records on which naturally one inclines to depend for ascertaining the truth. But they are so fantastic and self contradictory in the present case that it is almost impossible to find out the truth from them.¹⁸ These

¹⁸ On their unreliability observes S. K. Pelvalkar in his *Vedānta Philosophy*, Poona, 1929, pp. 231-232: "while all the other so-called Prācīna, Brāhmaṇa, or Keraliya Śaṅkaravijayas are prejudiced in favour of one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost shameless tampering of traditions and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the score of falsification of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other. When such is the case of the avowed followers of the School, it need hardly be wondered at if the pronounced opponents belonging to the Mādhyādhiṣṭhāna and the Rāmānujiya Schools have gone one better, and indulged in a merciless throwing of mud in the hope that some of it might stick."

records are the accounts of the life of the great Śaṅkara and those who were connected with him in some way or other.¹⁹ Readers desirous of knowing these legendary accounts of Gauḍapāda are referred to those works themselves which are to be used very cautiously.

§ 8. *The Date of Gaudapāda*

Now let us discuss the date of our author, and in doing so we shall begin from one of the old accounts of the school already referred to, viz., JM, in which Gauḍapāda is mentioned as having some connexion with a few Greeks. It is said there (10)¹ that the feet of Gauḍapāda were adored by Ayārcya, and he was the preceptor of such Niṣāka mystics as Apalūnya. Here Ātmabodhendra, the commentator, adds something on the authority of such works as *Gaudapādollsāsa* of Harimisra, and *Patañjalivijaya* (=°carita? of Rāmabhadra Dikṣita). He writes that when Gauḍapāda on a peak of the Himālayas was seeking after the truth of the self under the guidance

¹⁹ Gopinath Kavirāj singles out the following books in his learned Introduction (in Hindi) to the *Brahmasūtras* published from the Acyuta Press, Benares, 1936, pp. 26 ff.: (1) *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhabācārya (not of Vidyāranya), (2) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Ānandagiri, (3) *Śaṅkarābhuyudaya* of Rājacūḍāmani, (4) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Cidvilāsa, (5) *Śaṅkaravijaya* of Sadānanda, (6) *Puṇyaślokamāñjarī* of Sarvajña Sadāśivabodha, (7) *Puṇyaślokamāñjarī-pariśiṣṭa* of Ātmabodha, (8) *Gururatnamālā* of Sadāśivabrahmendra. Its Ṭīkā, *Suṣumā*, by Ātmabodhendra is a good one.

¹ abhiyujad-ayārcya-pūjyapādān apalūnyādiniṣākāsiddhanetin |
atha gauḍapadān phaṇḍabhaṣya-pratihemācāryakaparṇitān prapadye |

of Śuka,² it was through his influence that the wrong Buddhistic views (*śauḍdhodani-kadadhvanām*) of the persons headed by Ayārcya who was being attended by such Yogins belonging to the Western border of the country as Apalūnya and Damīśa (*apalūniyā-damīśādyaparāntyayogibhiś ca*), as well as by Pravṛti, the Śākyā chief of Taxila (*takṣaśilādhīśa-śākyapravṛti-pramukhāih*), were made to disappear.

If here one turns over the pages of *The Indian Travels of Apollonius of Tyana* by Osmond de Beauvoir Priaulx, JRAS, 1860, pp. 70 ff., one will easily see that Apalūnya in the Sanskrit text is no other than the Pythagorian philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, who flourished in the first century A.D. He travelled to India and came to the court of Phraotes who was the same as Pravṛti in the Sanskrit text, the king of Taxila. And Damīśa of our text is indentical with Damis,

² In connection with Gaudapāda's *tapasyā* in the Himālayas the following story may be related here from Nārāyaṇa's ṭikā on MāU: The four parts of the MāU of the recension of the RV (yet, note that the Upaniṣad is said to belong to the AV) were explained by Gaudapāda by his four Books (*prakaraṇas*). He was a disciple of Śuka and the grand preceptor of Ś. He flourished at the end of the age called *Dvāpara*. At the hermitage of Badaikā by his devotion he propitiated Nārāyaṇa and having obtained a boon from him he entered into a cave of a mountain, so that he would not look at the face of any one born in the age of *Kali*. In this state he was approached by Ś and requested to come out from the cave, but he did not comply with the request. Yet, having written the four Books of his work on the leaves of a Banyan tree with red chalk he gave them to Ś. *Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India* by E. Hultzsch, No. III, p. 133. But there is no end of such legends on which one can hardly rely.

the fellow traveller and friend of Apollonius. The last person in our text, Ayārcya, is the same and one with Iarchas (probably a corruption from Rac'hyas, *op. cit.*, p. 83, note), a Greek king.³

All this looks well, but do you gain anything from it about the date in question? The Greek account simply relates the travel of Apollonius,⁴ being completely silent about Gaudapādā. There is no doubt that some names of both the accounts are identical, but it does not follow from it that the persons having the same names are also identical. Supposing that the account is true it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great S, into which we do not enter here as useless.

Hence without having recourse to such legendary records for the determination of the date of our teacher

³ Perhaps it is M. Hiriyanna (IHQ, 1926, pp. 415-416) who has first made the identification. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴ How far this account is true it is not easy to say, Priaulx, the author of the paper observes (*Op. cit.*, p. 104): "of Damis's geography, I can only say that it reminds me of a fairy tale. ... Who shall explain these discrepancies, account for these mistakes and fix localities thus vaguely described?" "Reviewing the whole work of Philostratus (*i.e.*, the original author of the life of Apollonius) it seems to me that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through and made some stay in India, but that very possibly he did not visit it, our Damis never accompanied him; but if we may judge from cinnamon and pepper-trees ... fabricated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at the great mart for Indian commodities, and resort for Indian merchants—Alexandria."

we should take a safer course by which at least the upper and lower limits of his time can be ascertained.

I think we have no reason for discarding what Waller has said in this respect. So far three Buddhist writers are known to us, who have actually quoted *Gaudapāda*, viz., *Bhāvaviveka* (cir. 500-550 A.D.),⁵ *Sāntirakṣita* (705-762 A.D.) and his disciple *Kamalaśīla*. *Bhāvaviveka* is the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* as well as of its commentary *Tarkajvālā*, the full title being *Madhyamakahṛdayavṛtti Tarkajvālā*. In chapter VIII of his work *Bhāvaviveka* reviews the system of the Vedāntins as he does in other chapters the systems of *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Mimāṃsā*. In doing so *Bhāvaviveka* in his TJ, VIII has quoted passages from such texts as ChU, ŚU and MuU. Besides, there are some other passages quoted, four of them (10-13) being very important in the present connexion. While the first three have the closest relationship with three kārikās of our text the last (i.e. TJ, VIII, 13) is entirely identical with III. 5 of ou-

⁵ Or *Bhavya*, as he is sometimes called, or *Bhavyaviveka* as suggested from the Tibetan sources ('legs.l丹.ḥbyed). *Bhāvaviveka* was the founder of the *Prasāṅgika* school of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika system. He is much criticised by *Candrakīrti* in his MV, *Bhāvaviveka*'s *Prajñāpradipasāstra* (Nanjio, No. 1185) was translated into Chinese by Prabhākara Mitra in 630-632 A.D. He was junior contemporary of Dharmapāla (Th. Watter: *On Yü Chwang's Travels in India*, II. p. 222) who lived in the 5th century A.D. (Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature*, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. I, p. 362). Thus it can be said that the date of *Bhāvaviveka* is 500 A.D. or a few years after it.

text. There is, therefore, not an iota of doubt here that the GK was known to Bhāvaviveka. With reference to the other three kārikās cited by Bhāvaviveka, which are not identified in the GK, but have the closest relationship, we have to seek after another source.

As regards Śāntirakṣita he is the author among others of the *Madhyamakālaṅkarakārikā* as well as of its commentary called *Madhyamakālaṅkārvṛtti*. Besides, his disciple Kamalaśīla has written a *Pañjikā* on the former work just as on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Śāntirakṣita in his MAK, 93, discusses the views of the Aupaniṣadas (lit. Aupaniṣadānusārins, Tib. gsaiṅ.ba.paḥi.rjes.su.hbraṅ.ba.dag),⁶ and in doing so he cites there not less than ten kārikās from our text which is referred to by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upaniṣat sāstra*.⁷

Now as we have seen above we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the GK before Bhāvaviveka who has actually quoted it. Thus one may ascertain that the time of Gaudapāda is *cir.* 500 A.D.

The following consideration, too, leads us to the same decision. Gaudapāda has quoted almost fully, partially or substantially from works of some

⁶ Generally in Buddhist texts we come across similar words, as *Aupaniṣadika* (TSP, Sl. 328), and *Upaniṣad-vādin* (BAP, pp. 455, 465), and not *Vedāntavādin* or *Vaidāntika*.

⁷ It may be noted that though Śāntirakṣita has quoted here so many kārikās from GK he has not done so at all in TS (Sls. 328-335) either from this or any other work. For the kārikās quoted in Tibetan works see our text II. 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20; III. 4, 5, 6, 8.

celebrated Buddhist teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D. For instance, see our text, IV. 22^{a-b}:

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate |
And read here Nāgārjuna's (200 A.D.) MK,
XXI. 13^{a-b}:

na svato jāyate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate |
See our text, pp. 105 ff. and 127 ff. Again, we read
in our ĀŚ, 7^{c-d} and 29^{c-d}:

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhavisyati ||
And in MK, XV. 8^{c-d} we have:

prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate ||
The following line occurs in ĀŚ, IV. 4^b:

abhūtam naiva jāyate |

And let us cite here the following from the CS, 373^a of Nāgārjuna's disciple Āryadeva who probably lived, in the words of Winteritz (*A History of Indian Literature*, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 350), "at about the turning point of the second and third century A.D.":

nābhūto nāma jāyate ||

See our text III. 44 (pp. 77-78):

laye sambodhayec cittam vikṣiptam śamayet punah |
sakaśayam vijāniyāc chamaprāptam na cālayet ||

With this read the following from MAS, XIV. 9^{c-d}—10^{a-b} of Maitreyanātha or Asaṅga (400 A.D.):

linam cittasya gṛhṇiyād uddhatam śamayet punah |
śamaprāptam upekṣeta tasminn ālambane punah ||

Thus Gauḍapāda quoting the above teachers can in no way be placed before them, in other words he cannot be assigned a date before 400 A.D.

Here we are to consider another kārikā of our author, i.e., IV. 13 which runs thus (see pp. 114-115) :

jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate |

Compare this with the following line quoted in MV, p. 13 from the AKV :

utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām ana-vasthāprasaṅgah.

Now this work, AKV, is by Yaśomitra. Before he wrote his own commentary on the AK of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) there were at least three commentaries, two of them being written by Guṇamati (425 A.D.) and Vasumitra, as he himself says in the introductory slokas of his work. This shows that Yaśomitra lived in the 5th century A.D. And so, if Gauḍapāda's kārika (i.e., IV. 13) is in fact based on the above line of the AKV his date naturally falls in the 5th century A.D.

Certainly this will militate against the traditional time of Śaṅkara or the succession of teachers and disciples of his school. But how far the accounts of this succession can be relied upon is a question which has not yet been settled finally or satisfactorily. Are not the traditional succession lists kept in different Maṭhas unscrupulously manipulated? Under these circumstances we have no course left to us other than the evidences of

quotations and cross-references in early and reliable texts.⁸

Let us discuss the question from a different point of view. There is a work *Paramārthasāra*⁹ attributed to Śeṣa who is apparently the mythical Śeṣa, as he is referred to in the work itself as *ādhāra* (8), i.e., *jagad-ādhāra* (87). From this some take him as Patañjali, the less mythical Śeṣa, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini.

It is also called *Āryāpañcāśiti* owing to the fact that it is composed in eighty-five stanzas in the *Āryā* metre, though in fact there are eighty-seven stanzas.¹⁰

⁸ Our old traditions are so divergent that according to them as well as the modern researches we shall have to place Śāṅkara some time between the 6th century B.C. and the 9th century A.D., viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., 1st century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D., and the 9th century (788-820) A.D. The last date is now accepted by many a scholar. See Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 23 ff; Belvalkar, op. cit., pp. 209 ff.

⁹ There are so far at least five editions of this book, the latest and critical one being by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrī (Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes), Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay, 1941.

¹⁰ It may be that the first two stanzas which are not in *Āryā*, but *Upajāti*, were added later on. But, if it is so, as regards the first of them, it was added long before Abhinavagupta who has adopted it just at the beginning of his PS², l. The last stanza (87: vedānta⁹) does not also appear to constitute the original, being added by a second hand, as is suggested by Suryanarayana Sastrī, op. cit., p. 40, note. Mark here the employment of the perfect tense, in the word *babandha*. The original number, 85, can however, be obtained by reckoning an additional stanza between 18 and 19 given from a MS in a foot-note in the Trivandrum edition (PS) being fully supported by PS², 9 (and not 6 as in PS³).

It is a Vedāntic work.¹¹ Its excellence and importance can be understood by the simple fact that Abhinavagupta (in the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A.D.), the great teacher of the *Pratyabhijñā* school and Poetics, adapted it,¹² though retaining the original title, for writing a manual of the *Pratyabhijñā* school, by some omissions, additions, alterations and improvements.¹³ That it is an adaptation of the first work is known from the statement of Abhinavagupta himself.¹⁴

In this work of Sesha there are some passages, or words, or thoughts that supply certain points of resemblance to those of our ĀŚ. In order to see if this fact can throw any light on the question of the time of Gaudapāda we should like to discuss it in the following few lines.

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (*op. cit.*, p. viii) has noticed some of these points of resemblance¹⁵

¹¹ The last stanza (87) of it says that it was composed by its author having looked through the entire *Vedānta-sāstra*.

¹² V. V. Sovani: JRAS, 1912, pp. 257 ff; K. C. Pandey: *Abhinavagupta*, 1935, pp. 57 ff; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri: NIA, Vol. I, pp. 37 ff.

¹³ For instance compare PS¹, 35 and 36 with PS², 36 and 37 respectively. Abhinavagupta's work contains 105 kārikās, though he himself states that it has 100 kārikās. On this see K. C. Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁴ See PS², 1 and 2. Iyengar's observation (JRAS, 1910, p. 1338) does not appear to be reasonable.

¹⁵ For easy reference I write below the kārikās of PS¹ mentioning the numbers of the corresponding kārikās of the GK:

(a) prāṇādyanantabhedair ātmānam saṃvitatya jālam iva |
saṃharati vāsudevaḥ svavibhūtyākṛīḍamāna iva || PS¹, 30.

cf. GK, II, 19.

and writes (p. ix) after discussing them as follows : “ It seems plausible that Gauḍapāda was drawing on some earlier sources, agreeing in part, while rejecting in part, and that the rejection was not consistent or thorough. Such a hypothesis may well consider the *Paramārthasāra* the original drawn upon.” There is not the least doubt that Gauḍapāda has drawn much upon earlier works, as it is perfectly clear throughout his book,¹⁶ but can Śeṣa’s PS¹ be included in them, though it may appear to be so?

In order to avoid prolixity I propose to discuss only two points raised by Suryanarayana Sastri

- (b) tribhir eva viśvataijasaprājñais tair ādimadhyānidhanākhyaiḥ |
jāgratsvapnusuuptair bhramabutaiś chāditam turyam || PS¹, 31.
cf. GK, I. 1-5; MāU, 3-7 (pp. 223-234).
- (c) mohayatīvātmānam svamāyayā dvitarūpayā devaḥ |
upalabhatे svayam evam̄ guhāgataṁ puruṣam ātmānam || PS¹, 32.
cf. GK, II. 12.
- (d) jaladharadhūmodgatibhir malinikriyate yathā na gaganatalam |
tadvat prakṛitivikārair aparāmīṣṭaḥ parah puruṣaḥ || PS¹, 35.
cf. GK, III. 8.
- (e) ekasmīnn api ca ghaṭe dhūmādimalāvṛte śeṣaḥ |
na bhavanti malopetā yadvaj jīvo ‘pi tadvad iha || PS¹, 36.
cf. GK, III. 5.
- (f) himaphenabudbudā iva jalasya dbūmo yathā vahneḥ |
tadvat svabhāvabhūta māyaisā kathitā visṇoḥ || PS¹, 53
cf. GK, I. 9.
- (g) yad yat siddhāntāgamatarkesu prabruvanti rāgāndhāḥ |
anumodāmas tat tat teśām̄ sarvātmavādadhiyā || PS¹, 65.
cf. GK, IV. 5.
- (h) utpattināśavarjitam evam̄ paramārthām upalabhyā |
kṛtakṛtyaḥ saphala janmā sarvagatis tiṣṭhati yathestam || PS¹, 79.
cf. GK, III. 32.

¹⁶ For this the reader is referred to my Annotation of the ĀŚ, and the notes added thereto.

in the hope that this may decide the case. He writes : “Both are concerned with the three forms—Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña—as veiling the fourth which is the real.”¹⁷ This refers, as he says, to PS¹, 31 and GK, I. 1 and 11.

The most important thing to be pointed out here first is that between the two texts, ĀŚ and PS¹, the latter is certainly a later development, as a perusal of the texts will show. Let us, however, make an attempt to understand PS¹, 31 as it is before us without taking any help either from the commentator or from Abhinavagupta.¹⁸ The word *jāgrat-svapna-suṣupta* is an adjective of *viśvataijasaprājña*. But what is to be understood from the abrupt statement that Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *suṣupta* respectively? What are these three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña? How can one know them? How is one to understand that there is only one and the same who is regarded as three (i.e., Viśva, etc.) owing to three different stages (i.e., *jāgrat*, etc.)? How is it that *turya* undoubtedly referring to *Vāsudeva* in the preceding kārikā (30) is put in the neuter gender,

¹⁷ Is the last part of this statement exactly so? Do *chādīta* in PS¹, 31 (=āvṛta in P², 34) and -*baddha* in *kāryakāraṇabaddha* and *kāraṇabaddha* in GK, I. 11 convey the same idea? We are to consider here GK, I. 15 and NSI (IV. 41, 42) where these two kārikās of Gauḍapāda are quoted.

¹⁸ He has here the following two kārikās (PS², 34 and 35) :

śrīśiḥthitisaṁphārā jāgratsvapnau suṣuptam iti tasmin |
bhānti turiye dhāmanī tathāpi tair āyatām bhāti ||

(In the first half of this kārikā in PS² quoted in foot-note 2- *svapnam* is to be read as -*svapnau*.)

jāgrad viśvam bhedāt svapnas tejah prakāśamāhātmyāt |
prājñātātāvasthā jñānaghanatvāt tatah param turyam ||

while the latter word is in the masculine?¹⁹ Moreover, what is the significance of *taiḥ* in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with *chādita* in the second half? Again, why is it that *eva* should be used in the first half after *tribhir*? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that Śeṣa's work presupposes that of Gauḍapāda, and not *vice versa*. Śeṣa had before him ĀŚ, I. 1-5 (as well as MāU, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (*ādimadhyanidhana*) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in ĀŚ there are five kārikās, Śeṣa has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing PS¹ and PS² with the GK here it appears to me that as Śeṣa could not express himself adequately and consequently his kārikā became obscure. Abhinavagupta added here one kārikā more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidation.

Now, what is the source or sources of Abhinava's interpretation here (kārikās 34, 35), without which we cannot understand the kārikā of Śeṣa? Certainly it was not only Gauḍapāda, for such things as

¹⁹ Abhinava is quite justified in putting *turya* in the neuter gender as he has before it (kārikā 34) *dhāman*, neuter, which is referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from GK, I. 5, 22.

sṛṣṭiśūktaśāṁhāra cannot be known from his work. One is therefore inclined to say with some amount of certainty that it was partly the work of Śeṣa, and partly the tradition connected with him, though under the present state of our knowledge we do not know if this tradition is recorded anywhere. Nevertheless, we have to accept its existence, as we cannot explain the difficulties without it. The question arises here as to how Abhinava came to know that tradition. Does it not persuade one to think that the distance of time between Śeṣa and Abhinava is not as wide as it is supposed to have been? What is there against thinking that PS¹ and PS² belonged to the same period, though the former must have evidently been a little earlier? In this case the question of the interpretation of the present kārikā of Śeṣa given by Abhinava can very satisfactorily be explained. What is there that can be offered for pushing back the date of PS¹ to a period before GK?

Again, with reference to the creation of the world Śeṣa in his work which deals with the Vedānta has effected a synthesis of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems by the introduction of the creation from Upendra (=Viṣṇu = Vāsudeva = Hari = Nārāyaṇa-Paramātman = Brahman) through *prakṛti* with the gradual evolution from it of *buddhi* (= *mahat*), etc. In the process of the creation he has accommodated also the theory of *anda* ‘cosmic germ,’ found, as for instance, in the *Manusamhitā*, I. 8 ff. and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. 2. 58 ff. Here we are to note what Kulluka observes on *Manusamhitā*, I. 8 :

abhidhyānapūrvikām sṛṣṭim vadato manoh prakṛitir acetanā 'svatantrā pariṇamata ity ayam pakṣo na sammataḥ. kintu tridañdivedāntasiddhānta evābhimataḥ pratibhāti.

It is further elucidated by him in another place (I. 15) :

nanv abhidhyānapūrvakasṛṣṭyabhidhānād vedāntasiddhānta eva manor abhimata iti prāg uktam, tan na saṅgacchate. idānīm mahadādikramena sṛṣṭyabhidhānād vedāntadarśanena ca paramātmana evākāśādikramena sṛṣṭir uktā.²⁰ ucyate. prakṛito mahadādikramena sṛṣṭir iti bhagavadbhāskariyadarśane 'py upapadyata iti tadvido vadanti.²⁰

Now B hāskara is one of the post-Śaṅkara commentators of the BS. Undoubtedly he was in the ninth century A.D. being criticised by Vācaspati Miśra (841 A.D.) in his *Bhāmatī* (BS, III. 3. 29). Śeṣa seems therefore to have been well acquainted with the Vedantic system maintained by B hāskara and has then combined his theory with that of Mānu and others according to whom in the process of creation there intervenes the theory of *aṇḍa*.

I do not therefore think that I can concur with Suryanarayana Sastrī in suggesting that “the *Paramārthasāra* is the original drawn upon.” (p. ix).

²⁰ See B hāskara's commentary on the BS (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1914), II. I. 26: tataś ca brahmaṇah pariṇāmānupapatteḥ pradhānam eṣṭavyam iti tātparyārthaḥ. Udayana observes in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 332: brahmapariṇātē iti bhāskaragotre yujyate.

In passing we are to take up another question in this connexion. B. L. Atreya having noticed "much common between *Kārikās* (i.e., GK) and *Yogavāsiṣṭha* not only in thought, but also in language"²¹ concludes that the latter is prior on the following three grounds: (1) The *kārikās* do not form "an independent treatise on the *Advaita Philosophy*," being "a sort of commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*." (2) "On the other hand, the philosopher Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from the cosmic mind (Brahmā) and to have realised their truth in his own experience. The philosophy of Vasiṣṭha includes almost all the views held by Gaudapāda." And (3) "*Gauḍapāda-kārikās* represent a later phase of the *Advaita* philosophy, when it tended to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought, whereas *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* represents the earlier phase."

As the space at my disposal does not allow me here to enter into a detailed discussion I desire simply to make a few observations as briefly as I can. I do not see that I can follow the above arguments. For, supposing that the GK is a sort of commentary and Vasiṣṭha received his doctrines directly from Brahmā, are we in any way justified in thinking that the YV is prior to the GK? Does it follow from that? As regards the third argument of Atreya he thinks that the Advaita philosophy as represented in the GK is of a later phase, because it is "critical,

²¹ *Yogavāsiṣṭha and its Philosophy*, 1932, pp. 14-15.

hostile and polemical towards other " systems. But may one ask here: Is there anything in the GK that may be regarded as " critical, hostile and polemical?" If so, what and where is it so? On the contrary, one may find there (GK, III. 17; IV. 3-6) clear non-hostility (*avirodha*), and there is no instance of anything that is critical and polemical. If, however, the mention of different views in the GK is meant thereby, the case is the same also with the YV.²²

It is not always safe to conclude the priority or posteriority of one of two works simply seeing the same or similar passage, or thought, occurring in both of them. For instance, we read the following in the GK, II. 6²³ and IV. 31:

ādāv ante ca yān nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā |

The same line occurs also in the YV, IV. 45. 45 and a similar one in III. 11. 13, as quoted in our text, p. 142, note 3. Now, apart from the question of the date of the GK, can we determine with any amount of certainty the priority or posteriority of one of the two works unless we take into consideration the other factors that are connected herewith? One may be referred here to the present Annotation on GK, IV. 31, and it will be found that the same thought only in slightly different words is expressed in such works as MK and ĀS, which are undisputedly far earlier than YV. Now, if we see that Gaudapāda has abundantly drawn upon

²² For instance, see III. 62. 10-11; 84. 22-27 (vivadante hy asambuddhāḥ svavikalpavijñimbhitaiḥ).

²³ A t r e y a has noticed it.

such earlier works can we ever think in this or similar cases that he has borrowed from YV, unless there is any strong ground for doing so? When there are two texts containing the same thing, one earlier and the other later, one may quote from either of them; but to decide definitely as to from which one it is actually done one should discuss carefully.

Another instance of what is common to both GK and YV, as noted by Atreya, is the non-difference between the states of wakefulness and dream (*jāgrat* and *susupta*), as found in GK, II. 5 and YV, IV. 9. 11 ff. Here, too, when we see that the first half of the GK clearly refers to the BU, IV. 3-14 (see p. 19), upon which, just as upon other Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda draws so much, as is evident from the work itself,²⁴ how can we think that YV is here the source of GK? On the contrary, a careful perusal of YV will at once show that in his answer to the question put to him by Rāma about the difference between wakefulness and dream Vasiṣṭha has written a number of ślokas (YV, IV. 19. 9 ff), and attempted thereby only to explain what is very briefly stated in GK. Does this fact point to the priority or posteriority of YV to GK?²⁵

²⁴ See next section.

²⁵ According to Atreya the date of YV is the sixth century A.D. But his arguments do not appear to me to be strong or convincing. It may be noted here in this connection that there are two things that may specially be mentioned in Śvāmī Bhūmānanda's paper entitled *Priority of the Yogavasiṣṭha to Śaṅkarācarya*: (1) Śaṅkara quotes (BS, III. 4. 50; the *Vasiṣṭhadharmaśāstra* (ed. A. A. Führer, Bombay, 1883), X. 18;

§ 10. *The Works of Gaudapāda*

With regard to the works ascribed to Gauḍapāda the only one that can be accepted with certainty as written by him is the ĀŚ. The authorship of a few other books is ascribed to him. The most important of them is a *bhāṣya* on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. There is a *bhāṣya* under his name also on the *Uttaragītā*. But there is no strong ground for holding that they are actually by Gauḍapāda, the author of the ĀŚ, nor is there anything of the nature that can decide the case otherwise, though I incline to subscribe to the view that they are not by Gauḍapāda. A commentary, too, on the NUTU is attributed to him. There are three other works which pass under the name of Gauḍapāda as their author. A commentary on the *Durgāsaptāśatī* is one of them. This is referred to by the great Tantric teacher Bhaṭṭakararāya in his commentary on the same

and (2) mentions the name of Vasiṣṭha in his commentary on the BG, XIII. 4. But the question whether these two Vasiṣṭhas, the Vasiṣṭha of YV as well as the Vasiṣṭha in the list of the teachers of the Śaṅkara school are identical, remains to be settled, though according to some of the authors of the tīkās on BG, the Vasiṣṭha referred to by Śaṅkara is the author of YV.

¹ There is a manuscript, No. 1405, of this work in the Grantha character in the Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan. The following occurs there on folio 24a:

kavacam bijam ādiṣṭam argalā śaktir iṣyate |
kilakam kilakam prāhuh saptasatyām mahāmanoh ||

iti gauḍapādādhṛtavacaṇāt.

And again: yādy api vedāntamūrdhanyair gauḍapādācāryaiḥ sarvam idam
nirviśeṣacitpratipādakaśāstraratvena vyākhyātam.^o

work.¹ The other two are Tantric treatises, viz., *Subhagodaya*² and *Śrividyaṛalnasūtra*.

Here arises a question: Can we think that there are two *Gaudapādas*, one Vedāntic and the other Tantric, being the authors of works on the Vedānta and Tantricism respectively? In the *Śrividyaṛṇava* which is a Tantric work by Pragalbhācārya, Śaṅkarācārya is said to have been the founder of a Tantric school. There is in this work also a list of the succession of his teachers and disciples. But it seems impossible to reconcile this list with the traditional one of the Advaita Vedānta school. So the list in the *Śrividyaṛṇava* hardly helps us in this matter. Nevertheless, we may simply note in the list given here that there are two *Gaudapādas*, one of them being mentioned as *Gauda* (No. 55) and the other *Gaudapādaka* (No. 65),³ who is, in fact, the same as *Gaudapāda*, the suffix *-ka* being evidently on account of the metrical exigency. On this the reader may form his own judgment.

§ 11. The Sources

The sources of the *Āgamaśāstra*, which one naturally desires to know, roughly fall into three classes, viz.,

² It is said that there is a *bhāṣya* on it by Śaṅkara.

³ In the verse containing the word as quoted by Rājendranātha Ghosha in his *Advaitavāda* (in Bengali), p. 227, the actual reading is *Gaudapādakah*. But Gopinath Kaviraj (op. cit., p. 53), who has not quoted the verse, reads only *Gaudapāda* leaving out the suffix *-ka* which seems to be right.

(1) Vedic texts : Vedas and Upaniṣads, (2) Schools or Teachers, and (3) Buddhist works.

With regard to class (1), these are mostly Upaniṣads, Vedas being quoted in not more than two cases (III. 24b and c). It is, however, to be noted in this connexion that when there is a passage which occurs both in a Veda and in an Upaniṣad it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter. For instance, here in III. 24b we have *indro māyābhīr iti*. This is found in RV, VI. 47. 18 as well as in BU, II. 5. 19. How can we, in this case, ascertain that the reference is in fact to the one and not to the other? The case is exactly the same with the second instance (III. 24 c) of a quotation from a Veda. Similarly with regard to II. 24 we know much of *kāla* 'time' from the AV, XIX. 53, 54 and the ŚU, I. 2, IV. 1. But here it is very difficult to conclude whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter, or to the both of them. Again, the *Kālavids* 'knowers of time' are, as says Ānanda-giri, astronomers, and it is not impossible that our author might have alluded to some work of them, or simply to the view held by them or to their school.

In the course of the present Annotation many references to different Upaniṣads have been inserted in support of a point or points in our text, but which of them, if any, is in fact meant by the author in any particular case we cannot say definitely. It may be that in some cases the Upaniṣadic authority, really meant by the author, is different from what the present

annotator has quoted. For instance, with regard to *pāda* (II. 21) which is capable of being interpreted differently, various references are given in the Annotation, or still other references may be shown. But it is not easy to ascertain the particular reference or references the author himself intended. Nevertheless, it is certain that the author had in his mind any one or more of these or similar passages when he was writing his book.

Among the references in the Annotation the names of the *Bhagavadgītā* (XIII. 22 in II. 22 of our text) and the *Brahmasūtra* (II. 3. 19-32 in II. 23 of our text) will be found. But we cannot be sure that these two works are actually drawn upon by our author, though they may elucidate the texts to some extent.

Similarly for the explanation of our text there will be found some references in the Annotation to such minor *Upaniṣads* (for instance, in II. 32) as *Avadhūta* Up., 8; *Āśrama*^o, 4; *Ātma*^o, 31; *Jābāla*^o, 6; *Tripurātāpanī*^o, V. 10; *Brahmabindu*^o, 10. But whether these minor *Upaniṣads* are prior to the *Āgamaśāstra* is to be left as an open question, though some of them such as *Brahmabindu*^o and *Jābāla*^o, are before Śaṅkara as is quite clear from his commentary on BS, III. 2. 18 and 4. 20 respectively.

In five places (III. 12, 24, 25, 26 and 36) passages from *Upaniṣads* are expressly quoted, while in III. 11 and 23 the words *Taittirīya* and *śruti* are actually mentioned and in II. 3 a passage of the BU, IV. 3. 10 is clearly alluded to with the word *śrūyate*. Similarly in II. 5 another passage from the same *Upaniṣad* (BU, IV. 3. 14)

is clearly referred to though with the word *manīśins*¹ and not *śruti* as before and usual. In III. 12, 13 and 15 references to Upaniṣads are also very clear. In two or three more places (I. 2, 8, 9) references seem to have been made to Upaniṣads.²

It will be seen that no Upaniṣad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, *'Alātaśānti*. There is absolutely nothing of the kind.³

As regards class (2) of the sources readers are referred to § 6 : *The Name of the Work* of the present Introduction, p. lxiii, where the names of different schools or teachers alluded to in our text, are mentioned.

It appears from these names that some of the schools or teachers mentioned by our author here were undoubtedly prominent at his time, but gradually they have lost their prominence and have fallen almost into a state of oblivion.

With regard to class (3) of our sources, i.e., the Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to the Annotation on II. 31, 32, 35 (cf. 38), 44, 46, and most of the kārikās in Book IV.

§ 12. *The Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as the Main Upaniṣadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra*

In the preceding section we have seen that the BU is one of the sources of the ĀŚ in which there are

¹ As in the Upaniṣad itself (BU, IV. 3. 14) there is *atha khaly āhūḥ* our author seems to have chosen to take the nominative as *manīśins* and not *śruti*. See II. 1, 5; IV. 54, and Appendix X: Additional Notes, II. 1.

² See the Annotation.

³ With regard to the word *durdarśa* in IV. 100 we cannot say definitely that it refers to KU, II. 12, as it is often found also in Buddhist works.

some quotations from or references to the former. In the present section it is proposed to examine to some extent the inter-relationship of these two works by which we shall see that the main Upaniṣadic source of the ĀŚ is the BU.

From the text of the ĀŚ as it is before us it is quite clear that Gauḍapāda has drawn much upon it. In fact, Book I of our text is mainly based on it. Nay, it may be declared that Book I of the ĀŚ is nothing but an epitome or essence of the BU, IV. 2-3 with some clear exposition and an addition of the *upāsanā*¹ 'meditation' of *Praṇava* or Om. By writing the first Book of the ĀŚ Gauḍapāda has in reality made a key to that portion of the BU, without which it would have been extremely difficult to understand its true significance.

The opening part of the ĀŚ, i.e., the part dealing with the three divisions of the One (i.e., Puruṣa) such as Viśva, etc. (l. 1-4, 10), is to be found only in different words in the BU, IV. 2-3, as says Śaṅkara very clearly on BU, IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).²

¹ III. I and Appendix X on it.

² atra ca jāgratsvapnusuuptatutriyāny upanyastāny anyaprasaṅgena indhaḥ (IV. 2. 2), praviviktāhāratarah (IV. 2. 3), sarve prānāḥ (IV. 2. 4), sa esa neti neti (IV. 2. 4). idānīm jāgratsvapnādīdvareṇaiva mahatā tarkeṇa vistarato 'dhigamāḥ kartavyāḥ (p. 519).

See here also Śaṅkara's observation in showing the relationship between BU, IV. 2 and IV. 3 (p. 518):

"vijñānam ānandam brahmety avagatam. tad eva punar indhaśamjñāḥ praviviktāhāras tato 'ntarhṛdaye hṛingātmā praviviktāhārataras tataḥ pareṇa jagadātmā. See further on IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).

We see in our text (I. 1-4, 10) that the One, i.e., Puruṣa³ (=Brahman=Ātman of the MāU, 2) owing to different states is called Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turya (or Turiya, I. 15). None of these names excepting Prājña (BU, IV. 3. 21 and 35) is, however, to be found in the BU. For Viśva it reads (IV. 2. 2) *Indha* 'shining' which is the same as *Indra*, the former, as the Upaniṣad would say, being used by people cryptically.⁴ As to why the Puruṣa is called *Indha* Suresvara says (BBV, IV. 2. 37) that 'because he shines day and night' (idhyate 'harniśam yasmād indhanāmā tataḥ pumān). This 'shining' implies, according to Ānandagiri, his enjoyment of gross things in the waking state (śhūlārthabhoktīvena śadā jāgare sphurteḥ). Śankara is found to have employed both the terms in his commentary on the BU, *Indha* (BU, IV. 3. 1, p. 519) and *Vaiśvānata* (BU, IV. 2. 2-4, pp. 513-519), but not *Viśva*, so far as goes my information, with regard to the commentary referred to. From the text of the BU (IV. 2. 3, 3. 11, 35) itself it appears that

³ As in the original of the text, i.e., BU, IV. 3 we have this word.

⁴ It is a well-known saying in Brāhmaṇas that gods are fond of the cryptic, as it were, and dislike the evident 'parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ pratyakṣadvīṣāḥ —BU, IV. 2. 2). Suresvara says (in BBV, IV. 2. 37; p. 1365) that even now people do not like to call a superior person directly by his personal name:

pratyakṣānāmagāhaṇam pradviṣanti jagat� api |
śreyāṁso 'mukamīśāś ta ity uktim kāmayanti ca ||

In referring to a superior person the use of *amuka* 'so and so' or *uni* in Bengali, is still found. It is to be noted that in the country, at least in Bengal, a woman does not call her husband by his name, but for it uses such words as *uni*,

if any other term for *Viśva* is to be chosen from that work it is only *sārīra* 'existing in the body,' 'embodied.' But *Gaudapāda* has not accepted it, but has adopted a new name, *Viśva*, probably thinking the latter to be more expressive of the idea behind it. Finally in the hand of the author of *MāU* it has undergone a further change in the form of *Vaiśvānara* 'common-to-all' perhaps for the same purpose.

Of these names *Turya* (or *Turiya*) 'fourth' is evidently not a name in fact, but as it is described after the first three *Viśva*, etc., it is so called, being their fourth. In the BU *Indha-Indra* is a name, no doubt, but *Taijasa* and *Prājña* were originally mere adjectives,⁵ becoming names afterwards. Sometimes the appellation *Lingātman* is found for *Taijasa*, as writes Śāṅkara in his commentary on the BU, IV. 2. 3 (p. 515), IV. 3. 1 (p. 518). Similarly *sausupta* is used for *Prājña* as says Sureśvara (BBV, IV. 3. 5, p. 1377). Undoubtedly this word clearly expresses the state of the Person.

As regards the wording of our text in the first Book of ĀŚ with which we are now concerned the following comparison may be made:

(i) With regard to *Viśva* our author writes (I. 2): *dakṣinākṣimukhe viśvah.*⁶ See here BU, IV. 2. 2: *indho ha nāmaisa yo' yam* *dakṣine 'kṣan* *puruṣah* (=BU, II. 3. 5; IV. 2. 2; V. 5. 2, 4).⁷

⁵ See BU, II. 5. 8.

⁶ Mark that the *MāU* is here silent.

⁷ The idea that a person is seen in the eye and specially in the right one is often found in Upaniśadic texts. Besides the BU quoted above see ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; KtU, IV. 2, 17; MU, VII. 11. It simply signifies that

(ii) In I. 2 we have *ākāśe ca hṛdi prājñah*, and we read *ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśah* in BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3, 4. 22. Cf. TU, I. 6. 1.

(iii) In I. 3 there is *praviviktabhuj*,⁸ and in this connexion we read *tasmād eṣa praviviktāhāratara ivaiva bhavati* in the BU, IV. 2. 3.

(iv) With regard to the third or *susupta* state of the Person in I. 3, 4 there is *ānandabhuj* or *ānanda*, and in BU, IV. 3. 32 we read *eṣo sya parama ānandah*. See also, *Op. cit.*, IV. 3. 33.⁹

It is to be noted here that the above conception of Puruṣa is found also in ChU, VIII. 7-12 in the course of Prajāpati's instruction to Indra and Virocana. Here, too, the first three names, *Viśva*, etc. are not given, Saṅkara has used different appellations for them; viz., for *Viśva* he writes *Aksipuruṣa* 'eye-person' (VIII. 7, 4, 7 9), or *Chāyāpuruṣa* 'shadow-person' (VIII. 10.4), or *Chāyātman* 'shadow-self' (VIII. 7. 4, 8. 1, 2);¹⁰

he is visible to our eyes, and this means that he is the ordinary incorporated soul ('sārīra-ātman'). This is quite evident from Gaudapāda's employment of the word *mukha* after *dakṣinākṣi-* (I. 1: *dakṣinākṣimukhe* 'in the front of the right eye'). As to why the *right* eye is specially mentioned Suresvara says (BBV. V. 2. 37-38, p. 1365) that it may be due to some excellence of the right eye, which might have been known to the *smṛti*, or to the fact that the right limbs of a man is more vigorous than the left ones. Sometimes the left eye is also referred to (BU, IV. 2. 3). See below.

⁸ See also I. 4.

⁹ That the sentence *yatā supto na kiñcana* in the MāU, 5, p. 224, is quoted from the BU, IV. 3. 19 is already shown. Introduction: §2, p. xlvi.

¹⁰ He uses this term also in his commentary on BS, I. 2. 13; on I. 3. 43 he has also *sārīra*.

for *Taijasa* he has *Svapnātman* (VIII. 11. 1-2); and for *Prājña* he employs *Suṣuptastha* (VIII, 11. 1-2).¹¹ For *Turya* we have in the *Upaniṣad* (VIII. 12. 3)

¹¹ It is to be noted that Saṅkara while in his commentary on EU gives all the three names, *Viśva*, etc., he does not do so in the commentary on the ChU. It is further to be noticed that he, though so very fond of quoting *śruti*s does not refer to ChU in his commentary on EU, nor EU in that on ChU.

A few words may be added here as to why *Viśva* is said to be in the eye or in the right eye and consequently is called *Akṣipuruṣa*, *Chāyāpuruṣa* or *Chāyātman*.

To understand the Highest Self (*paramātman*) is very difficult for a man who is not properly trained. It took Indra, as says the ChU, VIII. 7. 3 ff., not less than one hundred and one years to realize him. So he is instructed to do it gradually, following the maxim of the view of the star *Arundhatī* 'Alcor' belonging to the Great Bear (*Arundhatidarśananyāya*). The star being a very small one cannot be seen at once. So a man in order to show it to another man first points out to the latter somethings other than the actual star one by one and finally succeeds in doing so. Saṅkara writes (ChU, VIII. 12. 1) the same thing in another way: On the second night of the bright half of a month a man desirous of showing a second man the fine moon first points out a tree before the latter saying: 'See, there is the moon.' In the same way he points out to him a series of trees one by one and then the peak of a mountain, on which the moon is visible, and thus the second man actually sees her. Similarly in our case, the mind of an ordinary man being too much attached to external things cannot at once grasp the Highest Self who is extremely subtle. Therefore, he is first instructed to know his incorporated Self ('sārira ātman), other Selves or the different states of the Self being described gradually. Now, how to know the corporated Self? What is the best means for it? The sage of the *Upaniṣads* says: "Look here. Here is my right eye. Look at it. What do you find in it?" Certainly he would see himself reflected thereon. And pointing out the shadow the sage would tell him 'Here is the Self.' This is elaborately described in the episode of Prajāpati and his two disciples, Indra and Virocana, in the ChU, VIII. 7-12, where it is said that the Self is to be seen not only in the eyes, but also on a looking glass *vādarśa*, water 'apī, and an earthen jar filled with water (*udāśarāvā*). Saṅkara rightly adds here (ChU, VIII. 7. 4) also such things as the blade of a sword (*khadgādi*). See KtU, IV. 2, 11. 17-18.

quite appropriately *Uttamapuruṣa* ‘the Highest Self.’¹²

That this conception of Puruṣa in ChU is a later development of that in the BU goes without saying. Now, though the ChU like the BU is far earlier than our text, there is nothing which can show that it is the former and not the latter which has been drawn upon by our author; yet, we have already seen what can be said in favour of BU.

In support of the view that the main source of the ĀŚ is BU we may discuss here one point more. The idea of Brahman (=Puruṣa=Ātman) as having four fourths or quarters (*catuṣpād*) at the beginning of the MāU is not a new one as it is found long before it even in the RV, X. 90. 3¹³ as well as in ChU, III. 18. 2.¹⁴ The difference of these texts lies, however, in the fact that the quarters (*pādas*) are different in them. For instance, in the RV referred to above all the beings (*viśvā bhūtāni*) are regarded as one quarter, and the remaining three quarters (*tripād*) are said to be in the heaven, while in the ChU, IV. 5-8

¹² See BG, XV. 17-18:

uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyaḥ paramātmety udāhṛitaḥ ।
yo lokatrayam āviṣya bibharty advaya iṣvarah ॥
yasmāt kṣaram atito'ham akṣarād api cottamaḥ ।
ato smi loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ ॥

Ś has here quoted no śruti. Śridhara refers to BU, V. 6. 1 (sa vā
ayam ātmā), but not appropriately.

¹³ See ĀŚ, II. 21.

¹⁴ For minor Upaniṣads see *Brahmopaniṣad*, 2: tatra catuṣpādaṃ brahma vibhāti; NPIU, V. 1; NUTU, 1; RUTU, 3: so 'yam ātmā catuṣpād.

the four quarters each consisting of four parts (*catuskala*) are named as *Prakāśavat* 'shining,' *Anantavat* 'endless,' *Jyotiṣmat* 'luminous,' and *Āyalanavat* 'having an abode.'¹⁵ In another place of the same Upaniṣad (III. 18. 1-6) the quarters of Brahman are described differently with reference to person (*adhyātma*) and with reference to divinities (*adhidaivata*). With reference to person they are speech (*vāc*), breath (*prāṇa*), the eye (*cakṣus*) and the ear (*śrotra*) representing respectively with reference to the divinities fire (*agni*), wind (*vāyu*), the sun (*āditya*) and quarter (*diś*). But in the MāU the quarters are described quite in a new way and it is remarkable. It is said that these four quarters are nothing but the same Self with its four states. The first three of them are waking (*jāgrat*), dreaming (*svapna*), and deep sleep (*suṣupta*). And the Self with them is called *Vaiśvānara* 'common-to-all,' *Taijasa* 'brilliant,' and *Prājña* 'intelligent' respectively. The fourth state is the true or absolute essence of the Self having no connexion whatsoever with anything else. In this state the Self is regarded as *śānta* 'quiescent,' *śiva* 'blissful' and *advaita* 'without a second.'

It is to be noted here that while in RV and ChU the Puruṣa or Brahman is represented as the Universal or World Self, in the MāU it is represented as the individual Self though ultimately in fact it is identical with the Universal Self.

Now, it is remarkable that though in the MāU, as

¹⁵ For details see the Upaniṣad.

we have seen above, there is a clear mention and description of the four quarters of the Self (*catuspād*), in the ĀŚ it is not so. Even the particular word *catuspād* or any of its possible equivalents is not to be found here. Up to kārikā 5 we come across the three-fold division of the Self, *viz.*, *Viśva* (instead of *Vaiśvānara* as in the MāU, 3), *Taijasa* and *Prājña* (I. 1-4). It is clearly said in our text (I. 1-2) that the One exists in three ways in the body, and this idea is further expressed in I. 3-5. Yet, it cannot be said from this that the idea of four quarters is altogether unknown to the author of the ĀŚ, as it is implied in I. 10-15 in which the word *turya* or *turiya*, which is the same in meaning 'fourth,' as *caturtha* in the MāU, 7, is used. It is further implied by the author's employment of the word *pāda* in I. 25.¹⁶ This difference between the ĀŚ and the MāU with regard to the idea of four *pādas*, implied in the former and expressed in the latter, is significant. It shows that the origin of the ĀŚ is not the MāU, but the BU in which the idea of *pādas* in this connexion did not then so develop.¹⁷

En passant we should like to discuss one thing more. There is a very striking difference at the very

¹⁶ See BU, IV. 1. 2-7 where each of the following six things, *vāc* 'speech,' *prāṇa* 'breath,' *cakṣus* 'eye,' *śrotra* 'ear,' *manas* 'mind,' and *hrdaya* 'heart' is regarded as a *pāda*. Consult Śaṅkara and Suresvara (BBV, IV. 1. 16 ff) according to whom each of the above six is explained as *catuspāda* 'having four quarters.'

.. ¹⁷ This fact will also show that the ĀŚ is prior to the MāU in which the obscure points of the former are made clear.

beginning between the two texts, MāU and ĀŚ. It is this that while the MāU begins (1-2) highly extolling Om symbolically identifying it with Brahman-Ātman, the ĀŚ has here nothing of the kind. It simply proceeds gradually to describe the One with its first three states, *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* (I. 1-5) the fourth having come afterwards (I. 10). Here in the ĀŚ till kārikā 19 there is no mention of, or reference to Om. So it is to be found that here in our text mention is made first of the One and then of Om. This order is quite right and logical. For, here there are two things, the object which is to be approached or realized (*upeya*) and its means (*upāya*). And it is reasonable that the object is stated first and then the means. Here the object is the realization of the Puruṣa or Self in its absolute state and the means is the meditation of Om. This is done in the ĀŚ, but it is quite reverse in the MāU, for here the means Om is stated first and then gradually the object (3-7) which is repeated later on (12). The author of the MāU seems to have been much influenced by earlier Upaniṣads, (such as ChU, I. 1. 1; TU, I. 8. 1) and too much bent on the glorification of Om, and this is why he has changed the reasonable order found in the ĀŚ. There is no *upāsanā* of *Pranava* in the BU and this is why our author of the ĀŚ did not include it in the main thesis of his work. Then independently of the BU in which no means for the realization of the object is shown Gaudapāda has added the remaining portion of the first Book of his ĀŚ setting forth *Pranava* and its *upāsanā*.

So far with regard to Book I. Let us now take up Book II and see the connexion it has with the BU. This Book is rightly called *Vaitathya* ‘unreality’ as it shows the unreality of the world in the waking state just like that of the experience in dream. This is the subject discussed herein by Gaudapāda with various arguments. And here, too, he has taken his stand on the BU, IV. 3, where it is clearly declared that the two states, waking and dream, are in fact one. Not only are passages quoted from the BU, or referred to by him (ll. 3, 5), but they are supported by his own arguments. This will be quite clear if one takes pains to read BU, IV. 3 and the second Book of the ĀŚ. And it should be noted that here in the latter we find the oldest interpretation of that portion of the BU, though in a concise, yet, very substantial form.

In Book III we are referred to BU not less than six times (12, 13, 15, 24, 25 and 26).

Thus we may safely conclude that the main Upaniṣadic source of the ĀŚ is the BU.

§ 13. *Pre-Saṅkara Teachers of the Vedānta and their Works*

Setting apart what we know of the Vedānta from the *Śruti-prasthāna* ‘the Course of Revelation’ or the Vedic literature, i. e., the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas including the Āranyakas and Upaniṣads, as well as from the *Smṛti-prasthāna* ‘the Course of Tradition or Remembered Texts’, such as the *Mahābhārata* with the

Bhagavadgītā, it may conveniently be divided into two, pre-Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara.

Among the teachers of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta the most distinguished is Bādarāyaṇa, the celebrated author of the *Brahmasūtras*, the source of which is the Upaniṣads. It is the *Brahmasūtras* that constitute the *Sūtra-prasthāna* ‘the Course of Sūtras.’

We all know that the difference of opinions is but natural. Owing to various factors the same thing is viewed differently by different persons. So it is found in the Brāhmaṇas that there are both the offering of oblation before sun-rise (*anudita-homa*) and the offering of oblation after sun-rise (*udita-homa*), there being a regular discussion thereof establishing that the latter is preferable and not the former (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, XXV. 5-6; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, II. 1. 2-8; cf. however, II. 1. 2. 12). There are also functions in these Brāhmaṇas, which are discarded saying that these are not to be preferred (*ādṛ̥ya*) or performed (*kārya*), though they are actually enjoined by others. There are many such contradicting, obscure or dubious cases, and an attempt has also been made in later works to find out a solution of these problems.¹

Now as with regard to *karman* the teachers had their different views, so they differed also on points of *jñāna*. In some cases they entertained even quite opposite views. For instance, with regard to creation while a sage of a certain Upaniṣad (i.e., TU, II. 7. 1;

¹ For instance, see MD. X. 8. 6 with reference to *Ṣoḍaśīgrahaṇa*.

see ChU, III. 19. 1) tells us: ‘In the beginning, verily, this was non-existent (asad vā idam agra āśid),’ but from another text (i.e., *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, II. 4. 1) we know: ‘Verily, in the beginning this was only Self (ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āśid).’ And the following is found in the ChU, VI. 2. 1-2, evidently refuting TU, II. 7. 1 quoted above: “Verily, in the beginning this was, my dear, existent only one without a second. On this some say that verily in the beginning this was non-existent only one without a second; from that non-existent the existent was produced. But, my dear, whence could it be? How from non-existent could the existent be produced? On the contrary, my dear, verily, in the beginning this was existent, only one without a second.”

From the above it is quite clear that all the śruti-s do not always tell us the same thing, clearly there is difference among them.² Such being the case the question arises as to which of them is to be accepted as valid and which is to be rejected as not valid. How can one say that this is valid, and that is not valid? For, as śruti there is no difference whatsoever.³ Therefore if you accept one, you will have to accept all of them. And in that case you cannot arrive at any definite

² See with the *Prakāśa* of Pūṇyārāja the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartrihari, I. 8:

tasyārthavādarūpāṇī niścitya svavikalpajāḥ |
ekatvinām dvaitinām ca pravādā bahudhā smṛtāḥ ||

³ Śaṅkara has rightly observed (BS, III. 2. 15): nahi vedavākyānām kasyacid arthavattvām kasyacid anarthavattvām iti yuktām pratipattum pramāṇatvāviśeṣāt.

conclusion. And if there is no conclusion of any kind the teaching of the Vedānta has no value to a person as it does not or cannot lead him to his final goal. The Vedānta is not a science for mere speculation, for one is to adjust one's life according to it. For only in this way one can fulfil the mission of one's life. It was therefore felt absolutely necessary by the teachers to bring into a harmony, a compromise or a connected sequence, all conflicting, obscure or dubious statements of the sages of the Upaniṣads. This was the origin on one hand of the Mīmāṃsāsūtras with regard to the question of *karmān*, and on the other of the Brahmasūtras in respect of *jñāna*.⁴

⁴ Let us however put here a question: Are we right in thinking that even through the methods or maxims ('nyāyas) shown in the Brahmasūtras in connexion with the explanation of the Upaniṣadic texts, we can in all cases get their true significance? By 'true significance' we mean the significance intended by their respective sages. It is true that the word *asat* may imply in some cases 'unfolded' or 'that of which the name and form are unfolded' (*avyākṛta* or *avyākṛtanāmerūpa*). For instance, see *asat ca sāt ca parame vyoman* (RV, X. 5. 7); or *nāśat āśin na sāt ēśit tādānīm*, (Op. cit., X. 129. 1). In such cases *asat* does not mean 'false, non-existent' (*nirupākhyā asat*), as the son of a barren woman, though in other cases it may actually mean so. Now considering the above passage of the ChU it is clear that the word *asat* in the TU quoted above is used in its literal sense, i.e., the sense of unreal non-existent (*nirupākhyā asat*). though an attempt is made in explaining it away figuratively to mean 'unfolded' (*avyākṛta*) according to the subsequently established maxims of the Vedānta. But a question arises: Well, in the TU the word *asat* may imply *avyākṛta* as you maintain (see here BU, I. 4. 7: *tad dhedam tarhy avyākṛtam ēśit*), but how do you ascertain that this meaning is in fact intended by the sage himself? How do you know that he does not want here to mean thereby absolutely non-existent *nirupākhyā asat*? We can only accept that the meaning *avyākṛta* is your explanation. But this may or may not be intended by the sage himself. There is this doubt that can hardly be removed.

It is well-known that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are the authors of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras* respectively. But there are reasons to think that there were also other authors of the *Mīmāṃsa-* and the *Brahma-sūtras* which are different from the extant ones.⁵ For instance, Bādārī, a teacher, is quoted not less than four times both in the present *Mīmāṃsā-* (III. 1. 3; VI. 1. 27; VIII. 3. 6; IX. 2. 33) and *Brahma-sūtras* (I. 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10). From this it may appear that Bādārī was an author of both the *sūtras*. But we cannot ascertain only from this that he was actually so. It may be that he had some views on some particular points of *karman* and Brahman and these are alluded to in those two works by their authors. Jaimini, as the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* is known to us all. He is referred to eleven times in the *Brahmasūtras* on different topics (I. 2. 28, 31, 3. 31, 4. 18; III. 2. 40, 4. 2, 18, 40; IV. 3. 12, 4. 5, 11). Here, too, we may think that Jaimini wrote also *Brahmasūtras*. But though from only this it is not safe to decide that he really did so, Suresvara's *Nsi* (2nd ed. by Hiriyanna), p. 52, shows that it is a fact. Kāśakṛtsna, a teacher, is quoted in BS, I. 4. 22, and his *Mīmāṃsā* is mentioned not less than three times by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*.⁶ This *Mīmāṃsā* may be both *Karmamīmāṃsā* and *Brahma-mīmāṃsā* (i.e., the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras*),

⁵ See Belvalkar, *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁶ See Jaimini's *Śārīrakasūtra* in the *Garbe-Festgabe*, 1927.

⁷ Kielhorn, Vol. II, pp. 206, 249, 325.

or either of them, and in this case probably the latter. Bādarāyaṇa in his BS refers also to Ātreya (III. 4. 44), Āśmarathya (I. 2. 29, 4. 20), Kārṣṇājini (III. I. 9)⁸, and Audulomi⁹ (I. 4. 21, III. 4. 45, IV. 4. 6).¹⁰

Then comes a number of teachers, some of whom flourished before and some after the great Śaṅkara. Some of them explained the BS of Bādarāyaṇa, some the *Bhagavadgītā*, and some an Upaniṣad or Upaniṣads. There were also some who interpreted more than one kind of the above works. This was done either by writing a gloss (*vṛtti*) or a commentary (*bhāṣya*). As we are concerned here with the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta the following teachers who are connected with it may be mentioned in this connexion.

So far as we know the first of all these teachers is Bodhāyana (about the first or second century A.D.). He wrote a lengthy gloss or commentary (*vistīrṇa vṛtti*) on the BS of Bādarāyaṇa on which is based the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of Rāmānuja, the *Mimāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini, and the *Devatākāṇḍa*, in other words, on the whole of the *Mimāṃsāśāstra*. This

⁸ He is mentioned also in MD, IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35.

⁹ The *Bhedābheda* doctrine of the Niimbāraka school owes its existence to him.

¹⁰ To them may be added the names of Kāśyapa alluded to by Śāṅḍilya in his *Bhaktisūtras*, 29, and of such sages as Asita, Devala, Bhṛigu, and Parāśara referred to in different works. But we do not know if they were the authors of different *Brahmasūtras* or if any one of them wrote also *Mimāṃsāsūtras*, though we know something of their views from the fragmentary accounts available from certain books, some of which are referred to above.

vṛtti is called *Kṛtakōti* (*Prapañcaḥṛdaya*, TSS, p. 39; *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1911, p. 17).

Next comes *Uparavaṇa*. He is credited with the authorship of a *vṛtti* on both the *Mimāṃsāsūtras* and *Brahmasūtras*. This *vṛtti* was, however, in fact a *bhāṣya* or *Mahābhāṣya* and consequently he was regarded as a *Mahābhāṣyakāra* as well as a *Vṛttikāra*, being the author of the *vṛtti*.

According to Rāmānuja (*Vedārthaśaṅgraha*, p. 154) and Śrinivāsādāsa (*Yatindramata-dīpikā*, Poona ed., p. 2) Guhadēva, Kapardika (or Kapardin) and Bhāruci are three ancient Vedānta teachers and authors. The former two, being referred to by Rāmānuja among the *śiṣṭas* ‘wise men’, seem to have been in favour of the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda. One Bhāruci as an author of a *Dharmaśāstra* is mentioned in such works as Vijnāneśvara’s *Mitāksarā* on the *Yajñavalkya-smṛti* (I. 18, II. 124), and Mādhabavācārya’s *tīkā* on the *Parāśarasamhitā* (II. 2, 3, Bombay Sanskrit series ed., p. 510). It is not known if the Vedāntic Bhāruci is identical with Bhāruci, the writer on the *Dharmaśāstra*. If it is so, he may be held to have belonged to the first half of the ninth century A. D.

Bhārtṛhari’s name is found among a host of writers on the Vedānta (*Siddhitraya*, p. 5). He may be identified with the celebrated author of the *Vākyapadīya* (600-650 A.D.), the very first kārikā of which points to the Vedāntic doctrine.

With him is mentioned in the same work Bhārtṛmitra. According to the *Nyāyaratnākara* on the *Śloka-vārttikā* (l. 10) he wrote a commentary on the *Mimāṃsāsūtras* and made the *Mimāṃsāśāstra* atheistic. Whether this Mimāṃsist Bhārtṛmitra and the Vedāntic Bhārtṛmitra are one and the same is not known, nor do we know anything of any Vedāntic work that might have been written by the latter.

Brahmanandin (or Brahmanandin) is another teacher. He is known as the *Vākyakāra* or *Chāndogyavākyakāra* quoted or referred to by Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his ṭīkā on the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (III.218-220). According to Bhāskara on BS, I. 4. 25, Brahmanandin approved the *Parināma-vāda*, but Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Op. cit.*) is of opinion that it was in fact gradually to lead one to *Suddhādvaita-vāda* 'Pure monism' through the *Vivarta-vāda* or the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman which is the only reality, the phenomenal world being held to be a mere illusion.

After him is Dravidācārya or Dravidācārya (*cir.* 750 A.D.). He was in favour of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda* 'Qualified monism' and as such is mentioned and quoted by Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS. As Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says (*Samkṣepaśārīraka*, III. 218-220), he wrote a *bhāṣya* on Brahmanandin's *vākyas* owing to which the latter was called *Vākyakāra* (Brahmanandi-viracitā-

nām vākyānām sūtrarūpāñām bhāsyakartā dravidācāryo'pi). It is known from Ānandagiri's tīkā on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the ChU that Dravidācārya wrote a vast commentary on the ChU compared with which Śaṅkara's commentary was a smaller one (*alpagrantha*). He is said to have written a *bhāṣya* also on the BS.

Brahmadatta was a renowned teacher of the Vedānta. In the *Prapañcahṛdaya* he is said to have composed a commentary on the BS. Some of his views are alluded to in such works as the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* (II.16), a tīkā by Veṅkaṭanātha deśika on his *Tattvamuktākalāpa*; Nsi, I. 67-68; and Śaṅkara's commentary on the BU, I. 4. 7. One of them may be mentioned here and it is this that it is the long *bhāvanā* 'meditation' of the knowledge arising from the *Vedānta-vākyā* and not the knowledge itself, as holds Śaṅkara, that removes one's illusion. Some informations of him as collected by Hiriyanna will be found in Nsi (2nd ed.), p. xxiii, and the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 1 ff. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, *Op. cit.*, p. 13 ff.

Bhartṛprapāñca was also a great Vedāntic teacher before Śaṅkara. It is known from the words of Maḍhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Samkṣepaśārīraka*, I. 7) that Bhartṛprapāñca explained the *Sūtras* of Vyāsa, i.e., Bādarāyaṇa (kaiścit tatsūtram vyācakṣāṇair bhartṛprapāñcādibhiḥ). Yāmunācārya (*Op. cit.*, p. 5) says that he was one of the writers on

the Vedānta, and we know from the introductory lines of Ānandagiri's *ṭīkā* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* of BU (p. 2) that while Śaṅkara commented on the Upaniṣad belonging to the Kāṇva recension Bhartṛprapāñca wrote his commentary on the text of the Mādhyandina recension, and the former's commentary was bigger than that of the latter. In many cases Ānandagiri in explaining Suresvara's *vārttika* on the BU, refers to or quotes from Bhartṛprapāñca. Of all the commentators before Śaṅkara, the works of whom could not yet been discovered it is Bhartṛprapāñca whose quotations are now mostly available. For the fragments gleaned together from his writings by Hiriyanna see *The Indian Antiquary*, 1924, pp. 76-86; and *Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1925, pp. 439.

I should like to mention here one teacher more of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta. He is Sundarapaṇḍya. He was a great Mīmāṃsist and Vedāntin of South India (8th century A.D.). His three kārikās (*gauṇamithyātva*^o) are quoted by Śaṅkara in the last portion of his commentary on BS, I. 1, 4. Amalananda in his *Kalpataru* (BS, III. 25) quotes his other three kārikās (*nihśreṇyārohaṇaprāpya*^o). These last three kārikās together with two more are cited by Kumārila in his *Tantravārttika* (Benares ed.), pp. 852-853. It seems that these kārikās are from a *vārttika* of Sundarapaṇḍya that he

wrote on some *vṛtti* or *bhāṣya* of some unknown author.¹¹

There were also some teachers who wrote independent works on the Vedānta and of these authors the most distinguished is Gaudapāda, the author of our *Āgamaśāstra* which is the most important work, still extant, representing one of the most remarkable phases of the Vedānta. Here we find the first interpretation of some of the most important *śruti*s as we shall see later on.

§ 14. *The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra*

Now we may give here a conspectus of the contents of our text, and in doing so Book I may conveniently be divided into two parts; part (i) containing kārikās I. 1-18, and part (ii) the remaining kārikās, i.e., I. 19-29. While part (i) discusses what is to be realized, part (ii) is devoted to show its means.

It is well-known that in the Upaniṣads all thoughts centre round the Puruṣa (Ātman=Brahman), 'Self' who is 'all that has been and that will be' (RV, X.90.2 : *puruṣa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yac ca bhavyam*). He must be known, according to the sages of Upaniṣads, for the fulfilment of the mission of one's life.

¹¹ S. Kuppuswāmī Śāstrī : *Journal of Oriental Research*, 1927, p. 1 ff.

On the main topic of this section see Gopinath Kaviraj, *Op. cit.*, and P. V. Kane: *Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference*, pp. 937 ff.

But how can he be known properly? As he is extremely subtle, Gaudapāda leads us gradually from the gross to the subtle, following our common and every-day experience. And in doing so he takes his stand on such Upaniṣads as the BU and ChU, and shows (l. 1-5) that the self, though in reality, only one (eka eva) remains in the body in three forms (tridhā dehe vyavasthitah), in accordance with his three states, *jāgrat* 'waking', *svapna* 'dream' and *susupti* 'deep sleep.' When the self is in the waking state he is called Viśva 'all' (because as an embodied one (*śārīra*) he is known to every man). In the state of dream he is named Taijasa 'brilliant' (because he himself is his light (*svayamjyotiḥ*) in that condition; i.e., he does not depend for his light on others for seeing things there, as he does in the waking state in which he is to take light from such things as the sun, the moon, and fire).¹ In the state of deep sleep he is called Prājña 'intelligent' (because he is never dissociated from his intelligence).²

Viśva is the embodied self (*śārīra ātman*), hence it is metaphorically said that he remains in the front of one's right eye,³ meaning thereby that he may be seen reflected in one's right⁴ eye (or in such things as

¹ See BU, IV. 3. 1-9 : *svena bhāsā svena jyotiṣā prasvapity atrāyam puruṣah svayamjyotir bhavati.*

² BU, IV. 3. 23 ff. : *yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati. nahi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer vipaśilopo vidyate 'vināśitvāt. na tu tad dvitiyam asti tato 'nyad viśhaktam̄ yat paśyet.*

³ See p. lxxxviii

⁴ As the right portion of the body of a male person is said to be more powerful than the left the reflection therein is brighter. See p. lxxxvii, note 7.

water (or a looking-glass). Taijasa is in the mind, as it is there that a man dreams. Prājña's seat is in the space of one's heart. Again, Viśva has the consciousness of outside, Taijasa of inside, while Prājña has his consciousness compact. These three enjoy or experience the gross, the subtle and bliss⁵ respectively.

In passing the author refers (l. 6-9) to the opinion of the sages that all things have their origin and mentions different theories or purposes of creation. The first 'theory' is this that one creates all as the rays of one's mind (*ceto'mśu*). This simply means that it is the mind that appears in the form of the external world which has, in fact, no reality. This is the author's own view.

Then he reverts to his main subject, the Self, and says (1-10) that besides his three forms or quarters (*pādas*) in accordance with the three states, -waking, etc., referred to above, there is one form more; it is his real, natural or innate form. It has no particular appellation, as he is beyond all expressions and is designated by the simple word Turya (or Turiya) fourth, as occupying the fourth place in order with the above three. This Turya is above all changes and duality, all-pervading, and when realized removes all miseries.

Gaudapāda then shows (11-18) some points of mutual agreement and disagreement of these four forms or quarters (*pādas*) of the Self, and says that one, if awakened from one's sleep, due to illusion

(*māyā*), can realize the state of Turya in which there is no duality at all. Duality, i.e., the expansion of the visible world, or the expressions, is mere illusion, and as such it has absolutely no reality. (Here it may be said that as there is no duality, in fact, it does not cease to exist. It is just a knot made and loosened by dint of illusion (*māyayaiva kṛto granthir māyayaiva vimocitah*).⁶ Nevertheless, we have our common practice with duality, but it is only for our instruction, i.e., it is only by that practice that we can understand and attain to the state of non-duality which is the highest (*advaitam paramārthataḥ*). Here ends the first part of Book I.

The second part (19-29) demonstrates the means for the realization of that non-duality or Turya. It is nothing but the *upāsanā* ‘meditation’ (*dhyāna*) of the Puruṣa (=Ātman=Brahman), ‘Self’ through the symbol of *Prāṇava* or Om.

In Book II Gaudapāda discusses and establishes the unreality (*vaitathya*) of the external world. For this purpose he begins this Book as Book I basing it on the BU, specially on its IV. 3. 8 ff. He says referring to the sages⁷ of that Upaniṣad that all things in dream are unreal on the following three grounds:

⁶ See the following saying of the Bhagavat (i.e., Buddha), as quoted in MV, p. 540: ākāṣena kṛto granthir ākāṣenaiva mocitah.

⁷ Gaudapāda does not employ here or elsewhere (i.e., II.5, cf. IV. 54) such words as *rishi* or *muni* (II. 35) as is generally done in similar cases, but he has here the word *manīśin*. This word, which is a Vedic one forming a phrase with *āhuḥ*, is used twice in our work (II. 1, 5) as in KU, I. 3. 4 and BG, XVIII. 3 (with a variation that *pra-* is prefixed to *āhuḥ*).

(i) because the things (such as a mountain, or an elephant) seen therein are inside the body ; (ii) because the time being short one does not see the things having gone to those far places where one dreams them ; and (iii) because one on waking is not found in the place where one dreams oneself to be. Having supported this proposition (II. 3) by a reference to the BU, IV. 3. 10, he asserts (II. 4) that the things in the waking state, too, are as unreal as those in dream, because in this state also the things are similarly inside the body, for the mind which appears in the form of different things around us is inside the body. Proceeding the teacher says (II. 5) on the authority of a scripture (BU, IV. 3. 14), supported by reasons, that the two states, dream and waking, are the same on account of the fact that the things experienced in them are of the same kind, there being no difference at all. Here, having offered one reason more in his favour and met an objection of his opponent, he says (II. 9-10) that the experiences in waking and dream are equally unreal, both of them being the creation of the mind. Here arises a question (II. 11) : If in both the states the things are unreal, then who is it that cognizes them? Who is it that imagines them? The answer is given (II. 12-15) according to the decision of the Vedānta that it is the Self that imagines himself as the Self through his own illusion, and it is he who cognizes the things. He creates some things in the mind which are not fixed and as such they vanish at once ; and he creates also some other things in the mind

which are outside and fixed. There is, however, no difference between these two sorts of creation—the creation of those inside which exists as long as exists the thought (*citta*), and the creation of those outside, which exists as long as exists the (notion of) the two, i.e., the perceptible (*grāhya*) and the percipient (*grāhaka*); both of these two creations are only imagined and there is nothing for their difference. Again, the things which are within and not-manifest, and the things which are without and manifest are all imagined, indeed, the only difference there being that the latter are cognized by different organs of sense. As to the creation of the internal and external things he tells us (II. 16) that first one imagines oneself as a personal Self and then various things, internal and external, following the recollection of one's experience. Of this he says further (II. 17-18) that as in the dark a piece of rope, or a continuous line of water, etc., not determinately known, is imagined to be a snake, so is imagined the Self. Now when the piece of rope is known determinately the things that are imagined there disappear at once,⁸ so is to be known about the ascertainment of the Self (Ātman). It is an illusion of the Self owing to which he is imagined differently by differnt persons, such as the Breath (*prāṇa*) by those who know it, or Elements (*bhūtas*) by those who know them (II. 19-30). But the reality is, concludes (II. 31-34) the teacher, that according to those

⁸ The illustration of *rajju-sarpa* which is so widely known in Vedāntic works is found perhaps for the first time here in the ĀŚ. It is not in any of the Upaniṣads used for his Concordance by Jacob.

who are well-versed in the Vedānta, the universe is just like a dream (*svapna*), or an illusion (*māyā*), or an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*). The highest truth is that there is neither disappearance nor origination; neither bondage, nor one desirous of emancipation. The universe is not manifold, either through its own nature or through that of others; it is neither different nor non-different. The sages (II. 35-38) who have fully mastered the Vedas have seen the truth that it is the cessation of the universe (*prapañcopaśama*), which is free from duality. Having known this, therefore, one should meditate on non-duality, and having realized it, one should behave as a fool among the people becoming an ascetic, and realizing the truth inward and outward; should remain unmoved from it.

Book III is devoted to show the non-origination of the universe. The author proposes (III. 2) that nothing originates, and concludes (III. 48) that this is the highest truth. In the course of the discussion he says (III. 5ff) that as the space (*ākāśa* or *mahākāśa*), owing to jars (*ghatās*), assumes the forms of the spaces occupied by the jars (*ghatākāśas*), and these forms, when the jars are destroyed, merge into the space, even so springs up the Ātman in the form of Jīvas ‘individual persons’ owing to the conglomerations of the different limbs, etc., and when these conglomerations are destroyed the Jīvas merge into the Ātman. If the space occupied by one jar is soiled with dust or smoke, not all the spaces occupied by other jars are soiled therewith, even so (i.e., not affected) are the Jīvas with reference to happiness, etc. The

forms, functions and names of the jars may be different, but the space is the same. This is the case also with Jivas. As the space of a jar is neither a transformation, nor a part of the space, so is a Jiva neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. As the space is never soiled with a dirty thing such as dust and smoke, yet it appears to be so to the ignorant, so appears the Ātman with impurities to those who are not enlightened: In death or birth, in moving forward or backward, he exists in all bodies just like the space. All the conglomerations of limbs, etc., as in dream, are created by the illusion of the Ātman.

Now having shown what the Jiva is according to the Upaniṣads (TA, II. 1-6 and BU, II. 5) Gaudā-pādā says (III. 13) that the praise of the identity of the Jiva and the Ātman as well as the censure of their difference in the Upaniṣads is reasonable. And so, though their difference is found in some Upaniṣadic texts it is merely attributable with reference to the future state, and certainly it is not in the primary sense (III. 14-16). Indeed in the scriptures the creation is described with various illustrations showing a distinction between the Jiva and the Ātman. But in fact there is no distinction. It is only to lead one to the truth. For, there are three kinds of people, viz., of the lower, the middle, and the higher visions and in order to help them an *upāsanā* is meant here (by the description of the creation involving some distinction which is mere attributive). Here (III. 17-18) with regard to the view of non-duality which he holds, our author says that it

does not conflict with that of the dualists and shows how it does not do so.

Gaudapāda reverts now (III. 19-32) to his main proposition, i.e., non-origination and offers some arguments in favour of it, refuting the views of his opponents. He says that though it is said that it is the unborn that is born, it cannot be maintained. It is true that in the scriptures creation or origination is found both from the existent (*bhūta*) and the non-existent (*abhūta*), yet, that which is reasonable is to be accepted. In scriptures origination is said to be through illusion, it is denied there and its cause is negated. Now, origination may be either of the existent (*sat*) or of the non-existent (*asat*), but neither of them is possible. That which exists may originate only through illusion and not in reality; because, if it originates in fact, it is to be accepted that the thing which had already been originated originates again. The origination of the non-existent is not reasonable either in reality or through illusion, as in the case of the son of a barren woman.

As in dream so in waking there is only the mind, yet it appears in the form of the duality of the percipient and the perceptible. The duality is perceived by the mind, but when it becomes non-mind, i.e., when its function of thinking (*manana*) ceases, there is no duality. The author says here (III. 33-36) that the mind which becomes non-mind, and as such is free from the states of dream and deep sleep and has no determination (*nirvikalpa*), is identical with Brahman.

This state of the suppressed (*nigr̥hita=niruddha*) mind is different from that in the deep sleep, because while in the latter it falls into a condition of stupidity (*mūḍha avasthā*), it is not so in the former. This is attainable (III. 37-47) through an intense abstract concentration, called *Asparśayoga* ‘contactless concentration,’ which, though very difficult, can be realized gradually by the means suggested by the author. When by that process the mind is completely suppressed being free from the states at stupefaction and distraction, not moving at all and having no sense-image whatsoever, it becomes Brahman. And it is said that in this state it rests on itself (*svastha*), it does not originate and is identical with the knowable which also does not originate. Here the author concludes (III. 48) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth.

Gauḍapāda begins Book IV, unlike the first three ones, with his homage to the ‘Greatest of men’ and the teacher of the yoga known as *Asparśayoga*, whom the present writer thinks to be no other than the Buddha (IV. 1-2). Introducing his thesis (IV. 3) he says that there are two classes of disputants, one of them holding that it is the existent (*bhūta*) that originates while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (*abhūta*). But the Advayas (=Advaya-vādins), i. e., Buddhists declaring that there is no origination at all maintain that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being (IV. 3-4). Gauḍapāda who is a Vedāntin subscribes to this last view

and says (IV. 5) : 'We approve of non-origination declared by them; we do not dispute with them, listen as to how there cannot be any dispute.' He then advances (IV. 6-71) various arguments gathered from Buddhist sources in support of the view attacking and refuting the theory of origination in different ways and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth. In the course of it he shows among others that though it is generally believed that a thing which is not born is born, it cannot be so in reality, for in that case it is to be admitted that nature changes; what is unborn must always remain unborn, it is its nature. Yet, if you say that it takes its birth, then evidently it changes. But what is nature does in no way change (IV. 6-10).

The theory that the cause itself is the effect that is born (as held by the Sāṅkhyas) cannot be maintained (IV. 11-13), nor can there be any reasonable relationship or order between the cause and its effect (IV. 14-21). Again, nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself; nor is there anything produced that is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent (IV. 22). It is not possible to prove the beginning of a cause or of an effect, and as such neither of them comes into being (IV. 24).

Gaudapāda offers here some reasons in his support from the standpoint of the Vijnānavādins (IV. 25-39) showing that the external things are unreal though they appear to be not unreal; they are, however, false as the experience in dream, being cog-

nizable only by mind (*cittadṛśya*). He tells us again (IV. 40-41) that origination cannot be established, for there is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent ; there is no existent arising from the existent, and where is the non-existent arising from the existent ?

It is true that the Buddhas have sometimes said of origination, but it is the instruction meant only for those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination (IV. 42). As an elephant called by illusion is said to exist only owing to the perception and the common practice, so it is said that a thing exists (IV. 44). He declares (IV. 45-46) that there is only *vijñāna* without the two (*i.e.*, the percipient and the perceptible), it is quiescent and has no origination (*aja*) ; it does not move, it is not an object (*vastu*), yet, it appears to admit movements, it appears to be an object. Thus the mind and the objects have no origination. As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight or crooked, even so the mind when it moves appears as the percipient and the perceptible (IV.42). And as the fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance of its being straight or crooked, even so when the mind does not move, it does not appear in the form of the percipient and the perceptible (IV. 48).

We have already seen that causation (*hetuphalabhaṭṭava*) is not reasonable. The author explains it further in the following few kārikās (IV. 53-56) for his main purpose of establishing non-origination. With the same object in view he refutes (IV. 57) like the Buddhists

theories of eternity (*sāśvata*) and annihilation (*uccheda*), and says (IV. 58) that it is in the empirical truth (*samvṛtisatya*) that things are originated, but not in reality. From an illusive seed may come forth an illusive sprout. This sprout is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation. It is to be known with regard to all things. Therefore there is no room for the appellation of 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' of anything (IV. 60). As in dream so in waking it is owing to illusion that the mind which is only one moves having the appearance of the external things. Whatever is experienced in dream is nothing but the mind, similarly whatever we see in the waking state is only the mind. As a creature formed of dream or made of illusion or by some supernatural power takes birth and dies, even so all these creatures exist and do not exist. Therefore there is no Jīva that takes birth, there is no possibility of it. That nothing originates is the highest truth (IV. 61-71). The duality consisting of the subject and the object is only the vibration (*spandita*) of the mind which has, in fact, no object, and consequently has no relation whatsoever to it (IV. 72-74).

Owing to the persistent belief in what is non-existent (*abhūtābhiniveśa*) the mind relates itself to its objects, but when their absence is known it turns back from them having no relation at all (*niḥsaṅga*). Now, when it so turns back and does not move onwards, that position of it is unwavering, it is then free from sorrow, desire and fear. This is the field of the activities of the Buddhas. It shines forth once for all having no

origination, nor sleep, nor dream, and is the essence of reality (*dharma-dhātu*, IV. 74-81).

This truth is, however, made obscure by the childish with their different notions; yet, one who can realize it attains the state of omniscience free from duality. And if it is so, what is beyond it that one may desire (IV. 82-85)? The author then shows that it is through the 'supra-mundane' (*lokottara*) knowledge by the realization of which one may become omniscient (IV. 86-89). Here he asks us to learn certain things from the *Agrāyāna* (=Mahāyāna) of the Buddhists giving some of its leading thoughts (IV. 90-95).

As the state of detachment (*asaṅgatā*) of our mind or knowledge is absolutely necessary, he tells us what it is and how it can be effected. Both the objects and their knowledge have no origination, and as there is no relation whatsoever between them the knowledge is said to be free from attachment (*asaṅga*). If this state is not achieved, there is no disappearance of the 'cover' or 'obscuration' (*āvaraṇa-cyuti*) from which we suffer. But in reality there is no cover or obscuration of anything, all the elements of existence being naturally unsullied (IV. 96-98). Concluding, the teacher declares that according to the Buddha the knowledge is not related to its objects, and these two things, i.e., the knowledge and its objects, are not mentioned by the Buddha (IV. 99), for, in fact, he has said absolutely nothing.

§ 15. *The Philosophy of Gauḍapāda*

Let us now make an attempt to discuss a little the philosophy of Gauḍapāda as it is in our text, though it has already been done to some extent in the preceding section, i.e., *the Conspectus of the Contents*. As some of the philosophical views of our teacher have already been shown incidentally they will not be repeated here. Indeed, much has been written on this by my predecessors, yet when a new annotation is added hereto the subject may be discussed anew according to the light derived from it. In doing so we should keep our minds free from the influence of later thoughts, for it is not always safe to explain an older text by the thoughts in a subsequent work or works.

Now, it goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion (II. 12, 31, 35). Naturally, therefore, as a Vedāntist, he treats his subject in accordance with the scriptures (*śruti*), yet, not without pure reasons. Direct or indirect, his reasonings are in many cases based on scriptures (II. 1-10; III. 24-26). But when there are contradictory scriptures, he says (III. 23) that those which are with reasons (*yukti yukta*) are to be accepted. Besides, throughout the work he has advanced a number of independent grounds which are very cogent. With a view to removing an apparent contradiction in the scripture he would interpret (III 14) a text in its secondary sense saying expressly

that the primary one is not reasonable. The well-known practice of explaining Upaniṣadic texts in their secondary senses among the later commentators of the *Brahmasūtras* may be seen first here in Gauḍapāda's interpretation.

Among the Vedāntists Gauḍapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being *advaita* 'non-duality' (*advaitam paramārthataḥ*, I. 17; *advaitam paramārtho hi*, III. 18; *advaite.yojayet smṛtim*, II. 36). He says (II. 31) that according to the Vedānta the universe is like dream or illusion or an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*). There is no duality at all, it is mere illusion (I. 17).

The statement of the duality in the scripture is intended for the instruction (of the ignorant), and so when the truth is understood the duality does not exist (I. 18) and its cessation is bliss (I. 29; see also II. 35). He says (I. 17) further that the duality is due to illusion (*māyā*). In order to support this view he quotes scriptures (III. 24) which say 'There is no plurality (*neha nānāsti kiñcana*, BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11)'; and 'Indra appears multiform through *māyās*' (BU, II. 5. 19); and he concludes (III. 24) that 'He (Prajāpati) is born variously, though (in fact) he does not take birth (VS, XXX, 19).

Having thus offered the scriptural evidence for maintaining the view that the duality is mere illusion and as such it has no reality, Gauḍapāda gives us some pure reasons. Here, too, first he refers us to a scriptural text (BU, IV. 3. 14) and says (II. 5) that the two

states, dream and waking, are the same and one, because of the identity of the nature of the things experienced in them. That the things in dream are unreal is well-known to all and it is said also by the wise (BU, IV. 3. 8 ff), and can be maintained on the following grounds :

The things (such as mountains) in dream are within as they are enclosed or in an enclosed place (II. 1, IV. 33); but if they are real it is impossible. The time being very short, or there being no fixed rule of time, it cannot be said that the dreamer really goes to the distant land dreamt of by him and sees things there. Nor is he seen there when he awakes (II. 2, IV. 34). Again, when he awakes he does not find his friends and others whom he had then in dream grasped (IV. 35). Further, it is said in our scripture (BU, IV. 3. 10) that in dream there are no chariots, etc., yet, they are seen there. Similarly, in the waking state, too, the things we see around us are unreal on account of the fact that they are *within* (II. 4; IV. 33). That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is so also in the middle, *i.e.*, at the present. Therefore, being like the unreal (such as mirage) the external things appear as not unreal (II. 6; IV. 31). In both the cases, dream and waking, things are only imagined by the mind. That which is imagined by the mind within is regarded as non-existent (*asat*), while that which is imagined by the mind without is regarded as existent; but the unreality of both of them is reasonable and a matter of experience (II. 9, 10). Whether in

dream or waking, whatever is cognizable by the mind is unreal (*cittadṛśyam avastukam*, IV. 36). Moreover, in both the states the mind though in its own nature is undoubtedly without the two (i.e., the percipient and the perceptible), yet it moves owing to illusion with the appearance of the two (III. 30; IV. 62). This duality comprising the movable and the unmovable is therefore perceptible only by the mind. Hence when the mind becomes non-mind, i.e., when it ceases from its function of thinking, no duality is experienced (III. 31). The cessation of the function of thinking of the mind, or, in other words, the state of non-mind is reached when the mind through its knowledge of the truth of the Ātman does not think anything being non-cognizant owing to the absence of the things to be cognized (III. 32).¹

We have seen above that the waking experience is as unreal as the dream experience both of them being due to *māyā* or mere imagination of the mind that moves on account of *māyā* (*spandate māyayā manah*, III. 29 ; *cittam calati māyayā* (IV. 61).

That all these external things are the creation of

¹ Gaudapāda seems to have been fond of compromising conflicting views (III. 17; IV. 5) and so considering the opinion of the Dvaitins, i.e., those who maintain duality, he says (III. 17 ff.) that they are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend one another, but his view does not conflict with them. In explaining it he says (III. 18) that the supreme reality is non-duality, yet, it is not that we do not admit duality, we do it; so there is no conflict amongst us. The only difference amongst us is this that while according to you duality is in reality as well as in appearance we hold that it is only in appearance on account of illusion, and not also in reality (III. 19).

the mind is further said (IV. 72) and described elaborately by Gauḍapāda (IV. 47-52) with a very apt illustration of the fire-brand (*alāta*). A fire-brand, only when it is moved, and not when it is not moved, appears to be straight or crooked, or so. Now these appearances are not produced from anything other than the fire-brand. And when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. Similarly when the *vijñāna*² or mind moves and not when it does not move, it appears in the form of the duality consisting of the percipient and the perceptible. These appearances are produced not from anything other than the *vijñāna*; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor they enter into it. He says again (IV. 63-66) that as animals seen in dream are visible to the mind of the dreamer and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the dreamer, even so the animals seen in wakefulness are visible to the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the waking one.

Clearly this is the *Vijñānavāda* 'Idealism' before us. Now taking here into consideration the passages quoted under IV. 72 from the LA, and comparing the kārikās IV. 47-52 with the corresponding Buddhist passages quoted in the Annotation under IV. 52, one will be struck with the agreement between a Vedāntist and a *Vijñānavādin*. One will also be in

² Mark here the use of the word *vijñāna* in these kārikās, and not of *citta* or *manas*.

a position to understand how far Gauḍapāda is here influenced by the Buddhist thoughts and arguments. It is, however, to be noted that Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist. It is true that he advocates the *Vijñānavāda*, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upaniṣadic source, i.e., BU, IV. 3. 14. on which is based his fundamental statement (ll. 5) that the two states, dream and waking, are one. This Upaniṣadic seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before Gauḍapāda, has developed into what we now find in the *Āgamaśāstra*. But when there are the above and the similar germs of idealism in the Upaniṣads³ it must be accepted that it did not first originate with the Buddhists, though it has much developed in their system later on.

There are thus two schools of *Vijñānavādins*, (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is *māyā* (III. 29; IV. 61) it is *vāsanā* (LA, X. 150)⁴ in the second, both of them being without beginning (*anādi*). This *māyā* and *vāsanā*

³ See *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, III. 2-3; TU, III. 5 : *vijñānam brahma* *meti vyajñat*. *vijñānād dhy eva*.

⁴ bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate |
vāsanair luḍitam cittam arthābhāṣam pravartate ||

may, however, be regarded as the same thing. For *vāsanā*, though explained as *pūrva jñāna* ‘previous knowledge’ is conceived as a cosmical force, transcendental illusion (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna*, Leningrad, 1927, p. 209). The real difference then between these two schools in the present case is with regard to the intervention of the Ātman with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial⁵ in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.

Now, the *māyā* of the Jīva referred to above like *vāsanā* has no beginning. He sleeps on account of it being himself deluded by it (I. 16; II. 19). He himself imagines himself and various other things through his own *māyā*, some of them being within while others without (II. 13). These things, i.e., those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (*citta*), as well as those which are without and exist as long as remains the notion of the two, are only imagined (II. 14, 15). In the process of the imagination first he imagines himself as a Jīva ‘personal soul’ then various things, external and internal (II. 16). Consequently as in the dark, a piece of rope not known determinately is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., even so is imagined the self ; but when that piece of rope is known determinately the imagined snake, etc., vanish and there is no duality. So is to be known of the ascertainment of the self (II. 17, 18).

⁵ cittamātram na dṛśyo 'sti dvidhā cittam pravartate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmīyam na vidyate !! LA, III. 21

But what is the characteristic of a Jīva ? As we have seen above, Gauḍapāda explains it (III.3-9) by an apt illustration of ākāśa 'space' or *mahākāśa* 'great space' and *ghaṭākāśas* 'spaces occupied by different jars'. As it is owing to the condition (*upādhi*) of jars that the ākāśa is regarded as *ghaṭākāśas*, so it is on account of the conglomerations (of the different parts of the body) that the Ātman is regarded as Jīvas. Consequently as when the jars are destroyed spaces occupied by them are completely merged into the great space (*mahākāśa*), even so are merged the Jīvas into Ātman when the conglomerations are destroyed. The spaces occupied by all jars are in reality only one; yet if the space occupied by one jar is covered by smoke or dust, etc., not all the spaces occupied by all other jars are connected with it. The case is the same also with the Jīvas in regard to their happiness, etc., i.e., if one Jīva feels happiness or suffers pain, not all the Jīvas are subjected to it. There may be different conditions (*upādhis*); their forms, functions and names may differ from one another, but as regards the space occupied by them there is no difference. Similar is the case with reference to the Jīvas. Again, the space occupied by a jar is neither a transformation (*vikāra*), nor a part (*avayava*) of the space (*ākāśa*), similarly a Jīva is neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. Gauḍapāda says further that the Ātman like the space remains in all the conglomerations or bodies which, too, have no reality as dream being the creation of the illusion of the Ātman (III. 10). The Jīva is the supreme soul of the 'sheaths' (*kōśas*) as

described in the TU, II. 1-6, and the supreme Brahman or Ātman is shown in the *Madhuvidyā* section of the BU, II, 5. That the identity of the Jīva and the Ātman without distinction is praised and their distinction is censured in the scriptures is reasonable (III. 13), for though in some texts their distinction is to be found, those texts are to be taken in their secondary sense, the primary one being not reasonable (III. 14). Here the distinction is made purposely, it is made out of compassion to help one of inferior vision in one's *upāsanā* which is for such a person impossible without some sort of distinction (III. 11-16). It is not that such a distinction must be a real one.

It is said that the mind becomes non-mind and Gaudapāda is definitely of opinion that Brahman is nothing but the mind that has become non-mind. He says that the mind in the state of *susupti* 'deep sleep' falls into a sleeping state (*laya*), but it does not do so when it is suppressed (*nigr̥hīta=niruddha*), and indeed that is Brahman above fear and radiant with the light of *jñāna* (III. 35). See IV. 77-81, and below. He expresses the same thing in other words saying that when the mind is completely suppressed (*niruddha*) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything else it becomes Brahman (III. 46) :

yadā na liyate cittam na ca vikṣipyate punah !
anīganam anābhāsam niśpannam brahma tat tadā ॥

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is

distracted again, and as such has no movement, nor any sense-image, then it becomes Brahman.'⁶

It is to be pointed out that here for the first time, so far as goes my information, it is found that Brahman is nothing but the *citta* which by *nirodha* is *anidra* (I. 16; III. 36; IV. 81; = *alīna* = *amūḍha*), *asvapna* (I. 16, III. 36; IV. 81; = *avikṣipta*),⁷ *aniṅgana* (III. 46; = *akṣipta*), and *anābhāsa* (III. 46; = *nirābhāṣa* = *nirākāra* = *arūpaka*, III. 36). Another appellation of this *citta* is *sanirvāṇa*⁸ 'with extinction' (III. 37), i.e. in this state it is extinct. It is *jñāna* 'knowledge' or 'thought' but *akalpaka* (III. 33; = *nirvikalpa*) 'indeterminate' and consequently *asaṅga* 'having no attachment or relation to any object' (IV. 72, 96; = *niḥsaṅga* IV. 79, see IV. 99 = *nirviśaya*, IV. 72).⁹ Being as such this *jñāna* is not different from the knowable (*jñeyābhinna*), which is Brahman (III. 33).

⁶ The first half of the kārikā implies that in this state of the mind, which can be reached by *Asparśayoga* (III. 39-45; IV. 2) it is free from the conditions known in the Yoga systems as *mūḍha* 'stupefied' and *vikṣipta* 'distracted' (V yāsa on the YS, I. 1). These two are also expressed by our teacher as *anidra* 'sleepless' and *asvapna* 'dreamless' respectively (III. 36; I. 16; IV. 81).

⁷ Vācaspati (YS, I. 1): *mūḍham* tu *tamaḥsamudrekān* *nidrāvṛttimat*. *kṣiptad* *viśiṣṭam*. *viśeso* *sṭhemabahula*-ya *kādācīkaḥ* *sṭhemā*.

⁸ Here *sanirvāṇa* mind = *amanībhāva* (III. 31; MU, VI. 34; YY, III. 67. 8); = *amanastā* (III. 32; *Mukti UP.* II. 29) = *unmanībhāva* (*Brahmabindu UP.* 4) *manākṣaya* (MU, VI. 20) = *manorāśa* (*Mukti UP.* II. 10, 35, 36. 39) = *manolaya* (*Nādabindu UP.* 47) = *acittatā* (*Mukti UP.* II. 20) = *cittanāśa* (*Op. cit.* II. 32, 34; *Śāṇḍilya UP.* in *One Hundred and Eight Upaniṣads*, Nirnayasagar, 1917, p. 358).

⁹ See the Annotation on IV. 72.

It is further said that in this state the mind rests in itself (*svastha*, III. 47; = *ātmasaṁsthā*, III. 34).¹⁰

This Brahman of Gauḍapāda then points on one side to the state of *kaivalya* ‘the state of being not connected with anything else,’¹¹ or the resting of the Draṣṭṛ or Puruṣa ‘Self’ in himself (*svarūpa*, i.e., *cin-mātra* ‘pure thought’), as described in YS, I. 3,¹² and on the other to the resting of the *citta* in the *vijñaptimātratā* of the Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins. According to the latter *citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna* and *vijñapti* are synonyms.¹³ Therefore *vijñaptimātratā* is the same as *vijñānamātratā* which means the state of pure and simple *vijñāna* ‘intellect’ or ‘consciousness.’ Here in this state there is the highest cessation of the perceiving faculty of the mind.¹⁴ And this is in their opinion *mukti* ‘deliverance.’¹⁵ This is also the ‘highest place of Viṣṇu’ (KU, I. 3. 9; MU, VI. 26; RV, I. 22. 20; 154. 5 with a slight variation), not only according

¹⁰ This will remind one of the following in the ChU, VII. 24, 1-2 :

Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyac chṛṇoti nānyad vijñātī sa bhūmā.° sa bhagavah
kasmin pratīṣṭhitā iti. sve mahimni. yadi vā na mahimnī.

¹¹ YS, IV. 34 : puruṣārthaśūnyānām guṇānām pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyam
svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā citisakteḥ.

¹² tadā draṣṭuh svarūpe 'vasthānam.

¹³ Vāk, p. 3; AK, II. 34; MV, p. 303; VM ed. D. K o s a m b i , XIV.82.

¹⁴ MSA, XI. 47 : parama upalambhasya vigamah; Tk, p. 29 : acitto
'nupalambho 'sau; see TSN, 36.

¹⁵ viditvā nairātmyam dvividham iha dhīman bhavagataṁ

saṁsaṁ tac ca jñātvā pravīśati sa tattvam grahaṇataḥ |

tatas tatra sthānān manasa iha na khyāti tad api

tad akhyānam muktiḥ parama upalambhasya vigamah ||

MSA, 47.

to the Upaniṣadists,¹⁶ but also to the Vaiṣṇavas (BP, II. 1. 19).¹⁷

One point is to be discussed here. Brahman of the Vedāntists or Gauḍapāda (III. 30) is eternal (*nitya*), and if it is so, how can it be suggested, as done before, that Brahman and the *citta* in *Vijñaptimātratā* are the same, for according to Yogācāras *jñāna* is not eternal, but momentary (*kṣaṇika*) ? The following is the solution :—

In the authoritative Buddhist works¹⁸ the following words are used for *nirvāṇa* : *dhruva* ‘enduring’, *amṛta* ‘not dying’, *acyuta* ‘stable’, *akṣara* ‘imperishable’, *ajarjara* ‘not decaying’ and *apalokita*¹⁹ ‘not broken down.’ Certainly these words do not imply momentariness, but on the contrary some kind

The third and the first part of the fourth lines are explained there thus :
 tatas tatra tattvajñaptimātrasthānān manasas tad api tattvam na khyāti vijñaptimātram. tad akhyānam muktih.

¹⁶ MBU, p. 12 :

yan manas trijagatsrṣṭisthitivyasananakarmakīt !
tan mano vilayam yāti tad viṣṇoh paramam padam "

¹⁷ tatraikāvayavam dhyāyed avyucchinna cetasā |
mano nirviṣayam yuktvā tataḥ kiñcana na smaret |
padam tat paramam viṣṇor mano yatra prasīdāti "

¹⁸ VM, p. 224 ; SN, IV. 369 ff; Poussin : *Nirvāṇa*, ΛCXXV, pp. 153-4.

¹⁹ Poussin has for it in French (*Loc. cit.*) with a query “le Soupcunne” (‘suspected’ or ‘surmised’). But as clear from Buddhabhagosa on SN, IV. 370 (*apalujjatāya apalokitam*), it is derived from *pra-* √*rūj* and not from *pra-* √*luk* as may appear. And so it can be said in the words of Yaśomitra (AKV², p. 23) with regard to the derivation of the word *lokā* that *rūjir iha gṛhito na lokih*. See my note, *A passage of the Abhidharmaśāvyaśākhyā*, in IHQ, Vol. II, pp. 418 ff., and Poussin’s Rejoinder, p. 656.

of stability. Now the *citta* in the state of *vijñaptimātratā* is described variously according to the variety of the aspects beginning from the 'Path of Illumination' (*darśanamārga*) in *Vasubandhu's* Tk, 29-30.²⁰ It is said there to be *lokottara jñāna* 'super-mundane knowledge,' *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (*āśrayasya parāvṛttih*) 'the revolution or change of the recipient', i.e., the '*ālayavijñāna*,' and *anāsrava dhātu* 'undefiled element' which is *dhruva* 'enduring.'²¹ Here by the word *āśrayaparāvṛtti* referred to above we understand, in brief, that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil condition (*dauṣṭhulya*), viz., the 'covers' or 'obscurations' (*āvaraṇas*), namely, the knowable (*jñeyā*) and the passions (*kleśas*), the recipient (*āśraya*), i.e., *ālayavijñāna*, turns back to its natural state in the form of *advaya jñāna* 'the knowledge free from the two,' i.e., the subject and the object. In other words, the *ālayavijñāna* which was before covered or obscured, the obscurations being now removed, gets its own innate state, i.e., the state of *advaya* (= *lokottara*) *jñāna*. This is called *anāsrava dhātu* 'undefiled element' which is *dhruva*.

²⁰ See our text, IV. 18, foot note 1, where these two kārikās with the introductory line of *Sthiramati* are quoted.

²¹ On these words the commentary of *Sthiramati* may be quoted here:

aparicitatvāt (Tib. ḥdras. par. ma. byas. pa. dañ, for *anucitatvāt* in the printed text) loke samudācāśabhbāvāt (for which Tib. suggests *samudayābhāvāt* reading kun. tu. ḥbyuñ. ba. med. pa. dañ), nirvikalpatvāt ca lokād uttīrṇam iti jñānam lokottaram ca tad iti°. āśrayo 'tra sarvabijakam ālayavijñānam, tasya parāvṛttir yā dauṣṭhulyavipākadvayavāsanābhāvena parāvṛttih°. nirdausthulyatvāt sa tu āśrayavigata ity anāsravah°. dhruvo nityatvād akṣayatayā°.

But what is the true significance of the word *dhruva*, that is intended here? Among the 33 descriptive words for *nirvāṇa* found in SN, IV. 368-373 and 46 synonyms for it in AP. 6-9, we have *dhruva* and never *nitya*. It is true that sometimes the words *nitya*, *dhruva* and *śāśvata* are used as synonyms (Pali *vevecana* = *vivacana* = *paryāya*), as says Buddha ghoṣa himself on SN, I. 142.²² Yet, there is some difference in their meanings. For while *śāśvata*, according to him, means 'always existing' (*sadā vijjamānam*) *dhruva* implies 'enduring' (*dhuvam* 'ti thiram'; he writes also on SN, IV. 370: *thiraṭṭhena dhuvam*).

Jaina teachers, too, are of the same opinion. In connexion with the definition of *dravya* 'substance'²³ in their system they give the same explanation of the word *dhruva* or *dhrauvya* using the same or similar words.²⁴

In the older Upaniṣads *Ātman* or Brahman is *nitya* and not *dhruva*. The word *nitya* implies that it does not admit of any change, while *dhruva* does not do so. Let us give here an illustration. If of a lump of gold a number of different ornaments is made one after another, their forms change, yet, through these changes

²² With regard to pāpaka dīṭṭhigata: idam niccam idam dhuvam idam sassatam. See also Sthiramati, Tk, 30, explaining *dhruva* as quoted in foot-note 21.

²³ *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, V. 29: utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat.

²⁴ *Tattvārlharājavārttika* (Sanātana-Jainagrānthaṁlā, 1915), V 29 (*dhrava* = *sthira*); *Tattvadīpikā* on *Pravacanasāra* (ed. A. N. Upadhye, 1935) II. 3 (*dhrauvya* = *avashīti*); *Tattvadīpikā* on *Pañcāstisamayasāra* (Rāyacandriā Jainaśāstramālā, 2nd ed.), 10: purvottarabhāvocchedotpādayor api svajāter aparityāgō dhrauvyam; *Sammatilarka* (Gujarāta-Purāttatva-mandira, Ahmedabad, 1940 V.S), Gāthā 12, p. 410 (*dhrauvya* = *sthiti*).

the same gold continues to exist... Owing to this continuance it can be said that gold is here *dhruva* 'enduring', but not *nitya* 'eternal'.

The Ālayavijñāna is certainly momentary (*kṣanikā*), as it changes every moment. It does not therefore move forward as one and the same (ekam abhinnam), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (*santati*) as the flood with its currents (*srotasā oghavat*). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (*anādinidhana*) till *nirvāṇa*. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijñāna continues it is *dhruva* and not *nitya*.

It may be pointed out here that there is more than one kind of *nityatā* 'eternity' according to the primary and the secondary senses of the word; viz., (i) *kūṭasthanityatā* 'eternity as unchangeability' as of Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntists; (ii) *parināmanityatā* 'eternity as transformation' as held by the Sāṅkhyas and the Jainas. To these two may be added, according to the Buddhists, (iii) one more, viz., *santatinityatā* 'eternity as continuance.' It may, however, be the same as *parināma-nityatā*. Where in such cases in Buddhist texts the word *nitya* is employed it is to be taken in this light.

Now in support of the main problem we are here concerned with, the following couplet may be taken into consideration :

prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ!
teśām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram ||²⁵

²⁵ Quoted by Jayatīrtha representing the views of the Vijñānavādins in his *ṭīkā* (sl. 30, on TĀK, III, p. 35). It is already cited once more on p. 70 of our text.

Mark that *citta* is said here to be *avinaśvara jyotiś* 'the light that is not liable to be destroyed'.²⁶

It may therefore be safely concluded that Gauḍādā's Brahman and the *citta* in *vijñaptimātratā* of the Yogācāras are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is *nitya* the latter is *dhruva*.

Let us remember here what Gauḍāpāda says about Brahman (III. 35-36, 46-47),²⁷ as we have seen just now from the Vedāntic point of view, and compare with what he says in IV. 76-81²⁸ of the 'field of the activities (*viśaya*) of the Buddhas' describing

²⁶ See also the following :

(i) tatrotpannpradhvamṣi vijñānam anutpannpradhvamṣi jñānam A, p. 157. See our text p. 85, foot-note 2.

(ii) *Jñānasiddhi* (Two Vajrayāna Texts, GOS, p. 85), XV, 50, referring *cittadhārā* 'current of thought' (in the text read *cittadhāraiva* for *chittāreva* in 48) :

anādinidhanā śāntā sarvadharmaśvari ca sā |
bibharti sarvarūpāṇi satyadvayasamāśritā ||

(iii) *Op. cit.*, p. 75 : anādinidhanām śāntām bodhicittam.

(iv) *Op. cit.*, p. 86 : jñānam amaraṇam° anabhilāpyam.

(v) Suzuki writes in his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1907, 348: "Nirvāṇa is sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes: (1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) blissful (*sukha*), (3) self-acting (*ātman*), and (4) pure (*śuci*). It is eternal, because it is immaterial; it is blissful, because it is above all sufferings; it is self-acting, because it knows no compulsion; it is pure, because it is not defiled by passion and error."

²⁷ Brahman is that *citta* which is unwavering and has no sense-image or origination, nor sleep, nor dream : *aniṅganam anābhāsam* (III. 46) and *ajam anidram asvapnam cittam* (III. 36).

²⁸ The field of activities or the aim of the Buddhas is the unwavering position of the mind having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream : *cittasya anutpattiḥ* (IV. 77) and *niścalā sthitih* (IV. 80), and *ajam anidram asvapnam cittam* (IV. 81).

and approving the views of the Buddhists ; it will then be clear that the same thing has been said by Gauḍapāda in two places almost in the same words though from the two different standpoints.

We have already discussed the *Vijñānavāda* as it is in our text. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is treated here by Gauḍapāda only with a view to the establishment of the *Ajātivāda* ‘the Theory of Non-origination’ which is one of the most important topics of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda. Having proposed to show what it is first in III. 2 and then in IV. 5 he declares (III. 48) and affirms (IV. 71) that the highest truth is that nothing originates. For details the reader is referred to the *Conspectus of the Contents* (pp. cxiii-cxxvi) and the work itself, we should like to point out here only a few important aspects of it.

The subject is dealt with by our author as a Vedāntist separately in two places, Book II and Book IV. In the former he does so purely from the Vedāntic point of view supporting his thesis by scriptures and grounds based on them or in favour of them, some of these grounds being strikingly similar to those offered by the Buddhists for the same purpose ; while in the latter, he expresses his approval on behalf of his school regarding *ajāti* as declared by the Advayas or Buddhists saying that he does not dispute with them on this point and asking his followers or the people at large to listen to him as to how there cannot be any dispute. He proceeds then to show throughout the Book IV the

arguments of the Buddhists taking even the actual words from their authoritative works in a number of cases. Readers are here referred to our text with Annotation.

One point may be pointed out here. In Book IV Gauḍapāda has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta,²⁹ as nothing Vedāntic will be found therein. In explaining the Vedānta in accordance with his own light he establishes the *Ajātivāda* in Book III, as we have seen above. Then in Book IV he supports that theory referring to the Buddhists who also hold the same view independently of the Vedāntists. Gauḍapāda says here that his school approves of what they say on this point and shows their arguments one by one.

From this it may appear that whatever is said by Gauḍapāda as the opinion of the Buddhists in that Book is approved or accepted by him. But can it be said strictly ? The Buddhists being the follower of the Middle Path (*madhyama pratipad*) reject both the extreme views of 'eternity' and 'annihilation' (*sāśvata-* and *ucceda-vādas*). This is alluded to in our text in IV. 57-60. But how can Gauḍapāda as a Vedāntist accept it when his Brahman in his own word (III. 33) is eternal (*nitya*)? Nevertheless, in the present case, Gauḍapāda seems to have accepted the middle theory, for, as the case is put here, there may not be raised any objection. Or it may be that Gauḍapāda has here simply mentioned the views

²⁹ Even such words as Brahman and Ātman are not to be found there;

of the Buddhists as he has done it in some other cases in this Book. For instance, see IV. 90.

It is a very striking fact that some of the most remarkable doctrines as discussed and established by Gauḍapāda have not been appreciated in subsequent works on the Vedānta even of the Advaita school; for instance, the peculiar conception of Brahman, the *Ajātivāda*, the *Sarvajñatvavāda* (IV. 85, 89) and the *Vijñānavāda*, besides what Gauḍapāda approves of the views of the Advayavādins or Buddhists in Book IV. Even the great Śaṅkara himself does not appear to subscribe to the above doctrines of our teacher. It need not, however, be said that his *Māyāvāda* has undoubtedly got strong impetus from the first three Books of the ĀŚ. His *Adhyāsavāda* as explained by him in his *Śārīrakabhbhasya* and other works has no mention in the ĀŚ, though a distant relationship may be found out. Here he is undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist Vijñānavādins specially in explaining their doctrine of *Trisvabhāva* or *Trilakṣaṇa* 'three characteristics' (IV. 74, pp. 175 ff).

Of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda there is much more that deserves to be discussed separately, but in order to avoid prolixity readers are referred to the text itself, specially to its Book IV together with the new Annotation of the present writer, in which he has tried to explain many an important and hitherto obscure point of the work. From this, it is hoped, readers will be in a position to form their own judge-

ments as to how much *Gauḍapāda* is influenced by Buddhist thoughts and how much of them he has adopted into his own system of the *Vedānta*.³⁰

³⁰ One may consider here the following words in the *Bhāvaprakāśa* (TM, Vol. II, p. 415) referring to ĀŚ, IV, 11-23 :

nanu māṇḍūkyakārikāsu Gauḍapādācāryaiḥ mādhyamikoktayuktibhiḥ kāiyakāraṇa- (for wrongly printed *kāryākāraṇa*) bhāvasya sāṃvṛtatvam
sīhāpitam.

BOOK I

I

bahiṣprajño vibhur viśvo hy antaḥprajñas tu taijasah !
ghanaprajñas tathā prajña eka eva tridhā sthitah ||

'The all-pervading one is Viśva 'all' when he has the consciousness of outside ; he is Taijasa 'brilliant' when he has the consciousness of inside and when his consciousness is concentrated¹ he is Prajña 'intelligent'. The one exists in three forms.'²

¹ Literally 'condensed' (*ghana*), in other words, when consciousness does not admit of any distinction within itself, as is the case in wakefulness and in dream.

² See I. 2

2

dakṣinākṣimukhe viśvo manasy antas tu taijasah !
ākāse ca hṛdi prajñas tridhā dehe vyavasthitah ||

'Viśva is in the front of the right eye,¹ within the mind is Taijasa, while Prajña is in the sky in the heart.² Thus he remains in the body in three ways.'³

¹ KtU, IV. 17; MU, VII. 11; ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; BU, II. 3. 5, IV. 2. 2, V. 5. 2, 4.

² BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3.

³ See pp. lxxxiv-lxxxviii and I. 3.

3.

viśvo hi sthūlabhuṇ nityam taijasah praviviktabhuk !
ānandabhuk tathā prajñas tridhā bhogam nibodhata !!

'Viśva enjoys what is gross, Taijasa what is fine, and Prajña bliss. (Thus) know enjoyment to be of three kinds.'

4

sthūlam tarpayate viśvam praviviktaṁ tu taijasam !
ānandaś ca tathā prajñam tridhā tṛptim nibodhata !!

'The gross satisfies Viśva, the fine Taijasa, and bliss Prajña. (Thus) know satisfaction to be of three kinds.'

5

triṣu dhāmasu yad bhojyam bhoktā yaś ca prakīrtitah !
vedaitad ubhayam yas tu sa bhuñjāno na lipyate !!

'One who knows both what is said to be enjoyable, and what is said to be the enjoyer in three stages, is not tainted through enjoying.'

6

prabhavaḥ sarvabhūtānām satām iti viniścayah !
sarvam janayati prāṇaś ceto'mśūn puruṣah pṛthak !!

'The settled opinion of sages is that all things have their origin. (Some hold that) the Breath,¹ the Puruṣa (self), creates all—the rays of the mind, differently.'

For the creation by Prāṇa see BS, I. I. 23. Prāṇa is here Brahman.

The objective world is the vibrations of one's mind (*cittaspandita*, see IV. 72) which shines inside. These vibrations are called here rays (*amśū*) and assume different forms just like the rays of the sun on the clouds appearing in the form of the rainbow.

7

vibhūtim prasavam tv anye manyante sṛṣṭicintakāḥ ।
svapnamāyāsvarūpeti sṛṣṭir anyair vikalpitā ॥

'Other theorisers about creation assert dogmatically that the creation (of the world) is (his) expansion,¹ while others imagine that creation is of the nature of dream and magic.'²

¹ As in the *Upaniṣads*. TU, II. 6. 1: so 'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya.

² This view is held by some of the Vedantists including our teacher (see II. 31) and the Buddhists, Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras.

8

icchāmātram prabhoh sṛṣṭir iti sṛṣṭau viniścitāḥ ।
kālāt prasūtim bhūtānām manyante kālacintakāḥ ॥

'Those who are assured about creation say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord,¹ and those who theorise about Time consider the creation of beings to be from Time.'²

¹ See note on 1.7. Kūrānārāyaṇa, a follower of Rāmānuja, says that they are *Aupaniṣadas* or the followers of the *Upaniṣads*, who say He is *satyasorīkalpa* 'one whose purpose is true or fulfilled' (ChU, 3.14.2).

² They are Astronomers, See SU, I. 1; MU, 7; MB, XII. 224, 227; SS, pp. 10-11 and specially the hymns on Kāla in the AV, XIX. 53, 54.

Now as regards the object of the creation the author says:

9

bhogārtham sṛṣṭir ity anye kṛidārtham iti cāpare !
devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā spṛhā ||

'Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of (his) enjoyment,¹ while others (are of opinion) that it is for the sake of his sport.² It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is (already) secured.'³

Kūraṇārāyaṇa says here in his ḥikāḥ harer atīptasyaiva bhogārtham sṛṣṭir ity anye. Śrinivāsatīrtih'a, an annotator of Mādhyācārya's commentary on MāU, clearly says that this view is held by Rāmānuja or his followers (kecid rāmānujāḥ).'

¹ See BU, I.4.17: ātmavedam agra āśid eka eva, so 'kāmayaata jāyā me syād atha prajāyeya vittam me syād atha karma kurviyeti.

² See BS, II. 1. 33: lokavat tu lila-kaivalyam; MU, VI. 1: viśvākṛidāratiprabhuḥ.

³ The second half of the kārikā is quoted as śruti in the Mādhvabhbāṣya on BS, II. 1, 33.

10

nivṛtteḥ sarvaduhkhānām iśānah prabhur avyayah !
advaitah sarvabhāvānām devas turyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ ||

'The Turya 'fourth one' is said to be all-pervading, efficient in removing all miseries, the shining one, changeless, and of all things without a second.'

¹ The other three are already mentioned: Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña.

11

kāryakāraṇabaddhau tāv iṣyete viśvataijasau |
prajñah kāraṇabaddhas tu dve tu turye na sidhyataḥ ||¹

'It is held that those two, Viśva and Taijasa, are bound with cause and effect, Prajña is bound with cause, but in Turya neither of them can be asserted.'

Here according to the commentator 'cause' (*kāraṇa*) is non-grasping of the truth (*tattvāgrahaṇa*), while 'effect' (*kārya*) is grasping the truth otherwise (*anyathāgrahaṇa*). See I. 15. These two are common to both Viśva and Taijasa. In Prajña there is only *tattvāgrahaṇa*, 'while in Turya there is neither of them, Cf. PS¹, 31; PS², 34, 35.

¹ This kārikā is quoted in the NSI, IV. 41.

12

nātmānam na parāmś caiva na satyam nāpi cānṛtam |
prajñah kiñcana samvetti¹ turiyāḥ sarvadṛk² sadā ||

'Prajña knows nothing—neither himself nor others, neither truth nor falsehood; but Turya is always all-seeing.'

As to why Prajña is bound with cause (*tattvāgrahaṇa*) and Turya is not bound with either of cause and effect (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) is stated in the following kārikā.

¹ See BU, IV. 3. 21.

² See IV. 84; Cf. *sarvajña*, III. 36, 47.

As Prājñā does not know anything he is regarded as bound with the cause (*tattvāgrahaṇa*) which is just like darkness (*tamas*).³ As regards Turya there being nothing except himself he is all-seeing and thus in the absence of all ignorance he is not bound in any way.

³ See US, XVIII, 26.

13

dwaitasyāgrahaṇam tulyam ubhayoh prājñaturyayoh |
bijanidrāyutah prājñah sā ca turye na vidyate ||

'Non-recognition of duality is common to both Prājñā and Turya; but Prājñā is with sleep which is a seed (i.e., cause of specific cognition), while it does not exist in Turya.'

In this kārikā the difference between Prājñā and Turya is shown. In the text *nidrā* 'sleep' implies *tattvāpratibodha* 'non-realization of truth' (I. 15), and as it is the cause of specific cognition in dream and waking it is called *bija* 'seed'.

14

svapnanidrāyutāv ādyau prājñas tv asvapnanidrayā |
na nidrām naiva ca svapnam turye paśyanti niścitāḥ ||

'The first two (Viśva and Taijasa) are with sleep and dream,¹ Prājñā is with dreamless sleep, while those who are certain (about the truth) see neither sleep nor dream in Turya.'

It follows, therefore, from the above that Turya is not bound either with cause or with effect.

¹ Dream (*svapna*) is 'knowing otherwise' (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) and sleep (*nidrā*), as said before, is 'non-cognition of truth' (*tattvāpratibodha*). See I. 15.

15

anyathā gr̄hnataḥ svapno nidrā' tattvam ajānataḥ ।
viparyāse tayoḥ kṣīne turīyam padam aśnute ॥²

'Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know the Reality. The error in these two (*svapna* and *nidrā*) being destroyed one attains the stage of *Turiya*.'

¹ See YS, I. 10.

² See NSI, IV. 42; US, xviii. 26,

16

anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvah prabudhyate ।
ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tadā ॥

'When the Jiva sleeping on account of illusion¹ which has no beginning is awakened, he realizes (the state of *Turya*) which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream,² nor duality.'

¹ The commentator says that this *māyā* is in the form of *tattvāpratibodha* and *anyathāgrahaṇa*.

² See I. 14, III. 36, IV. 81.

17

prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na samśayah ।
māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthatataḥ ॥

'If the expansion of the (visible) universe (*prapañca*) were (really) existing it would have to cease to exist, no doubt, but this duality is mere illusion, in absolute truth there is non-duality.'

For the meaning of *prapañca* see Candra kīrtti on MV, p. 350:

te ca vikalpā anādimatsaṁsārābhyaṣṭāj jñānajñeya-vācyavācaka-kartikarmakriyā-ghaṭa-paṭa-mukuṭa-ratha-rūpa-vedanā-stri-puruṣa-lābhālābha-sukha-duḥkha-yaśo-'yaśo-nindā-praśaṁsādi-lakṣaṇād vicitrāt prapañcād upajāyante.

Op. cit., p. 373:

prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā.

18

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit |
upadeśād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate ||

'False creation (*vikalpa*)' would cease if it were created¹ by some one. This statement (of *vikalpa*) is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality) is known there is no duality.'

It means that if it is held, as we hold, that the *vikalpa* (= *prapañca* in the preceding kārikā) 'false creation', i.e., duality, is made by some one it must disappear. We say that it is said so in order to instruct the ignorant or stupid people, so that they may gradually arrive at the truth (*ajñānām avibodhātham*.—YV, III. 84.24). This will be clear from YV (III. 84.19-27), from which a few lines are quoted below.

The second half of the kārikā is identical with YV. III. 84.25a and 27b with the single variation that in 26a there is *avibodhād* for our *upadeśād*. The reading *avibodhād*, however, seems to have actually been *avabodhād*. See the following from YV, III.84:

upadeśāya sāstreṣu jātaḥ śabdo 'thavārthaḥ |
pratiyogiyavacchedasamkhyālakṣaṇapakṣavān || 19
bhedo dīśyata evāyam vyavahārān na vāstavaḥ |
vetālo bālakasyeva kāryārthaṁ parikalpitah || 20

¹ That is, duality which is only imaginary.

² Lit. imagined.

et mādimayī mithyāsaṅkalpākalpanā matā |
 ajñānām avabodhārthaṁ na tu bhedo 'sti vastuni || 24
 avibodhād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate |
 jñāte saṃśāntakalanam maunam evāvaśiṣyate || 25
 vivadante hy asaṃbudhāḥ svavikalpavijñmbhitaiḥ |
 upadeśād ayaṁ vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate || 27

In *a* of the kārikā KN reads *na nivarteta* for *vinivarteta*. Accordingly it would give the following meaning: *vikalpa* would not cease if it is created by some one, but the fact is not so, for it is mentioned only for one's instruction. KN, however, explains it differently.

19

viśvasyātvavivakṣayām ādi sāmānyam utkaṭam |
 mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ||

'In the desire of saying that Viśva is A and in knowing the measure¹ the common quality 'first' (*ādi*) as well as 'pervading' (*āpti*) is quite apparent.'

Ātman is to be meditated through the symbol Om, and for doing so these two must be regarded as identical. This identification of Ātman and Om is described in this and the following two kārikās. In the present kārikā the first part (*pāda*) of Ātman, viz., Viśva, is identified with the first part or measure (*mātrā*) of Om, viz., the letter A. It is to be noted that Om results from the euphonic combination of the three letters (*mātrās*), A, U and M. In such identification there must be some common quality (*sāmānya dharma*) of the things to be

¹ That is, in knowing the identity of the first *mātrā* of Om, i.e., A, with the first *pāda* of Ātman, i.e., Viśva. See I, 20, 21, note 1.

meditated as identical.² In the present case there are two common qualities, 'first' (*ādi*) and 'pervading' (*āpti*). As Viśva is the first of the four *pādas* of Ātman, so A is the first of all the letters of which Om is composed. And, again, as the reward of one who understands this identity of Viśva and A is far-reaching (for one attains thereby everything that one may desire), so is far-reaching A, for, as said in the *śruti*, A is all speech, as it manifests itself in different letters.³

² See *bhaktivāda* in Vedic texts; *Nirukta*, VII. 24 : bahubhaktivādīni brāhmaṇāni bhavanti; and the present writer's *Vedic Interpretation and Tradition* in the *Proceedings of the Sixth Oriental Conference* held at Patna, p. 498.

³ Sāyaṇa says in his commentary on the TA, VII : etad apy aitareyake samāmnātam akāro vai sarvā vāk. saisā sparśoṣmabhir vyanjamānā bahvī nānā-rupā bhavati. This passage is quoted by commentators on the BG, X. 33. See AA. III. 2.3 with Sāyaṇa : tasvaitasyākāro rasah.

20

taijasasyotvavijñāna utkarṣo dṛṣyate sphuṭam |
mātrāsampratipattau syād ubhayatvam tathāvidham ||

'In understanding that Taijasa is (the letter) U and in knowing the measure,¹ the common quality 'subsequence' (*utkarṣa*) as well as the state of being in (the middle of) both (*ubhayatva*) is clearly seen.'

The common qualities required for identification of Taijasa with U are *utkarṣa* 'subsequence' and *ubhayatva* which is the same as *madhyasthatva* 'intermediate position.'

¹ That is, in understanding that the second *mātrā* of Om, i.e., U, and the second *pāda* of Ātman, i.e., Taijasa, are identical. See I, 19, note 1. and 21, note 1.

Taijasa is subsequent to Viśva and U is subsequent to A; therefore there is *utkaraṣa*. Taijasa and U both are in the middle being between Viśva and Prājña and A and M respectively.

21

makārabhāve prājñasya mānasāmānyam utkaṭam |
mātrāsampratipattau tu layasāmānyam eva ca ||

'In the identity of Prājña with (the letter) M and in understanding the measure the clear common quality is 'measure' (*māna*) as well as 'disappearance' (*laya*).'

The commentator's explanation of the kārikā, as I understand it, is as follows: In involution Viśva and Taijasa enter into Prājña, while in evolution they come out of it; and as such they, as it were, are measured with Prājña, just as grains of barley are measured with *prastha* 'a special standard of measure,' generally a basket made of bamboo or cane of particular capacity. In measuring the grains they are first put into the basket and then they are taken out. Now as Viśva and Taijasa enter into and come out of Prājña, so in pronouncing Om continually, A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. This is the first common quality, called 'measure' (*māna*) for the identification of Prājña and M. The second common quality called 'disappearance' (*laya*) is this: In *susupti* 'profound, deep and undisturbed sleep' Viśva and Taijasa disappear in Prājña. Similarly in pronouncing Om, A and U seem to disappear in M.

22

triṣu dhāmasu yas tulyaiṇ sāmānyam vetti niścitaḥ ।
sa pūjyah sarvabhūtānāṁ vandyāś caiva mahāmuniḥ ॥

'One who knows what is equal and common in the three stages and is certain (about it) is a great sage worthy of veneration and praise of all beings.'

23

akāro nayate viśvam ukāraś cāpi taijasam ।
makāraś ca punah prājñām nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ ॥

'A leads to Viśva, U to Taijasa, and M to Prājña; there is no going to that which has no measure (*mātrā*).'¹

This is the consequence of one's meditating upon the symbol Om consisting of three *mātrās*, A, U and M. The last *pāda* of the kārikā speaks of the consequence of the meditation on 'the fourth' (Turya). In this state none is led to anywhere, it itself being the cessation of all duality (*dvaitasya upaśamah*).²

¹ That is, Turya.

² See I. 29.

24

oṅkāram pādaśo vidyāt pādā mātrā na saṃśayah ।
oṅkāram pādaśo jñātvā na kiñcid api cintayet ॥

'One should understand Om with each of the *pādas* 'quarters'; no doubt, the *pādas* are the *mātrās* 'measures.'

¹ It is said in the original Up, 8 : pādā mātrā mātrāś ca pādāḥ, which means that the quarters (*pādas*) of ātmā are to be regarded as identical with the measures (*mātrās*) of Om.

And having understood Om with each of the *pādas* one should not think of anything else.²

² For d cf. BG, VI. 25 : *ātmasamsthāṇ manah kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet*. See BP, II. 1.19.

25

yuñjīta praṇave cetah praṇavo brahma nirbhayam |
praṇave nityayuktasya na bhayaṁ vidyate kvacit ||

'One should apply¹ the mind to Om, for Om is Brahman in whom there is no fear. And nowhere is fear for him who is always fixed² upon Om.'

¹ That is, concentrate.

² That is, whose mind is always fixed.

26

praṇavo hy aparaṁ brahma praṇavaś ca param smṛtaḥ |
apūrvo 'nantaro 'bāhyo 'naparah praṇavo 'vyayah ||

'Om is said to be the lower, as well as the higher Brahman. Om is without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside.'¹

¹ BU, IV. 5. 83 : anantaro'bāhyah.

27

sarvasya praṇavo hy ādir madhyam antas tathaiva ca |
evam hi praṇavam jñātvā vyāśnute tad anantaram ||

'Om is the beginning, middle, and end of all. Having known Om in this way one attains it¹ immediately.'

¹ Original *kad*. It seems to refer to Brahman in the preceding kārikā. The commentator takes it to refer to *ātmabhāva*.

28

praṇavam hīśvaram̄ vidyāt sarvasya hṛdi saṃsthitam¹ |
sarvavyāpinam oṅkāraṁ matvā dhīro na śocati² ||

'One should know Om to be the Lord present in the heart of all. Having understood the all-pervading Om a wise man does not grieve.'

¹ BG, XIII. 17 : hṛdi sarvasya dhiṣṭhitam ; KU, II. 3. 17 : sadā janānām hṛdaye sannivīṣṭah.

² KU, I. 2. 22 ; II. I. 4, 3. 6.

29

amātro 'nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopaśamaḥ śivah ।
oṅkāro vido yena sa munir netaro janaḥ ॥

iti gauḍapādīya āgamaśāstra āgamākhyam
prathamaṁ prakaraṇam̄ samāptam.

'He and no other person is a sage (*muni*)¹ who knows Om which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure, and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss.'

'Here ends, in the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, Book One, called Traditional Doctrine.'

¹ I. 22.

BOOK II

1

vaitathyam sarvabhāvānām svapna āhur manisinah ।
antahsthānāt tu bhāvānām samvṛitatvena hetunā ॥

'The wise say that all things in a dream are unreal, for they are within owing to the fact that they are enclosed.'

See II. 4, IV. 33.

Things such as mountains, elephants, etc., which are seen in a dream are not outside but inside the body. But as in reality they cannot exist within the body they must be regarded as unreal. Literally the kārikā means that owing to the fact that the things in a dream are enclosed (*samvṛta*) they are inside (*antahsthāna*), and hence they are unreal (*vitatha*). But it will be evident from kārikā IV. 33 in which this very thought is expressed in almost identical words, that the state of being enclosed (*samvṛtatva*) is not with reference to things (*bhūtas*), but to the place (*pradeśa*). This explanation of the author himself may rightly be accepted here and also in kārikā II. 4.

See II. 2.

That the things seen in a dream are inside the body is explained in the following kārikā :

2

adīrghatvāc ca kālasya gatvā deśān na paśyati ।
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate ॥

'The time being not long one does not see the things

dreamt) by going to (different) places ; and no person, on waking, is in the place (where he dreamt himself to be).'

It cannot be held that in a dream one goes to different places and sees things in those places, for one may see things in a dream in a very distant land, but the time being short it is impossible to think that the dreamer travels to that distant land and sees the things there. Moreover, it is found that a dreamer, on waking, does not see himself in the country where he dreamt himself to be.

Thus it follows that the things seen in a dream do not exist in the external world.

As support of this view the author refers in the next kārikā to the BU, IV. 3. 10 :

3

abhaś ca rathādinām śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam !

vaitathyam tena vai prāptam svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam ||

'The non-existence of chariots, etc. (seen in a dream), with the reason therefor, is learnt from the śruti.' Therefore, it is

¹ See BU, IV. 3. 10 which runs as follows : na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanty atha rathān rathayogān pathah sijate. In this passage *tatra* refers to *svapna*. See also IV. 3. 13 :

svapnānta uccāvacam iyamāno
rūpāṇi devaḥ kurute bahūni !
uteva stribhīḥ saha modamāno
jakṣad utevāpi bhayāni paśyan ||

As regards the *nyāya* 'reason' referred to here, Puruṣottama writes : svapnānta uccāvacam iyamāna—iti mantrēṇānekarūpakaraṇam uktvā tasmān nāyatām bodhayed durbhiṣajyam hāsmai bhavatity anena suptasya nirbandhena jāgaranे kaṣṭam āha yady anyatra gato bhavet tatkaraṇām na vaded (?) durbhaiṣajyam ca. yatra suptas tatraiva striyā svapne ramamāṇah skhalite jāgrat tām bahiḥ paśyet. yato na'paśyati tataḥ karoti. yataḥ karoti tato rathādyabhāvāḥ. evam ca svapne pūrvam rathādyabhāvāḥ paścāt karaṇād ityādīnyāyapūrvakam.

said that the unreality (of things seen) in a dream, as follows (from the foregoing arguments), is evident.'

In the next kārikā the author proceeds to show the unreality of things in the waking state also applying the same reasons :

4

antahsthānāt tu bhedānām tathā jāgarite smṛtam |
yathā tatra tathā svapne samvṛitatvam na bhidyate¹ ||

'The same² is declared of the things³ in waking on account

¹ The actual reading of *d* in all printed texts and MSS. examined is *saṃvṛitavena bhidyate* which hardly gives any proper sense. The commentary does not help us on this point. It explains : *antahsthānāt saṃvṛitatvena ca svapnadīśyānām bhāvānām jāgraddīśyebhyo bhedaḥ*—'on account of being inside as well as of being covered the phenomena in a dream are different from those in waking.' But this explanation is hardly possible, for one naturally expects here to know the non-difference (*abheda*) and not the difference between the things in waking and in dream. Accordingly one might disjoin the *sandhi* in *jāgraddīśyebhyo bhedaḥ* in the commentary taking the last word as *abhedaḥ* and not *bhedaḥ*, though Ānanda giri evidently accepts the latter. Apart from the propriety of that explanation the question is: How should one construe the second half of the kārikā? What is the nominative of the verb *bhidyate*? According to the commentator it must be *svapnadīśya bhāva*, but it is not in the text, nor can it be understood or supplied from any of the preceding kārikās.

One may, however, take the line as *saṃvṛitava na bhidyate*. In this case the nominative is *vaitathyā* 'unreality' which is to be supplied from the preceding kārikā. The author wants here to show the unreality of the phenomena in the waking state just like that of those in a dream on the same ground, i.e., *antahsthāna* which is due to *saṃvṛitava* of the place. Thus it is said that the *vaitathyā* of the things in waking does not differ from that of the things in a dream, for in both the cases *saṃvṛitava* is the same, there being no difference whatsoever.

² That is, *vaitathyam* already described in the preceding kārikā.

³ The words *bhūta* (IV. 33), *bhāva* (II. 13, 16, 17, 19, 33 ; III. 20, 22), and *bheda* (II. 4, 5, 11, 12) are the same as regards the meaning.

of the fact that they are inside ; for, as there (i.e., in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ.'⁴

See II. I, IV. 33.

I should, however, like to suggest the reading as *samvṛtavat* *na bhidyate* which makes the sense very clear.

As to how the state of being enclosed (*samvṛtavat*) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following kārikās (II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15 ; III. 29, 30 ; IV. 61, 62, 64-66), where it is fully explained, as the Vijnānavādins would say, that there being no external thing in reality, whatever we see around us either in waking or in dream is only imagined (*kalpita*) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (*samvṛta*). Says Diñnāga in his Ālambanaparīkṣā, 6 : yad antar jñeyarūpam tad bahirvad avabhāsate.

Puruṣottama writes here: jāgarita iti. bahir anubhavat katham antalīsthatvam ity ākānkṣayām svapnatulyatvād iti vaktum svapnasyaitattaulyam āha yathā treti. yathā jāgarite manodhyāto 'rthaḥ śarirasamvṛtavena bāhyebhyo bhidyata iti śarirāntalīsthatvam tathā svapne 'pi pūrvain uktam. atas tattulyatvāt tathety arthaḥ.

⁴ The commentary reads in explaining the kārikā :

jāgraddṛśyānām bhāvānām vaitathyam iti pratijñā. dṛśyatvād iti hetuh. svapnadṛśyabhvavād iti dṛśāntah. yathā tatra svapne dṛśyānām bhāvānām vaitathyām tathā jāgarite 'pi dṛśyatvam avisisṭam iti hetūpanayāḥ. tasmāj jāgarite 'pi vaitathyām smṛtam iti nīgamanam.

Now the author goes to show further in the next kārikā that there is no difference between the two states, waking and dream ; in fact they are one :

5

svapnajāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur maniṣināḥ ।
bhedānām hi samatvena prasiddhenāiva hetunā ॥

'The wise say that the two states, dream and waking, are

one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states), for the reason that has been well established.'

The first half of the kārikā refers to BU, IV. 3. 14 :

- atho khalv āhur jāgaritadeśa evāsyaiṣa iti yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti.

Here *esah* refers to *svapna*, as says Śaṅkara: *esah svapnah*.

For *svapnajāgarite sthāne* cf. BU, IV. 3. 9 : dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ.

'The reason that has been well established' (*prasiddhenaina hetuṇā*) refers to *antahsthāna* already explained (II. 1, 4),

Though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal. How it may be so the author proceeds to say in the following kārikās:

6

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā ।
vitathaiḥ sadṛśaḥ santo'vitathā iva laksitāḥ ॥

See IV. 31.

'That which is non-existent at the beginning, and at the end, is so also at the present (i.e., in the middle); being like the unreal¹ things still appear as not unreal' ;

For a full discussion see IV. 31, which is identical with the present kārikā.

¹ That is, being like mirage, etc., which are acknowledged to be unreal by all.

7

saprayojanatā teṣāṁ svapne'pi pratipadyate¹ ।
tasmād ādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ ॥

¹ The reading of *b* generally found in editions and MSS. examined is *svapne vipratipadyate*; but as the sense requires it should 'be *svapne'pi pratipadyate*

'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known. Hence owing to their having a beginning and an end, indeed, they are regarded as unreal.'

For particulars see IV. 32 which is a repetition of the present kārikā.

padyate which is actually found in a MS., D². in IV. 32 which is identical with the present kārikā. Here, too, MS. Vn. reads *svapne ca prati*^o. It is supported also by MS. Ch (८) of the Comm. in Ānandāśrama ed. which has *svapne prati*^o for *svapne vīprati*^o.

8

apūrvāḥ sthānidharmā hi yathā svarganivāsinām !
tān ayam prekṣate gatvā yathaiveha suśikṣitāḥ ||

'(The phenomena of dream) are strange, like (the characteristics) of the inhabitants of the heaven; they are the characteristics of the person in the place (of dream, i.e., the dreamer himself). Just like one who is well trained here, he goes and sees them (in dream).'

I confess this kārika is not quite clear to me. I simply write what I have been able to gather from it in the light of the commentator.

It is to be noted that in *a* I suggest the reading *apūrvāḥ sthānidharmāḥ* for *apūrvam sthānidharmah*, so that the former can be connected with *tān* in *c*. For other readings see the commentary and the Appendix.

The kārikā seems to say as follows: The phenomena of dream, on the analogy of which the objects of the waking experience are held to be unreal, are sometimes strange, as the characteristics of some gods, such as the thousand eyes of Indra, and this is the nature of the dreamer (*sthānin* 'one in the place' of dream) himself. And just as a man who is

well trained goes to a place and sees there strange things, so he sees strange things in a dream.

The next two kārikās seek to establish the unreality of dream and waking experience alike :

9

svapnavṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat |
bahiś cetogṛhitam sad dṛṣṭam vaitathyam etayoh ||

'Even in the state of dream that which is imagined by mind within is (regarded as) non-existing (*asat*), while that which is cognized by mind without is (regarded as) existing (*sat*) ; (but) the unreality of (both of) them is a matter of experience.'

10

jāgradvṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat |
bahiś cetogṛhitam sad yuktam vaitathyam etayoh ||

'In the waking state also, that which is imagined by mind within is regarded as non-existing (*asat*), while that which is cognized by mind without is regarded as existing, (*sat*) ; the unreality of (both of) them is reasonable.'

Cf. these two kārikās with IV. 63-66.

The opponent here says that it cannot be said that everything in the waking experience and dream is unreal, for there must be at least one thing real without which we cannot go on:

14

cittakālāś ca ye 'ntas tu dvayakālāś ca ye bahih !
kalpitā eva te sarve višeśo nānyahetukah :

'Those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (*citta*), and those which are without and exist as long as remains (the notion of) the two (*i.e.*, *grāhya* 'perceptible' and *grāhaka* 'percipient'), are all merely imagined. And (in this respect) there is no difference on any other ground.'

For *dvaya* see III. 29, 30 ; IV. 4, 24, 61, 62, 72, 75, 87.

That in such cases *dvaya* 'twofold' means *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, 'perceptible' and 'percipient' respectively, is quite clear from the words of the author himself (IV. 72b) : *grāhya-grāhakavat dvayam*. It is also well known throughout the Buddhist literature, for instance, MS. XIV. 28 (p. 94) :

dvayagrāhavisamyuktam lokottaram anuttaram !
nirvikalpatm malāpetatm jñānam sa labhate punah ||

[°]dvayagrāhavisamyuktam grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhavisam-yogat. *Op. cit.* XI. 32 (p. 63) :

svadhātuto dvayābhāsāḥ sāvidyākleśavittayah !
vikalpāḥ sampravartante dvayadravyavivarjitāḥ ||

[°]dvayābhāsā iti grāhyagrāhakābhāsāḥ. dvayadravyavivarjitaḥ iti grāhyadravyeṇa grāhakadravyeṇa ca.

See also the following quoted from the *Āryadīḍhā-sayaparipṛccchā* in MV, p. 463 :

na hi kulaputra dvayaprabhāvitā tathāgatadharmatā. tatra ye dvaye caranti na te samyakprayuktā mithyāprayuktās te vaktavyāḥ. katamac ca kulaputra dvayam. ahaṁ rāgam prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. ahaṁ dveṣam prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. ahaṁ moham prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat.

TS, 3,538 :

prakṛtyā bhāsvare citte dvayākārākalaikite ।
dvayākārāvīmūḍhātmā kah kuryād anyathāmatih (tim) ॥
dvayākārāvīmūḍhātmeti prahīṇagrāhyagrāhakābhiniveśah.

—Pañjikā.

Though both of the experiences, i.e., the experiences in dream and waking, are mere imaginations, and as such are not different, yet there is some difference between them with regard to the means of their cognition. This is shown in the next kārikā :

15

avyaktā eva ye 'antas tu sphuṭā eva ca ye bahiḥ ।
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣas tv indriyāntare ॥

'Those which are unmanifest within and those which are manifest without are all imagined indeed, but there is some difference owing to the difference of the organs of sense (with which they are cognized).'

The experiences of dream being related only to the mind (*manomātrasambandhāt*) are unmanifest (*avyakta=asphuṭa*); while those of waking being related to external senses, such as eyes, etc. (*cakṣurādibhir indriyasambandhāt*) are manifest (*sphuṭa*). Hence it is to be admitted that there is some difference between them. But this difference is not due to any reality (*astitvakṛta*) of external things; for the phenomena of dream, too, appear for the time being to be as real as those of waking. Therefore this difference lies in the fact that while the things within are cognized by mind, those without are cognized by external senses. The following line of Ānandagiri is to be noted here specially: *ye manasy antarbhāvanārūpatvād asphuṭā ye ca manaso bahir upalabhyamānāḥ sphuṭā bhavanti te sarve manahspandanamātratvena*

kalpitāḥ. Mark here *manahspandana* and compare the views of the Vijñānavādins which will be more and more evident as we proceed. See IV. 72.

The creation of internal and external things are effected thus:

16

jīvaṁ kalpayate pūrvam tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān |
bāhyān ādhyātmikāmś caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmṛtiḥ ||

'First one'¹ imagines a personal soul (*jīva*)², and then various things,³ external and internal.⁴ As one knows so one recollects.'

Mark that it is a personal soul (*jīva*) that is first imagined, and then the other things. And it is so, because the imagination of the latter depends entirely on that of the former. Says the commentator (II. 17) : *jīvakalpanā sarvakalpanāmūlam* 'the imagination of *jīva* is the root of other imaginations.' This imagination of a personal soul is what is called *satkāyadṛṣṭi*⁵ or *svakāyadṛṣṭi* (MK. XXIII. 5), Pali *sakkāyadīṭṭhi*, 'theory of individuality' in Buddhism. It is generally known as *ātmadṛṣṭi*, Pali *attadīṭṭhi*, or *ātmavāda*, Pali *attavāda*. This *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is fourfold : thinking that (i) *rūpa* (so also *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*,

¹ It refers to *ātman* 'self,' II. 12, 13.

² *ātman*, *sattva*, *jīva*, *jantu*, *puruṣa*, *pudgala*, etc.. are synonyms, MVt¹, §207; *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, 93; SS, pp. 172, 236; NS, Commentary, I. 1.2.

³ Such as *prāṇa* 'breath,' etc., See II. 19-28.

⁴ MS, XI.5 (p. 55) : *tatra grāhakabhlūtam kāyādikam ādhyātmikam grāhya-bhūtam bāhyam*. See also Vācaspati Miśra on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, I.

⁵ See ZDMG, Vol. 64, pp. 581 ff; AK, V. 7; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 77 ff.

sam-skāra and *vijñāna*) is ātman, (ii) ātman has *rūpa*, (iii) *rūpa* is in ātman, and (iv) ātman is in *rūpa* ⁶.

This *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is the source of all sorts of miseries in the world and consequently their cessation is effected only by giving it up (MK, XVIII, 2; MV. pp. 346,361; SS, p. 247).

As to how the imagination of all other things is dependent on the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* the following may be quoted from the BAP. pp. 491-92 :

tathā hy ātmānam paśyataḥ saṃskṛteṣu skandhadhātv
āyataneṣv ahām iti dṛḍhataram utpadyate snehaḥ. tatas
tadduḥkhapratiķārecchayā sukhābhilāśi doṣān pracchādy
tadarthitayā guṇādhyāropāt tatsādhaneṣu pravartate svopakāriṇi
vayam iti buddhir upajāyate aham mameti ca darśanāt.
paripanthini vidveṣaḥ. tataḥ samastaduḥkhanidānam sarva eva
kleśopaklesā labdhaprasārah pravartante. ity ātmamoha-
pravartito duḥkhahetur ahaṅkāro bhavati. tad uktam
ācāryapādaiḥ :

yah paśyaty ātmānam tatrāsyāham iti śāsvatasnehaḥ |
snehāt sukheṣu ṭṛṣyati ṭṛṣṇā doṣāṇis tiraskurute ||
guṇadarśi parīṭṣyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte ·
tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa samsārah ||
ātmani sati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadvēṣau |
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante ||⁷

⁶ To mention only a few see DSⁿ, pp. 182-183, § 1003; MN, I, 300; SN, III. 16 ff. 42, 44, 46, 56, 102, etc ; MVTⁿ, § 208: rūpam ātmā svāmivat, rūpavān ātmā alaṅkāravat, ātmīyam rūpam bhṛtyavat, rūpe ātmā bhājanavat. The following may be quoted here which refutes the above view :

rūpam nātmā rūpavān naiva cātmā
rūpe nātmā rūpam ātmān asac ca |

This is quoted in SS, p. 20; MV, p. 355.

⁷ These stanzas are from PV, II. 217-19. BAP reads *tasyātrāha*° for *tatrāsyāha*°, *parīṭṣyan* for °*ṭṛṣyān* and *tu* for *sa* in kārikā 1^b, 2^a and 2^d respectively. The last verse is quoted in AAA, p. 67; NK, p. 279. Cf. the views

yāthāvidyas tathāsmītih 'as one knows so one recollects' implies here that one's imagination of different things follows the recollection of one's experience.

of the Kāpīlas (Sāṃkhyas) quoted here. See Aniruddha's *Vṛtti* on the SāS, V 79; JA, 1902, Sept.-Oct., p. 291, AK, IX 230 :

sāhaṅkāre manasi na śamaṇ yāti janmaprabandho
nāhaṅkāras calati hṛdayād ātmadṛṣṇu tu satyām !
anyah śāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmayavādi
nānyas tasmād upaśamavidhes tvanmatād asti mārgah !

See also the *Basic Conception of Buddhism*, p. 72.

17

aniścītā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā !
sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitah ||

'As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water,¹ etc., so is imagined the soul (*ātman=jīva*).'²

¹ See note 2.

² In the commentary on sloka 93 of his *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* which is now available only in its Tibetan version, Tanjur Mdo, sa=XXVIII, 52^b.1—84^b 7; C o r d i e r : III. p. 311). Śāntirakṣita quotes some kārikās from Books II and III of our work. The following is the Tibetan version of the present kārikā :

ji. ltar. mun. khuñ. ma. rtogs. te !
thag.pa. sbrul gyi.rgyun.la sogs !
dño por.rnaṇ par. brtags pa ltar !
de.bžin bdag. kyañ rnam.par brtags !

In a Tib. has *andhakārable* (mun. khuñ) for *andhakāre* and in b it takes *sarpādhārā* as *sarpasya dhārā* (sbrul. gyi. rgyun), and not as *sarpa* 'snake' and *dhārā* 'continuous line'.

18

niścitatāyām yathā rajjvām vikalpo vinivartate |
rajjur eveti cādvaitam tadvad ātmaviniścayah ||

'As the rope being determinately known the thing imagined vanishes and there is non-duality—it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of ātman '

According to Tib.¹ the reading *rajjur eveti* in c is *rajjur ekaiva* (thag. pa. gcig. n̄id), and it appears to be better. In d Tib. literally reads *ātmāpi niścitaḥ* (bdag. kyañ. n̄es pa. yin) for *ātmaviniścayah*.

¹ It runs thus:

ji.ltar. thag.pa n̄es rtogs na |
rnam.par.rtog.pa.ldog.hgyur.te |
thag.pa.gcig.n̄id gñis.mñin.pa |
de.ltar.bdag.kyañ.n̄es.pa.yin ||

19

prāṇādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitah |
māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayāyām mohitah svayam ||¹ '

'It (Ātman) is imagined as Prāṇa 'breath' or 'life' and other innumerable things.² This is an illusion of it, the shining one,³ by which it itself is deluded.'⁴

¹ See II. 12.

² See II. 20 ff.

³ See BU, IV. 4. 15 : yadaitam anupaśaynty ātmānam devam añjasā.

⁴ The following is the Tib. version :

srog.la.sogs.pa. mthah.yas.pahi |
dños po.de.dag.rnam.par.bratags |
gañ.gis.de.bdag.n̄id.rmoñis |
de.ni.lha.dehi.sgyu.ma. yin ||

In c the actual reading is *dag* for *bdag* and in d there is *rgyu* for *sgyu*. In c there are only six syllables instead of seven. One may, however, add here *pa* after *rmoñis*.

It is said that Ātman is imagined as Prāṇa and such other things. But what these things are is stated in the following kārikās (20-28) :

20

prāṇā iti prāṇavido bhūtānīti ca tadvidah ।

guṇā iti guṇavidas tattvānīti ca tadvidah ॥¹

'Those who know *prāṇa* 'breath' or 'life' (imagine) it as *prāṇa*; those who know *bhūtas* 'elements' as *bhūtas*; those who know *guṇas* 'ingredients' as *guṇas*, and those who know *tattvas* 'categories,' as *tattvas*.'

The knowers of *prāṇa* are some followers of Upaniṣads; their view is found in the following : MnU, III. 4 : *prāṇo* hy eṣa yaḥ sarvabhūtair vibhāti; PU, II. 4 : *prāṇe* sarvam pratiṣṭhitam; ChU, I. 11. 4-5; BU, IV. 4. 18; BS, I. 1, 13. Ānandagiri says that they are the votaries of Hiraṇyagarbha, etc., Vaiśeṣikas and others.

The *bhūtas* 'elements' are five, viz., earth, water, fire, air and sky (or ether). According to Mādhyamikas and the Sautrāntikas there are only four elements excluding the sky (CŚ, IX. 3, 5). The Vaibhāṣikas, however, admit it as *bhūta* (AK, I.8). Ānandagiri says that the view referred to here is held by the Lokāyatikas who maintain that the first four elements are the origin of the world.

¹ The following is the Tib. version :

srog du. rig.pas.srog.ces brjod ।
ḥbyuñ.po.yin.žes.de.rig.rnams ।
yon.tan.rig.rnams. yon.tan.sñam ।
yañ.dag.yin. žes. de.rig.rnams ॥

Tib. *yañ*, *dag* is generally used for Skt. *samyak* and sometimes for *bhūta*; and *paramārtha*; but it is only here in *d*, so far as I have noticed, that it is employed for *tattva*.

The *gunas* are the three constituent elements of *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

As regards the *tattvas* Ānandagiri says that the Śaivas are referred to here, according to whom there are three *tattvas*, viz., *ātman*, *avidyā* and *Śiva*.

21

pādā iti pādavido viṣayā iti tadvidah ।
lokā iti lokavido devā iti ca tadvidah ॥

'Those who know *pādas* 'quarters' (imagine it) as *pādas*; those who know *viṣayas* 'objects' as *viṣayas*; those who know *lokas* 'worlds' as *lokas*; and those who know *devas* 'gods' as *devas*.'

Pāda may refer to what is known from such passages as the following : RV. X. 90. 3 pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripād asyāmītaṁ divi ; ChU, III. 12.6 : pādo 'sya sarvā bhūtāni. 18.2; vāk pādaḥ prāṇāḥpādaś cakṣuḥ pādo 'gnih pādo vāyuḥ pādaḥ; also IV. 6.3, 8.3. Ā says it alludes to the four *pādas* of *ātman*, viz., *Viśa*, *Taijasa*, etc., described above.

According to Ā the *viṣayas* are the objects of senses (*indriyas*). They are five, viz., sound (*śabda*), the tangible (*sparśa*), colour (*rūpa*), savour (*rasa*), and odour (*gandha*). These are to be enjoyed again and again, and as such are regarded as *tattva* 'principle'. This view is, as Ā tells us, held by Vātsyāyana and others (*vātsyayana-prabhṛti*). This Vātsyāyana appears to be the author of the *Kāmaśāstra*. By 'others' we may take the Lokāyatikas and some Tāntrikas, Buddhist and Brāhmanic. See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 62 ff.; SS, pp. 37 ff.; *Cittaviśuddhi-prakaraṇa*;

Visvabharati, 1933, p. 2. The following is quoted from the last mentioned work :

svādhidaivatayogātmā jagadarthakṛtodyamah ।
bhūjāno viṣayān bhogī mucyate na ca lipyate ॥ 17
yathaiva viṣatattvajño viṣam ālokya bhakṣayan ।
kevalam mucyate nāsau rogaīnuktaś ca jāyate ॥

The *lokavids* are, according to Ā, the followers of the Purāṇas holding that there are three *lokas* 'worlds,' viz., *bhū* 'earth', *bhuvas* (*bhuvar*) 'atmosphere,' and *svar* 'heaven.'

The *devavids* are, as says Ā, the followers of the *Devatākāṇḍa*, i.e., that part of the Veda (cf. *Nighaṇṭu* or *Nirukta*, VII) which deals with *devatās* 'deities.' They hold that *karmaphala* 'consequence of action' is given by *Devatās*, Agni, Indra and others, and not by God.

22

vedā iti vedavido yajñā iti ca tadvidah ।
bhokteti ca bhoktṛvido bhojyam iti ca tadvidah ॥

'The knowers of the Vedas (imagine it) as the Vedas, the knowers of *yajñas* 'sacrifices' as *yajñas*, the knowers of the *bhoktṛ* 'enjoyer' as *bhoktṛ*, and those who know *bhojya* 'enjoyable' as *bhojya*.'

According to Ā *yajñavids* are *B a u d h ā y a n a* and others.

The *bhoktṛvids* are the Sāṅkhyas who maintain that *ātman* is only enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) and not also doer (*kartṛ*). Or see BG, V. 29: *bhoktāram yajñatapasām*; IX. 24: *bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca*; XIII. 22: *bhartā bhoktā maheśvaraḥ*. See also our text, I. 9.

In accordance with the same authority *bhojyavids* are the cooks (*sūpaśāras*), for in their opinion food (*bhojyam vastu*) is the principle. Cf. TU, III. 2-1 : *annam brahmaeti vyajānāt*; ChU, I. 3. 6: *anne hīdām sarvam sthitam*.

23

sūkṣma iti sūkṣmavidah sthūla iti ca tadvidah ।
mūrta iti mūrtavido 'mūrta iti ca tadvidah ॥

'Those who know what *sūkṣma* 'a subtle thing' is (imagine it) as *sūkṣma*, those who know what *sthūla* 'a gross thing' is as *sthūla*, those who know what *mūrta* 'an embodied thing' is as *mūrta*, and those who know what *amūrta* 'non-embodied' is as *amūrta*.'

Sūkṣmavids are those who hold that the dimension of ātman is like that of an atom (*aṇu*). 'Accordingly they would refer to all the Vaiṣṇava teachers, such as Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhvā, and Vallabha. For the discussion see BS, II. 3. 19-32. See also MuU, III. 1 : sūkṣmāc ca tat sūkṣma-taṭam vibhāti ; 9: eso 'nur ātmā cetasā veditavyah; MU, II. 5 : sa vā esa sūkṣmo 'grāhyah.

Sthūlavids refer to a class of Lokāyatikas holding that the gross body is ātman.—Ā.

Mūrtavids are Āgamikas, followers of Āgamas (*Śaivas* and *Vaiṣṇavas*). mūrtas triśūlādīdhārī maheśvaraś cakrādīdhārī vā paramārtho bhavati.—Ā. The following passage (BU, II. 3. 1) may here be cited: dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam caivā-mūrtam ca.

Ā says *Amūrtavids* are Śūnyavādins. But see the passage quoted above from the BU.

24

kāla iti kālavido diśa iti ca tadvidah ।
vādā iti vādavido bhuvanānīti tadvidah ॥

'Those who know *kāla* 'time' (imagine it) as *kāla*, those who know *diś-es* 'directions' or 'quarters' as *diś-es*, those who know

vādas 'discussions' as *vādas*, and those who know *bhuvanas* 'worlds' as *bhuvanas*.'

Kālavids are astronomers. *Kāla* is the cause of all existence. See AV, XIX. 53, 54; SU, I. 2, VI. 1; SS with Guṇaratna, pp. 10 ff.

The knowers of *dīś*-es, as says Ā, are *svarodayavids*, i.e., those who know good or bad omens by voices of birds, etc., holding that the *dīś*-es are the highest reality.

Vādavids are, according to the same authority, those who hold *dhātuvāda* 'alchemy', *mantravāda* 'formulas of sacred texts,' or 'the science of magic,' and so on. Here *vāda* may, however, refer to 'discussion' as in NS, I. 1.1, 2. 1.

The knowers of *bhuvanas* are those who know the system of the worlds (*bhuvanakoṣa*) and say that there are in all fourteen of them. See ViP, XXXIII-LX ('*Bhuvanavinyāsa* and *yotiṣpraeāra*).

25

mana iti manovido buddhir iti ca tadvidah ।
cittam iti cittavido dharma-dharmau ca tadvidah ॥

'Those who know *manas* 'mind' (imagine it) as *manas*, those who know *buddhi* 'intellect' as *buddhi*, those who know *citta* 'thought' or 'consciousness' as *citta*, and those who know *dharma* 'duty' and *adharma* 'non-duty' as *dharma* and *adharma*.'

Ā says that a particular section of the Lokāyatikas who opine that *manas* is the self (*ātman*) is referred to by the word *manovid*, and the knowers of *buddhi* are Buddhists who maintain that the intellect is the self (*ātman*). The knowers of *citta* are evidently Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins. The knowers of *dharma* and *adharma* are the Mīmāṃsists.

26

pañcavimśaka ity eke ṣadviṁśa iti cāpare |
ekatriṁśaka ity āhur ananta iti cāpare ||

'Some say it to be consisting of twenty-five, some consisting of twenty-six, some consisting of thirty-one, while others to be endless in number.'

Here *pañcavimśaka* refers to the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas, according to whom there are twenty-five *tattvas* 'principles,' viz., 1. *prakṛti*, 2. *mahat*, 3. *ahaṅkāra*, 4-8. five *tanmātras*, 9. *manas*, 10-14. five *jñānendriyas*, 15-19. five *karmendriyas*, 20-24. five *mahābhūtas*, and 25. *puruṣa*.

By *ṣadviṁśa* we are to understand the view of Pātañjalas or the followers of the Yoga system. Their *tattvas* are the same as those of the Sāṅkhyas enumerated above plus Īśvara, the twenty-sixth.

The word *ekatriṁśaka* refers to the view held by the Pāśupatas. There are, in fact, thirty-six *tattvas*, viz., 1. *śiva*, 2. *śakti*, 3. *sadāśiva*, 4. *īśvara*, 5. *vidyā*¹, 6. *puruṣa*, 7. *māyā*, 8. *kāla*, 9. *niyati*, 10. *kalā*, 11. *avidyā*², 12. *rāga*³, 13. *prakṛti* or *avyakta*, 14. *mahat*, 15. *ahaṅkāra*, 16. *manas*, 17-21. five *jñānendriyas*, 22-26. five *karmendriyas*, 27-31. five *tanmātras*, and 32-36. five *bhūtas*.⁴

As Nos. 8-12 are merely the manifestations (*vibhūtis*) of *māyā*, as said by the commentator of the MM, p. 50, one may

1 Nos. 1-5 constitute the *tattva* called *pati*.

2 This is according to MM, p. 50; but TP, III. 8 clearly reads *vidyā* and the commentator explains it as *asuddhavidyā*.

3 Nos. 6-12 constitute the *tattva* known as *pāśa*.

4 Nos 13-36 are included in the *tattva* named *pāśa* See MM, verses 13-25; TP. II 5-11, III. 4, 12.

excluded these five, thus making the number thirty-one as required in our text.

There is one point to be noted here. According to TP, IV. 2, between *avyakta* and *buddhi* or *mahat* there is an additional *tattva* called *guṇa*, but in MM it is not mentioned.

27

lokāllokavidaḥ prāhur āśramā iti tadvidah ।
stripuṇnapuṇṣakaiḥ laīṅgāḥ parāparam athāpare ॥

'Those who know *lokas* 'people' (imagine it) as *lokas*, those who know *āśramas* 'stages of religious life' as *āśramas*, those who know *līṅgas* 'sexes' as a male, a female, or a eunuch, while others as *para* 'higher' and *apara* 'lower'.'

The *lokavids* or *laukikas* are those who hold that the pleasing of people (*lokānurañjana*) is the real thing.—Ā. See II. 21.

The *āśramavids* are, as says Ā, D a k ṣ a and others. Probably they are the writers on religious laws (*dharmaśāstrakāras*).

Laiṅgas are grammarians, as says Ā.

Here *parāpara* refers to those who say that two *Brahmans* are to be known, the higher and the lower. MU, VI. 1 : dve brahmaṇi veditavye paraṇi caivāparaṇi ca.—Ā.

28

sṛṣṭir iti sṛṣṭividō laya iti ca tadvidah ।
sthitir iti sthitividah sarvam ceha tu sarvadā ॥

'Those who know *sṛṣṭi* 'creation' (imagine it) as *sṛṣṭi*,¹ those who know *laya* 'destruction' as *laya*, and those who know *sthiti* 'continued existence' as *sthiti*.² All (these imaginations) are always here.'³

1 See I. 7.

2 The knowers of *sṛṣṭi*, *laya* and *sthiti* are, according to Ā, the Paurāṇikas 'knowers of *Parāṇas*.'

3 It (*iha*) refers to Ātman.

29

yam bhāvam darśayed yasya tam bhāvam sa tu paśyati |
tam cāvati sa bhūtvāsau tadgrahah samupaiti tam ||

'Whatever thing is presented to him, he sees it; that (ātman) becomes it (i.e., the thing presented), and satisfies him. And the strong attachment to it (i.e., to the idea that herein lies the truth) takes possession of him.'

30

etair eṣo pṛthagbhāvaiḥ pṛthag eveti laksitah |
evam yo veda tattvena kalpayet so 'viśāṅkitah ||

'Verily it (ātman) is considered different through these things that are not different from it. One who knows it in fact may imagine without any hesitation.'

When one sees a piece of rope as a snake, in fact, there is no difference between these two things, for the snake is nothing but the piece of rope which simply appears as a snake. Thus there is only the piece of rope and not the snake which is merely imposed thereon. In the same way there is only ātman, all things other than that being mere imagined.

The imagination referred to in *d* of the kārikā is with reference to the practical view of the things. There is no harm to the man in doing so when he knows the truth.

31

svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā |
tathā viśvam idam dṛṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ ||

'As dream and illusion are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who are well-versed in the Vedāntas.'

The word *gandharvanagara* 'an imaginary town in the sky' ¹ is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works. The thought, too, of the kārikā has often found expression in them. For instance, SR, IX (p. 29) :

yathaiva gandharvapuram marīcikā,
yathaiva māyā supinam yathaiva |
svabhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā
tathopamān jānatha sarvadharmaṇ ||

See MV, p. 178 ; MK, XVII. 33 :

gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasannibhāḥ |

LA, X. 144 (p. 283) :

gandharvanagarasvapnamāyānirināṇasādṛśāḥ |

Op. cit. 875 (p. 374) :

māyāsvapnanibhā bhāvā gandharvanagaropamāḥ |
marīcyudakacandrābhāḥ svavikalpaṁ vibhāvayet ||

¹ T. S. S. C. S. writes in his *Popular Scientific Recreations* : The mirage or Fata Morgana is a very curious but sufficiently common phenomenon and in the Asiatic and African plains it is frequently observed. * * * The Fata Morgana and the inverted images of ships at sea are not uncommon on European coasts. Between Sicily and Italy, this effect is seen in the Sea of Riggio with fine effect. Palaces, towers, fertile plain, with cattle grazing on them are seen with many other terrestrial objects upon the Sea.—*The Palaces of Fairy Morgana*, p. 649.

See also 279, 291 (pp. 301, 303).

In showing the Buddhist view Śaṅkara quotes the following in his commentary on BS. II. 2, 28 :

svapnamāyāmarīcūdakagandharvanagarādipratyayā vinaiva
bāhyenārthena grāhyagrāhakakārā bhavanti.

The author says in the kārikā that this view is of the Vedāntins. Śaṅkara follows it, but Rāmānuja with others is of the opposite opinion saying (B.S., I. I. 1) : jagad api pāramārthikam eva jñāyate.

The following two kārikās show the conclusion :

32

na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakah |
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā ||

'There is no disappearance,¹ nor origination ; no one in bondage, no one who works for success ; no one who is desirous of emancipation, no one who is emancipated.--This is the highest truth.'

This is what is the essence of Mahāyāna Buddhism. For the wording of na nirodho na cotpattiḥ cf. the opening kārikā of Nāgārjuna's MK, p. 3: anirodham anutpādam. See also BA, IX, 150:

evam ca na nirodho 'sti na ca bhāvo 'sti sarvadā |
ajātam aniruddhaṁ ca tasmāt sarvam idam jagat ||

LA, p. 191: aniruddhā anutpannāś ca bhagavatā sarva dharmā deśyante.

See also LA, II. 1, X. 1:

utpādabhaṅgarahito lokah khapuspasannibhah |

¹ Lit. 'suppression.'

ĀGAMASĀSTRA

For *bandha* and *mokṣa* compare the following: CS, 179:

kasyacit kenacit sārdhaṇī bandho nāma na vidyate |
pareṇa saha bandhasya viprayogo na yujyate ||

LA, 79b:

nātra kaścin mahāmate badhyate na ca mucyate.

Op. cit. X. 275:

na mokṣo na ca bandhanam !

See also the *Āryaratnakūṭa* quoted in MV, pp. 49, 339 and Chapter called *Bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā* of MK with MV, from which we quote the following (5):

atrāha. yady api tvayā saṃsāranirvāṇe pratiṣiddhe tathāpi
ndhamokṣau vīdyete. na cāvidyamānasya bhāvasvabhāvasya
ndhamokṣau sambhavataḥ. tasmād bandhamokṣasadbhāvād
dyata eva bhāvānām svabhāva iti. ucyate. syād bhāvānām
abhbāvo yadi bandhamokṣāv eva syātām. na tu sta ity āha—
na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharmaṇīḥ !

Āryaratnakūṭa in MV, p. 49 :

athāyuṣmān subhūtis tān bhikṣūn etad avocat kutrāyuṣmanto
tāḥ kuto vāgatāḥ. te 'vocan. na kvacid gamanāya na kutaś-
āgamanāya bhadanta subhūte bhagavatā dharmo deśitāḥ.
na. ko nāmāyuṣmatām śāstā. āhuḥ. yo notpanno na parinir-
isyati. āha. kathām yuṣmābhīr dharmāḥ śrutasāḥ. āhuḥ. na
andhanāya na mokṣāya.

Cf. *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 62 :

tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaścit !
saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ ||

We read in the MSA, VI. 2 (p. 22):

na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā
na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate !
na vardhate nāpi viśudhyate punar
viśudhyate tat paramārthalakṣaṇam ||

The present kāñkā is widely quoted in minor Upaniṣads and other religious and philosophical works of the country sometimes with slight variations. For instance, see *Avadhūtopaniṣad*, 8; *Ātmopaniṣad*, 31; *Tripurātāpanyupaniṣad*, V. 10; *Brahmabindūpaniṣad*, 10.

The reason for what is said above is advanced in the following kārikā:

33

bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitah ।
bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā ॥

'It is (ātman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-dual, and the things (themselves), too, are imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-duality is blissful.'

The word *advaya* 'non-dual' means 'one free from both the perceiver and perceptible (*grāhyagrāhakarita*).'

The imagination of ātman as different things, such as *prāṇa*, etc., which have no existence, is through the *advaya*. For the imagination mainly depends on it, just like the imagination of a snake on a piece of rope; no imagination of a snake is possible, if there is no rope. Similarly things are imagined through the *advaya*, ātman. It is the *advaya* through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of ātman as different things, and the imagination of the things themselves. Thus *advayatā* 'the state of non-duality' being real is blissful.

34

nānyabhāvena nānedam na svenāpi kathañcana ।
na pṛthān nāpṛthak kiñcid iti tattvavido viduh ॥

'It (the world) is not manifold either through its own nature
1201B.—6

or through that of another; there is not either the different or the non-different—the knowers of truth know this.'

Here in the beginning of *a* I should like to propose to read *nānyabhāvena*, as I have done, for *ātmabhāvena* accepted by all, though the former is not supported by any edition or MS. known to me. My reason is this: The words *ātmabhāvena* (*a*) and *svena* (*b*) are in fact, one and the same in sense; they do not convey any difference in their meanings which is evidently required here. I am afraid, Ś's explanation¹ can hardly be accepted being unwarranted and far-fetched, as it seems to me. Here *ātmabhāvena* appears to be inexplicable.

Having modified the reading as above, I think the words *anyabhāva* and *sva* are actually the same as *parabhāva* 'nature of other' and *svabhāva* 'nature of one's own' respectively, as thoroughly attacked, discussed, and finally refuted in MK and MV, XV (*svabhāvaparīkṣā*), pp. 259 ff. Cf. Nāgārjuna's *pratītyasamutpāda* which is (MV, p. 3) anekārtham anānārtham. Candrakīrti comments: *ekaś cāś arthaś caikārtho 'bhinnārthah. na pṛthag ity arthaḥ, nānārtho bhinnārthah. pṛthag ity arthaḥ.* See MK, X. 16:

ātmānaś ca satattvam ye bhāvānām ca pṛthag pṛthag !
nirdiśanti na tān manye sāsanasyārthakovidān ||

See our text IV. 91 with notes.

¹ *ātmabhāvena paramārthasvarūpeṇa, svena prāṇādyātmanā.*

vītarāgabhyakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ !
nirvikalpo hy ayam dṛṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayah ||

'This cessation of the expansion of the universe, devoid of duality and imagination, is seen by the sages who have reached

the other shore of the (ocean of the) Vedas and are free from attachment, fear and anger.'

The word *prapañcopaśama* is nowhere found in the pre-Buddhist Brahmanic works. It is met with only in later and minor Upaniṣads (NPU, 4. 1; NUU, 1; RUU, 2; for *prapañca* see ŚU, 6.6; KIU, 17), including the MāU, 7, the existence of which before Ś is doubtful.

The word *prapañca* of *prapañcopaśama* is from *pra-* √*pac* or √*pañc* 'to spread out, make clear, or evident.' With this is connected √*pajpañj* from which *pañjikā* 'a commentary.' Rājaśekhara writes in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, GOS, 1916, p. 5: *viśamapadabhañjikā pañjikā*; and we read in Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmani*, II. 168, 170: *niruktam padabhañjanam, pañjikā padabhañjikā*. From this it appears that *pañjikā* is from *bhañjikā* (from √*bhañj*; cf. *vibhaṅga* from this root in the sense of 'thorough explanation' used in Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali works). But philologically it can hardly be supported.

Let it be as it may, the meaning of *prapañca* used frequently in subsequent Vedantic works is, according to that system, 'expansion of the universe' or the 'visible world' (*prapañcyata iti prapañcaḥ*). But in accordance with the Buddhists it means 'verbal designation,' 'expression,' 'word' (*prapañcyate 'nena* or *prapañcayatiti prapañcaḥ*). Thus anything that is expressed by a word or the word itself is *prapañca* according to the Buddhists. (See *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 48, 91, 156, 209.) Candrakīrtti writes in his MV, p. 373:

prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā. prapañcair aprapañcitaṁ (MK, XVIII. 9) vāgbhir avyākṛtam ity arthaḥ.

These words (*vāc*) are naturally various as said in the same work, p. 350. See the passage quoted in our text, I. 17.

prapañcopaśama which is the same as *prapañcoparama* (MV, p. 11) and *prapañcavilaya* (discussed by Ś in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 21) is *mokṣa* of the Vedāntists belonging to the school of Gaūḍāpāda followed by Ś, and *nirvāṇa* of the

Mādhyamikas, and the object in view of Nāgārjuna in writing his MK as said in MV, p. 4: sarvaprapañcopaśamaśivalakṣaṇam nirvāṇam śāstrasya prayojanam nirdiṣṭam. He himself says (MV, p. 11):

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvatam !
anekartham anānārtham anāgamam anīrgamam ||
yah pratītyasamutpādaṁ prapañcopaśamaṁ śivam !
deśayāmāsa sambuddhas tam vande vadatām varam ||

For a fuller explanation of *prapañcopaśama* (and *śiva*, MāU, 7) from the Buddhist point of view see MK, XXV. 24 with MV, p. 538:

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivah !

iha hi sarvesām prapañcānām nimittānām ya upaśamo 'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam. sa eva copaśamaḥ. prakṛtyaivopaśāntatvāc chivali. vācām apravṛtter vā prapañcopaśamaś cittasyāpravṛityā śivah. kleśaprahāṇena vā prapañcopaśamo niravaśeṣavāsanā-prahāṇena śivah. jñeyānupalabdhya vā prapañcopaśamo jñānā-nupalabdhya śivah.

LA, X. 230 (p. 295):

sarvaprapañcopaśamād bhrānto nābhīpravartate
prajñā yāvad vikalpante bhrāntis tāvat pravartate ||

For *nirvikalpa* see MV, p. 374:

nirvikalpa hi tat (referring to *tattva*, MK, XVIII. 9). *vikalpaś cittapracāraḥ*. tadrahitatvāt tattvam nirvikalpam. yathoktaṁ sūtre. paramārthasatyam kataimat. yatra jñānasyāpracāraḥ kaḥ punarvādo 'kṣarāṇam iti. evam nirvikalpam.

It is to be noted that it is *vikalpa* from which spring up *rāga*, *dueṣa*, *moha*, etc.

The word *vedapāraga* in the text may be taken here as *vedapāra-ga* and not *veda-pāraga* as above meaning 'one conversant with Vedānta (*Veda-pāra*). Cf. *vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ* (II. 31).

36

tasmād evam veditvainam advaite yojayet smṛtim !
adwaitam samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret ||

'Therefore having thus known it (i.e., *prapañcopaśama*) one should fix one's memory on non-duality, and having realized non-duality should behave as a fool among people.'

The word *smṛti*, Pali *sati*, means one of the five *balas* 'strengths or powers,' or one of the seven requisites for attaining supreme knowledge (*bodhyāṅgas*, Pali *bojjhaṅgas*). See DS, LXVIII, XLIX; MVT², §§ 38, 39, Cf. ChU, VII. 26. 7 : āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ. sattvaśuddhau dhruvā sīrtih. smṛti-lambhe sarvagrānthinām vipramokṣah. Here Ś explains *dhruvā smṛti* as continuous absence of forgetting (*avicchinnā avismaraṇa*). This is nothing but *dhyāna* 'meditation.' Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS, I.I.I (ed. Narasiṃha cārya, Ananda Press, 1909, pp. 9ff.), supports it; and Vācaspatimisra, YS, I. 20, expressly says that *smṛti* is steady and undisturbed meditation (*smṛtir dhyānam anākulam avikṣiptam*). The word *smṛti* in the present kārikā should be taken in this sense.

For *d* see Ś on BS, III. 4. 50, where he says : 'Let him be free from guile, pride and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others (SBE).' He quotes here the following from a work (*smṛti*) :

gūḍhadharmāśrito vidvān ajñātacaritaṁ caret !
andhavaj jaḍavac cāpi mūkavac ca mahīm caret !!

See *Jābāla Up*, 6 ; *Āśrama Up*, 4 ; *Minor Upaniṣads*, Adyar Library, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 154, 161, 184.

nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca |
calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet ||

'Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing *svadhā*, with an unfixed home and acting at random, one should become an ascetic.'

The word *svadhā* (originally *svadhā'* 'self-position,' 'self-power,' 'inherent power') is a Vedic exclamation mostly used in offering food to *pīṭṛs* 'deceased ancestors.' It also means the food for *pīṭṛs*. In this case *svadhākāra* would mean 'offering food to *pīṭṛs*'.

Calācalaniketa is, in fact, *aniketa* of BG, XII. 9, and *anilaya* of BA, VIII. 29, 88, both meaning 'homeless.' Cf. *apūrva iva sarvatra* in BA, VIII. 16; *anagāra* 'homeless' or 'a homeless wanderer' in Buddhist literature, and in Jaina works (*Aupapātikasūtra*, ed. Leumann, 1883, §§. 27, 57, etc.).

Here *calācala* in the compound *calācalaniketa* is taken by Ś as two words *cala-* and *-acala-*, and consequently he has fallen into a great confusion in explaining it. The fact is that *calācala* is one word meaning *cañcala* 'intensely moving' i.e., 'absolutely not fixed.' See the *Vārtika*, 6 ('caricali°') in the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini, VI 1. 12. For example, the following may be quoted : *Śiśupālavadha*, XVII. 53 : *calācalair anupadain āhatāḥ khuraiḥ*; *Kirātārjunīya*, XI. 30 : *janmino 'sya sthitim* *vidyāl lakṣmīm iva calācalam*; *Cāṇakyanītidarpaṇa* (Bombay, 1867), V. 20 : *calācale ca samsāre dharma eko hi niścalāḥ*.

The word *yādṛcchika* does not imply absolutely unrestrained movements, for that is impossible for such a man. See Ś on BS, III. 4. 28-31, 47-50. Mark the significance of the word *yati* lit. 'one who strives to restrain one's passions.' The

following occurs in the NPU in the *Minor Upaniṣads*, Adyar, Vol. I, pp. 147, 153 :

nirdvandvo nirnamaskārō niḥsvadhākārā eva ca.
kasyāpi vandanam akṛtvā na-namaskārō na-svāhākārō na-
svadhākārō na-nindāstutir yādṛcchiko bhavet.

38

tattvam ādhyātmikam drṣṭvā tattvam drṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ !
tattvibhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet ||

iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstre vaitathākhyam
dvitiyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

'Having realised the truth inward, having also realised the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself), delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved from it.'

Here ends in the *Āgamaśāstra* of G a u d a p ā d a
Book Two called Unreality.'

The *tattva* referred to in the kārikā is nothing but *prapañcopasama* (ll. 35) and this is for Vedantists *mokṣa* and for Buddhists *nirvāṇa*=*pratītyasamutpāda*=*śūnya*.

The words *ādhyātmika* and *bāhya* are two opposite terms and can respectively be translated by 'subjective' and 'objective', or in some cases by 'inward' and 'outward' respectively, *ātman* meaning 'body' and, according to those who believe in the existence of a separate soul, 'soul' as well. Here *bāhyataḥ* is an adverb, and so *ādhyātmika*, too, may be taken as such. Or both of them are to be construed as adjectives.

For the thought and wording of the kārikā see the following couplet quoted as a speech of Bhagavat in MV, p. 348 (Poussin JRAS, 1910, p. 137) :

śūnyam ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyaṁ bahirgatam !
na vidyate so 'pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām ||

BOOK III

I

upāsanāśrito dharmo jāte brahmaṇi vartate |
prāg utpatter¹ ajam̄ sarvam̄ tenāsau kṛpaṇah smṛtaḥ ||

'The *dharma* 'duty' relating to *upāsanā* 'worship' arises when Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (*dharma*) is regarded as miserable.'

Ś takes *dharma* to signify a worshipper (*upāsaka*, *sādhaka*). A simply follows him explaining: dehasya dhāraṇād dharmo jivah.

Upāsanā depends upon the duality of an *upāsaka* 'worshipper' and an *upāsya* 'one to be worshipped.' This duality also in its turn is possible only when that one Brahman is *jāta* 'born', i.e., manifests himself in the form of this universe. His *jāti* or *prajāti* 'birth' or 'growing forth' or *bahubhāva* 'becoming many' is often found in the Upaniṣads : TU, II. 6: so 'kāmavata bahu syām̄ prajāyeya; ChU, VI. 2.1-3: tad aikṣata bahu syām̄ prajāyeya, 3.23: seyaṁ devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jivenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāni. See BS with Ś, I. 1. 2, 5.

Upāsanā literally means 'sitting near,' i.e., 'sitting near one who is to be worshipped.' In fact, *upāsanā*, as Ś explains it, is a continuous course of thought (i.e., meditation), not disturbed by any other dissimilar thought upon an object supported by the scripture. So says Ś in his Introduction to ChU, I. 1. 1: upāsanam̄ tu yathāśāstrasamarthitam̄ kiñcid ālambanam upādāya tasmin samānacittavṛttisantānakaraṇam̄ tad-vilakṣaṇapratyayānantaritam. See his Com. PU, 5, and BS, I. 1.II.

¹ This phrase, *prāg utpatteḥ*, is used not less than eight times by Ś in his comm. on the ChU, VI. 2. 1.

ato vakṣyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatām gatam |
yathā na jāyate kiñcij jāyamānam samantataḥ ||

'I shall, therefore, so speak of that state of non-miserableness in which there is no origination (*jāti*), and which (on that account) is the same throughout, as to show that the things which are (apparently) being born on all sides are none of them born at all.'

The highest truth (*paramārtha*), according to our author and the Mādhyamikas as well, is that there is nothing that comes into being (*jāyate*, III. 48). This *ajāti* or *anutpāda* (so frequently used in Buddhist texts) 'non-origination' is the main subject which the author takes up and discusses throughout the remaining portion of his book. See II. 32; III. 20, 38, 48; IV. 5, 71. The word *ajāti* occurs nine times in the work: III. 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 21, 29, 42, 43.

The sameness (*samatām gata*, *samatā*, *sāmya*) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (*ajāti*). The following is from the *Āryasatyadvayāvatāra* quoted in MV, p. 374: paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpādasamatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājatisamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ. tat. kasmād dhetoh. paramārthato nirvāṇā-(nānā)karaṇā hi devaputra sarvadharmā atyantanirutpādatām upādāya. tad yathāpi nāma devaputra yac ca mṛdbhājanasyā-bhyantaram ākāśam yac ca ratnabhājanasyābhyantaram ākāśam ākāśadhatūr evaiṣaḥ. tat paramārthato na kiñcin nānākaraṇam. evam eva devaputra yaḥ [saṃ]kleśa[ḥ sa] paramārthato 'tyantā-nutpādatā. yad api vyavadānam tad api paramārthato 'tyantā-nutpādatā. samsāro 'pi paramārthato 'tyantā-nutpādatā. yāvan nirvāṇam api paramārthato 'tyantā-nutpādatā. nātia paramārthato nānākaraṇam. tat kasmād dhetoh. paramārthato 'tyantā-nutpādatvāt sarvadharmāṇām. See SP, IV. 83 (p. 143):

sarvadharmaṇi saṁjñāni śūnyāni nirnānākaraṇātmakān !
na caitān prekṣate nāpi kiñcid dharmam vipaśyati ||
sarvadharmaṇi samāḥ sarve samāḥ samasamāḥ sadā ||
evaṁ jñātvā vijñānāti nirvāṇam amṛtaṁ śivam ||

For *b* of the kārikā see III. 38a; IV. 93c-d, 95a, 100b.

In the first kārikā of this chapter mention of origination (*jāti*) of Brahman is made. Non-origination (*ajāti*) is, however, said in the second, and the author promises here to explain it. Now from the following kārikā he proceeds to do so showing the real sense of origination and non-origination:

3

ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghaṭākāśair ivoditah !
ghaṭādivac ca saṅghātair jātāv etan nidaśanam ||

'Ātman has sprung up in the forms of Jivas 'individual selves,' just like the springing up of the *ākāśa*¹ 'space' in the form of *ghaṭākāśas* 'spaces occupied by jars,' the conglomerations (of different limbs, organs of sense, etc.) being like jars and others. This is the illustration of origination.'

It is with *ghaṭas* that *ghaṭākāśas* are formed from the *mahākāśa*. In the same way, it is with the conglomerations that Ātman is born in the form of Jivas.

On the origination of Ātman see BU, II. I. 20; MuU, II. I. I.; MnU, I. 4; BS, II. 3.17 with Ś's Com.

It is evident from the kārikā that the origination in both of the cases is not real, but imaginary.

See TJ, VIII. 10, and cf. :

ghaṭasamvṛtam ākāśam niyamāne ghaṭe yathā !
ghaṭo niyeta nākāśam tathā jīvo nabhopamaḥ ||

TTU, V. 3.

¹ This is generally called *mahākāśa* in Vedantic and other works

This is further explained in the following kārikā :

4

ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāśādayo yathā ।
ākāśe sampralyante tadvaj jīvā ihātmani ॥

'As the jars, etc., being destroyed the spaces of jars, etc., are completely merged into space, so are (completely merged) the Jivas into Ātman'

This kārikā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita in his commentary on MAK, 93, and it runs as follows in its Tibetan version:

bum.pa.la. sogs. shig.¹ pa.ni !
[bum. paḥi. nam. mkhaḥ.la.sogs. pa !]
ji.ltar. nam.mkhaḥ.hdu.hgyur. ba !
de.bshin. srog.kyañ. nes.pa.yin ॥

The second line of the verse is left out in Tib., and is reconstructed from Sanskrit by Wallesser: *Der älter Vedānta*, p. 20.

¹ Read *bshig* for *shig*.

The following kārikā meets the objection that the Ātman that springs up as different Jivas being one, if one jīva feels happiness or suffers pain, all the Jivas should have the same state of mind. But in fact it is not so :

5

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute ।
na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ ॥

'As one *ghaṭākāśa* 'space occupied by a jar' being connected with dust, smoke, etc., not all (*ghaṭākāśas*) are connected with them, so are the jivas with reference to happiness, etc.'

The kārikā is quoted by Bhavya in his MHK, VIII. 13, the Tibetan version being as follows :

ji.ltar.bum.pahi.nam.mkhaḥ.gcig !
rdul.dañ.du.bas.bsgribs.pa.na !
thams.cad.de.bshin.ma.yin.ltar !
bde.sogs.de.bshin.bdag.la.min !!

Literally reconstructed it would read in Sanskrit :

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmaiḥ [sam]āvīte !
na bhavanti tathā sarve na sukhādi tathātmāni !!

The present kārikā is quoted with the reading *na ca sarve prayujyante* for c and is attributed to the ViP by Vijnānabhikṣu in his comm. on the SāS, I. 152; but it is not to be found there. See Ś's comm. on the VSN, p. 16.

6

rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai !
ākāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jīvesu nirṇayah !!

'Indeed forms, functions and names differ here and there, but there is no difference of the space : similar is the conclusion with regard to jīvas.'

There are different things, earthen pots, cloths, etc., their forms, functions, and names all differing from one another, yet the ākāśa intercepted by them is in itself not different in fact. In the same way though jīvas corresponding to *ghaṭākāśas*, etc., are different, Ātman corresponding to *ākāśa* or *mahākāśa*, etc., is not different.

Cf. TJ. VIII. 12 :

ji.ltar.bum.sogs.tha.dad.kyañ !
sa.la.tha.dad.hgah.yañ.med !
de.bshin.lus.ni.tha.dad.kyañ !
bdag.la.tha.dad.hgah.yañ.med !!

It may thus be translated into Sanskrit:

bhinneṣv api ghaṭādyeṣu mṛdi bhedo na kaścana !
tathā deheṣu bhinneṣu na kaścid bheda ātmāni ||

7

nākāśasya ghaṭākāśo vikārāvayavau yathā !
naivātmanah sadā jīvo vikārāvayavau tathā ||

'As the *ghaṭākāśa* is neither a transformation, nor a part of the *ākāśa*, so is always a Jīva neither a transformation, nor a limb of Ātman.'

8

yathā bhavati bālānam gaganam malinam malaiḥ!
tathā bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malino malaiḥ ||

'As the sky appears to be soiled with dirt¹ to the ignorant, so appears Ātman, too, with impurities, to those who are not enlightened.'

For *a* and *b* see § on BS, 1. 1. 1 : ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti.

This kārikā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita, loc. cit. The Tib. version is as follows :

ji. ltar. byis. pa. rnams. la. ni !
nam. mkhaḥ. dri. mas. dri. can. ḥgyur !
de. bshin. mi. mkhas. rnams. la. yañ !
bdag. ni. dri. mas. dri. can. ḥgyur ||

¹ Such as dust, smoke, etc., See III. 5: *rajodhūmādibhiḥ*.

9

maraṇe sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api |
sthitah¹ sarvaśarireṣu ākāśenāvilakṣaṇah |

In death and in birth, in moving forward and backward, (Ātman) in all bodies exists just like the space.'

In the origination and destruction of the *ghaṭākāśa* the *mahākāśa* is not affected. So is the case with Ātman in regard to death, birth, etc., which are connected only with the bodies. See ChU. VI. II. 3 : *jīvāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate na jīvo muiyate.*

¹ This is found in only one MS., the reading which is generally known is *sthitau* 'in standing.'

10

saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ |
ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattir hi vidyate ||

'All conglomerations (of limbs, etc.) are like dream being projected by the illusion of Ātman. As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground.'

The *saṅghātas*, i.e., the bodies, having which the Ātman is born in the form of Jivas, are like the *ghaṭas* of *ghaṭākāśas*. These *saṅghātas* have, however, no real existence, nor is there, therefore, any ground for thinking of their superiority or equality among them.

In discussing what Jiva is the author says further:

11

rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātās taittirīyake |
teṣām ātmā paro jīvah sa-yathā¹ samprakāśitaḥ ||

'The seaths such as consisting of the essence (of food)

are described in the *Taittirīyaka*, i.e., *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (II. 1-6), the supreme soul of them is Jīva, as it is made there clear.'

'There are five *kōśas* 'seaths,' viz., *annarasamaya* or simply *annamaya*, *prāṇa*^o, *mano*^o, *vijñāna*^o, and *ānanda*^o, i.e., consisting of the essence of food, breath, mind, understanding, and bliss respectively. These are explained in the TU, II, 2 ff. According to the five divisions of *kōśas* Ātman is also divided into five and are called after them, the last of them i.e., *ānandamaya*, or in accordance with a different authority (see BS, I. 1. 12-19), the one on which rests the last of them is real Ātman. This is referred to in the present kārikā by *para ātman*. And the author says that this is Jīva.

¹ With some MSS. I read *sa-yathā* for *khaṭ yathā* accepted by S and found in other MSS. In favour of the second reading compare *d* of the next kārikā, which is in fact identical. The word *sayathā*, Pali *seyyathā*, in the sense of *tad yathā*, is often used in Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. See PU, IV. 7, VI 5 ; MuU, III. 2. 8; SB, I. 2. 5. 24; 7. 3. 2; BU, II. 1. 20. Cf. in this connexion *sa-yadi* (=*tad yadi*), PU, V. 1, and Pali *sa-ce* for *sa-cet* (see p. 72, l.2) in the same sense (Skt. *tac cet*).

12

dvayor dvayor madhujñāne param brahma prakāśitam |
pṛthivyām udare caiva yathākāśah prakāśitah ||

'In the *madhuvidyā* (i.e., the *Madhubrāhmaṇa* section of the BU, II. 5) in each of the pairs, (such as) the earth and the inside (of the body), the supreme Brahman is made manifest, as is made manifest the sky (III. 3 ff.).'

BU, II. 5, is called *Madhubrāhmaṇa* owing to the fact of its dealing with a particular *Brahmavidyā* which is named *madhuvidyā* or *madhujñāna* (as in our text) on account of the frequent use of the word *madhu* which is very important

In this connexion. Here there are some pairs of things, such as the earth and all beings (*pṛthivī* and *sarvāṇī bhūtāni*), and in these pairs it is shown that the person outside the body in the earth, etc., and the person inside the body are identical with Ātman, Brahman. Let the following passage be quoted here (BU, II. 5. 1):

iyām pṛthivī sarveṣām madhv asyai pṛthivyai sarvāṇī bhūtāni madhu. yaś cāyam asyām pṛthivyām tejomayo 'mṛtamayah puruṣo
as cāyam adhyātmamā sārīras tejomayo 'mṛtamayah puruṣo 'yam
va sa yo 'yam ātmedam amṛtam idam brahmaṇam sarvam.

'This earth is the honey (*madhu*, the effect) of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this earth. Likewise this bright immortal person in this earth, and the bright immortal person incorporated in the body (both are *madhu*). He indeed is the same as the self, that immortal, that Brahman, that All.'¹

¹ Tr. Max Müller, SBE.

13

jīvātmānōr ananyatvam abhedenā praśasyate |
nānātvam nindyatē yac ca tad evam hi samañjasam :

'That the identity without any distinction of Jiva and Ātman is praised, and that their distinction is censured, this becomes reasonable only on this hypothesis.'

As regards the identity of Jiva and Ātman see ChU, VI. 8.7 (at *tvam asi*); BU, I. 4. 10 (aham brahmāsmi), II. 5. 19 (ayam mā brahma); MuU, III. 2. 9 (sa yo ha vai tat paramām brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati). As for the difference see U, I. 4. 2 (dvitiyād vai bhayam bhavati), IV. 4. 19, KU, V. 10, 11 (mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati); U II. 7 (yadā hy evaiṣa etasmīn u daram antaraṁ kurute ha tasya bhayam bhavati).

jīvātmanoh pṛthaktvam् yat prāg utpatteḥ prakīrttitam |
bhaviṣyadvṛttya gauṇam tan mukhyatvam na hi yujyate ||

'The difference of Jīva and Ātman before creation, which is declared (in texts¹), is attributive with reference to the future state; its primary sense is certainly not reasonable.'

It is only after creation that there is a distinction between Ātman and Jīva, but before it there is no distinction whatsoever. When there is no production of *ghaṭa* 'jar,' and consequently no *ghaṭākāśa*, there is no distinction between *mahākāśa* and *ghaṭākāśa*. Yet, one sometimes speaks of that distinction at that time, simply anticipating what is going to happen in the near future, that is, thinking of the imminent production of the *ghaṭa*.

In his explanation of the kārikā Ś gives an apt example. He says that it is like the use of the following sentence which is very common: *odanam pacati*. The word *odana* means 'cooked or boiled rice.' Therefore literally the sentence means 'one cooks cooked rice.' But the rice which was already cooked or boiled does not require to be cooked again. Yet, the people say, 'He cooks cooked rice.' Clearly here this use is attributive and has reference to the future state of the unboiled rice. The people assume the future state as present. So is here the statement of difference of Ātman and Jīva.

Ś says that in passages of the Upaniṣads about evolution and dissolution it is the unity of Ātman and Jīva, which is sought to be established. This unity will be demonstrated in the text. First there is shown difference and then unity which is the conclusion. It is, therefore, in view of this future

¹ Such as RV. X. 121.1:

sa dādhāra pṛthivīm dyām utemām |
kasmai devāya havīṣā vidhemai||

sense or state that the difference is stated. Thus it is only in its secondary, and not in its primary sense.

The author wanted (III. 2) to show that there is no origination (*jāti*), nor is there anything that comes into being (*jāyate*). Having done so to some extent he now meets, in the next kārikā, the objection that may be raised against this view, showing thereby also that there is, in fact, no distinction between Ātman and Jīva :

15

mṛlohavisphuliṅgādyaiḥ śṛṣṭir yā coditānyathā |
upāyah so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathañcana ||

'The creation which is urged in different manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means for an introduction (to the truth). There is in no way any distinction (between Ātman and Jīva).'

For details see IV. 42.

For the creation referred to see ChU, VI. 1. 4-5; BU, II. 1.20. VI. 2. 14 ; MuU, II. 1-1; MU, VI. 26.

As to how that creation and consequently the distinction between Ātman and Jīva, though unreal, are a means for introducing one to truth is explained in the next kārikā :

16

āśramāḥ trividhā hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭadrīṣṭayah |
upāsanopadīṣṭeyam tadartham anukampayā ||

'There are three spiritual stages, viz., of lower vision, of middle vision, and of higher vision ; and this *upāsanā* 'worship' is laid down for them out of kindness.'

In fact there is no distinction between Ātman and Jīva, yet some distinction is attributed there, only to help people

in realizing the truth by prescribing different *upāsanās* according to their respective powers of vision. See III. 1.

The word *āśrama* in the text is explained by Ś as *āśramin* ‘one with *āśrama* or religious state of life,’ i.e., *adhikṛta* ‘an entitled one.’ In all probability the original word was *āśraya* ‘a recipient, a person or thing in which any quality or article is inherent or retained or received,’ i.e., an *adhikārin* or *adhikṛta* ‘an entitled one.’ See the use of the word in the following line from MSA, XVI. 69 :

nikṛṣṭamadhyottamaviryam anyad
yānatraye yuktajanāśrayeṇa !
atra āśrayabheda vīryabhedo nirdiṣṭah.

The author now mentions the opinions of the dualists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, etc., and shows that the decision arrived at by him, i.e., non-distinction (*abhedā*), does not conflict with the views held by them :

17

svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu dvaitino niścitā dṛḍham |
parasparam virudhyante tair ayam na virudhyate ||

‘The dualists are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend with one another, but this (our view) does not conflict with them.’

18

advaitam paramārtho hi dvaitam tadbheda ucyate |
teṣām ubhayathā dvaitam tenāyam na virudhyate ||

‘The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said

to be of it a particular state or effect of it,¹ while according to them (*i.e.*, dualists) there is duality in both ways.² Therefore it does not conflict.'

So far as mere duality is concerned, it is not that we do not admit it at all, as you do; we do accept it. Hence there is no conflict. Between cause and effect there is, in fact, no difference (*kāryakāraṇayor abhedah*), the effect being merely a particular state of its cause. So there is no independent existence of the effect apart from that of its cause. In the same way duality is a particular state or effect of non-duality, being an illusion (II. 10). The only difference between us is that according to you duality is in both ways, in reality and also in appearance, while we say that though there is duality, no doubt, it is not in reality, it exists only in appearance.

See next kārikā.

¹ Cf. *bheda* with *bhidyate* in the following kārikā.

² Š: *paramārthatas cūparamārthatas ca* 'in reality and not in reality,'

19

māyayā bhidyate hy etan nānyathājām kathañcana |
tattvato bhidyamāne hi martyatām amṛtam vrajet ||

'It (*advaita*) becomes different only through illusion, as the unborn (*aja*) can in no other way become different, for if it becomes in reality different the immortal would become mortal.'

See IV. 6.

20

ajātasyaiva bhāvasya jātīm icchanti vādinah |
ajāto hy amṛto bhāvo martyatām katham eṣyati ||

'The disputants seek to establish the birth of an unborn

thing. Now a thing which is unborn is immortal, and that being the case, how can it become mortal ?

See IV. 6.

21

na bhavaty amṛtam martyam na martyam amṛtam tathā !
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ||

'The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. In no way can nature change.'

See IV. 7, 29.

22

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchatī martyatām |
kṛtakenaṁṛtas tasya katham sthāsyati niścalah ||

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless ?

See IV. 8.

23

bhūtato 'bhūtato vāpi sriyamāne samā śrutiḥ |
niścitat̄ yuktiyuktam ca yat tad bhavati netarat ||

'As regards creation there are equal sacred texts (stating

creation to be) from the existent¹ or from the non-existent.² But that which is ascertained and reasonable is (acceptable), and not the other.'

See IV. 3.

It says that in reality there is no *jāti* 'origination' either from the existent or the non-existent, though there are *śruti*s supporting both the views equally. Therefore the author says that what is reasonable is to be accepted, as certain. And what is reasonable is pointed out in the next kārikā.

According to Śaṅkara *bhūtataḥ* is *paramārthataḥ*, and *abhūtataḥ māyayā*. But in IV. 3 he explains the same words saying *bhūtasya vidyamānasya*³, *abhūtasya avidyamānasya*.

¹ sad eva somyedam agra āśit*. ChU, VI. 2.1.

² asad vā idam agra āśit. tato vai sad ajāyata. TU, II. 7. 1.

24

neha nāneti cāmnāyād indro māyābhīr ity api |
ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu sah ||

'From the sacred text¹ "there is no plurality here"² and also from "Indra through māyās, etc.,"³ (it is to be known

¹ In the original cāmnāya means śruti.

² neha nānāsti kiñcana. BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11.

³ rūpamrūpam pratirūpo babhūva
tad asya rūpam pratikṣaṇāya |
indro māyābhīḥ purūpa iyate
yuktā hy asya harayaḥ śatā daśa ||

RV, VI. 47. 18; BU, II. 5. 19.

that) it is through illusion that he⁴ is variously born, though (in fact) he does not take birth.'⁵

⁴ It refers to Puruṣa, Prajāpati.

⁵ The sentence ajāyamāno bahudhā jāyate in the text is taken from the VS. XXXI. 19 (=TA, III. 13.1) which runs as follows:

prajāpatiś carati garbhe antar
ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate |
tasya yoniṁ paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ
tasmin ha tathur bhuvanāni viśvā ||

The preceding stanza (18) is:

vedāham etāṁ puruṣām mahāntam
ādityavarṇām tamasaḥ parastāt |
tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti
nānyāḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya ||

25

sambhūter apavādāc ca sambhavaḥ pratiṣidhyate |
ko nv enām janayed iti kāraṇām pratiṣidhyate ||

'By the denial of *sambhūti* 'birth' (in the *śruti*)¹ birth is negated; and (by the *śruti*) "who indeed would produce him"² the cause of birth is denied.'

Here for the first time we have the oldest interpretation of the words *sambhūti* or *sambhava* and *asambhūti* or *asambhava* in IU, 12, 13, 14, which are so differently explained

¹ tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u sambhūtyām ratāḥ. IU, 12. This is the second half of the verse the first half being: andham tamāḥ pravīśanti ye 'sambhūtim upāsate.

² jāta eva na jāyate ko nv enām janayet punāḥ. BU, III. 9. 28.

by Ś and others.³ Evidently Gaudapāda takes here *sambhūti* (*sambhava*) in the sense of *utpatti* or *jāti*, 'birth,' 'production,' 'origination.' This origination is negated (*ajāti*) here, and that is one of the main points of the work of Gaudapāda. For his use of the word *sambhava* see III. 9, 48; IV. 16, 38.

³ The following may be read with interest. Here the meanings of the words *asambhūtiḥ*, etc., are given according to Ś and others.

The figures refer to the stanzas of IU, while those in brackets to the stanzas of the VS.

S a n k a r a

12	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>prakṛtiḥ</i> , kāraṇam avyākṛtakhyā.
	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>kāryabrahma</i> , hiranyagarbhiḥ,
13	<i>sambhavaḥ</i>	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i> , kāryabrahma.
	<i>asambhavaḥ</i>	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i> , avyākṛtam.
14	<i>vināśah</i>	<i>vināśavat kāryam.</i>
	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>avyākṛtam</i> , <i>avyākṛtopasank.</i>
	(once taken as <i>asambhūtiḥ</i>)	

U v a ḍ a

12 (9)	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>mṛtasya zataḥ sambhavo nāsti.</i>
	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>mṛta īmano 'bhāvah.</i>
13 (10)	<i>sambhavaḥ</i>	<i>ītmātivam.</i>
	<i>asambhavaḥ</i>	<i>sambhavaparijñānam (=sambhūti*)</i>
14 (11)	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>0</i>
	<i>vināśah</i>	<i>jaigataḥ sambhavaikahetuḥ param brahma.</i>
		<i>vināśi īarīram.</i>

M a h ī d h a r a

12 (9)	<i>asambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>asambhavam* mṛtarya punaḥ sambhavo nāsti.</i>
	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>ītmā.</i>
13 (10)	<i>sambhavaḥ</i>	<i>kāryabrahma.</i>
	<i>asambhavaḥ</i>	<i>avyākṛtam.</i>
14 (11)	<i>sambhūtiḥ</i>	<i>param brahma.</i>
	<i>vināśah</i>	<i>vināśadharmaśām īarīram.</i>

For the explanation given by the followers of Rāmānuja and Mādhyācārya see their respective works: commentary by Rāṅgārāmānuja, Anandashrama Sanskrit Series; by Mādhyācārya, in the *Sacred Books of the Hindus*.

26

sa esa neti netīti vyākhyātām nihnute yataḥ ।
sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājām prakāśate ॥

‘(The śruti) “This is No, No” denies what is explained. Therefore by the reason of incomprehensibleness it is evident that all is unborn.’

The śruti “This is No, No” refers to sa esa neti nety ātmāgṛhyo na hi gṛhyate (BU, III. 9. 26; IV. 2. 4, 4. 22, 5. 15) — ‘That (Ātman) is (to be described by) No, No. He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended.’ But it appears, as thinks also the commentator himself, it alludes to the following śruti, too: athāta ādeśo neti neti (BU, II. 3. 6) ‘Now follows the teaching by No, No.’ For it is that śruti which denies both the forms of Brahman, viz., that which has form (*mūrtta*) and that which has not form (*amūrtta*). These two forms have already been described or explained in the text (BU, II. 3. 1).¹ Things are either with or without a form, so when both of them are denied they cannot be comprehended. Thus it becomes evident that there is nothing that may have origination, in other words, all is ‘unborn’ (*aja* ‘without generation’).

¹ dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam caivāmūrtam ca°.

Now *jāti* or origination may be either of the existent (*sat*) or of the non-existent (*asat*). But both the cases are impossible. The author shows it in the next kārikās :

27

sato hi māyayā janma jujyate na tu tattvataḥ ।
tattvato jāyate yasya jātam tasya hi jāyate ॥

‘The birth of that which exists can be reasonable only

through illusion, but not in reality. He who holds that one is born in reality has to accept (the position) that what is born had, indeed, been born.'

See IV. 58. See also IV. 13 with its explanation. Cf. CS, XI. 10 (260) with the note :

sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so' stīti na yujyate !
sato yadi bhavej janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ ||

28

asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate |
vandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate |

'The birth of that which does not exist is not reasonable at all through illusion or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either through illusion or in reality.'

The author now proceeds to show that the birth of the existent is possible only through *māyā* as said before (III. 27) :

29

yathā svapne dvayābhāsam̄ spandate māyayā manah | .
tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam̄ spandate māyayā manah ||

'As owing to *māyā* the mind in dream moves with appearance (or image) of the two (viz., the percipient and the perceptible, or in other words, the subject and the object), so owing to *māyā* the mind in the waking state¹ moves with the appearance of the two.'

See IV. 61..

¹ See IV. 40.

30

advayam ca dvayābhāsam manah svapne na samśayah !
 advayam ca dvayābhāsam tathā jāgran na samśayah !

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two; so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two.'

See IV. 62.

31

manodṛṣyam idam dvaitam yat kiñcit sacarācaram !
 manaso hy amanibhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate !!

'This duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable is perceived by the mind, but when the mind becomes non-mind (i.e., when it loses its own function of thinking, *manana*) duality is not experienced.'

See IV. 47, 48, 72. It means that the appearance of duality is nothing but the vibration of the mind (*citta-* or *vijñāna-spandita*), and when this vibration is stopped there is no duality at all.

When the state of non-mind is reached is said in the following kārikā :

32

ātmasyatānubodhena na saṅkalpayate yadā !
 amanastām tadā yāti grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt !!

'When by the knowledge of the truth of ātman it (the mind) ceases from imagining it goes to the state of non-mind being non-cognizant in the absence of the things to be cognized.'

See IV. 72, 79, 99.

Mark here that *d* (*grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt*) is identical with that of Tk. 28. See Vis, p. 584; LA, p. 169; and the note on III. of our text.

The next kārikā says that the mind which becomes non-mind 38 as described above, is, in fact, identical with Brahman :

33

akalpakam ajam jñānam jñeyābhinnam pracakṣate |
brahma jñeyam ajam nityam ajenājam vibudhyate ||

'The *jñāna* that does not imagine (i.e., indeterminate) and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable. The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one. So the unborn (Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn (*jñāna*).'

Here *jñāna* which the commentator explains as *jñaptimātra* is in reality *vijñāna* or *citta* 'mind' as spoken of above. See V_k, p. 3 : *cittam mano vijñānam* *vijñaptis ceti paryāyāḥ*; MV, XVII. 1 (p. 308) : *cittam mano 'tha vijñānam iti tasyaiva (=cittasyaiva) paryāyāḥ*; AK, II. 34 : *cittam mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham*; DN, I. 121; SN, II. 94. See III. 38, IV. 96.

For *ajam vibudhyate* cf. I. 16: *advaitam budhyate tadā*; III. 26: *ajam prakāsate*. For the whole thought see III. 35, 46. *ajenājam vibudhyate*=*ajena jñānenā (=cittena) ajam jñeyam* (Brahman) *vibudhyate prakāsate*. The unborn knowable Brahman is manifest through the unborn knowledge (i.e., the mind when it ceases from its function), there being no difference between them. See III. 46, 47.

akalpa=*nirvikalpa* (III. 34)=*asaṅga* (IV. 72). See LA, p. 157: *asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam*.

For *jñeyābhinna* 'not different from the knowable' see IV. 1.

The author now goes to speak about the state of the mind described above :

34

nigṛhitasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ ।
pracāraḥ sa tu viñeyah susupte 'nyo na tatsamah ॥

'That state (*pracāra*) of the mind of a wise man which is suppressed and (thus) indeterminate is to be known; (the state of the mind) in deep sleep is different from that, it is not like that.'

It is said here that the state of the suppressed and indeterminate mind is different from that in *susupti*. Why it is so is stated in the following kārikā (III. 35).

The word *pracāra* which is the same as *vihāra* or *bhūmi*, as the yogins and the Buddhists would express, means in such cases *avasthā* 'state.' Our author uses (IV. 80) for it also *viṣaya*.

By *nirvikalpa manas* 'indeterminate mind' we are to understand that it recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object, etc.

In Buddhist works *dhīmat* is a synonym for Bodhisattva (MSA, XIX. 73).

The reason for what is said above is now offered as follows :

35

liyate hi susupte tan nigṛhitam na liyate ।
tad eva nirbhayaṁ brahma jñānālokam samāntataḥ ॥

'For in deep sleep it (*manas*) falls into a state of oblivion, but it does not do so when suppressed. Indeed, that is

¹ Or, into a sleeping state, *laya*, see III. 41, 42.

Brahman, free from fear and radiant as *jñāna*² on all sides.'

It is clear here that the mind when suppressed, i.e., ceases from all of its activities, becomes Brahman. See III. 46.

Cf. the following quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on sloka 30 of TA (Vol. III, p. 23) presenting the views of the Vijñānavādins :

prabhāsvaram idam cittaṁ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ ।
teṣām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram ॥

² On *jñānāloka* Śaṅkara writes: *jñāptir jñānam ātmasvabhāvacaitanyam* iad eva *jñānam ālokaḥ prakāśo yasya tad brahma jñānālokom*. For *āloka* see *vibhāta* (III. 36, IV. 81), and *jyotiś* (III. 37).

Brahman referred to above is now further described in the following kārikā :

36

ajam anidram asvapnam¹ anāmakam arūpakam ।
sakṛdvibhātam² sarvajñam³ nopacāraḥ kathañcana ॥

'It is unborn, and has no sleep, nor dream ; nor has it name and form ; it is illumined once for all, and is all-knowing. And in no way is there access-concentration (*upacāra*).'

The state, i.e., the state of becoming Brahman as stated above, is, in fact, the state of *samādhi* 'intense abstract meditation,' as we shall see presently in the following two kārikās.

See I. 16^a; IV. 81^a.

² See III. 37^a; IV. 81^a with the note; ChU, VIII. 4. 1-2: *sakṛd vibhāto hy eṣa brahmalokaḥ*.

³ III. 47.

Now, there are two kinds or stages of *samādhi*, *upacāra samādhi* and *arpaṇā*° (Pali *appanā*). In the first the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninterruptedly, for now it is so and the next moment it is not so, simply moving near (*upacarati*) the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of its honey. In the second, the mind is firmly and uninterruptedly fixed on the object. Because this state of *samādhi* ‘gives (*arpayati*)’ the one-pointed mind to the object it is called *arpaṇā*, as Buddha ghoṣa explains in his AS, p. 142 : ekaggaṇi cittam ārammaṇe appetīti appanā. Cf. p. 143 : upagantvā vicaraṇavasena upavicāro. Cf. also *vicāra* as explained in the *Vibhāvanī Tīkā* on the AAS, I. 17 :

santavutti vicāro cittassa nātipphandabhūto ākāse uppatitassa
sakuṇassa pakkhapasāraṇam viya, padumassa uparibhāge
paribbhamaṇam viya ca padumābhimukhapatitassa bhamarassa.

The difference between *upacāra* and *appanā* is thus shown in VM, p. 126 :

duvidho hi samādhi upacārasamādhi ca appanāsamādhi ca. dvīh' ākārehi cittam samādhīyatī upacārabhūmiyam (=upacārāvatthāyam—Tīkā) vā parilābhabhūmiyam (=jhānassa adhigamāvatthāyam—Tīkā).° dvinnam pana samādhīnam idam nānākaraṇam°. yathā nāma daharo kumārako ukkhipitvā ṣṭhapiyamāno punappunam bhūmiyam patati evam eva upacāre uppanne cittam kālena nimittaṇi ārammaṇam karoti kālena bhavaṅgam otarati.° yathā nāma balavā puriso āsanā vuṭṭhāya divasam'pi tiṭṭheyya evam eva appanāsamādhimhi uppanne cittam saki bhavaṅgavāram chinditvā kevalam'pi rattiṇi kevalam'pi divasam tiṭṭhati.

The *d* of the kārikā may be explained in another way. Brahman is described here by such words as *aja*, *anidra*, etc., but being beyond speech and mind it cannot be done so. This is said : nopacārah kathañcana ‘(But) in no way there is any figurative (or metaphorical) expression (*upacāra*). See BSB, p. 44 :

sa punah pāramāṇihikāḥ svabhāvah sarvadharmāṇam nirvi-
kalpasyaiva jñānasya gocaro veditavyah. sacet punar yathaivā-
bhilāpo yeṣu dharineṣu yasmin vastuni pravartate tadātmakās-
te dharmaś tad vastu syāt. evam sati bahuvidhā bahavaḥ
svabhāvā ekasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyuh. tat kasya hetoh.
tathāhy ekasmin dharīna ekasmin vastuni bahuvidhā bahavo
bahubhir abhilāpaiḥ prajñaptaya upacārāḥ kriyante.^o

The following two kārikās say that this state of becoming
Brahman is *samādhi* :

37

sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamutthitah ।
supraśāntah sakṛjjyotiḥ samādhīr acalo 'bhayah ॥

'It is intense abstract concentration (*samādhi*) which is beyond all expression,¹ and above all thoughts,² very calm and full of light burning once for all,³ unwavering and without fear.'

In Buddhism there is a particular *samādhi* called *acala* (MVt,¹ 580).

¹ *anabhilāpya=okathyā*, AK, ii. 243. See IV. 24.

² III. 38⁴: cintā yatra na vidyate.

³ III. 36⁴, IV. 81 with note.

38

graḥo na tatra notsargaś cintā yatra na vidyate ।
ātmasamsthām tadā jñānam ajāti samatām gatām ॥

'Where there is no thought¹ there is neither apprehension or abandonment (of any object). At that time the mind

¹ III. 37⁴.

(*jñāna* = *citta*)² rests in itself, is unborn and attains to the state of sameness.³

In this state the mind does not apprehend or abandon any of its objects and as such rests in itself (*ātmasaṃsthā*).

The word *ātman* in *ātmasaṃsthā* here means 'itself' (*svarūpa*) and not 'soul' (*paramātman* or Brahman) as distinct from the mind (*jñāna*). Cf. BG, VI. 25 : *ātmasaṃsthām manah kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet* 'having made the mind resting in itself one should not think of anything.' Nīlakaṇṭha writes here in his *ṭīkā* on the word *ātmasaṃsthā* : *ātmani svarūpe saṃsthā sthitir yasya.*

This *ātmasaṃsthā jñāna* is, in fact, in other words, *vijñaptimātra* or *vijñānamātra* of the Buddhist *Vijñānavādins*. The word *vijñānamātra* means 'simply *vijñāna*', and the state of being so is *vijñānamātratā*. When the *vijñāna* does not apprehend any object whatsoever and as such rests only in itself this state is called *vijñānamātratā*. Says V a s u b a n d h u (Tk. 28, ViS, p. 584) :

yadā tv ālambanam jñānam naivopalabhatे tadā !
sthitam vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt ||

LA, p. 169 :

yadā tv ālambyam arthaṁ nopalabhatē jñānam tadā
vijñaptimātravyavasthānam bhavati. vijñapter grāhyābhāvād
grāhakasyābhāvāḥ. tadagrahaṇān na pravartate jñānam.

This is referred to in the following stanza of the KU, II. 3.10 :

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha !
buddhiś ca na viceṣṭate tām āhuḥ paramām gatim ||

² See III. 32, IV. 96, with notes.

³ See III. 2; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95, 100. It is to be noted in these kārikās that *ajāti* or *anupatti* and *sama*, or *sāmya* or *samatā* are always used together. Cf. this with the quotation of MV in the note on III. 2

In the Upaniṣads it is well-known that Brahman is *vijñāna* (BU, III. 9. 28; TU, II. 5 I., III. 5. I., etc.. *vijñānamaya*=*vijñāna*) or *jñāna* (TU, II. 11). This *vijñāna* or *jñāna* is *ātmasaṃsthā jñāna* or *vijñānamātra*.

For *ātmasaṃsthā jñāna* see ChU, VII. 24. 1-2 :

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite (*bhūman*)."

'Sir, in what does the Infinite rest?'

'In its own greatness,—or not even greatness.' "⁴

It is to be noted that in the beginning of the present chapter (III. 2) the author proposed 'ato *vakṣyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatāṁ gatam,' here in the present kārikā he concludes the subject.*

⁴ See my paper *Evolution of Vijñānavāda* in IHQ, X, 1934, pp. 1 ff.

That *saṃādhi* which is *nirvikalpa* is further described in the next kārikā :

39

asparśayogo nāmaisa durdarśah sarvayogibhiḥ ।
yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśināḥ ॥

'This is what is called 'contactless concentration' (*asparśayoga*), very difficult to be realized by all yogins; the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where (in fact) there is no fear.'

For *asparśayoga* see IV. 2.

The Commentator explains the second half of the kārikā saying that though there is no fear in this yoga yogins (of lower order) are afraid of it thinking it to be one's own destruction

(ātmanāśarūpa). These people have no discrimination (*avivekin*), and so they have fear though there is no fear.

Vidyāraṇya quotes this kārikā in his PD, ll. 29, introducing it (ll. 28) thus :

gauḍācāryā nirvikalpe samādhāv anyayoginām !
sākārabrahmaniṣṭhānām atyantam bhayam ūcire ||

Now the author proceeds to say that for the yoga referred to the control of mind is absolutely necessary, on which depend the absence of fear, and such other things :

40

manaso nigrahāyattam abhayaṁ sarvayoginām !
duḥkhakṣayaḥ prabodhaś cāpy akṣayā sāntir eva ca ||

'The absence of fear, the destruction of misery, the awaking, as well as the eternal peace of all yogins depend on the control of mind.'

The next kārikā shows how the mind can gradually be controlled without difficulty :

41

utseka udadher yadvat kuśāgreṇaikabindunā !
manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparikhedataḥ ||

'The control of mind without great pains is like the draining out of a sea by drops with the point of a kuśa grass.'

The first half of the kārikā refers, according to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (BG, VI. 23) and Rāmakṛṣṇa, a commentator of PD (XI. 109), where this

kārikā is quoted, to an old story, (cf. *Tītlibhopākhyāna*, HU, pp. 78-79) which runs, as given by M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t i , as follows :

Once upon a time the sea carried off with its waves the eggs of a bird which were laid on the beach. The bird got angry and determined to dry it up. He began to take out the water drop by drop with the tip of his beak and he could not be dissuaded from it by the birds related to him. In the mean time the divine sage Nārada came there. He, too, asked him to turn back, but in vain. The bird said that anyhow he would dry up the sea either in this or in the future life. Fortunately Nārada became very kind to him, and sent there Garuḍa, the lord of birds, for his help. Owing to the wind produced by the flapping of the wings of Garuḍa the sea began to dry up and thus being frightened gave back the eggs to the bird.

The substance of the kārikā is that it is with determination and perseverance that mind is gradually controlled.

The author now suggests the means for controlling the mind :

42

upāyena nigṛhṇiyād vikṣiptam kāmabhogayoh ।
suprasannam laye caiva yathā kāmo layas tathā ॥

'By the means¹ one should control it (mind) when it is distracted in desire and enjoyment, and also when it remains at ease in the sleeping state, for the sleeping state is as (bad) as desire is.'

Kārikās III. 42-46 are quoted and explained by M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t i in the commentary on the BG,

¹ See III. 43.45.

VI. 26, and III. 44-45 *a-b* by S a d ā n a n d a in his VeS, §§32-33. According to the former *kāma* 'desire' is the state of thinking of, or longing for enjoyment (*cintyamānāvasthā*), while *bhoga* 'enjoyment' is the state of enjoying the desired things (*bhuṣyamānāvasthā*). *Laya* 'sleeping state' is, in his opinion, deep sleep (*susupti*), as supported by G a u ḍ a p ā d a himself (III. 35), but S a d ā n a n d a explains it by 'sleep' (*nindrā*). *Laya* causes mental inactivity, and corresponds to the state called *mūḍha* 'infatuated' in the yoga philosophy. See V y ā s a on YS, I. 1.

The means referred to above are as follows :

43

duḥkham̄ sarvam̄ anusmṛtya kāmābhogān̄ nivartayet |
ajam̄ sarvam̄ anusmṛtya jātam̄ naiva tu paśyati ||

'Repeatedly remembering that all is misery one should turn back (one's mind) from desires and enjoyments.¹ Indeed repeatedly remembering that all is unborn one does not see anything born.'

The second half of the kārikā implies that when everything is unborn and consequently has no existence in reality there is no object for one's desire and enjoyment.

¹ Or we may write for 'one should, etc.,' 'one should keep back (from the mind) desires and enjoyments'. Thus, as says M a d h u s ū d a n a S a r a s v a t i (BG, VI. 26), *kāmābhogān̄* in the kārikā may be explained as accusative plural or ablative singular.

44

laye sambodhayec cittam̄ vikṣiptam̄ śamayet punah |
sakaśāyam̄ vijānīyāc chamaprāptam̄ na cālayet ||

'One should awaken the mind when it is in the state of

sleep; when distracted one should pacify it again. One should also investigate if it is with the evil passions (*sakaśāya*). And (finally) when it reaches the state of equanimity one should not cause it to move.'

As regards the control of mind there are four impediments enumcerated in our *kārikās* (III. 42-45) of which *vikṣepa* 'distraction' and *laya* 'slcep' have already been mentioned also in *kārikā* 42, the other two being *kaśāya* and *sukha-*, or according to some (VcS, §33) *rasa-āsvāda*. The last term will be explained in the next *kārikā* (45). We are concerned here with *kaśāya*. It means here *stabdhībhāva* 'becoming stiffened' of mind as Mādhusūdana Sarasvatī and Sadānanda would explain (*loc. cit.*). The primary meaning of *kaśāya* is 'decoction,' so to say, of evil passions (*rāga*, *duṣṭa*, *moha*). Saṅkara explaining *mṛditakaśāya* in ChU, VII. 26. 2, writes: *vārksādir iva kaśāyo rāgadveṣādidoṣah*. It causes the stiffness of mind, owing to which it cannot be fixed on the object. Thus the *kaśāya*, i.e., the evil passions, being the cause of *stabdhībhāva*, is explained by those authors to mean *stabdhībhāva*. We may, however, take the word in its actual sense, i.e., the evil passions.

Cf. MSA, XIV. 9c-d—10a-b :

linam cittasya gṛhṇiyād uddhataṁ śamayet punah ॥
śamaprāptam upekṣeta tasmin nālambane punah ॥

See also XIV. 11.

For *śamaprāpta* in *d* which gives better sense (cf. *śamayet* in *d* of the *kārikā*) and is supported by VeS, with its Tīkā *Vidvanmanorañjanī*, §33 and MSA quoted above, the reading found in editions and a very large number of MSS is *śamaprāpta*. It means one that has reached the state of equilibrium. Mādhusūdana Sarasvatī takes the word *sama* in the sense of Brahman.

45

nāsvādayet sukhām tatra niḥsaṅgaḥ prajñayā bhavet |
niścalam niścarac cittam ekikuryāt prayatnataḥ ||

'There (in practising yoga) he should not enjoy happiness.¹ By wisdom² he must be (then) free from all attachment. If the mind which is (thus) fixed goes out, by endeavour he should so do as to make it remain only in itself.'

On *ekikuryāt* 'should make one' the Commentator says : citsvarūpasattāmātram evāpādayet. Cf *ekibhavati*, BU, IV. 4.2 ; *ekibhūta*, MāU, 5.

¹ There is a feeling of happiness from that condition of mind in practising yoga, and it should be avoided as it is an impediment.

² Or, discrimination.

The next kārikā says that when the mind is thus completely controlled or suppressed (*niruddha*) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything it becomes Brahman :

46

yadā na liyate cittam na ca vikṣipyate punah |
aniṅganam anābhāsam niśpannam brahma tat tadā ||

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is distracted again, and as such has no movement nor any senses-image, then it becomes Brahman.'

See III. 35.

The first half refers to two states *laya* corresponding to *mūḍha* and *vikṣepa* corresponding to *vikṣipta* in the Vyāsa's commentary on YS, I. 1. See III. 42. See also *anidra* and

asvapna in III. 36. The Commentator explains *anābhāsa* saying that it does not appear in the form of any of its objects which are imaginary (na kenacit kalpitena viśayabhāvenāvabhāsate). *Ābhāsa* is *pratīcchāyā* 'reflection'. See BAP, V. 36. Or it may be taken in the sense of 'appearance,' namely, the appearance of any object.

On *d* the Commentator says : yadaivamplakṣaṇaṁ cittam tadā niśpannaṁ brahma brahmaśvarūpeṇa niśpannaṁ cittam bhavatiḥ arthaḥ. Cf. IV. 77 where he writes : cittasyeti yā mokṣākhyā-'nutpattiḥ and on IV. 80 cittasya niścalā cālanavarjītā brahmaśvarūpaiva tadā sthitir yaiśā brahmaśvarūpā sthitiś cittasyādvaya-vijñānaikarasaghanalakṣaṇā.

In this connexion the following may be quoted from the BA, IV. 15 : *cittasya brahmaṭādikam* which BAP explains : *cittasya phalaṁ brahmabhuṭādikam*.

It is said here that the *anāgama* and *anābhāsa* *citta* becomes Brahman. With this compare the following :

MU. VI. 24 (p. 143) :

mānase ca viline tu yat sukhām cātmākṣikam !
tad brahma cāmṛtam śukram sā gatir loka eva ca ||

Mṛtyujīdbhaṭṭāraka as quoted in ŠV, p. 99 :

nirābhāsaṁ padaṁ tat tu tat prāpya vinivartate !

LA : IV. 16 :

cittamātram nirābhāsaṁ vihāro baddhabhūmi ca !
etad dhi bhāṣitaṁ buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca ||

X. 105 (p. 278).

cittamātram atikramya nirābhāse sthitaṁ phalam !

X. 110 (p. 279).

cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet !
nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānam na paṣyate ||

X. 257 (p. 299).

tadā yogī hy anābhāsam̄ prajñayā paśyate jagat̄ !
 nimittam̄ vastu vijñaptir manovispanditam̄ ca yat̄ !
 atikramya tu putrā me nirvikalpāś caranti te !!

X. 94 (p. 277).

etad vibhāvayan yogī nirābhāse pratiṣṭhate !

X. 235 (p. 296).

ālambālambayvigataṁ yadā paśyati saṃskṛtam̄ !
 niścitaṁ cittamātram̄ hi cittamātram̄ vadāmy aham̄ !!
 mātrāsvabhāvasaṃsthānam̄ pratyayair bhāvavarjitam̄ !
 niṣṭhābhāvah̄ param̄ brahma etām̄ mātrām̄ vadāmy aham̄ !!

III. 25,26.

See also LA, p. 126 : matpravacane punar mahāmate vikalpakasya manovijñānasya vyāvṛttir nirvāṇam. Saṅkara on BU, IV. 3.7 (p. 587) : vijñānasya nirvāṇam̄ puruṣārthaḥ.

See III. 35, IV. 29 (comm. : ajātaṁ yac cittam̄ brahmaiva jāyate), 48, 77, 80.

The *citta* that becomes Brahman is described in the next kārikā :

47

svastham̄ sāntam̄ sanirvāṇam̄ akathyam̄ sukham uttamam̄ !
 ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñam̄ paricakṣate !

'They say it rests in itself¹ and is calm having *nirvāṇa* ; it is unspeakable and the highest bliss, unborn, and (identical) with the knowable, which is also unborn, and is all-knowing.'

See III. 33, IV. 1.

The word *nirvāṇa* has different meanings, such as 'delight', 'extinction', 'cessation', 'disappearance', 'calmed', 'quieted'.

¹ Here *svastha* is ātmasaṃsthā, III. 38.

We may take it here in the sense of 'extinction'. . The extinction of mind means the disappearance of its function of thinking (*manana* or *cintana*), in other words, the *amanibhāva* of *manas* referred to above (III. 31), and in MU, VI. 34, or *vilaya* of *manas* in MBU p. 12. This is also called *unmanibhāva* (BBU, 4), *vṛttikṣaya* of *citta* (MU, VI. 34, p. 178), and the *nirodha* of *vijñāna* (= *nirvāṇa*) in DN, I. 223 (*viññāna-sa nirodhena*).

Cf. YV, III. 67.8 :

spandād bhavati citsargo niḥspandād brahma śāsvatam !

See also MU, VI. 24 (p. 143) :

mānase ca viline tu yat sukham cātmasākṣikam !
tad brahma cāmṛtaṁ śukram sā gatir loka eva ca ||

For *sarvajña* see III. 36.

The author proposed in the beginning of this chapter (III. 2) to speak of non-origination (*ajāti*). Now having done so mainly with regard to Jiva and partly also to other things he concludes thus :

48

na kaścij jāyate jīvah sambhavo 'sya na vidyate |
etat tad uttamam satyam yatra kiñcin na jāyate ||¹

iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstre 'dvaitākhyam trīyam
prakaraṇam samāptam.

'No individual soul is born, nor is there any possibility of it. This is that highest reality where nothing is born.'

Here ends, in the Āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda,
Book Three called 'Non-duality'.

BOOK IV

The proposition was enunciated (III. 2), discussed (III.), and finally established in the last line of the last kārikā of the last Book, and it will further be affirmed later on (IV.71) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. In order to further elucidate this view the author now begins the present Book of his *Āgamaśāstra*.

Its first two kārikās form what is known in later Sanskrit works as *māngalācarana* ‘salutation, benediction, or prayer for success.’ The first kārikā is as follows :

jñānenākāśakalpena¹ dharmān yo gaganopamān² |
jñeyābhinnena³ sambuddhas tam vande dvipadām varam ||

‘Who has perfectly understood the elements of existence (*dharma*) that are like the sky, through the knowledge (*jñāna*) which is not different from its object (*jñeya*) and is also like the sky, to him, to the greatest of men, I pay my homage.’

The author here pays his homage to *dvipadām vara* ‘the greatest of men.’ Who is this *dvipadām vara*? The word *dvipad* (RV, X. 165.1: *śam* no astu *dvipade* *śam* *catuspade*) or *dvipada* literally ‘biped’ means in such cases ‘man.’ Words such as *dvipadām vara* or *dvipadānām uttama* (or *agra*) or *dvipadottama* (Pali *dvipad'uttama*) in compound are all synonymous. They are used both as adjectives and nouns.

¹ IV.96 with S.

² IV.91.

³ III.33; IV.88.

As an adjective *dvipadām vara* is found in MB, Vanaparvan, 54.45 (:*naiṣadho dvipadām varah*) and also in Ādiparvan, 220.36 (with reference to D *hṛta rāśīraḥ abhiṣṭauṣi ca yat kṣattuh samīpe dvipadām vara*).⁴ In Buddhist literature, both Sanskrit and Pali, *dvipadottama* or *dvipad'uttama* in Pali or any one of the synonyms mentioned above is used to mean the Buddha (AP, 1; MSt, p. 60, l. 25; SNt, 83, 995, 998; MVt², § 267; SS, p. 8, 57, here in the last place not less than thirteen times). *Narottama* (Pali *nar'uttama*) and *puruṣottama* (Pali *puris'uttama*) are also used specially for the Buddha [SNt, 544 (see DP, 78) 1021; MVt,² § 1,40; MVu, Vol. II, pp. 194, 199, 232, 266].

On the other hand Ś takes *dvipadām vara* to mean *puruṣottama* in the sense of Nārāyaṇa.⁵

Now, which of them, the Buddha or Nārāyaṇa, is really meant by the author himself can be decided if we consider the subject matter of the kārikā.

There are mainly two points to be discussed here. First, *jñāna* 'knowledge' is said to be *ākāśakalpa* 'like the sky,' and again it is not different from the *jñeya* 'the knowable,' i.e., the object of knowledge. And second, the *dharma*s, 'elements of existence' or 'things or objects,' are also *gaganopama* 'like the sky.'

What are we to understand by the statement that *jñāna* is like the sky? One characteristic of *jñāna*, according to both our author and the Vijñānavādins, is that it is *asaṅga* (IV. 72, 96) 'having no attachment, contact, or relation,'

⁴ Such instances are there many. See I. 50.27.

⁵ It may be noted that so far as I know no word compounded with *dvipad* or *dvipada* is found in Brahmanic literature to mean Nārāyaṇa. But thanks to a friend who points out that *dvipadām variṣṭha* which, in fact, is the same as *dvipadām varo* is applied at least once to Nārāyaṇa (MB, Sāntiparvan, 343. 1). But it is to be noted that though here it refers to Nārāyaṇa, no doubt, this Nārāyaṇa is not God (*iśvara*), but a sage (*rishi*) and hence a man, though an incarnation of the former.

i.e., it does not relate itself to its object, it does not cognize any object (*agraha*, III. 32), there being no object whatsoever. See IV. 26, 27, 72, 96, 99, and the following from LA, p. 157: *asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam*.⁶ Now *jñāna* being *asaṅga* is compared here with the sky which is also *asaṅga*. See BAP, p. 359: *evam° niśprapancatvād ākāśavad asaṅgam anāspadam*⁷ *aśeṣam viśam utpaśyāmaḥ*.⁸

As regards the absence of difference between *jñāna* and *jñeya* it is a well-known fact that this view is maintained by Vijñānavādins. According to them there is no reality in external things. Knowable is, in fact, inside being the transformation of *vijñāna*, and only appears to be outside. Dīnāgā says in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, 6 (quoted by Śāṅkarā in his commentary on BS, II. 2.28 and by Kamalasīla in his *Pañjikā* on TS, p. 582 : *yad antarjñeyarūpam tad bahirvad ababhāsate*⁹. And Dharmakīrti formulates it in his PV,¹⁰ fol. 274a, l. 7 in the following

⁶ Sometimes there is made a difference between *jñāna* and *vijñāna* as the following passages of the same work (LA) will show saying that *jñāna* is *asaṅga*; p. 157: *tatrotpannapradhvansi; vijñānam anutpannapradhvamsi jñānam; asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam viśayavaicityrasaṅgalakṣaṇam ca vijñānam; asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānam; aprāptilakṣaṇam jñānam*; ASP, p. 399: *asaṅgalakṣaṇā subhūte prajñāpāramitā*. See also MV, p. 533; *nimittālambanam vijñānam, jñānenā hi śūnyatālambanena bhavitavyam, taccānutpādarūpam eveli*. See IV. 96, notes.

⁷ As the editor, Poussin, has pointed out, this reading is supported by the Tibetan version where we have: *lhag.pa.med.pa(asāṅga).gnas.med (anāspada)*.

⁸ See also BA with BAP, IX. 155.

⁹ The other half runs as follows: *so 'rtho vijñānarūpatvāt tatpratyayatayāpi ca*. See also TS, p. 582 :

nilapītādi yaj jñāne bahirvad ababhāsate |
tatra satyam ato nāsti vijñeyam tattvato bahiḥ ||

¹⁰ The book in its original Sanskrit is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan translation called *Tsad.ma.rnam.par.nes.pa* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya*) in Tanjur, Mdo, G, fols. 250b. 6—329b.1. Cordier, III, p. 437.

line which is widely quoted¹¹ in Brāhmaṇical works in discussing *vijñānavāda*, a common subject for philosophical discussions found in them¹²:

sahopalambhanyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoh¹³

'On account of the regularity of the simultaneous perception of the blue and its knowledge there is no difference between them.'

This theory is based on such utterances of the Buddha as the following :

cittamāttam bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātakam.¹⁴

'O the sons of Jina, the three planes are only mind.'

The following may also be quoted in this connexion: V_k, I: *vijñaptimātram evaitad*; L_A, X. 77 : *vijñaptimātram tribhavam*.

¹¹ Poussin has shown it in his *Le Buddisme d'après les sources brāhmaṇiques* in *Le Muséon*, N. S. 1901, pp. 181-82; Ānandagiri and Vācaspati (*Bhāṣāṭī*) on BS, II. 2. 28; *Tētparyasikā*, p. 457; *Slokavārttika* (ṭīkā), 290; *Nyāyakandali*, p. 126; *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, (Bib. Ind.) p. 93; *Vivaranyaprameyasamgraha*, p. 75. See also IHQ, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1933, pp. 979-80.

¹² For instance, MD with Śabara, I. 1.5; M_SV, *Nirñlambavāda* and *Śākyavāda*, pp. 217-345; BS with Ś, II. 2. 28.

¹³ The Tibetan version runs:

lhan.cig.dmigs.pa.nes.pahi.phyir |
sso.dai.de.blo.gshan.ma.yin |

See IHQ, IX, pp. 279 ff. and PV_k, II. 588-591:

sakṛtsaṁvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha !
vijayasya tato 'nyatvāpūkenākārepa siddhyali " "
bhedaś ca bhrāntavijñānair dṛṣṭyeitendāv ivādvaye !
saṁpritiyamo nāsti bhūmaylor nīlapītayoh !
nārtho 'saṁvedanāḥ kaścid anarthāpū vāpi vedanam !
dṛṣṭāpū saṁvedyamānāpū tat taylor nāsti vivekitā !
iāmād arthasya durvāram jñānakālāvabhāsināh !
jñānād avyatirekitvam" !

¹⁴ DS, p. 49; SS, p. 19; TA¹, p. 18. For further details see Lévi : *Matiériaux pour l'étude du système Vijnaptimātra*, Paris, 1932, p. 43.

etc. And from this it follows that in reality there is no external object as the foolish imagine,¹⁵ it being nothing but the transformation of the mind (*vijñānapariṇāma*) owing to *vāsanā*.¹⁶

In this kārikā *jñeya* ‘object of knowledge’ is to be taken in its ordinary sense and not in its particular significations, as in III.33, and IV.90.

We are now to discuss the second point, i.e., the *dharma*s ‘elements of existence’ are *gaganopama*. From the absolute point of view (*paramārthataḥ*) the external things appear only in their imposed forms having no reality at all. They have not their intrinsic existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and as such are void (*śūnya*) like the son of a barren woman. Hence they are *gaganopama*.¹⁷ Śāntideva says in his BA, IX.155 :

sarvam ākāśasaiṅkāśam parighṛṣṇantu madvidhāḥ !

‘Let those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like the sky.’

Why is it like the sky? Prajñākaramati explains : because it is imposed and devoid of reality (*samāropitataṭṭva-śūnyatvāt*). We read the following in ASP, p. 297 :

evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā ākāśagatikā ānāgatikā agatikā ākāśasamāḥ. yathākāśam anāgatam agatam akītam avikītam anabhisamāskītam asthitam avyavasthitam anutpannam anirudham evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā anāgatā agatā akītā avikītā

¹⁵ LA, p. 285 :

bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate |
vāsanair luditaṁ cittam arthābhāsam̄ pravartate ||

¹⁶ Tk, 1 :

ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate |
vijñānapariṇāmo'sau" ||

Sthiramati writes here in his bhāṣya: dharmāṇām ātmānaś ca vijñānapariṇāmād bahirabhāvāt.

¹⁷ BAP, p. 503 (with regard to *aṇu*) : ato 'bhiniśkr̄ṣyamāṇo' niḥsvabhāvatayāś ākāśam śūnyam eva : See pp. 504-505,

anabhisam̄skṛtā asthitā asaṃsthitā avyavasthitā anutpannā ani-
ruddhā ākāśakalpatvād avikalpāḥ.

See BAP, p. 395, quoted above, and specially our text, IV. 93,

Or because the *dharma*s are beyond enumeration (*gaṇanā-samatikrānta*), they are *gaganopama*.¹⁸

Or, it may be that as *jñāna* is *asaṅga* and is thus like the sky, so are *asaṅga* the *dharma*s, and as such they are like the sky. See IV. 96. That the sky is *asaṅga* needs no explanation.

One of the grounds on which this theory is based is that the things are *nihsvabhāva*, i.e., without their own nature and condition or state of being (*svabhāva*). And that which has not its own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (*ākāśa, sūnya*).¹⁹

Or again, as in fact the things have naturally neither origination nor suppression, they are like the sky. See LA, X. 172 :

aniruddhāḥ anutpannāḥ prakṛtyā gaganopamāḥ !

S does not explain here as to how *jñāna* is *ākāśakalpa* and the *dharma*s are *gaganopama*. He would, however, explain the non-difference of *jñāna* and *jñeya* saying that *jñeya* refers to *ātman* (or strictly *ātmans*), and *jñāna* is not different from *ātman*.

¹⁸ ASP, pp. 278-279: sarvadharmaḥ api subhūte 'cīnīyā alulyā aprameyā asaṃkhyeyā asamasamāḥ.' sarvadharmaḥ api subhūte 'saṃkhyeyā gaṇanā-samatikrāntavat. rūpam api subhūte 'samasamam evam vedanā samjñā sameskārā vijñānam api subhūte 'samasamam evam sarvadharmaḥ api subhūte samasamā ākāśasamaivāḥ subhūte sarvadharmaṇām.'

BA, V. 12: durjanān gaganoparnān on which BAP writes Satravo hi gaganasamaivād aparyanīāḥ.

¹⁹ See BAP, p. 503: ato 'bhiniśkiṣyāmāno nihsvabhāvalayā ākāśam sūnyam eva; pp. 504-505: iti ko 'ra kāyah. itasya pratyavekṣamāṇasya bhavati—ākāśa-samo 'yam kāyah ° sarvam etad ākāśam iti pāsyati °

Now the word *dharma* used here in this kārikā and not less than twenty-two times in this Book,²⁰ requires some explanation. It is very widely used in such cases as the present one throughout Buddhist literature in Sanskrit and also in Pali.²¹ Figuratively it means a thing or object, a thing of which the senses or mind takes cognition and as such, it is synonym of such Sanskrit words as *artha* or *padārtha* or *viṣaya* or *prameya*. Literally it has among others the sense of nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, in Sanskrit *svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa*. It is derived from √*dhṛ* 'to hold, maintain, preserve, keep.' Because a thing in whatever form it may be maintains its own characteristics or essential quality (*svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva*), it is called *dharma*. So we read in AKB, p. 6: lakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmaḥ (rañ.gi.matshan.ñid.hdzin.paḥi.phyir.chos.te). See MV, pp. 304, 457. Buddha ghoṣa (AS, §94, p. 39) explains the term in the following words: (i) attano pana sabhāvam dhārentīti dhammā, (ii) dhāriyanti vā paccayehi, (iii) dhāriyanti vā yathāsabhāvato'ti dhammā.²² According to it *rasa*, *sparśa*, etc., are *dharmas*. Only these are there and not also *dharmaṇi* 'those endowed with or having a *dharma*', as the Buddhists hold unlike such non-Buddhist philosophers as Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, according to whom earth, or jars, etc., are *dharmaṇi*, while their qualities, i.e., hardness (*kāṭhinya*), etc., are *dharmas*. In Buddhist philosophy it is only the quality of tangibility called 'hardness' (*kāṭhinya*, *sparśa*) that is regarded as existent, but

²⁰ IV. I, 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 41, 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99. It is used also in II. 25 and III I, but evidently in a meaning different from that in Book IV.

²¹ For instance, ASP, p. 39: sarvadharmaḥ api devaputrā māyopamāḥ svapnopamāḥ; DP, 279 (Maggavagga, 7) sabbe dhammā anattā'ti.

²² It is thus translated in Ex., p. 50: "Dharmas may be defined as those states which bear their own intrinsic natures, or which are borne by causes-in-elevation, or which are borne according to their own characteristics."

there is no entity excepting it that we call earth, or the element of earth. Āryadeva says in his CS, 309 :

kaṭhinā dīśyate bhūmih sā ca kāyena gṛhyate !
tena hi kevalam sparśo bhūmir eṣe ti kathyate ||²³

'It is seen that the earth is hard and that is perceived with one's body. Therefore it is said that the earth is only the quality of tangibility.'

Thus, as says Stcherbatsky in his *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 26, 'If we say "earth has odour, etc.," it is only an inadequate expression; we ought to say "earth is odour, etc.," since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to.'²⁴

It is also to be borne in mind in this connexion that in the absolute truth there is nothing as *avayavin* 'one having portions' as in other systems. It is owing to this fact that expressions like the following are found in Buddhist works :

nāstiha sattva ātmā vā dharmāstv ete sahetukāḥ |²⁵

This theory of *dharma* seems to be exactly the same as that of the *tattva* of the Sāṅkhyas. The word *tattva* (*tat-tva*) literally

²³ This is a reconstructed verse from Tibetan which runs:

sa . ni . brtan . shes . bya . bar . mthoñ |
de . yah . lus . kyis . hdzin . par . hgyur |
des . na . reg . pa . hbaḥ . shig . hdi |
sa . ho . shes . ni , bya . bar . brjod ||

See V, 82; AK and AKV¹, I, 35 (p. 69) : 'pṛthivīdhātuḥ katamāḥ . khakkhaṭvatvam iti vistaraḥ; MV, pp. 66-67: iha tu kāṭhinyādīvyatirikta-pṛthivīḍyasyambhave sati na yukto viśeṣayaviśeṣanābhāvah.' evam pṛthivī-dināṁ yady api kāṭhinyādīvyatiriktaṁ vicāryamāṇam lakṣyam nāsti, lakṣyavyati-rekeṇa ca lakṣṇāṇam nīrāśrayaṇam tathāpi samvītir eveti.^o YB, 16¹: khakkhaṭvatvam katamat, pṛthivī. This view is found also in the *Gārbhopaniṣad*, I: tatra yat kaṭhinaṁ sā pṛthivī.

²⁴ He quotes here the following from AKV² IX p 717: pṛthvī gandhavatī ukte rūpa-gandha-sparśebhyo nānyad darśayitum sakyate. Cf. *Soul Theory*, p. 742.

²⁵ Quoted in MV, p. 355 as a saying of the Bhagavata.

means 'thatness,' i.e., 'the state of that (referring to a thing) and hence it signifies 'nature (*svabhāva*)' or 'true nature.' Thus, in fact, *tattva* is a *guṇa*, yet each of the twenty-five categories in the system is considered as a *tattva* (*pañcavimśatī tattva*), and not *tattvavat* 'having *tattva*.' When the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, are in equal condition (*sāmyāvasthā*), they are collectively called *prakṛti*. It is itself a *tattva*, it has no *tattva*.²⁶ It consists in the three *guṇas*, it has no *guṇa*, though sometimes even in authoritative works it is loosely said that it has three *guṇas*. Thus it is well-known fact that teachers belonging to other systems say that in Sāṃkhya there is no difference between a *guṇa* and a *guṇin* or *dravya*²⁷ (*guṇadravyayos tādātmyam*), or between a *dharma* and a *dharmin* (*dharma-dharmīḥ abhedāḥ*).²⁸

Says Aśvaghosa (BCK, XII. 76) :

guṇino hi guṇānām ca vyatireko na vidyate !
rūpoṣṇābhyaṁ virahito na hy agnir upalabhyate ||

²⁶ See *Tattvayāthārthyadīpanī* included in the *Sāṃkhyasamgraha* (Chittambar Khamba Sanskrit Series), pp. 72-93: tattvānīti tāntrikī samjnā. tadart cātmānātmavivekapratiyogyanuyoginas tattatpadārthāḥ. teṣām bhāvāḥ tatpadanimittāni puruṣatvapratyktivādīni pañcavimśatijātayāḥ. dharmadharma abhedād vyaktayo 'pi tattvānīty ucyate.

²⁷ Vasuvandhu gives (AK, IX. 290) the following definition of *dravya* rejecting that of the Vaiśeṣikas: *vidyamānaṃ dravyam iti*. Yaśomita adds: *yat svalakṣaṇato* *vidyamānaṃ* *tad dravyam*. He does not accept position that *smṛti*, *saṃskāra*, *icchā*, etc., are *guṇas* as held by Vaiśeṣika (*Ibid*). See AK, III. 100^{a-b}. But Viśnānabhiḥikṣu who is undoubtedly much influenced by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems writes the following in his commentary on SS, I. 61: *ayam ca pañcavimśatiko gaṇo dravyarūpa e* dharmadharma abhedāt tu *guṇakarmasāmānyādinām* *atraivāntarbhāvah*. Cf. I. 1. dharmadharma abhedād *dravyānām* *api tanmātratā smṛtā*.

²⁸ See Viśnānabhiḥikṣu on SS, II. 5 where the following is quoted:

śaktisaktimator bhedam paśyanti paramārthataḥ |
abhedam cānupaśyānti yoginas tattvacintakāḥ ||

It may be noted in this connexion that Vasubandhu in his *Vijñānamātrasiddhi* applies the term *dharma* to the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas (O. Rosenberg).²⁹

It is not that in Brahmanical works the word *dharma* is not used in the above sense. For instance, see KU, I. 1. 21 : *anur esa dharmāḥ*.³⁰ Yāskā (Nt, I. 20) writes *sākṣātkṛtadharmaṇāḥ*. Here the word *dharman* differs from *dharma* only in form and not also in sense, as the former, too, means *artha* or *padārtha* 'a thing.' Vācaspati explains in his *Tātparyatīkā* the word *sākṣātkṛtadharman* used by Vātsyāyana (NS, I. 1.7), saying *sudṛḍhena pramāṇenāvadhāritā arthā yena sa sākṣātkṛtadharma*. Evidently he takes here *dharman* in the sense of *artha*. Vyāsa in his commentary on YS, II. 17, explains *dṛśya* by *buddhisattvopāñḍhāḥ sarve dharmāḥ*.

In our present Book here and in other places Ś takes *dharma* to mean *ātman*. But this seems to be forced. To imply *ātman* our author uses in every case *ātman* or *jīva*.³¹ Why should he employ in this chapter *dharma* for it? Undoubtedly these two terms are well-known in their meanings. So there is no ground for giving preference to such a word as *dharma* in the sense of *ātman*. In all the twenty-two cases in the present Book *dharma* is easily construed in the sense of 'a thing,' literally 'an element of existence' as in Buddhist literature. But while in some of them Ś takes the word to mean *ātman*, in others he could not do so. In some cases he did not explain the word at all, and certainly the meaning *ātman* cannot be accepted

²⁹ Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 27, n. 2.

³⁰ The commentator, Ś, explains the word *dharma* here saying *ātmākhyā dharma*. Undoubtedly *ātman* is a *dharma* as we have seen. But certainly it is not the actual meaning of the word though it may be implied with reference to the context. See also KU, II. 1. 14: *evam dharmān pṛthak paśyan*.

³¹ See for *ātman* I. 12; II. 12, 17; III. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14; for *jīva* I. 16; III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 48; IV. 63, 68, 69, 70.

in them. For instance, in the text *sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne* (IV. 33) the word *dharma* can in no way mean *ātmān*. In two cases he explains it saying *hastyādīn bāhyadharmaṇ* (IV. 41), and *bāhyadharmaḥ* (IV. 54). Once he writes *ātmāno 'nye ca dharmāḥ* (IV. 58). In one case (IV. 82), however, he gives the actual sense, i.e., *vastu* 'thing'.³²

It can further be shown from the words of the author himself that in meaning *dharma* and *bhāva* (= *vastu* = *padārtha*) are identical. See the following passages :

(i) *ajātasyaiva bhāvasya* (III. 20^a) and *ajātasyaiva dharmasya* (IV. 6^a).

(ii) *ajāto hy amṛto bhāvah* (III. 20^c) and *ajāto hy amṛto dharmah* (IV. 6^c).

(iii) *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvah* (III. 22^{c-d}) and *svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmah* (IV. 7^{c-d}).

It is to be noted that while *bhāva* is used only in the second and third Books³³ of the work, *dharma* in the above sense is used only in Book IV, and this is very significant indicating the Buddhist relationship of the subject dealt with in it.

There is one thing more. It is said in the *kārikā* that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly understood the *dharmas*. Here if he is meant to be *Nārāyaṇa* one would naturally ask : What is the authority for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that *Nārāyaṇa* is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first *kārikā*, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, is in favour of the *Buddha*.

³² The text is: *yasya kasya ca dharmasya*, and Ś explains: *yasya kasyacid vastunah*. This reading is in the MS *ca* of Anandashrama ed., the other readings add *dvaya-* before *vastunah*.

³³ Kārikās II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 33; and III. 20, 22.

2

In the second kārikā the author salutes the teacher of the *asparśayoga*:

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ ।
avivādo 'viruddhaś ca desitas tām namāmy aham ॥

'I salute him (who has) taught the *asparśayoga* which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition.'

I construe the kārikā taking *yena* 'by whom' as understood, thus differing a little from the commentator, Ś, who says that it is the *asparśayoga* that is saluted here.

In the kārikā *avivāda* refers to the fact that our theory is not contradicted by theories of other schools, and *aviruddha* implies that it involves no self-contradiction or is not against any other position held by us.

Now what is the *asparśayoga*, by whom and where has it been taught? The word does not occur in the Upaniṣads, though Ś says on III. 39, where also it is described, that it is well-known in the Upaniṣads (*prasiddham upaniṣatsu*). See also III. 37, 38. The following is found in KU, II. 3. 10 :

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha ।
buddhiś ca na viceṣṭate tām āhuḥ paramāṇi gatim ॥

'When the five (instruments of) knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state.'

Similar statements are met with in other Upaniṣads.¹ But though they in fact may point to what is called *asparśayoga*, as will presently be explained, it is not termed *asparśayoga*.

For instance, BBU, 4-6; MU, VI. 34. See kārikā, III. 38.

The word *asparśayoga* literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch. The author himself says (III. 37) it is a *samādhi* ‘profound or abstract concentration,’ it is very difficult to realize. It points to what is *asamprajñāta samādhi* (YS, I. 2, 18, 51 with the scholiast *Vyāsa*),² or *nirvikalpa samādhi* (PD, II. 28) of yogins. But nowhere in their systems, so far as my information goes, it is called *asparśayoga*.³ Why is it that the word *asparśa* is used here?

I am inclined to think that it refers to the ninth or the last of the nine *dhyānas* or meditations called *anupūrvavivihāra* (Pali *anupubbavivihāra*) or the successive states of *dhyāna* which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts.⁴ They are as follows :

I. Four *rūpa dhyānas* or the meditations of which *rūpa* ‘matter’ is the object, viz.—

- (i) *prathama dhyāna* or the first stage of meditation.
- (ii) *dvitiya dhyāna* or the second stage of meditation.
- (iii) *trtiya dhyāna* or the third stage of meditation.
- (iv) *caturtha dhyāna* or the fourth stage of meditation.

II. The four *arūpa dhyānas* or the meditations of which the object is not matter, viz.—

(i) *ākāśānāntyāyatana* (Pali *ākāsañnañcāyatana*) or the place of infinity of space.

² *Vyāsa* explains (YS, I. 2) it: na tatra kiñcit samprajñāyata ity *asamprajñātah* ‘as nothing is known there it is called *asamprajñāta*.’

³ Cf. *asparśasamvītpṛapti* used in explaining *svarūpalabha* in the following line of the VV, p. 42: *svarūpalabhaḥ samastakalpanottīmatvād akṛtakā-niravakāśa-niruttara-nistaraṅga-niravadhi-nimiketāsparśasamvītpṛaptiḥ bhavati*. This is kindly pointed out to me by Dr. S. N. Sen Gupta of the Lucknow University. The following occurs in the same work (p. 4) in the course of the explanation of *mahāśūnyatāpraveśa*: *kulākulavikalpadośoijhito'vyapadeśya-mahānirāvaraṇa-niratyaya-vedyavedaka-niryukto varṇāvaraṇanirvaraṇottīrṇah sparsasparśa-prathāparivarjita upacārāt paramākāśādyabhidhānair abhidhīyate*.

⁴ AN, Vol. IV, pp. 410-448: *nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavivihārā*. *nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavivihārasamāpattio desissāmi, tam sunātha.*

(ii) *vijñānānānāntyāyatana* (Pali *viññānañca*⁵) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness.

(iii) *ākiñcanāyatana* (Pali *ākiñcaññā*⁶) or the place of nothingness.

(iv) *naivasamjñā-nāsamjñāyatana* (Pali *nevasaññānāsaññā*⁷) or the place neither of consciousness nor of unconsciousness.

And the ninth is *samjñāveditanirodha* (Pali *saññāvedayitanirodha*) or the cessation or complete suppression of consciousness and sensation.

As in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation not only sensation or consciousness, but also all the mental properties or mentals (*cittta* or *caitasika dharma*s), headed by *sparsa* (Pali *phassa*) 'contact,'⁸ are restricted or suppressed with the *citta* or mind itself, it is called *asparśayoga*. It is to be noted that the word *sparsa* employed here implies also the other mentals of which it is the first. The cessation of *vedanā* is possible only when *sparsa* ceases, as is clearly shown in the SN, IV, p. 220 (XXXVI. 15.4): *phassasamudayā vedanā-samudayo phassanirodhā vedanānirodho*. It means that *sparsa* is the cause of *vedanā*, so when there is *sparsa* there is *vedanā*, and when there is no *sparsa* there is no *vedanā*.⁹ The fact that in this state of *nirodha* (which is the same as *asamprajñāta* or *nirbijā* or *nirvikalpa samādhī*) the mind and its properties (*citta* and *cittta* or *caitasika*) completely cease to work is clearly described by Buddhaghosa in his VM, p. 552.¹⁰

It is said (III. 39) that *asparśayoga* is very difficult to realize. From this very fact the word *asparśayoga* may be explained

⁵ AAS, II. 2: *phasso vedanā saññā catanā*¹¹ *cetasikā sabbacittasādhāraṇā nāma*.

For its explanation see *Sthiramati* on Tk, p. 20, II. 1, 2, 7, 9, 10; p 28, I. 18.

kā nirodhasamāpattīti. yā anupubbanirodhavasena cittacetasiikanam dharmmānam appavatti. See also SN, Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI. 11. 5): *saññāvedayitanirodham samāpannassa saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti,*

quite in a different way. In Buddhist Sanskrit works there is frequent use of such words as *sparśavihāra* (M^{Vt}¹, 8349, 8351; Tk, p. 28, ll. 18), *sparśavihāratā* (M^{Vt}¹, 6288), and *asparśavihāra* (AAA, p. 326; Tk, p. 28, II. 17, 19; p. 30, ll. 15, 20). Sthiramati explains the last word in his commentary on Tk, p. 28, l. 18, saying : *sparśah sukham tena sahitō vihārah sparśavihārah, na sparśavihāro 'sparśavihārah.* He says that *sparśa* means *sukha* 'joy, content, ease, comfort'; *sparśavihāra* is a state with it; and *asparśavihāra* is its opposite. In Tibetan *sparśavihāra* is translated by bde.gnas.pa, literally the Sanskrit equivalent to which is *sukhasthiti* (or *sukhāvasthiti*) 'pleasant state.' In Pali *sparśavihāra* is *phāsuvihāra* in the same meaning.⁸ In this light *asparśayoga* in sense is nothing but *asukhayoga* (*a-sukhayoga*) meaning thereby 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease.' This explanation is fully supported by what we know of it in III. 39 : It is very difficult to realize and yogins shrink from it seeing fear though in fact there is no fear.

We read in the present kārikā that this yoga conduces to happiness of all beings (*sarvasattvasukha*). This is found also in Buddhist works where it is said (SN, Vol. IV, p. 228=XXXIV, 19, 20)⁹ that the highest bliss is felt in the *saññāvedayitanirodha* (or *sammāvedayita*^o according to the Chinese version. *sammā=samya*g).

⁸ It is, however, to be noted that, strictly speaking, Pali *phāsu* is not from Sanskrit *sparśa* the Pali form of which is *phassa*. In Northern Sanskrit Buddhist works Pali *phāsu* is wrongly translated into Sanskrit by *sparśa*. See the Pali Dictionary of Childers, p. 982. Sometimes in Buddhist Sanskrit *sukhasparśavihāra* is found for *phāsuvihāra*. It clearly indicates that the writers of the former did not think that mere *sparśavihāra* could imply the sense of *phāsuvihāra*.

⁹ idhānanda bhikkhu sabbaso neva saññānāsaññāyatanaṁ samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharati. idam kho ānanda etamhā sukhā aññām sukham abhikkantataram ca paññataram ca. See also the next paragraph (21) for the reply to a question raised here. Cf. AN, Vol. IV, pp. 414-418

It may, however, be observed here that considering the use of the word *sparśa*, BG, II. 14, V. 27, and the explanations offered there by Ś and other commentators the interpretation as given in the present case as well as in III. 39 by Ś cannot be rejected.

It is to be noted here that attempt has been made above to interpret the word *asparśayoga* in different ways, but it seems that the best interpretation may be found in Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi*. After what is written above a transcription¹⁰ of that work has come to my hands and the following is quoted here from it :

[78b] kathaṁ nirodhaṁ samāpadyamānasya naivam bhavati
aham nirodhaṁ samāpadye vā vyuttiṣṭhe vā. samāpattikāle
nirabhisaṃskāreṇa cittanirodhāt.

kathaṁ nirodhād vyutthitas trīn sparśān spṛśati āniñjyam¹¹
ākiñcanyam ānimittam. yad bhūyasā tasyāḥ samāpatter
vyuttiṣṭhamānas trividhenālambanena vyuttiṣṭhate bhavā-
lambanena viśayālambanena nirodhālambanena ca. taiś ca
vyuttiṣṭhamāno yathākramam eva trīn sparśān spṛśati. [79a] tatra
bhavālambanena vyuttiṣṭhamānasya na bhavati cetasa iñjitatvam
asmīty ayam asmīti bhaviṣyāmiti vistaraḥ. ata āniñyam sparśam
spṛśatity ucyate. viśayālambanena vyuttiṣṭhamānasya na rāga-
kiñcanam bhavati na dveṣakiñcanam bhavati na mohakiñcanam.
tasmād ākiñcanyam sparśam spṛśatity ucyate. nirodhālambanena
vyuttiṣṭhamānah sarvanimittānām amanasikārād ānimittam
dhātum avalambate. tasmād ānimittam sparśam spṛśatity ucyate.

(=XXXIV, 2-3) : kiṃ pāṇ'et̄ha (i.e., in *nirvāṇa*) āvuso sāriputta sukham yad
et̄ha n'atthi vedayitan'ti. etad eva khv et̄ha āvuso sukham yad et̄ha n'atthi
vedayitam.

¹⁰ This is made by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyaṇa, and he has kindly given it to me. An edition of this work is undertaken by the present author for the Asutosh Sanskrit Series, Calcutta University.

¹¹ For the variants of this word see AK, IV. 107 (where different authorities are quoted): MV, pp. 334-5; AKV², pp. 389 ff.

We know from it that in the stage of *nirodhasamāpatti* the *citta* or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever. But in the stage called *vyatthāna* 'rising up' one has three kinds of *sparsa* 'experience,' known as *āniñjya*, *ākiñcanya*, and *ānimitta*. The word *sparsa* in such cases means 'experience' or 'that which is experienced', √*spṛś* meaning here 'to experience.'¹²

Now, because in the yoga called *nirodhasamāpatti* there is no *sparsa* of anything, it is rightly named *asparśayoga*.

It is said (III. 39c-d) of the *asparśayoga* that yogins or rather untrained ones shrink back from it, imagining fear where in reality there is no fear: *yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinah*. But what is the cause of their fear? Ś rightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self.¹³ Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e., *saññāvedayitanirodha* before his *parinirvāṇa*, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one only having entered the stage of the *dhyāna* called *saññāvedayitanirodha*. After a short time, however, He passed away.¹⁴ It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death.

Yet there is a real difference between death and *asparśayoga* or *saññāvedayitanirodha*, and Buddha has explained it in his VM, p. 558, quoting a passage from the *Suttapiṭaka*. It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same excepting this that in the latter the heat of the body is not

¹² See KnU, IV-2: te hy enan nedīṣham paspṛśuh. [te hy enat prathamo vidāñcakāra—this portion is grammatically defective and not in the *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa*, Chapter X which forms the KnU]; 3: sa hy enan nedīṣham pasparśa; sa hy enat prathamo vidāñcakāra.

¹³ ātmanāśarūpam imam yogam manyamānā bhayaṁ kurvanti.

¹⁴ *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, VI. 8-9 (=DN, Vol. II, pp. 156-158).

lost, that life does not come to an end, and that the organs of sense are not destroyed, while in the former all these are annihilated.

We have seen in the present kārikā that this yoga is taught by the Buddha. It cannot be denied that up to the eighth of those successive states of *dhyāna* (*anupūrvavihāra*) already explained, viz., 'neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness', there is nothing particularly Buddhist. For it is evident from Buddhist literature, both Pali and Sanskrit, that the Buddha's two teachers Ālāra Kālāma (Āḍāra Kālāpa) and Uddaka Rāmaputta (Rudraka Rāmaputra) knew the seventh and eighth of the *dhyānas*, respectively.¹⁵ The Buddha was, however, not satisfied with what he had from his teachers, and he started thereupon to seek after a still higher state and succeeded in realizing it. It is this state which is called *sāññāvedayitanirodha* or briefly *nirodha*.

There is one thing more which suggests that the *asparśayoga* was not originally taught in the Brahmanic system of yoga. It is said in the kārikā that this yoga is 'not disputed' (*avivāda*)¹⁶ and 'not opposed' (*aviruddha*). It is implied, as said before, from these two words that in the acceptance of the *asparśayoga* by the Vedantists, among whom the author himself is included, there cannot be raised any dispute or opposition, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view.

Thus it is clear from what we have seen above that the real instructor of the *asparśayoga*, who is saluted here by the author, is no other than the Buddha.

Let us now follow what the author has to say in this Book (IV). The subject matter of it is *a-jāti* (= *an-utpatti*, *an-utpāda*) 'non-becoming' or 'non-origination,' or, in other words, the doctrine that there is nothing about which it can be said that it is produced.

¹⁵ MN, Vol. I, pp. 8-9 (*Ariyapariyesanasatta*, I. 3.6.); LV, Vol. I, pp. 238-239, 243-244; BCK, XII. 63, 83; Kern: *Manual of Buddhism*, 1896, p. 55.

¹⁶ See IV. 5.

There are two classes of teachers: one (*i.e.*, the followers of the systems of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta¹) holding the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*), and the other (*i.e.*, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas²) maintaining the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause (*asatkāryavāda*). The author refers to these two views in the third kārikā which runs as follows:

3

bhūtasya jātim icchanti vādinah kecid eva hi |
abhūtasyāpare dhīrā vivadantah parasparam ||

'There are only certain disputants who maintain that *jāti* 'origination' is of a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is of a thing which is non-existent.³ Thus they dispute with each other.'

¹ See SK, IX; BS, II. I. 14-18 with Ś; Ś on BU, I. 2. 2, (p. 20): *kāryasya hi sato jāyamānasya kāraṇe saty utpattidarśanāt*. Among the Buddhists the Vaibhāśikas maintain *satkāryavāda*. See CS, IX. 15 and our text, IV, 11, note 1.

² See NK, pp. 143 ff. Among the Buddhists Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold *asatkāryavāda*. CS, IX. 15.

³ The interpretation of the words *bhūta* and *abhūta* by Ś in the text here is quite different from that in III. 23, and it is very remarkable.

The Ācārya now proceeds to mention in the next kārikā the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute 'non-becoming' (*ajāti*) of things:

4

bhūtam na jāyate kiñcid abhūtam naiva jāyate |
vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātiṁ khyāpayanti te ||

'That which is already existent does not come into being, and that which is non-existent does not also come into being;

disputing thus the followers of the doctrine of *advaya* assert absolute non-becoming (*ajāti*).¹

Before discussing the meaning of the kārikā it is to be noted that the reading that can reasonably be accepted in c is not *vivadanto dvayā* as in many editions, but *vivadanto'dvayā* with our MS. M^c, and some editions.¹ It is supported also by the commentary in those editions, as well as by the MS. *Ka* used in the Anandasram edition of 1900.

The word *advaya* in the kārikā is, in fact, identical in meaning with *Advayavādin*, which is well-known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit as one of the names for the Buddha.² Some of the commentators of Amk explain *advaya* in *advayavādin* as *advaita*.³ But there is a marked difference between the two terms *advaitavāda* and *advayavāda*; while the former literally means the theory of non-difference, i.e., the non-difference between, or identity of (according to the school of Ś) Jīva and Brahman, the latter means the theory of 'non-two', i.e., neither of the two extreme views.

The two (*dvaya*) or the two extreme views are as follows: The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist. He rejects both of these two extreme views and propounds his view taking a middle path (*majjhimā patipadā* or *madhyamā pratipad*). So according to

¹ Such as of Mahesacandra Pāla, Calcutta, Śaka 1806; Durgācarapa Sāṅkhya vedañatārtha, Calcutta, 1331, B.S.; and Gītā Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S.

Amk, I. I. 14; MVt¹, 23; DA, p. 95: buddhānām bhagavatām mahākāruṇikānām advayavādinām. In the *Index of words* to the last work, the word *advaitavādin* is wrongly written.

³ For instance, Bhānujīdikṣita : advayam advaitam vadanty avaśyam ; Kṣiravāmin : advayam vijñānādvaitam vadaty avaśyam.

Advayavādin, the exact Tibetan equivalent of which is *gñis.su.med.pa.gsuñ.ba*, and Chinese *pu-erh-yü*, both literally meaning 'one who says not two' is misunderstood in the *Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary (Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. IV, 1913)*, p. 2, for the word *cañ n* no way mean 'not doubtful in his command' as it is explained there.

him nothing is existent, nor is anything non-existent; nothing comes into being (*anutpāda*), nor does anything disappear (*anirodha*); nothing is eternal (*aśāsvata*), nor has anything an end (*anuccheda*); nothing is identical (*eka*), nor anything differentiated (*aneka*); nothing moves hither (*anāgama*), and nothing moves thither (*anirgama*).⁴

This *advayavāda* is found throughout the Buddhist sacred literature both in Sanskrit and Pali.⁵ That the reading in c of the kārikā must be with the word *advayāḥ* and not *dvayāḥ* will

⁴ So says Nāgārjuna, MV, p. 11:

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvataṁ |
anekartham anānartham anāgamam anirgamam ||
yaḥ pratityasamutpādaṁ prapañcopaśamam śivam |
deśyāmāsa sambuddhas tam vande vadatām varam ||

⁵ astīti kāśyapa ayam eko'nto nāstīty ayaṁ dvitīyo'ntaḥ. yad anayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānām bhūtāpratyavekṣā. KP, § 60 (p. 90). See MV, p. 270.

yad bhūyasā kātyāyanāyam loko 'stītām vābhiniviṣṭo nāstītām ca tena na parimucyate. Kātyāyanāvavāda quoted in MV, p. 269.

So writes Nāgārjuna:

kātyāyanāvavāde cāsti[ti] nāstīti cobhayam |
pratiśiddham bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || MK, XV. 7.
astītām ye tu paśyanti nāstītām cālpabuddhayaḥ |
bhāvānām te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopasamam śivam || MK, V. 8.

sammādiṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhitī bhante vuccati, kittavatā nu kho bhante sammādiṭṭhi hotīti. dvayanissito khv āyaṁ kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena athhitām ceva na'tthitām ca SN, II, p. 17 (XII. 15). Iokasamudayaṁ kho kaccāyana yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke na'tthitā sā na hoti. lokanirodhaṁ kho kaccāyana yathā bhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke athtitā sā na hoti. sabbam atthiti kho kaccāyana ayam eko anto. sabbam natthiti ayam dutiyo anto, ete te kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṁ deseti. SN, II, p. 17 (XII. 15).

nityam iti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ. anityam iti kāśyapa ayam dvitīyo 'ntaḥ. yad etayor dvayor nityānityayor madhyam tad arūpyanidarśanam° | ātmeti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ. nairātmyam iti dvitīyo 'ntaḥ. yad āmanairātmyayor madhyam tad° saṅkleśa iti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ vyavadānam ity ayam kāśyapa dvitīyo 'ntaḥ. yo'syāntadvayasyānupagamo (Text anugamāḥ but see

further be perfectly clear to anyone when one considers that in the preceding kārikā two classes of teachers are referred to, who hold the theory of origination (*jātivāda*). According to one of them the origination is of the existent, while in accordance with the other, it is of the non-existent. These teachers are *dvaitins* 'advocates of dualism', viz., the Sāṃkhyas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The teachers alluded to in the present kārikā are, however, quite of a different view. They do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the non-existent, but assert that there is no origination at all (*ajātim khyāpayanti te*). Thus the teachers alluded to in kārikās 3 and 4 are different, though Ś takes them to be identical.

As is evident, the main subject of this chapter is the theory of non-origination (*ajātivāda*). In different systems of Indian philosophy it is held that things around us have their origination ; in other words, they are produced; they have their causes, they themselves being their effect. But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different view emphatically denying the origination of anything in the world. Thus the first sentence of Nāgārjuna's MK begins with *anirodham*

Tib. version: khas. mi. len. ciñ" } 'nudāhāro 'pravyāhāra iyam ucyate kaśyapa
madhyamā pratipad dharmāṇām bhūtapratyavekṣā. KP, pp. 86-88.

astīti nāstīti ubhe 'pi antā
śuddhī aśuddhīti ime 'pi antā |
tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayitvā
madhye 'pi sthānam na karoti paṇḍitah ||
astīti nāstīti vivāda eṣa
śuddhī aśuddhīti ayam vivādah |
vivādaprāptyā na dukham praśāmyate
avivādaprāptyā ca dukham nirudhyate||

SR, p. 30, quoted in MV, pp. 135, 270.

bhāvābhāvadarśanadvayaprasaṅgo yāvat tāvat saṃsāra ity avetya
mumukṣubhir etaddarśanadvayanirāsenā sadbhīr madhyamā pratipad bhāvanīyā
yathāvad iti. MV, p. 276. See the whole of chapter XV.

*anutpādam*⁶ ‘having neither origination nor suppression.’ This *anutpāda* is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let here be quoted only a few lines in translation from that book together with the commentary of Candrakīrtti (MK, I. 1 with MV, p. 12) :

‘Now...the Ācārya, thinking the facility in refuting *nirodha*, after *utpāda* is refuted, begins first with the refutation of the latter. *Utpāda* of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself, or something other than it, or both, or again, from one which is no cause at all. But in no way it can be justified. So he (the Ācārya) says :

‘Nowhere and never are such things as are produced either from themselves, or from some other things, or from both, or from what is no cause at all.’’’⁷.

This non-origination is asserted again and again in the same work and sometimes in identical words:

na svato jāyate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate !
na svatah paratas caiva jāyate jāyate kutah ||

MK, XXI. 13. See XXIII. 20.

‘A thing does not come into being from itself, nor from other (=not-itself), nor from both, itself and other. How can it come into being?’

⁶ For the order of these two words see Candrakīrtti (MV, p. 12) : *atra ca nirodhasya pūrvam̄ pratiṣedha utpādanirodhayoh paurvāparyāvasthāyah siddhyabhāvam̄ dyotayitum̄. vakṣyati hi* (MK, XI. 3; MV, p. 221) : *pūrvam̄ jātir yadi bhavej jarāmarañam uttaram̄*. Our author, Gaudapāda, too, has followed the same order in his widely quoted kārikā (III. 32) : *na nirodho na cotpattiḥ*.*

⁷ idānīm̄ utpādapratiṣedhenā nirodhapratiṣedhasaukaryam̄ manyamāna ācāryah prathamam evotpādapratiṣedham ārabhate. utpādo hi paraih kalpyamānah svato vā parikalpyeta parata ubhayato ’hetuto vā parikalpyeta. sarvathā ca nopapadyata iti niścīty āha :

na svato nāpi paraṭo na dvābhyaṁ nāpy ahetutaḥ |
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvah kvacana||

MK, I. 1; MV, p. 12.

Compare this with the following line from our kārikā, IV. 22 which speaks for itself:

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate !

'Nothing is produced either from itself or from other.'

For further details one may be referred to MK, I and XXIII with MV; CS, XV. See also our kārikā, IV. 22.

That there is no *jāti* or *utpāda* 'origination' is thus maintained also in a short line of the BA, IX. 106:

evam ca sarvadharmaṇām utpattir nāvasiyate !⁸

'Thus the origination of all things is not known.'

The first half of the present kārikā is undoubtedly based on such statement as the following of Nāgārjuna (MK, I. 6):

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyō'rthasya yujyate !
asataḥ pratyayah kasya sataś ca pratyayena kiṃ ?⁹

For the wording in b of the kārikā (*abhūtam naiva jāyate*) see CS, 373^d (XV. 23^d): *nābhūto nāma jāyate*. See here also Candrakīrtti on CS, 366 (XV. 16): *atrāha: jāto na jāyate ajāto 'pi na jāyate*.¹⁰ It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of non-origination is fully discussed.

S explains the first half of the present kārikā as follows:

bhūtam̄ vidyamānam̄ vastu na jāyate vidyamānatvād eva°.
tathā abhūtam avidyamānam avidyamānatvān naiva jāyate
śāśaviṣṇavat.

'The thing which is already existent does not (again) come into being owing to its very existence. And the thing that is

⁸ BAP runs here: evam eva yathoditanyayena sarvadharmaṇām̄ sarva-bhāvānām utpattir utpādo nāvasiyate na pratīyate. See the same work, pp. 355 ff.: na ca svaparobhayahetunibandhanam ahetunibandhanam̄ vā bhāvasya janmātipēśalam upapadyate. Here the subject is discussed to a great extent.

⁹ See MA, VI. 58; MV, pp. 82-83.

¹⁰ Reconstructed from the Tibetan version: ḥdir. smras. pa | skyes. pa. mi. skye. la. ma. skyes. pa. yañ. mi. skye. ste |

not existent does not come into being on account of its being non-existent, as, for instance, the horn of a hare.'¹¹

Gauḍapāda refers to the doctrine of *ajāti* in the present kārikā, and accepts it in the next which runs as follows:

5

khyāpyamānām ajātīm tair anumodāmahe vayam !
vivadāmo na taiḥ sārdham avivādām nibodhata ||

'We express our approval of *ajāti* which they declare; we do not dispute with them, and listen how there cannot be any dispute.'

It is to be noted here that Gauḍapāda is a Vedantist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advaya-vādins or Buddhists expressing his approval. He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his Vedantist followers to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed.

Like the Sāṅkhyas, the Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., the Vedantists, are originally believers in the doctrine of origination, as is evident from the BS, I. 1. 2 (:janmādy asya yataḥ, 'From whom are the origination, etc. of this') which is based on such statements of the Upaniṣads as TU, III. 1. 1: yato vā imāni bhūtāni jātāni' tad Brahma, 'That is Brahman from whom these beings are originated.' The reality of this origination or creation is denied later on in the school of Ś in the absolute truth. This is due to the doctrine of Gauḍapāda who invites here his followers to listen as to how

¹¹ Buddha pālita quoted in MV, p. 14: na svata utpadyante bhāvah,
tadutpādavaiyarthyād atiprasaṅgadeśāc ca. na hi svātmanā vidyamānām
padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanam asti. atha sann api jāyeta na kadācin na
jāyeta.

the non-origination doctrine of the Advayavādins can be approved.

Having thus introduced his readers to the subject he has to deal, the author now proceeds in the following kārikās to offer his arguments as to how the doctrine of jāti cannot be justified. He says:

6

ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātim icchanti vādinah
ajāto hy amṛto dharma martyatām katham esyati ||¹

'Disputants are of opinion that there is birth only of that thing (lit. 'element of existence') which is unborn. But how is it that the thing which is unborn and (consequently) immortal should become mortal?'²

It means that the teachers of both the classes referred to in kārikā 3 are agreed upon the point that birth is possible of what is unborn; for what is already born does not take birth again, and so it is useless to think of the birth of such a thing. Our author says that the birth of an unborn one cannot be justified, and he offers the following arguments: It is accepted on all hands that what has no birth (*ajāta*) has also no death (*amṛta*). Now when you say that birth is of an unborn one, you have necessarily to admit that it has death; and so it follows that you also admit the death of an immortal

¹ The kārikās 6, 7, and 8 of this Book are identical with the kārikās 20, 21 and 22 of the Book III respectively excepting only this that in kārikās III. 20 and 22 there is the word *bhāva*, while in IV. 6 and 8 the reading is *dharma*.

For the words *jāta* and *ajāta* see MK, XX, 12-14.

² According to Ś the second half of the kārikā ('But how is it that the thing which is unborn and immortal should become mortal') means, in fact, that how it should take birth in reality. He writes: *svabhāvenāmṛto bhāvo martyatām gacchati paramārthato jāyate.* III. 22.

one. Now an unborn one is by its own nature immortal. And this death of the immortal one is utterly absurd.

The author continues in support of his above statement:

7

na bhavaty amṛtam martyam na martyam amṛtam tathā |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati ||¹

'The immortal does not become mortal and a mortal one does not also become immortal; for the change of nature can in no way be possible.'

The second half of the kārikā is repeated in kārikā IV. 29, and seems to have mostly been taken here from Nāgārjuna's MK, XV. 8, which runs as follows:

yady astitvam prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstītā |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate ||²

The author having shown here that nature does in no way change says in the next kārikā that if a thing which in its own nature is unborn (*ajāta*) and hence regarded as immortal (*amṛta*) comes into being (*jāyate*) and thus becomes mortal (*martya*), then owing to this very fact it cannot remain changeless. The point is that which is unborn or immortal by its own nature should remain always so. But if you say that the unborn takes

¹ See III. 21, and the note 1 on IV. 6.

² The following may also be quoted here from the same work:

prakṛtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati |
prakṛtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati || XV. 9.
kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaś cen na vidyate |
kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate || XIII. 4.
kaḥ svabhāvam prahāsyati | XXIII. 24.
svarūpasyānyathābhāvāsambhavāt.

birth, or the immortal becomes mortal, evidently it undergoes a change. But no change of nature is possible. The kārikā runs :

8

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmo gacchati martyatām !
kṛtakenaṁṛtas tasya katham̄ sthāsyati niścalah̄ ||¹

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal², maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial³, will remain changeless?'

The following may here be quoted from Nāgārjuna's MK, XV. 1-2 in which one should note the word *kṛtaka*:⁴

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ !
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet ||
svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhavisyati punaḥ katham̄ !
akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca ||

¹ See III. 22.

² That is, takes birth. See note 2 on IV. 6.

³ The word *kṛtaka* in the kārikā (a) is to be explained taking it as noun, i.e., *kṛtakatva*, just as the word *anādi* in IV. 14 is evidently for *anāditva*. Ānandagiri lends his support writing (III. 22) *kṛtakena*, *kṛtakatvasya*, *yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti*. Cf. Sāyaṇa who explains *manasaspati* (TA, VII. 6) as *°patitva*.

⁴ It seems that our author had these kārikās of Nāgārjuna in his mind while writing his own and so he has unconsciously written *kṛtaka* instead of *kṛtakatva* as is required.

In order to explain as to how nature (*prakṛti* or *svabhāva*) cannot change Gauḍapāda proceeds to define it in the next kārikā:

9

sāṃsiddhikī svābhāvikī sahajāpy akṛtā ca yā |
prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvam na jahāti yā ||

'That is to be known nature (*prakṛti*) which is self-existent,¹ natural, innate, not artificial and one that does not give up its own being.'

As regards *svabhāva* Candrakīrtti explains it following Nāgārjuna in his MV, pp. 264-265, that it is nothing but always non-origination (*sarvadānuptpāda eva*). He says that by *svabhāva* we are to understand that which is independent of other (*paranirapekṣa*) and as such not artificial (*akṛtrima*), and thus having no existence before it does not come into being (not *abhūtvā bhāvah*). Therefore the *svabhāva* of fire is nothing but its non-origination (*anuptpāda*), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having no existence at first².

¹ The word *sāṃsiddhiḥ* may also mean that which comes into being simultaneously (*saha-utpanna*) as illustrated by Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 296) in their commentaries on SK, XLIII of Iśvara kṛṣṇa: tatra sāṃsiddhikā yathā bhagavataḥ kapilasyādisarge utpadyamānasya catvāro bhāvah sahotpannāḥ. The explanation of Ś is as follows: samyak siddhiḥ samsiddhis tatra bhavā sāṃsiddhikī. yathā yoginām anyimādyaisvaryapraptih prakṛtiḥ sā.*

² MV, p. 265: sarvadānuptpāda eva hy agnyādinām paranirapekṣatvād akṛtrimatvāt svabhāva ity ucyate.

Now having shown that there is no origination of anything the author proceeds to say in the next kārika that there is also neither decay nor passing away :

10

jarāmarananirmuktāḥ sarve dharmāḥ svabhāvataḥ ।
jarāmaraṇam icchantaś cyavante tanmaniṣayā ॥

'All things are by nature free from 'old age' (decay) and 'death' (passing away), So the persons who believe in 'old age' and 'death' are reborn owing to their that very thought.'

That there can be neither *jarā* nor *marana* is very elaborately established by Nāgārjuna in his MK, XI. 3 ff. from which we cull the following two couplets (3 and 4):

pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam uttaram ।
nirjarāmaraṇā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmītaḥ ॥
paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam ādītaḥ ।
ahetuṁ ajātasya syāj jarāmaraṇam kathaṁ ॥

For further details readers are referred to the original text of Nāgārjuna with MV.

The author attacks the doctrine of *jāti* from different points of view and refutes it in the following way referring first to the followers of the Sāṃkhya system who hold the theory of actual existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*).¹

11

kāraṇam yasya vai kāryam kāraṇam tasya jāyate ।
jāyamānam katham ajam bhinnam nityam katham ca tat ॥

'(It is to be admitted by him) according to whom the cause itself is the effect, that it is the cause that takes birth (i.e., is

See notes on IV. 3 and SK, IX.

produced). And in that case how is it that the thing which takes birth and is thus different (from the effect) can be regarded as unborn (*aja*) and how it can be permanent ?”¹

In the Sāṅkhya system *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is held to be the first or original cause (*mūla karaṇa*). It is ‘unborn’ (*aja*) and permanent (*nitya*). From it other things are gradually produced. This view is criticized in this and the following kārikās by our author.

¹ The point is that there must be some difference between that which is produced and that which is not produced (*jāyamāna* and *aja*).

S explains the word *bhinna* in a different way saying that it means ‘rent asunder’, ‘divided into parts’ or ‘opened’ (*vidirṇa, sphuṣṭita*) implying thereby ‘subject to some change.’ And that which admits of any kind of change cannot be permanent.

The identity of cause and effect may be viewed from two different points, viz., the cause is not other than the effect (*kāryābhinnam kāraṇam*), or the effect is not other than the cause (*kāraṇābhinnam kāryam*). But in neither case can the Sāṅkhya system be defended. The object of the first viewpoint is shown in the present kārikā which says : If the cause is not different from the effect then it is to be admitted that it is the cause (and *not the effect*) that ‘takes birth’ (*jāyate*) and thus, if you accept it, the cause cannot be regarded as ‘unborn’ (*aja*), as you hold it to be.

Now, in order to avoid this difficulty one may follow the second point of view saying that the effect being not different from the cause the former is as *aja* as the latter ; and thus one cannot say that the cause is not *aja*. The author, however, says in the next kārikā that this argument, too, cannot be accepted :

12

kāraṇād yad¹ ananyatvam atah kāryam ajam yadi |
jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇam te katham dhruvam ||

'If you hold that the effect is also 'unborn' (*aja*), for there is no difference of it from the cause (which is *aja*), then, how is it, in your opinion, that the cause is permanent when the effect is produced ?'²

¹ The reading should be here *yad* and not *yadi* as discussed elsewhere.

² Ś explains c saying that how it is that the cause being not different from the effect, that is, being produced, can be permanent: jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇam ananyam nityam dhruvam ca.

The author offers further grounds :

13

ajād vai jāyate yasya dṛṣṭāntas tasya nāsti vai |
jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate ||

'There is no illustration (to give) for him who holds that a thing is produced from what is unborn'. (On the other hand, if it is maintained that) a thing is born from what is born, then there follows no finality, it leads to an endless series of causes (*anavasthā*).'

Here in the text in *d* *na* is to be taken with *vyavasthā* (as *na-vyavasthā* = *avyavasthā* = *anavasthā*) and not with *prasajyate*. Ś explains: *na vyavasthā prasajyate anavasthānam syād ity arthaḥ*.

The second half of the kārikā means that if A is produced from B which you take as produced (*jāta*), by the very fact that it is produced it must have been produced

¹ That is, existing from all eternity.

from one C, and C, too, in the same way must have been produced from one D, and so on. Thus it is impossible to ascertain the ultimate cause of a thing.²

² Cf. Candrakīrtti (MV, p. 15): na ca vidyamānasya punar utpattau prayojanam paśyāmaḥ, anavasthām ca paśyāmaḥ; AKV (quoted in MV, p. 13): utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām anavasthāprasaigah; MA (quoted in MV, p. 13): jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva juktam; ŚŚ, p. 262 (from ASP): kiṃ punar āyuṣman subhūte utpanno dharma utpatsyata utānuṭpannah. subhūtir āha. nāham āyuṣman sāriputra utpannasya dharmasyotpattim icchāmi na cānutpannasyeti. CS, 260:

sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so'stiti na yujyate |
sato yadi bhavej janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ ||

In support of this *ajātivāda* the author offers further arguments :

14

hetor ādiḥ phalam yeśām ādir hetuh phalasya ca |
hetoh phalasya cānādiḥ katham tair upavarṇyate ||

‘How can those who hold that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, describe that there is no beginning of the cause and the effect?’

In c *anādi* means ‘absence of beginning’ (*āder abhāvah*). Ś explains it by *anāditva*. Cf. *kṛtaka* in IV. 8c.

Let us take here an example (IV. 20). As regards a seed (*bija*) and its sprout (*aikura*) it is said that they have no beginning, for it cannot be ascertained as to whether the seed was first and then the sprout, or the sprout was first and then the seed, each of them being dependent on the other for

their existence. Yet, they say that the antecedent of the sprout is the seed and that of the seed is sprout. This cannot be justified.

The point is further dealt with in the following kārikās :

15

hetor ādiḥ phalam yesām ādir hetuh phalasya ca |
tathā janma bhavet teṣām putrāj janma pitur yathā ||

'To those who maintain that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, the production of a thing would be just after the manner of the birth of a father from the son.'

The point is that if it is held that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and vice-versa, then it would follow from it that as a cause produces its effect, so an effect, too, produces its cause ; and if one accepts it one would also accept that a son begets his father. But it is absurd.

Cf. Nāgārjuna in his ViV, 50 :

pitrā yady utpādyah putro yadi tena caiva putreṇa |
utpādyah sa yadi pitā vada tatrōtpādayati kah kam ||

Here in the second half *yadi*, though supported by the Tibetan text, seems to be redundant.

See NS, II. I. 41, IV. I. 39; BA, IX. 114:

pitā cen na vinā putrāt kutaḥ putrasya sambhavaḥ |
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsattvam tayor dvayoh ||

As regards the relationship between *hetu* 'cause' and *phala* 'effect' see MK, XX, specially XX. 20 :

ekatve phalahetvoh syād aikyaṇi janakajanyayoḥ |
piṭhaktve phalahetvoh syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā ||

MV writes here: na cānayor ekatvam pitāputrayoś cakṣuś-
cakṣurvijñānayor bijāṅkurayoś ca aikyaprasaṅgāt.

The next kārikā says that there must be an order (*krama*) of a cause and its effect as to whether the cause or the effect precedes, otherwise there cannot be any relationship between them, and consequently nothing can be produced:

16

sambhave hetuphalayor eşitavyah kramas tvayā |
yugapat sambhave yasmād asambandho viṣṇavat ||

'As regards production (*sambhava*, i.e., *jāti*) you must determine an order of the cause and the effect; for, if they are simultaneous they cannot be related (to each other), as the horns (of an animal).'

This argument is found in Buddhist works as shown below. As regards the production of an effect by its cause only three orders are possible, and not more. For, it may be said that first there is the cause and then the effect (*pūrvaka* 'prior order'); or it may be said that first there is the effect and then the cause (*apara-krama* 'posterior order'); or, again, it may be said that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (*sahakrama* 'the order of simultaneity'). But it is clearly shown that none of them can be justified. Says Nāgārjuna, MK, XI. 2:

tasmān nātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |¹

¹ Candrakīrti introduces it (MV) saying: ata eva sāṃsārābhāvaj
jarāmarañādīnām pūrvāparasahakramā api na sanctyāha.

The following may be quoted here from MK, XI. 3-5:

pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmarañam uttaram |
nirjarāmarañā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ ||
paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmarañam āditah |
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmarañam katham ||
na jarāmarañenaiva jātiś ca saha yujyate |
mriyeta jāyamānaś ca syāc cāhetukatobhayoh ||

Op. cit. XI. 6 :

yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |

For details the reader is referred to the whole of the chapters XI and XII.

In the kārikā under discussion Gaṇḍapāda referring to the *krama* of cause and effect refutes their simultaneity saying exactly what is said by Nāgārjuna (MK, XX. 7) and his commentator Candrakīrtti :

phalam sahaiva sāmagryā yadi prādurbhavet punah |
ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca jāyate ||

'Should an effect come into existence just with its cause in its entirety then that which produces and that which is produced become simultaneous.'

Here Candrakīrtti adds : na caikakālayoḥ savyetara-goviṣāṇayor janyajanakatvam dṛṣṭam vāmadakṣiṇakarayoś caraṇayor vā. 'But it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any such relation as between the producer (*janaka*) and the produced (*janya*), just like between the right and left hands or feet.'²

This order of cause and effect has again been referred to later on (IV. 19) by the word *kramakopa* 'incompatibility of order.'³

² Sometimes the female breasts are cited as example in such cases.

³ See Candrakīrtti (MV, XI. 7-8): tatra yadi pūrvam kāraṇam paścāt kāryam syād akāryakam kāraṇam nirhetukam syāt. atha pūrvam kāryam paścāt kāraṇam evam api kāraṇāt pūrvam kāryam nirhetukam eva syāt. atha yugapat kāryakāraṇe syātām evam ubhayam apy a[hetu]kam syāt.

Now, according to these three orders (*krama*) of cause and effect there may be three propositions respectively, viz., (i) the cause produces its effect, (ii) the effect produces its cause; and (iii) the cause and its effect produce each other.¹ Of these three propositions the second² is taken up in the following kārikā :

17

phalād utpadyamānah san na te hetuh prasidhyati |
aprasiddhah katham hetuh phalam utpādayisyati ||²

'Your cause coming into being from the effect cannot come into existence ; how will, therefore, the cause that has not come into existence produce the effect ?'

The argument of our author seems to have been based on what Nāgārjuna has said (MK, X. 10):

yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sidhyati |
yadi yo 'pekṣitavyah sa sidhyatām kam apekṣya kah ||

¹ See here Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrtti, MK, XX. 5-7, and specially the following line (MV, p. 395, II. 5-6): yady evam phalasya hetor utpattau doṣa evam sati sahotpannaiva sāmagrī phalasya janikāstu tad yathā pradīpaprabhāyāḥ.

² It appears that a kārikā dealing with the first proposition is now lost between kārikās 16 and 17. For, as the second and third propositions are discussed (IV. 17, 18), one may naturally expect to have the discussion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found. Can we think that the author himself has omitted it?

Candrakīrtti explains it thus (MV, p. 208) :

tatra yadi yo 'gnyākhyo bhāvo yam indhanākhyam bhāvam
apekṣya sidhyati, indhanākhyāś ca bhāvo yo 'gninātmasiddhya-
rtham apekṣitavyah, sa yadi tam evāgnyākhyam padārtham
apekṣya sidhyati, kathyatām idānīṁ sidhyatām kam apekṣya ka-
iti. yadā cāgnyabhāve satindhanasya siddhir ēva nāsti tadā-
kāraṇasyendhanasyābhāvāt kutas taddhetuko 'gnih prasetyati.

It says that if the fire is effected having regard to its fuel and the fuel is effected having regard to the fire, neither of them can be effected. See also the next kārikā (MK, X. 11) :

yo 'peksya sidhyate bhāvah so 'siddho 'peksate kathaṁ |
athāpy apeksate siddhas tv apeksāsyā na yujyate ||

Mark here the use of the root *sidh* with or without the prefix *pra-* by Gaudapāda, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrtti.

This point is further discussed in the following kārikā :

18

yadi hetoh phalāt siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutah |
katarat pūrvam utpannam yasya siddhir apeksayā ||

'If the coming into being of the cause is from the effect and that of the effect is from the cause, which (of the two) has first come into being,—the coming into being of which is dependent?'

Read here the following quoted from Nāgārjuna's MK, X. 8 :

yadindhanam apeksyāgnir apeksyāgnīṁ yadindhanam |
katarat pūrvaniśpannam yadapeksyāgnir indhanam ||

MV (p. 207) runs here as follows :

asyendhanasyāyam agnir dāhakaḥ kartety evam yadindhanam
apekṣyāgnir vyavasthāpyate, asyāgnir idam indhanam karmety-
evam agnim apekṣya yadindhanam, tat katarad anayoh pūrva-
niśpannam. kim indhanam yad apekṣyāgnih syāt, utāgnir yam
apekṣyendhanam syāt.

Mark the wording of c in both the kārikās quoted above.¹

¹ See Poussin: JRAS, 1913, p. 139

The author proceeds to show very clearly in the next kārikā as to how the Buddhas have explained the theory of *ajāti* 'non-origination' :

19

aśaktir aparijñānam kramakopo 'tha vā punah ।
evam hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridipitā ॥

'As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance, or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddha has elucidated (the theory of) absolute non-origination (*ajāti*)'.

Against the theory of *jāti* there are given three reasons in the present kārikā, viz., (i) *aśakti* 'absence of capability', (ii) *aparijñāna* 'complete ignorance', and (iii) *kramakopa* 'incompatibility of orders'. Of these three the third, i.e., *kramakopa* has already been discussed in kārikā 16.¹ But what do the other two terms *aśakti* and *aparijñāna* signify? The answer will be found in Buddhist works. In regard to *aśakti* it

¹ On this as well as on *aśakti* (*asāmarthya*) one may be referred to the *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda* in the Buddhist section of the SDS.

refers to IV. 3 where two classes of teachers are mentioned, one holding *satkāryavāda* and the other *asatkāryavāda*. It has already been shown (IV. 4) that the Buddhists subscribe to neither of these two views. Nāgārjuna says (MK, l. 6), as has once already been quoted :

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate |
asataḥ pratyayah kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim ||

It says that one cannot be a cause of either an existent or a non-existent thing, for, how is it that there is a cause of a thing which is not in existence? And what is the use of a cause of that which is already existent?

The opponent may say here : Well, when we speak of the cause of a non-existent thing we thereby mean to say that the cause is of a *future* thing. Candrakīrtti replies (MV. on MK, l. 6) to it by quoting the following half of a verse in his MA (VI. 58) which is now available only in its Tibetan version edited by Poussin in BB (IX) :

bhaviṣyatā ced vyavahāra iṣṭah
śaktim vinā nāsti hi bhāvitāsyā | ²

It means that if you want to say that the cause is of a future thing, then owing to the want of energy that thing cannot come into being.

² In Tibetan

gal. te. ḥbyuṇ. bar. ḥgyur. bas. besñad. ḥdod. na !
nus. pa. med. par. ḥdi.yi. ḥbyuṇ. ḥgyur. med |

The other half of the verse in Tibetan runs :

phan. tshun. don. la. brten. paḥi. grub. pa. ni |
grub. min. ūid. ces. dam. pa. rnams. kyis. gsüns ||

It may be translated into Sanskrit as follows :

parasparārthaśrayiṇī ca siddhiḥ |
siddhir bhaven neti hi sadbhīr uktam||

The point here is this that in the coming into being of anything there must be some *śakti* 'energy', otherwise everything is possible from everything, or nothing is possible from anything. But the existence of such a *śakti* cannot be established. For, as discussed by Candra kīrtti in his MA, VI. 57, it cannot be said that the *śakti* belongs to a thing 'that has come into being (*jāta*)', or to one that has not yet come into being (*ajāta*).³

I think this *asakii* is referred to here by Gaudapāda in his present kārikā.

Now *aparijñāna* in the kārikā seems to me to be nothing but *pūrvāparāparijñāna* 'absolute ignorance of the first and last (points)' in kārikā IV.21. And this *pūrvāparāparijñāna* is in reality *pūrvāparakoṭi-aparijñāna*, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, i.e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it. To this theme a whole chapter (XI) is devoted in the MK, owing to which it is called *pūrvāparakoṭi-parikṣā* 'the Examination of the First and the Last Points.' Let here be quoted the first kārikā of it (XI. 1) :

pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro 'navarāgo hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam ||

'The great sage said that the first point (of the world) is not known, for it is without the first and last points owing to the fact that it has neither the beginning nor the end.'

Candra kīrtti comments : koṭir bhāgo deśa iti paryāyāḥ. pūrvā koṭiḥ pūrvo deśa ity arthaḥ. yadi hi saṃsāro nāma. kaścit

³ skyes. la. nus. pa. srid. pa. yod. ma. yin |
ma. skyes. no. bo. lahaṇi nus. yod. min. ni |

The Sanskrit rendering in prose may be: jāte śaktir na sambhavati, ajātasvabhāve' pi śaktir nāsti.

syāt niyatam tasya pūrvam api syāt paścimam api ghaṭādinām ita. uktam ca bhagavatā anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijarāmaranasaṁsāra iti.⁴ tasmān nāsti saṁsārah pūrvāparakoṭya-nupalambhād alātacakravad iti sthitam.

It is to be noted here that *pūrvāparakoṭyaparijñāna* (or *koṭyanupalambha*) is not only of the world, but also of everything. So says Nāgārjuna (MK. XI. 8):

pūrvā na vidyate koṭih saṁsārasya na kevalam |
sarveśām api bhāvānām pūrvā koṭir na vidyate||

' It is not only of the world, but also of every thing that there is no existence of the first point.'

Nāgārjuna proceeds to say (MK, XI. 2) :

naivāgram nāvaram yasya tasya madhyam kuto bhavet |

' How is it that that which has no beginning nor the end should have the middle? '

And the very thing is said also by our author (II, 6, IV. 31) :

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā |⁵

' That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, is so also in the present.'

See IV, 31

⁴ See DA, p. 197, l. 5; SN, Vol. II, pp. 178, 193, Vol. III, pp. 149, 151, MP, 11. 3. 2 (pp. 50-51); KV, I. 1. 159.

⁵ ādāvante ca yan nāsti madhye 'pi tat tathā.

Nayopadeśa, 14.

jassa n'athi purā pacchā majjhām tassa kuo siyā.

ĀS, 4.4.1.3.

It is not also in the middle, as says Ś (tan madhye 'pi nāstīti).

It has been shown before that causation (*hetuphalabhbāva*) in cases of origination is not possible. But one may meet the objection offering the example of seed and sprout (*bīja* and *an̄kura*). For it is evident that a sprout comes into being from a seed and a seed from a sprout. There is an endless series of it, yet the fact cannot be denied. Thus by dint of the example causation is established. The author, however, says that the example does not establish any causation, though it may appear to do so, according to you. Therefore until it is established to the satisfaction of both the parties this example cannot be cited. Thus he says :

20

bījān̄kurākhyo dr̄ṣṭāntah̄ sadā sādhyasamo hi naḥ |
na ca sādhyasamo hetuh̄ siddhau sādhyasya yujyate ||

'To us the illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (*sādhyasama*). And a reason (*hetu*) which is like one that is yet to be proved (*sādhyasama*) cannot be used for establishing a thing in question'.

Nāgārjuna has discussed (MK, X) the point thoroughly taking the example of fire and fuel (*agni-indhana*) and has arrived at the conclusion that there cannot be any causation (*hetuphalabhbāva*) of anything. Let us cite here only the following few lines from this work :

yad indhanam̄ sa ced agnir ekatvam̄ kartkarmāṇoh̄ |
anyaś ced indhanād̄ agnir indhanād̄ apy ḍte bhavet ||

nityapradipta eva syād apradipanahetukah̄ |
punar ārambhavaiyarthiyam evam̄ cākṛ makah̄ sati|| X. 1-2.

agnīndhanābhyaṁ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramaḥ |
sarvo niravaśeṣeṇa sārdhaṁ ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ || X. 15.

Cāndrakīrtti says on CS, IX.8 : tasmād evam hetu-phalabhbāvavyavasthābhāvād dvayam api (*hetu* and *phala*) svarūpeṇa na sidhyati.¹

sādhyasama hetu is one of the fallacies of a reason (*hetvābhāsa*). It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved, *petitio principii*. See NS, I. 2. 4, 8; V. 1. 4.

The word *hetu* has been used here in the kārikā in the sense of *dṛṣṭānta*, as says S.

¹ The Sanskrit text has not yet been discovered hence it is reconstructed (see my edition) from the Tibetan version which runs : deḥi. phyir. de. ltar. na. rgyu. dañ. ḥbras. bu. dños. po. rnam. par. gnas. pa. med. paḥi. phyir. gñi. ga. rañ. gi. no. bos. grub. pas. yod. pa. ma. yin. no || See also the kārikā and MA, p. 150.

The opponent says referring to kārikā IV. 19 :

21

pūrvāparāparijñānam ajāteḥ paridīpakam |
jāyamānād dhi vai dharmāt kathām pūrvam na gṛhyate ||

' The absolute ignorance of the first and the last (points of a thing) is elucidator of non-origination; but how is it that the first (point) is not known (of a thing) which actually comes into being ?

The word *pūrvāparāparijñāna* has already (IV. 19) been explained.

To the question raised above the author gives his reply in the following kārikā actually in the words of Nāgārjuna and his followers :

22

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate |
sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate ||

'Nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself, nor is anything produced which is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent'¹

The author wants to say here that should there be a thing that originates (*jāyate*) one may say that it has its first point (*pūrva kōti*), i.e., the state of its becoming or being produced, but in reality there is nothing of the kind. For the first half of the kārikā see Nāgārjuna :

na svato jāyate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate |
na svatah parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutah ||²

MK, XXI. 13, see also XXIII. 20.

'A thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from another, nor from both, itself and another; and that being the case, how can it come into being at all?'

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpyahetutah |
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvah kvacana kecana||

Op. cit, I. 1.

'There are nowhere and never such things as are produced either from themselves or from others, or from both, or from one that is no cause at all.'

¹ Here the point 'not existent-and-non-existent (*na sad-asad*)' may also be added. See IV. 83.

² Quoted in BAP, p. 339, and SS. p. 18.

For the second half of the kārikā the reader is referred to the following line of Nāgārjunā (MK, I.7) :

na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadā |
katham nirvartako hetur evam sati hi yuujyate ||³

' When nothing existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, comes into being, how is it reasonable to say that a cause brings about a thing? '

³ See :

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam !
catuṣkoṭivinimuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduḥ||

This couplet is attributed to Sarahapāda in SS, p. 15 and found in a book *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, 28. The original Sanskrit of this work is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan version (Tanjur, Mdo, Tsh; Cordin. III, p. 29). Here the authorship of the original book is attributed to Āryadeva. In Tibetan it is called Ye. śes. sñiñ. po. kun. las. btus. pa. The present kārikā is quoted in BAP, p. 359, and many other books both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. In this connection see IV. 83-84, and atas tattvam sadasadubhayānubhayātmaka- catuṣkoṭivinimuktam śūnyam eva in SDS (Buddhism section). Bib. Ind., 1858, p. 14.

The next kārikā is a reply to those who maintain the theory of origination (*jātivāda*) on the ground of the rule of cause and effect (*hetuphalavyavasthā*) saying that both of them are without a beginning and as such cannot come into existence :

23

hetur na jāyate 'nādiḥ phalam vāpi svabhāvataḥ |
ādir na vidyate yasya tasya jātir na vidyate ||¹

¹ All the MSS. utilized for the Anandasram editions as well as those (not less than sixteen) collected from different provinces and examined by myself including different extant editions read 'nādeḥ' for nādiḥ in *a* and *hy* ādir for jātir in *d*. With these original readings the kārikā hardly gives any appreciable sense. What does the second half with that reading (ādir na vidyate yasya tasya hy ādir na vidyate) mean? With the reading jātir for *hyādir* suggested by me the sense is quite clear and it is in one way supported by the explanation given by the commentator, Ś, who has twisted the text with the reading *hy* ādiḥ saying:

'A cause as well as an effect having no beginning does not naturally come into being, for that which has no beginning has no origination.'

Compare BC, IX. 123 :

hetor ādir na ced asti phalasyādīḥ kuto bhavet |

'Should there be no beginning of a cause how could an effect have a beginning ?'

yasmād ādīḥ kāraṇam na vidyate yasya loke tasya ādīḥ pūrvoktā jātir na vidyate. The reason for suggesting '*nādīḥ*' for '*nādeḥ*' is this that by doing so the meaning becomes quite clear and only as such is supported by the second half of the kārikā.

24

Now, a few words are necessary to introduce the words *prajñapti* and *samklesha* in the next kārikā. We say 'It is a tree', and by saying so we affirm the existence of the tree. We know thereby that in reality there is a thing which is called 'tree.' But some thinkers including a class of Buddhists would utterly deny the existence of such a thing. According to them there is nothing that can be called a tree. That which is known to us as a tree is nothing but a mere understanding (*saṃkhyā*), a designation (*saṃjñā*); it is only making known to others (*prajñapti*), that is, the practical denomination, simply a common use (*vyavahāra*), it is merely a name (*nāman*) and nothing else. And it is only on account of its having the branches, the leaves. etc., that it comes under the generally understood term of 'tree.' Similarly there is nothing in fact like a branch, a leaf, and so on, it being merely a current term, an enumeration, a designation, an expression or a distinctive mark of discourse¹

¹ DS, § 1308 (see *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 340-341): katame dhammā paññatti. yā tesam tesam dhammānam sankhā samanīā paññatti voharo nāmam nāmakammam nāmadheyam nirutti vyājanam abhilāpo. Compare here the theory against that of what is known as *Avayavivāda*, BA with BAP, IX. 79 seq. and ASP, p. 97. There is also a small separate treatise entitled *Avayavi-*

The true literal significance of the word *prajñapti*, ‘practical denomination’, is ‘making known’ (*bhāvasādhana*); or ‘that by which a thing is made known’ (*karaṇasādhana*), i.e., name or term. Or, again, it may mean what is made known (*karmasādhana*).² In the present case the word is used in either of the first two senses.

On the use of the word *prajñapti* in Buddhist works Kumārila’s observation (TV, I. 3. 12, p. 234) is interesting: *śākyādigrantheṣu punar yadapi kiñcit sādhuśabdābhiprāyenāvināṣṭabuddhyā prayuktam tatrāpi prajñapti-vijñapti-paśyatātiśhatādiprāyaprayogāt kiñcid evāviplutam labhyate. kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhraṣṭadeśabhāṣṭabhyo ‘py apabhraṣṭatarāṇi bhikkhave ityevamādīni.* See here its *Tikā Nyāyasudhā*.

As regards *samklesha* it has also a special sense in Buddhist works. It is well-known in Buddhist literature along with its opposite term *vyavadarāna*. They mean ‘impurity and purification’ respectively. See BA with BAP, IX. 28. By impurity the mind (*citta*) becomes impure and by purification it becomes pure. This *samklesha* is threefold: (1) *kleśa* ‘passion’ (i.e., *rāga*, *duṣṭa* and *moha*), that can be avoided by right view (*darśana*) and meditation (*bhāvanā*); (2) *karman* ‘act,’ bad (*akuśala*), and good-impure (*kuśalāsrava*); and (3) *janman* ‘birth’ (or *phala* ‘fruit’, recompense that projects the existence). See Vis, pp. 214 ff. Let the following be quoted here from Tk, p. 28 :

tatra kleśakarmajanmātmakas trividhaḥ samklesah.

nirākaraṇa by Pandita Aśoka in the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, Bib. Ind., pp. 78 ff. The well-known ‘Chariot Simile’ in the *Milindapañha*, pp. 27 ff. (II. 1. 1) may also be referred to here. The *Avayavivāda* is established among others in the following works of Brahmanic authority: NS, II. 1. 33 ff., PB with NK on VSt., pp. 41 ff.

² ASH, § 107 paññatti pana paññāpiyattā (Skt. *prajñāpyatvāt*) paññatti. paññāpanato (Skt. *prajñāpanataḥ*) vā paññattitī ca duvidhā hoti. Thus the first is *karmasādhana* and the second *bhāvasādhana*,

The following occurs in MSBT, pp. 34-35 :

[kleśa eva śaṃkleśa iti kleśa]saṃkleśah. evam karma-[saṃkleśo] janmasaṃkleśah. kleśo hi pravartamānah svaparātmanor vyābhādhakatvāt saṃkleśah. yathoktaṃ sūtre³ rakto hi rāgaparīta ātmavyābhādhāyāpi cetayate paravyābhādhāyāpi cetayata ubhayavyābhādhāyāpi cetayate. evam dveśamohayor api jñātavyam iti. karma janma ca saṃkleśapratyanād api saṃkleśah.

³ This is, as pointed out by S. Yamaguchi, from AN, III. 54.

Now, the opponent having his hold on the meaning of the word *prajñapti* as well as *saṃkleśa* well-known among, and accepted by, Vijñānavādins, who maintain that there is, in fact, only *vijñāna* and the external word has no reality at all, proceeds to refute their views, the purpose thereof being that if the existence of external things is once established one will have to accept their *jāti*, too.

The kārikā runs thus:

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam anyathā dvayanāśataḥ !
saṃkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā ||

'The practical denomination (*prajñapti*) has its (objective) cause (*nimitta*),¹ for otherwise there is the disappearance of the two; (owing to this fact) as well as the experience of

¹ For *nimitta* see IV. 25, 27, 75, 77, 78; LA, pp. 225-226: tatra nimittam punar mahāmate jac cakṣurvijñānasyābhāsām āgacchati rūpasamjñakam, evam śrotraghṛṇājihvākāyamanovijñānānām śabdagandharasprasṭavyadharma-samjñakam, etam nimittam iti vadāmi; p. 228: tatra mahāmate nimirāt yat saṃsthānākṛitiśeṣākāraruपādilakṣaṇam dṛṣyate tan nimittam.

impurities (*samklesa-upalabdhi*) (their) existence is regarded as dependent (*paratantra*).²

It says that it must be admitted that *prajñapti* must have its *nimitta*; i.e., the objective cause; for otherwise there will be no notion of the (*dvaya*)³, i.e., *grāhya* and *grāhaka* 'the percipient and the perceptible,' in other words, the subject and the object,—a fact that cannot be denied. And, again, owing to *samklesa-upalabdhi* it is also to be admitted that there must be some things (for example, as the Buddhists would say, *śkandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas*) that are the causes of these *samklesas*. Thus the things to which the *prajñapti* and the *samklesa-upalabdhi* owe their existence are external and have their origination (*jāti*).

The argument advanced here has two parts: first, owing to the existence of *prajñapti* the existence of its cause, too, is to be admitted; and second, as there is the experience of *samklesas* there must be also their cause. Both the parts of the argument are taken from Buddhist works. As regards the first let us quote here a few lines from the LA, p. 104 :

punar aparam mahāmatir āha. nanu bhagavann abhilāpasadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvāḥ. yadi punar bhagavan bhāvāna syur abhilāpo na pravartate, pravartate ca. tasmād abhilāpasadbhāvād bhagavan santi sarvabhāvāḥ. bhagavān āha. asatām api mahāmate bhāvānām abhilāpaḥ kriyate yad uta śāśaviṣāṇakūrmāromabandhyāputrādīnām loke dṛṣṭo⁴ 'bhilāpaḥ. te ca mahāmate na bhāvā nābhāvā abhilapyante ca. tad yad avocas tvām mahāmate abhilāpasadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvā iti sa hi vādaḥ prahīṇaḥ.

² For the word *paratantra* see IV. 24, 73, 74.

³ For *dvaya* see II. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 24, 61, 72, 75, 79, 87.

⁴ The printed text reads 'dṛṣṭo which is evidently wrong.

"Māhāmatī says again : 'Is it not, O Blessed One, that all beings exist, for they all have their expressions (*abhilāpa*). If, O Blessed One, there exist no beings there cannot be their expressions. Therefore, all beings exist on account of their expressions.' Says the Blessed One : 'There are, O Māhāmatī, expressions also for those which are non-existent, for example, the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a 'barren woman, and so on. These are O Māhāmatī, neither beings, nor non-beings, yet they are expressed. Therefore, O Māhāmatī, the theory, as you say, that owing to expressions all beings exist, is lost.' " ⁵

The following couplet from the same work (LA. p. 105) supplies the gist of the above :

ākāśam śāśāśīgām ca bandhyāyāḥ putra eva ca |
asanto hy abhilapyante tathā bhāveṣu kalpanā ||

It is quoted in MV, p. 528, where occurs the following :

tatrāpi bhāvakalpanāpratiṣedhamātram nābhāvakalpanā bhāvatvāsiddher eveti vijñeyām. bandhyāputra iti śabdānātram evaitat. nāsyārtha upalabhyate yasyārthasya bhāvatvam abhāvatvam vā syād iti kuto 'nupalabhyamānasvabhāvasya bhāvābhāvakalpanā yokṣyate.

The following is taken also from LA, p. 319 (X. 430):

asatsu sarvadharmaṣu prajñaptih kriyate mayā |
abhlāpo vyavahāraś ca bālānām tattvavarjitaḥ ||

It is to be noted that *abhlāpa* and *prajñapti* are synonymous with each other. See DSq, § 1308, quoted above, p. 129.

⁵ See III. 37 : sarvābhilāpavigataḥ.

Now, as regards the second part we should like to quote a few lines also from a Buddhist work. Candra kīrtti introduces the sixth chapter of the MK thus (MV, p. 137) :

atrāha. vidyata eva skandhā[yatana]dhātavah. kutah. tadaśrayasamkleśopalabdheḥ. iha yan nāsti na tadā[śraya]samkleśopalabdhīr asti bandhyāduhitur iva bandhyāsūnoḥ. santi ca rāgādayah kleśāḥ samkleśanibandhanam.

'Here (the opponent) says: "Verily there are the *skandhas*,⁶ *āyatanas*,⁷ and *dhātus*⁸. Why? Because there is experience of *samkleśas* arising from them ; and because, on the other hand, there is no experience of *samkleśas* arising from that which has no existence, as of a barren woman's daughter from a barren woman's son." ' And there are attachment and other passions, the cause of *samkleśa*.

With regard to *prajñāpti* the following may also be quoted in this connexion :

prajñaptir nāmamātreyam⁹ lakṣmaṇena na vidyate |

LA, X. 23 (p. 267).

prajñaptimātram tribhavam nāsti vastu svabhāvataḥ |
prajñaptim vastubhāvena kalpayiṣyanti tārkikāḥ||

Op. cit, X. 86 (p. 275).

Now the author proceeds to give his reply to the above *prima facie* case :

⁶ Five: *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *samjnā*, *samskāra*, and *vijñāna*.

⁷ Twelve: six organs of sense and their objects, viz., six internal: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; and six external: form, sound, odour, taste, contact and ideas.

⁸ Eighteen: six organs of sense, their six objects, and six kinds of consciousness arising from them.

⁹ Calcutta ed. has *prajñaptināmātredam*.

25

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam iṣyate yuktidarśanāt ।
nimittasyānimittatvam iṣyate bhūtadarśanāt ॥

‘ Seeing the reason (advanced above) one wants (to say) that the *prajñapti* has its *nimitta* ; but seeing the reality (we) want (to say) that the *nimitta* is no *nimitta* at all. ’

The opponent says, as we have seen, *prajñapti* must have its objective cause, but the argument drawn from the real nature of things points to the conclusion that what is called by him a *nimitta* (cause) is in reality no *nimitta* at all. The reason hereof is advanced in the following kārikā :

26

cittam na saṃspṛśyat�artham nārthābhāsam tathaiva ca ।
abhūto hi yataś cārtho nārthābhāsas tataḥ pṛthak ॥

‘The mind does not touch (*i.e.* relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance (*arthābhāsa*), for the object is unreal and its appearance is not different from it. ’

The mind has no contact with its object owing to the absence of the object itself. For in this theory (of the Vijnānavādins) there is nothing but the mind (*citta*). Now it goes without saying that the mind having no contact with its object has in fact no contact also with its appearance (*arthābhāsa*). The second half of the kārikā offers the reason hereof. It means that the object is unreal and it being so its appearance which depends on it is also unreal ; and thus both of them being unreal the latter is in this respect not different from the former. This being the case the mind can in no way be related either to its object or its appearance. Therefore it cannot be said,

as done in the first half of the preceding kārikā, that *prajñapti* has its *nimitta*. One must remember here that according to the Vijñānavādins there is no reality of external things. Let us read here the following from the MVBT, p. 10:

[°athavā cittacaitasikā rūpaṭo dravyataś ca santiti yeṣāṁ dṛṣṭis teṣāṁ pratiṣedhārtham uktam] abhūtaparikalpo [’stī]. [tasmād] asti dravyataḥ. nāsti rūpam tadvyatiriktam. [nāsti] dravyata iti. kiṁ kāraṇam. yasmād dvayam tatra na vidyate. na hy abhūtaparikalpaḥ kasyacid grāhako nāpi kenacid gṛhyate. kiṁ tarhi. grāhyagrāhakatva [rahitaṁ vastumātram. tathā hi vijñānād bahir na rūpādi gṛhyate svapnādīvat vijñānam hi rūpādyā]bhāsam utpadyate. tasmān nirabalambanam eva svapnādāv ivānyatrāpi svabijapariपākād arthābhāsam vijñānam utpadyata ity eva jñeyam, grāhyā[bhāve grāhako na bhavatīti grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāvo na yujyate. ato rūpam abhūtaparikalpān na pṛthagbhūtam].

The opponent may argue here: Well, according to you there are no external things. But you cannot deny that there is an appearance of things round us. It may be a false one in your opinion. Yet, it must have some cause. What is it? It is nothing but the contact of the mind with an object. Thus even for a false notion or impression (*viparyāsa*) the existence of an object must be postulated.

The author rejoins that it is quite true that even false impressions are possible only when there is a contact of the mind with an object, but when that contact itself is never and in no way possible there is no possibility also of them. How to explain, then, the false impressions? He would reply that it is the nature of the mind itself that even in the absence of any object it transforms into various objects under the influence of *vāsanās*. For it is the seed of all (*sarvabijā*) having possessed the power of producing everything. Says Sthiramati (Tk, p. 36, l. 7 on kārikā 17: *sarvabijam hi vijñānam*):

tatra sarvadharmaṭpādanaśaktyanugamāt sarvabijam.

LA, X. 49 (p. 271) :

cittam vicitram bijākhyam khyāyate cittagocaram |
khyātau kalpenti utpattiṁ bālāḥ kalpadvaye ratāḥ||

Proceeds our author :

27

nimittam na sadā cittam saṃspṛśaty adhvasu triṣu |
animitto viparyāsaḥ katham tasya bhaviṣyati ||

'Never in the three divisions of time (*i.e.*, the past, the present, and the future) the mind touches any cause (object), how is it then that a false impression would arise without any cause thereof ?'

See IV. 41, 77, 78; LA, X. 123 :

viparyāsasya vastutvād yad yad evopalabhyate |
niḥsvabhāvam bhavet tad dhi sarvathāpi na vidyate||

That in the above kārikās (25-27) the doctrine of the Vijñānavādins is supported by our author is clearly admitted by Ś in the following words introducing the next kārikā (28) :

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam ityādy etadantam vijñānavādino bauddhasya vacanam bāhyārthavādipakṣapratiṣedhaparam ācāryeṇānumoditam.

Now the Ācārya draws his conclusion from what is said above in this connexion :

28

tasmān na jāyate cittam cittadṛśyam na jāyate |
tasya paśyanti ye jātiṁ khe vai paśyanti te padam ||

'Hence neither the mind (*citta*), nor that which is cognizable by it (*cittadṛśya*) is originated. Those who see its (i.e., of the *citta* and *cittadṛśya*) origination see the (foot-) mark (of birds) in the sky.'

'Hence (*tasmāt*)' refers to the reason advanced above in 26 and 27: because there is no contact of the mind with any object.

The belief in the origination of things is as absurd as the seeing of foot-marks of birds flying in the sky.

For this simile compare DP, 93 (=TG, 92):

ākāse va sakuntānam padam tassa durannayam |

This simile in our kārikā can be better explained by what Buddhanghoṣa has said in his DPA on the above line:

padam tassa durannayan'ti yathā ākāse gacchantānam sakuntānam imassim iñhane pādehi akkamitvā gatā idam iñhanam udarena pahāritvā gatā idam sisena idam pakkhehīti na sakkā nātum evam eva'

It says with reference to an Arhat that as in the case of birds flying in the sky it cannot be ascertained that they have gone away stepping on this spot with the legs and striking this spot with the wings, just so...

A similar verse is quoted by Ś in IV. 91. It runs :

śakunānām ivākāśe gatir naivopalabhyate |

Cf. DP, 92 :

ākāśe va sakuntānam gati tesam durannayā |

The following is quoted by Ś in his commentary on MU, III. 2. 6 :

śakunināmivākāśe jale vāricarasya ca |
padam yathā na dṛsyeta tathā jñānavatām gatiḥ ||

On such texts is based the following observation of Ś in his commentary on the BU, IV. 4. 6 (p. 637) :

ta utsahante khe' pi śākunam̄ padaṇ̄ draṣṭum.

For further details see IV. 91.

As regards the main proposition here the following lines from Āryaratnacūḍapariṇīcchā (quoted in BAP, IX. 18, p. 392; MV, p. 62; SS, p. 235) deserve to be cited :

sa cittam̄ parigaveśamāṇo nādhyātmam̄ cittam̄ samanupaśyati
na bahirdhā cittam̄ samanuśyati.^o sa cittamasamanupaśyan
cittadhārām̄ paryeṣate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. tasyevam̄ bhavati.
ālambane sati cittam̄ utpadyate. tat kim anyad ālambanam
anyac cittam̄. tadā dvicittatā bhaviṣyati. atha yadevālambanam
tat eva cittam̄. tat kathaṇ̄ cittena cittam̄ samanupaśyati. na
ca cittam̄ cittam̄ samanupaśyati. tad yathāpi nāma tayaivā-
śidhārayā saivāśidhārā na śakyate chettum̄. na tenaivāṅgulya-
greṇa tad evāṅgulyagraṇi śākyate spraṣṭum̄. evam eva na tenaiva
cittena tad eva cittam̄ śākyam̄ draṣṭum̄.^o

And the following is from KP, 149 (§ 102)¹ :

cittam̄ hi kāśyapa parigaveśamāṇam̄ na labhyate. yan na
labhyate tan nopalabhyate. tan nātītām̄. nānāgataṁ, na
pratyutpannam̄. yan nātītām̄ nānāgataṁ na pratyutpannam̄ tat
tryadhvasamatikrāntam. yat tryadhvasamatikrāntam̄ tan naivāsti
naiva nāsti. yan naivāsti na nāsti tad ajātām̄. yad ajātām̄ tasya
nāsti svabhāvah. yasya nāsti svabhāvah tasya nāsty utpādah.
yasya nāsty utpādah tasya nāsti nirodhah.^o ²

¹ See MV, p. 45 (KP = Ratnakūṭasūtra): SS, p. 233; BAP, IX. 106 (p. 338).

² On citta see the work, pp. 142-150.

Having shown that the *citta* does not originate the Ācārya comes to his main thesis, the theory of *ajāti* ‘non-origination.’ Says he :

29

ajātām jāyate yasmād ajātiḥ prakṛtis tataḥ ।
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhavisyati ॥

‘As it is one unborn (*ajāta*) that is born (*jāta*), non-birth (*ajāti*) is its very essence (*prakṛti*). And there can be in no way any change of essence.’

For *a* see *jāta eva na jāyate*, BU, III. 9, 25; and *ante ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātim icchanti vādināḥ*, III. 20, IV. 6; and note on IV. 13.

If a man is born it must be said that before his birth he was unborn, and this state of being unborn before the birth is his essence. Now, if it is accepted, and it must be accepted, as his essence, there cannot be his birth which is a change, for essence can in no way change, as essence and change are two contradictory terms. Similarly before a *citta* is produced it must be considered as unproduced, and that being its essence which can never change it cannot be produced at all. This law holds good wherever there is the question of *jāti*.

For the wording of the second half of the *kārikā* which is found also in III. 21 see MK. XV. 8 :

prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate.

On this point one may be referred to also :

kasya syād anyathābhāvah svabhāvo yadi vidyate ॥
tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo nāpy anyasyaiva yujyate |
yuvā na jīryate yasmād yasmāj jīrṇo na jīryate ||

Op. cit., XIII. 4, 5.

In the next kārikā the author says that an advocate of the theory of *jāti* cannot account for his two propositions : first, *samsāra* ‘continued existence’¹ is without a beginning,² but has an end ; and the second, liberation is with a beginning, but has no end. He says :

30

anāder antavattvam̄ ca samsārasya na setsyati |
anantatā cādimato moksasya na bhavisyati ||

‘It would not be established that *samsāra* is without a beginning, but has an end ; nor would it be possible that liberation which has a beginning has no end.’

An advocate of the theory of origination has to admit that *samsāra* has its origination; and if it is so, it must have a beginning. And that being so, the tenet that *samsāra* has no beginning cannot be maintained. Similarly according to him liberation also has its origination, and as such it must be with a beginning, and consequently must have an end, and in that case one cannot say that it has no end.

The point discussed in the next few kārikās is this that it is only when there is the existence of *samsāra* that there arises the question as to whether it has or has not a beginning

¹ khandhānam̄ paṭipāṭī ca dhatu-āyatānāna ca |
abbhocchinnam̄ vattamānam̄ samsāro ti pavuccati ||

² That *samsāra* is *anādi* is admitted on all hands. As for Buddhists see MK, XI. 1 with its *vṛtti*:

pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
samsāro 'navarāgро hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam̄ ||

or an end ; but in fact it has no existence at all. Says the Ācārya :

31

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā ।
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo 'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ ॥ १

'That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present, (i.e., in the middle²) ;³ being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal.'

Compare here what Nāgārjuna says in his MK, XI. 2 :
naivēgram nāvarām yasya madhyam tasya kuto bhavet.

'How should that which has neither the anterior point, nor the posterior one, have the middle?'

Candrakīrtti comments :

agram ity ādiḥ pūrvam prathamam ucyate. avaram ity avasānam vyavaccheda ucyate. yasya samsārasya ādir antar ca pratijiddhah tasya madhyam kuto bhavishyati. tatas ca samjnāmātrakam eva vīparīasaparavaśamānasenām samsāra ādi-madhyāvasānavirahitetyād ākāśavad alātacakravat iti bhāvah.

The following may also be quoted here :

yassa n'āthi purā pacchā
majjhām tassa kuo siyā ॥ AS, I. 4. 4. 3.

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti
madhye'pi ca na tat tathā ॥ Nayopadeśa, 14.

¹ See II. 6.

² yad ādāv ante ca nāsti vartu mrgatāmikādi tan madhye'pi nāstīti niscitem loke. See II. 6.

³ Cf. adāv era hi yan nāsti kāraṇāśamobhavat evayam ।
vartamāne'pi tan nāsti nātāḥ syat itatra kicciḥ ॥ YY. III. 11. 13.

na yat purastād uta yan na paścān
 madhye ca tan na vyapadeśamātram |
 bhūtam̄ prasiddham̄ ca pareṇa yad yat
 tad eva tat syād iti me manīṣā ||

BP, XI. 28. 21.

That *samsāra* has neither a beginning nor an end is fully discussed in MK with MV, XI.

Now, there are two kinds of things, one kind experienced in dream (*svapna*), and the other in wakefulness (*jāgrat*) ; and it has been thoroughly established in Book II (Vaitathya Prakaraṇa) that there is no difference between the states of dream and wakefulness, and so the things experienced in the latter are as false as those in the former. The author here puts forth the same argument in the same language with a view to show that the thing which is as false as that in one's dream cannot come into being in reality, and so the *jātivāda* cannot stand. He says :

32

saprayojanatā teṣām svapne'pi pratipadyate |
 tasmād ādyantavāttvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ ||

' That the things have some purpose in dream also is known; hence owing to their beginning and end, indeed, they are regarded as false.'

One may object to the falsity of the phenomena of waking experience on the ground that they really serve some purpose; as for instance, water, when it is drunk, quenches one's thirst, while the phenomena in dream are not such. To this the author replies in the above kārikā. His point is this that the phenomena of dream are linked with one another by some purpose no less than those of waking experience. In dream also one drinks water to quench one's thirst. So the

phenomena like those in dream having a beginning and an end have no reality at all; for that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real, as the mirage.

This kārikā is identical with II. 7. See the note on it for a different reading.

It is said that the things seen in the waking state are false, because, as regards nature, they have no difference from those seen in dreams which are evidently false. But why the latter are so the author says in the next few kārikās as in II. 1-10:

33

sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne kāyasyāntar¹ nidarśanāt |
saṃvṛte² 'smīn pradeśe vai bhūtānām darśanām kutah ||

'All things in dream are false as they are seen within the body; for how can objects be seen in this confined space (of the body)?'

¹ For *a* see II. 1^c.

² II. 1^d, 4^d

34

na yuktam darśanām gatvā kālasyāniyamād¹ gatau |
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate ||²

'(In dream) the seeing (of a thing at a distance) having gone (up to it) is not reasonable; for there is no fixed rule of time for the act of going (there), and no persons being awake exist in the place (where they dream themselves to be).'

¹ Cf. adirghatvāc ca kālasya, II. 2^a.

² Identical with II. 2^{c-d}.

35

mitrādyaiḥ saha sammantrya prabuddho¹ na prapadyate |
gṛhitam cāpi yat kiñcit pratibuddho na paśyati ||

‘When awake, he does not find his friends and others with whom he had deliberated, nor does he see all that which he had (then in dream) grasped.’²

¹ With a large number of MSS. I read this for *sambuddha* in printed editions.

36

svapne cāvastukah kāyah pṛthag anyasya darśanāt |
yathā kāyas tathā sarvam cittadṛśyam avastukam ||

‘In dream the (active) body is unreal, for (quite) a different body is seen (in the place where one dreams); and as the body so all the things which are cognizable by the mind are unreal.’

37

grahaṇāj jāgaritavat taddhetuh svapna iṣyate |
taddhetutvāc ca tasyaiva saj jāgaritam iṣyate ||

‘The experience (of dream) being like (that of) wakefulness, it (wakefulness) is considered to be the cause of dream; and that being so it is (also) considered that wakefulness is real only to him (*i.e.*, the dreamer).’

It is a fact that cause and its effect must be of the same nature. Accordingly wakefulness and dream being the cause and the effect respectively must be of the same nature. So if a dream is false wakefulness is also false. And as a

dream appears to be real only to the dreamer, so wakefulness, too, is real only to an ordinary unenlightened man.¹

¹ I think the logical order of the following four kārikās, viz., 38-41 should be as follows: 39, 41, 38 and 40. For the kārikās 39 and 41 with 32-37 form the same subject of discussion, i.e., the equality of the states of dream and wakefulness, while the kārikās 38 and 40 are meant for showing the impossibility of origination directly. The traditional order is shown in the present edition by the figures in parenthesis.

38 (39)

asaj jāgarite dṛṣṭvā svapne paśyati tānmayah ।
asat svapne 'pi dṛṣṭvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati ॥

'In the waking state one sees an unreal thing and being absorbed in it sees it (also) in a dream. And in a dream, too, one sees an unreal thing, but does not see it when one awakes.'

To see the unreal is common to both the states, dream and wakefulness; the only difference between them is, however as stated in the kārikā itself.

¹ yathāsva kāmān evaśānti seviya
pratibuddhīmetuh (?) puruṣo na paśyati । SR, IX, p. 29.

39 (41)

viparyāsād yathā jāgrad acintyān bhūtavat spr̥ṣṭe¹ ।
tathā svapne viparyāsād dharmāṇḍa tatraiva paśyati ॥

¹ For the use of *spr̥ṣṭe* in such cases see IV. 27.

'As in the waking state² through mistake one may see unthinkable things³ as real, so in dream it is owing to mistake that one sees things only in that (state).'

² The word *jāgrat* is taken here in the locative sense. See III. 29 together with S's commentary thereon and on IV. 40 (41): [jāgraj jāgarite. Cf. IV. 65 and BU, IV. 3. 14 with the comm. *jāgraj jāgaritadeśe*. See also IV. 61, note 3.

³ Such as *raju-sarpa* 'string serpent,' etc.—S.

Having established above that a thing which are as false as that in a dream cannot come into being the author shows his conclusion of the *ajātivāda* by some other arguments:

40 (38)

utpādasyāprasiddhatvād ajam sarvam udāhṛtam |
na ca bhūtād abhūtasya sambhavo 'sti kathañcana ||

'As origination is not established all are said to be without origination. There is in no way origination of the non-existent from the existent.'

The origination of the non-existent, such as the horns of a hare, etc., is in no way seen.—S.

In the next kārikā the author says with regard to causation referred to just now that it itself is not reasonable:

41 (40)

nāsty asaddhetukam asat sad asaddhetukam tathā |
sac ca saddhetukam nāsti saddhetukam asat kutah ||

'There is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent; again there is no existent arising from the existent and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?'

Here are four points :

- (i) An unreal thing cannot have an unreal cause,
- (ii) nor can a real thing have an unreal cause; again,
- (iii) a real thing cannot have a real cause,
- (iv) nor can an unreal thing have a real cause.

Let us read here the following from MK, XXI. 12:

- (iii) na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo
- (ii) bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate !
- (i) [nābhāvāj jāyate 'bhāvo
- (iv) 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate ||]¹

This is fully explained in MV. See the following from MK:

sadbhūtaḥ kārakaḥ karma sadbhūtam na karoty ayam !
kārako nāpy asadbhūtaḥ karmāsadbhūtam iha te || VIII. 1.

satā ca kriyate nāsan nāsatā kriyate ca sat !
kartrā sarve prasajyante doṣās tatra ta eva hi || VIII. 8.

nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtam sadasadbhūtam eva vā !
karoti kārakaḥ karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ || VIII. 10.

¹ These last two lines of the kārikā missing in Sanskrit are rightly reconstructed by Poussin from the Tibetan which runs as follows :

dñoś. mcd. dñoś. med mi. skye. ste |
dñoś. med. dñoś. las. mi. skyeho ||

This kārikā is identical with CS, 364 (XV. 14) of Āryadeva.

Having thus refuted the *jātivāda* and established thereby the *ajātivāda* of the Buddhists the author goes on to reconcile some statements made by the Buddhas themselves, which appear to be irreconcilable with the *ajātivāda* doctrine.

These statements, some of which are quoted in the foot-note,¹ are in support of *jāti*. Besides, the Buddhas are found to have instructed their followers on causation, as their well-known *pratītyasamutpāda* ‘dependent origination’ itself shows very clearly.² It must, therefore, be admitted that the Buddhas have not denied *jāti* altogether. The Ācārya takes up the point and gives his reply in the following two kārikās, the first of which runs thus :

42

upalambhāt samācārād astivastutvavādinām !
jātis tu deśitā buddhair ajātes trasatām sadā ||

‘But *jāti* is taught by the Buddhas for those who from their perception and common practice hold that things exist (in reality) and are afraid of (the doctrine of) *ajāti*.’

These people who are intent upon the reality of things around them are of a lower order and are consequently frightened when they hear of the doctrine of *ajāti* and *nairātmya* (absence of *ātman*, i.e., *svabhāva* ‘nature’) as taught by the Buddhas.³ The Buddhas are, however,

¹ PSP, p. 9: buddhā bhagavanta utpannāḥ, p. 79: pañcendriyāṇi utpatsyante, p. 91: arhantāḥ samyak saṃbuddhā loka utpatsyante; SN. IV, p. 14: yo bhikkhave cakkhussa uppādo ḥiti abhinibbatti pātubhāvo; MV, p. 145: uktaṇ hi bhagavatā triṇīmāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni, saṃskṛtasya bhikṣava utpādo’pi prajñāyate vyayo’pi sthityanyathātvam apīti. na ca avidyamānasya kharaviṣṇasyeva jātyādilakṣaṇam asti. See also AN, I, p. 162.

² SN, IV, p. 33: cakkhuñ ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññāṇam.

³ advitīyam śivadvāram kudīśīnām bhayañkaram |
viṣayaḥ sarvabuddhānām iti nairātmymam ucyate ||
asya dharmasya nāmno’pi bhayam utpadyate ’sataḥ
balavān nāma ko dṛṣṭaḥ parasya na bhayañkaraḥ ||

CŚ, 288-289.

On the word *nairātmya* C a n d r a k ī r t t i writes here: tatrātmā nāma yo ‘parāyattasvarūpaḥ svabhāvaḥ [tadabhāvo nairātmymam]. Tibetan: de. med. pa. ni. bdag. med. paḥo.

very kind-hearted and so in order to lead them easily and gradually to the truth (*tattvāvatāra*)⁴ followed the disposition of their minds and preached to them of *jāti*, though in fact there is nothing of the kind. The author himself says elsewhere (III. 15) that the creation described differently in the Upaniṣads with illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire and such other things is meant only as a means devised for making one 'descend to', i.e., realize, truth (*upāyah so'vatārāya*). This act is called *avatāraṇasandhi* 'intention of making one descend' of the Buddha.⁵ It has found its expression in Buddhist works from which some passages are quoted here in the foot-note.⁶

⁴ See MV, p. 340.

⁵ MS, XII. 16.17: tatrāvatāraṇābhīsandhīḥ śrāvakeṣu draṣṭavyaḥ, sāsanāvataṇārtham anutrāsaya rūpādyastitvadeśanāt. The word *sandhi* is here in the sense of *abhisandhi*.

⁶ lokāvatāraṇārtham ca bhāvā nāthena deśitāḥ |
trāso nārabhyate 'dṛṣṭe dṛṣṭe 'parti sa sarvaśaḥ |
niyamenaiva kiñcijjīte tena trāso vidhīyate || CS, 283.

C a n d r a k ī r t t i o n C S , 183 :

tattvāvatārasopānabhūtatvāt pravīptyupadeśo'pi kartavyaḥ.
lokāvatāropāyatvāt sadasadādideśanānām.

Op. cit., 196.

dharmadhātor asambhedād yānabhedo 'sti na prabho |
yānatritayam ākhyātaṁ tvayā sattvāvatārataḥ ||

NSt, 21.

nānavadhlārya yathārtham śūnyatām kaścic chaktaḥ saṁsāre saṅgam avadhūya
nirvāṇaspīhām utpādayitum. sa ca śūnyatārtho jagatām ativotrāsakaratvād
apriyāvedananipuṇapuruseṇa rājñāḥ priyabhāryāmarāṇakramāvedana-sauma-
nasyotpādanavat kayāpi yuktyā viduṣāvatāryaḥ.

CS, a p. 514.

astitvanāstiyadīśīpatitānām teṣām utrāsaḥ syād iti utrāsyamānā mahāmate
dūre bhavanti mahāyānāt. LA, p. 167.

etāni kāśyapa pañca bhikṣusatāni dīśīpraskandhānīmām gambhīrām dharma-
deśanām nāvataranti nāvagāhante nādhimucyanta utrāsyanti samṛtrasyanti
santrāsam āpadyante. KP (=Ratnakūṭa) in MV, pp. 337.338.

As regards the different modes of teaching of the Buddhas the following couplet may be quoted :

deśanā lokanāthānām sattvāśayavaśānugā !
bhidyate bahudhā loka upāyair bahubhiḥ kila⁷

'The teachings of the Lords of the worlds (i.e., the Buddhas) following the disposition of the people differ in the world in many ways according to the diversity of methods.'⁸

That was their 'skilfulness in method (*upāyakauśalya*) by which all discrepancies in their teachings are explained.

tatra tathāgato mahākāruṇiko lokatrāsapadaparihārārthaṁ vyavahāravaśād uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na nirodha iti. BAP, p. 589.

evam ukte bhagavān āyuṣmantām śāriputram etad avocat. alaṁ śāriputra etenārthena bhāṣitena. tat kasya hetoḥ. uttrasiyati śāriputrāyam sadevako loko 'smīn arthe vyākriyamāṇe. SP, II, p. 36.

āha. yad etad uktam bhagavatā sāṃskṛtā dharmā utpadyante nirudhyante cet yasya tathāgatabhāṣitasya ko 'bhiprāyah. āha. utpādanirodhābhinnivिषṭः kulaputra lokasamniveśah. tatra tathāgato mahākāruṇiko lokasyotrāsapada-parihārārthaṁ vyavahāravaśād uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca. na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na nirodha iti. SS, p. 263.

See also MN, I. 136-137; SR, pp. 70-71.

⁷ Bodhicittavivaraṇa (Tib. version) 97-98. It is quoted in the Buddhist section of SSD. See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 27ff. Sometimes there is in d of the kārikā *punah* for *kila*.

⁸ See

kṛtvā dharmesv avasthānam tattvam deśemi yoginām |
tattvam pratyātmagatikam kṛpyakalpena varjitaṁ ||
deśemi jinaputrāṇam neyam bālāna deśanāḥ |
vicitrā'hi yathā māyā dṛṣyate na ca vidyate !
deśanāpi tathā citrā deśyate vyabhicāriṇī ||
deśanā hi yad anyasya tad anyasyāpy adeśanā |
āture āture yadvad bhiṣag dravyam prayacchatī ||

LA, pp. 48-49.

See also Op. cit, X. 611-613 (pp. 340-341); SP, pp. 44 ff.; SS, pp. 14-15; MV, pp. 359-360, 369-372.

Now, when there is in fact no *jāti* it is certainly no good to teach it and consequently some evil would result from such teaching. The author, however, says that in reality there would arise no evil, or if it actually does, it would be very small which can easily be overcome (by following the path of the truth):

43

ajātes trasatām teṣām upalambhād viyanti ye ।
jātidoṣā na setsyanti doṣo'py alpo bhaviṣyati ॥

'Those who (being instructed of *ajāti*) go asunder owing to the perception (of things) and are afraid of (thinking) *ajāti*, are not affected with the evils resulting from (the perception of) *jāti*; (or if there be any evil) the evil will be a small one.'

The reality of a thing cannot be proved on the evidence of mere perception and common practice. For an elephant called up by illusion (*māyāhastin*) cannot exist in fact though we all may see it moving or carrying men. Thus the author says that it is only on account of perception and common practice that it is said of a thing that it exists, but in reality it does not :

44

upalambhāt samācārān māyāhastī yathocyate ।
upalambhāt samācārād asti vastu tathocyate ॥

'As an elephant called up by illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice, so on the same grounds it is said of a thing that it exists.'

¹ For *māyāhastin* see LA, X, 126:

māyāhastī yathā citram patrāṇī kanakā yathā ।
tathā dīśyam nṛṇām khyāti citte ajñānavāsite ॥

TSN, 27-28 :

mayākṛtam mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā |
ākāramātram tatrāsti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā ||
svabhāvah kalpito hastī paratantras tadākṛtiḥ |
yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate |

In the next kārikā the author says, as a Vijñānavādin can say, that there is only *vijñāna* (= *citta*) 'mind', and nothing else, yet it appears variously :

45

jātyābhāsam̄ calābhāsam̄ vastvābhāsam̄ tathaiva ca |
ajācalam̄ avastutvam̄ vijñānam̄ sāntam̄ advayam̄ ||

'There is only *vijñāna* without the two (*advaya*),¹ which is quiescent (free from all sorts of disturbances), it has no origin (*aja* 'unborn'),² it does not move (*acala*), nor is it an object (*avastutva*),³ yet it appears to have an origin (*jātyābhāsa*), it appears to admit movements (*calābhāsa*), and it also appears to be an object.

It is to be noted here that *vijñāna*,⁴ *citta* and *manas* are synonyms. See LA. X. 459 :

cittam̄ vikalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam̄ eva ca |
ālayas tribhavaś ceṣṭā ete cittasya paryayāḥ ||

¹ The word *dvaya* refers to *grāhya* and *grāhaka* 'the percipient and the perceptible' respectively.

² But truly speaking according to the Buddhist theory it cannot be described even as *aja*. See IV. 74.

³ Literally, one that has no quality of an object.

⁴ Here in the kārikā under discussion the word *vijñāna* does not refer to Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntist. The following kārikā (46) using *citta* which alludes to *vijñāna* in the present kārikā clearly bears it out. Ś takes here *vijñāna* as *vijñapti*, but in the next kārikā (IV. 46) he interprets it in the sense of ātman (: evam eva yathoktaṁ vijñānam̄ jātyādirahitam̄ advayam̄ ātmatattvam̄ vijñānantah).

Ak. II. 34:

cittam mano'tha vijñānam ekārtham.

Cf. SN, II. 94.

What follows from this discussion is shown in the next kārikā :

46

evam na jāyate cittam¹ evam dharmā ajāḥ smṛtāḥ |
evam eva vijānanto na patanti viparyaye ||²

' Thus the mind is not originated, and thus the objects³ are declared to be without origination. Those who know it in this way do not fall into error.'

¹ Cf. YV, III. 13-15: evam na jāyate kiñcit.

² See IV, 58.

³ Ś takes here the word to imply *ātmans*, but in IV. 54 to mean external things (*bāhyadharmaḥ*); and in IV. 58 he writes *ātmāno 'nye ca dharmāḥ*.

This truth is profusely illustrated in the next kārikās (47-52) by the simile of a fire-brand (*alāta*). The author says, that as the different appearances of a fire-brand in motion, such as a circle or a straight line, do not come into existence from a thing other than itself, nor do they go out to a place other than itself when it is at rest, and at the same time they do not enter into itself, even so when the mind vibrates its appearances in the form of different objects they do not come into

being from any thing other than itself, and when it does not vibrate they do not go out anywhere, nor do they enter into it:

47

ṛjuvakrādikābhāsam alātam spanditam¹ yathā !
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsam vijñānam spanditam tathā² ||

'As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as the perceiver (*i.e.*, subject) and the perceptible (*i.e.*, object).'

¹ Comparing and considering all the readings in kārikās 47-51 in connection with the use of *vijñāna* and the derivatives of the root *spand* I think in the present kārikā one may incline to read *alātam spanditam* and not *alataspanditam*, a compound word, though the former is not supported by any MS consulted by me. In either case the import of the karika is the same.

² Cf. *cittaspanditam* (with the variant *cittam spandati vai sarvam*) in IV. 72, with *vijñānam spanditam* (or *vijñānaspanditam*) in *d* of the present kārikā.

48

aspandamānam ālātam aṇābhāsam ajam yathā !
aspandamānam vijñānam anābhāsam ajam tathā ||

'As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, crooked, etc.), and is (thus) 'unborn', even so when the mind does not move it has no appearance (of any subject or object), and is (thus) 'unborn.'

For *aṇābhāsa* in the text cf. *arūpaśā*, III. 36.

In the text *ālāta* supported by many MSS, is, according to lexicons, another form of *alāta*.

49

alāte spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvaḥ ।
na tato 'nyatra nispandān nālātam praviśanti te ॥

'The appearances in a moving fire-brand are not produced from anything other than it, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the fire-brand), nor do they enter into it.'

50

na nirgatā alātāt te dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ ।¹
vijñāne 'pi tathaiva syur ābhāsasyāviśeṣataḥ ॥

'They (i.e., the appearances) do not go out from the fire-brand, for they have no qualities of a substance (*dravya*), and with reference to the mind, too, they must be the same, for there is no difference in appearances.'

It is a substance, *dravya*, that can move from one place to another, but appearances are not substances, and hence they cannot move. The second half of the kārikā says that as an appearance there is no difference whatsoever in the two cases, that is, the case of a fire-brand and that of the mind.

¹ See IV. 52^a-^b.

51

vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvaḥ ।
na tato 'nyatra vijñānān na vijñānam viśanti te ॥

'When the mind vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than it and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the mind), nor do they enter into the mind.'

na nirgatās te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ ।¹
kāryakāraṇatābhāvād yato 'cintyāḥ sadaiva te ॥

'They do not go out from the mind, for they have no qualities of a substance, and as there is no state of cause and effect they are always unthinkable.'

All this is Buddhistic, and so are also arguments and the words as the following quotations will show :

sa mahārāja tāvān abdhātūr utpadyamāno na kutaścid āgacchati° niruddhyamāno na kvacid gacchati.

Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra quoted in ŠS, pp. 247.

evam eva kulaputra teṣāṁ tathāgatānām kāyapariniṣpattir na
kutaścid daśa diśi lokād āgatā nāpi kvacid daśa diśi loke
gacchati.° tad yathāpi nāma kulaputra viñayāḥ śabda
utpadyamāno na kutaścid āgacchati nirudhyamāno 'pi na kvacid
gacchati na kvacit saṃkrāmati.°

ASP, pp. 515-516.

anyato nāpi cāyātām na tiṣṭhati na gacchati |
māyātaḥ ko višeṣo 'sya yan mūḍhaiḥ satyataḥ kṛtam ||
māyayā nirmitām yaccā hetubhir yac ca nirmitām |
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām ||

BA, IX. 143-144.

Cf. āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate |
MK, X. 13.

atha pañḍitu kaś ci mārgate
kuta 'yam āgatu kutra yāti vā |
vidiśo diśa sarvi mārgato
nāgatir nāsyā gatiś ca labhyati ||

quoted in MV, p. 216; BAP, p. 533; ŠS, p. 240.

¹ See IV. 50^{b-c}.

utpannasyāgatir nāsti niruddhasya gatis tathā |
evam sati katham naiva bhavo māyopamo bhavet ||²

CŚ, 360.

² This is reconstructed by the present author from the Tibetan text which runs:

skyes. pa. la. ni. hoṇ. ba. daṇ |
de. bzin. hgags. la. hgro. ba. med |
de. ltar. yin. na. ci. lta. bur |
srid. pa. sgyu. ma. ḥdra. ma. yin ||

It is shown (IV. 14-18, 52) that there is no causation (*hetuphalābhāva* or *kāryakāraṇatābhāva*). This is further explained in the following kārikā :

53

dravyam̄ dravyasya hetuh̄ syād anyad anyasya caiva hi |
dravyatvam̄ anyabhāvo vā dharmāṇam̄ nopapadyate ||

'A substance can be a cause of another substance ; and a thing can be the cause of a different thing only; but it is unreasonable to hold that things can have substantiality or mutual difference.'

A substance must have three qualities, (i) origination (*utpāda*), (ii) change (*vyaya*), and (iii) continuance (*sthiti*). But in fact there is no such thing called substance, as the Buddhists hold. See MK with MV, VII; AN, I. 152. Again, it is well-known that from one thing a different thing is produced, and not the same thing from the same thing ; for instance, from a seed there is the sprout. Thus there is a difference between a cause and its effect. But in reality this difference, too, cannot be maintained. See MK, X.I and 15 :

yad indhanam̄ sa ced agnir ekatvam̄ kartkarmaṇoh̄ |
anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ḫte bhavet ||
agnindhanābhyaṁ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramah̄ |
sarvo niravaśeṣena sārdham̄ ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ ||

The author arrives at the conclusion :

54

evam na cittajā dharmāś cittam vāpi na dharmajam |
evam hetuphalājātīm praviśanti maniṣinah ||

'Thus the things are not produced from the mind (*citta*=
vijñāna), nor the mind from the things. And thus the wise
enter into (the doctrine of) the non-origination of cause and
effect.'

Cf. IV. 46.

55

yāvad dhetuphalāveśas tāvad dhetuphalodbhavaḥ |
ksiṇe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ ||

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect
there is the origination of cause and effect, but when the
strong adherence to cause and effect is lost there is no
existence of cause and effect.'

Here and in the next kārikā (56) the word *āveśa* in the
text is the same as *abhiniveśa* (IV. 75, 79) 'strong adherence.'
These are synonyms (to which *graha* and *grāha*, may be
added). The latter is frequently used in Buddhist works
in which it is clearly shown that not only cause and effect
but everything round us owes its existence to one's stong
adherence to it. The following may be cited here :

tad yathāpi nāma mahārāja puruṣaḥ suptah svapnāntare
piśācena paritāpyamāno bhītaḥ sammoham āpadyate. sa śayita-
vibuddhas tam piśācam tam ca moham anusmaret. tat kiṁ
manyase mahārāja samvidyate svapne piśācaḥ sammoho vā,

yāvad evam eva mahārāja bālo 'śrutavān pṛthagjanaś cakṣuśā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭivā upekṣṭhānīyāny abhiniviśate 'bhiniviśṭah san muhyati mūḍho mohajam karmābhisaṃskaroti.

ŚS, p. 254.

bālo mañjuśrī aśrutavān pṛthagjano 'tyantaparinirvṛtān sarvadharmān aprajānāna ātmānam param copalabhatे, upalabhy [ābhiniviśate abhiniviśṭah san rajyate duṣyate muhyate. sa rakto duṣṭamūḍhaḥ san] trividham karmābhisaṃskaroti.

MV, p. 296.

yas tu bhāvasvarūpam adhyāropya tadvigamāvigamata etā dṛṣṭir utpādyābhiniviśate. tasyām abhiniveśo nirvāṇapuragāminam panthānam viruṇaddhi, samsārikeśu ca duḥkheśu niyojayatīti vijñeyam.

Op. cit., p. 537.

56

yāvad dhetuphalāveśah samsāras tāvad āyataḥ ।
kṣīne hetuphalāveśe samsāro nopapadyate ॥

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect the world is extended, but when that strong adherence to cause and effect is lost the world is not possible.'

Thus having propounded to some extent the *vijñānavāda* our author proceeds incidentally to show also with the Buddhists that neither of the two theories, *śāśvatavāda* 'the theory that everything is eternal' and *ucchedavāda* 'the theory that every thing has annihilation'¹ can be maintained :

¹ These two views are specially with regard to soul and world. See, for instance, DN, I. 13, 39; MK XXVII.

saṁvṛtyā¹ jāyate sarvam śāśvataṁ tena nāsti vai |
svabhāvena² hy ajaṁ sarvam ucchedas tena nāsti vai ||

'In the practical truth (*saṁvṛti*) everything comes into being; hence there is nothing eternal. (On the other hand), everything is naturally without origination; hence there is no annihilation.'

It says that in the practical truth we say that a thing comes into being. In that case we cannot hold, so far as the practical truth is concerned, that there is any eternal thing. For that which has origination cannot be eternal, as an earthen jar. Again, as we have seen above, nothing has naturally any origination, and one that has no origination can have no annihilation also.

It is a fact that a sprout comes out only if there is a seed and not otherwise. Now the sprout is neither identical with, nor different from the seed. When there is a sprout the seed is not completely destroyed, nor is it absolutely in the same state as before. Hence it can be said that there is neither eternality nor annihilation.³

¹ See IV. 73.

² All MSS. and editions examined by me read *sadbhāvena* for *svabhāvena* in c, yet I think the latter to be the actual reading. Everywhere in similar cases the author employs *svabhāva* (III. 22, IV. 8, 10, 23, 81) and not *sadbhāva*. In the same sense he uses also the word *prakṛti* (III. 21, IV. 9, 29, 91, 92, 93, 94). If one accepts the reading *sadbhāvena* the meaning will be, according to Ś, 'in transcendental truth' (*paramārtha-sadbhāvena-pāramārthikasattayā*). That the reading is *svabhāvena* is supported also by IV. 29 in which we read *ajātiḥ prakṛtiḥ*.

³ bijasya sato yathāṅkuro na ca yo bija sa caiva aṅkuro |
na ca anyu tato na caiva tad evam anuccheda-aśāśvatadharmaṭā ||
mudrāt pratimudra dṛṣyate mudrasaṅkrānti na copalabhyate |
na ca tatra na caiva sānyato evam saṃskāra 'nucchedaśāśvatāḥ ||

Some of the teachers hold either of these two theories, the *sāśvatavāda* ‘the theory of eternity,’ and *ucchedavāda* ‘the theory of annihilation.’ But in the teachings of the Buddhas who maintain the Middle Path (*madhyamā pratipad*), there is no room for any one of them. So his doctrine is said to be free from both the theories (*anuccheda aśāśvata*).⁴ This view of the Buddhists is too well-known to require here any particular treatment.

The Buddhists also proclaim that there are two truths (*satya*) which they call *saṃvṛti satya* ‘practical or empirical truth’ and *paramārtha satya* ‘absolute or supreme or transcendental truth,’ corresponding to *vyavahāranaya* and *paramārthanaya* of the Jainas, and *vyāvahārika satya* and *pāramārthikā satya* of Ś respectively.⁵

śūnyatā ca na cocchedah samsāraś ca na sāśvatam |
karmaṇo vipraṇāśas ca dharmaḥ buddhena deśitah || MK, XVII. 20.

yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate |
yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate || CS, X. 25.

utpādabhaṅgarahito lokaḥ khaṇḍpasannibhāḥ |
sadasan nopalabdho 'yam prajñayā kṛpeyā ca te ||
sāśvatochedavarjas ca lokaḥ svapnasamaḥ sadā | LV, X. 1-2.

⁴ anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvataṁ |
etat tal lokanāthānām buddhānām sāśanāmr̥tam || MK, XVIII. 11.

For the *ucchedavāda* and *sāśvatavāda* in Brahmanical literature see Vyāsa on YS, II. 15, and MB, XII. 222 :

ucchedaniṣṭhā nehāsti bhāvananiṣṭhā na vidyate 16
evam sati ka ucchedah sāśvato vā kathaḥ bhavet 15

⁵ dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā |
lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ ||
ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvayoh |
te tattvam na vijānanti gambhiram buddhaśāsane ||
vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate |
paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādhigamyate || MK, XXIV. 8-10.
duve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadatām varo |
sammūtiṁ paramattham ca tatiyam nūpalabbhati ||

quoted by Buddha ghoṣa in the *Aṭṭhakathā* on KV, p. 30; *Sumangala-vilāsinī* (DN: *Poṭṭhapādasutta*), p. 251.

It may be observed here that these two truths are not specified in the Upaniṣads and I am inclined to think that Ś has accepted them in his system from the Buddhists through Gaudapāda.

satya imē duvi lokavidūnām diṣṭa svayaṁ aśruṇitva pareśām |
saṃvṛti yā ca tathā paramārtho satyū na sidhyati kiṃ ca tṛīyu ||

Pitāputrasamāgama quoted in BAP, pp. 361-362.

saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaḥ ca satyadvayam idam matam | BA, IX. 2.

On the explanation of *saṃvṛti* see BAP, pp. 352 ff : saṃvriyata āvriyate yathābhūtāparijñānam svabhāvāvaraṇād āvṛtaprakāśanāc cānayeti saṃvṛtiḥ. avidyā moho viparyās iti paryāyāḥ. MV, pp. 492-3 : samantād varanam saṃvṛtiḥ. ajñānam hi samantāt sarvapadārthatattvācchādanāt saṃvṛtir ity ucyate. atha vā saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo lokavyavahāra ityarthāḥ. sa cābhidhānābhi-dheyajñānjeyādilakṣaṇāḥ. loke saṃvṛtir lokasaṃvṛtiḥ. See MA, VI. 28:

mohaḥ svabhāvāvaraṇād dhi saṃvṛtiḥ
satyaṁ tayā khyāti yad eva kṛtrimam |
jagāda tat saṃvṛtisatyam ity asu
muniḥ padārtham kṛtakam ca saṃvṛtim ||

quoted in BAP, p. 353.

58

dharma ya iti jāyante saṃvṛtyā te na tattvataḥ |
janma māyopamam teṣām sā ca māyā na vidyate ||

'The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact. Their generation is like illusion, and that illusion, too, does not exist.'

The phrase 'generation is like illusion' may be explained saying that generation is *like* illusion, but itself is *not* illusion. The true sense is, however, not so. It says that generation is

¹ See III. 27.

identical with illusion, there being no difference whatsoever between them (*advayam advaidhikāram*).²

As regards the non-existence of illusion see

yāvat pratyayasāmagrī tāvan māyāpi vartate |
BC, IX. 10.

See also 27, 28.

² See ASP, pp. 39-40 : kīm punar ārya subhūte māyopamās te sattvā na te māyā. subhūtiḥ° avocat. māyopamās te° sattvā iti māyā ca sattvāś cādvayam etad advaidhikāram iti.

According to this Mādhyamika theory even the Buddha and *nirvāṇa*, and, if there is anything higher than *nirvāṇa*, that, too, are illusion, i.e., those things and illusion are one and the same thing.

59

yathā māyāmayād bijāj jāyate tanmayo 'ñkurah |
nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanā ||

'From an illusive seed comes forth an illusive sprout, and that (sprout) is neither eternal nor is attended with destruction. The same applies to all things.'

Cf. yathā hi kṛtakād bijāj jāyate tanmayo 'ñkurah |

CŚ, X. 28.¹

¹ This is the reconstructed text from the Tibetan which runs:
ji. Itar. sa. bon. byas. pa. las |
myu. gu. byas. pa. skye. hgyur. ba ||

60

nājeṣu sarvadharmeṣu śāśvatāśāśvatābhidhā |
yatṛa varṇā na vartante vivekāś tatra nocyste ||

'When all things are without generation, there is no room for the appellations 'eternal' and 'non-eternal'; for where words fail discrimination cannot be expressed.'

The following may be cited here :

yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate |
yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate||

CŚ, XI. 25.

Now the Ācārya takes up again the *vijñānavāda* of the Buddhists showing that there is nothing but the *citta* which is the same as *vijñāna* or *manas* 'mind' that is transformed into the external world. And in doing so he shows that there is no difference whatsoever between the experiences in the waking state and those in dream, as has already been shown (II. 1-10) :

61

yathā svapne dvayābhāsam cittaṁ calati māyayā |
tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam cittaṁ calati māyayā ||¹

'As owing to illusion the mind in dream moves with the appearance of the two (*i.e.*, the subject and the object, or, in other words, the percipient and the perceived)², even so owing to illusion the mind in waking condition³ moves with the appearance of the two.'

¹ This as well as the next kārikā is the same as III. 29 and 30 respectively with a few variants.

² See IV. 72: grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam; IV. 75; Ś on III. 29, 30: grāhyagrāhakarūpeṇa dvayābhāsam. In Buddhist works in such cases the word *dvaya* is frequently used in the same meaning. For instance, advayārthena paśyati, MS, XIV. 32; dvayagrāhavisamyuktam grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhavisam-yogāt, advayārthenātī agrāhyagrāhakārthena, *Ibid*, p. 94. See II. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 62, 72, 75, 87.

³ The word *jāgrad* is to be taken here in the locative case. See IV. 39, note and 62.⁴

62

advayam ca dvayābhāsam cittam svapne na saṃśayah ।
advayam ca dvayābhāsam cittam jāgrān na saṃśayah ॥

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two, even so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two.'¹

See III. 30.

¹ See IV. 61, notes.

63, 64

svapnadṛk pracaran svapne dīksu vai daśasu sthitān ।
aṇḍajān svedajān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā ॥

svapnadṛk citta dṛśyās te na vidyante tataḥ pṛthak ।
tathā taddṛśyam¹ evedam svapnadṛk cittaṁ isyate ॥²

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a dreamer moving in dream sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) to the mind of the dreamer, and do not exist apart from it (i.e., mind); and this which is visible only to it (i.e., the mind) is to be accepted (lit. wished) as the mind of the dreamer.'

¹ See IV. 77.

² See IV. 65, 66.

65, 66

carañ jāgarite jāgrad dīkṣu vai daśasu sthitān |
aṇḍajān svedajān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā ||

jāgraccittekṣanīyās te na vidyante tataḥ pṛthak |
tathā taddr̄syam evedam jāgrataś cittam iṣyate ||¹

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a waking one moving about in the state of wakefulness sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) by the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it (i.e., the mind of the waking one); and this which is visible only to it (i.e., the mind of the waking one) is to be accepted as the mind of the waking one.'

In these four kārikās (IV. 63-66) it is said that whatever one sees in the waking state is nothing but one's *citta* 'mind', just as the things in one's dream. This view has repeatedly been expressed among others in LA, and specially in its Chapter X where the Buddha is reported to have said again and again that all the phenomena are *citta* (X. 483, 484, 692) : *cittamātram vadāmy aham* 'I say (all this is) only *citta*.' ²

The word *cittadr̄syā* here (IV. 64) and elsewhere (IV. 28, 36, 77) of which the equivalent is *cittekkṣanīya* (IV. 66) is found in frequent use in LA, pp. 56 (four times), 79, 84 (twice), 93, 94, 186 (twice), 338 (twice), etc.

¹ See IV. 63, 64.

² See also X. 101 :

svacittābhinivesena cittam vai sampravartate |
bahirdhā nāsti vai dīsyam ato vai cittamātrakam ||

67

ubhe hy anyonyadṛṣye te kim tad astiti cocyate |
lakṣaṇaśūnyam ubhayam tanmatenaiva gṛhyate ||

'You say that the cognition of both of them is dependent on each other, but you do not say what remains then. Both of them have no characteristics; yet they are cognized owing to their (previous) thought.'

In the text *ubha* and *ubhaya* refer to 'mind' (*citta*) and *jīvas* or objects in general referred to in the preceding kārikās. Their cognition depends on each other; for no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object.¹ So they are interdependent in this respect. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing, and as such they have no characteristics and yet they are cognized owing to our previously existing thoughts of them.

The following may be quoted on this point :

atītaṁ subhūte cittam nopalabhyate. anāgataṁ cittam nopalabhyate. pratyutpannam cittam nopalabhyate. VC, 39.

uktam ca lokanāthena cittam cittam na paśyati |
na cchinatti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manah ||

BA, IX. 17-18.

sa cittam gaveṣayamāṇo nādhyātmaṁ cittam samanupaśyati na bahirdhā cittam samanupaśyati na skandheṣu cittam samanupaśyati. na dhātuṣu cittam samanupaśyati. nāyataneṣu cittam samanupaśyati. sa cittam asamanupaśyaṁs cittadhārāṁ paryeṣate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. ālambane sati cittam utpadyate. tat kim anyat cittam anyad ālambanain. atha yad

¹ Ś writes : na hi ghaṭamatīm pratyākhyāya ghaṭo gṛhyate nāpi ghaṭam pratyākhyāya ghaṭamatih. tanmatenaiva taccittatayaiva.

evālambanam tad eva cittam. yadi tāvad anyad ālambanam anyac cittam tad dvicittatā bhaviṣyati. atha yad evālambanam tad eva cittam, tat katham cittam cittam paśyati. na hi cittam cittam samanupaśyati. tad yathā no tayevāsidhārayā saivāsidhārā śakyate chettum. na tenaivāngulyagreṇa tad evāngulyagram spraṣṭum śakyate. evam eva tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam draṣṭum iti vistarah.

Āryaratnacūdasūtra quoted in BAP, pp. 392-393 ;
MV, pp. 62-63 ; SS, p. 235.

For *lakṣaṇāśūnya* which is the same as *lakṣaṇa*° in meaning see the following :

yad dhi cittam mahāmate na nityam nānityam na kāryam na kāraṇam na saṃskṛtam nāsaṃskṛtam° na lakṣyam na lakṣaṇam° tad vāñmātram° tad anutpannam yad anutpannam tad aniruddham° ākāśasamam°. tatredam ucyate

pramāṇendriyanirmuktam na kāryam nāpi kāraṇam |
buddhiboddhavyarahitaṁ lakṣyalakṣaṇavarjitam ||

LA, pp. 189-190.

tasmān na vidyate lakṣyam lakṣaṇam naiva vidyate |
lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto bhāvo 'pi naiva vidyate ||

MK, V. 5.

upāyadeśanā mahyaṁ nāham deśemi lakṣaṇam |
bālā gṛhṇanti bhāvena lakṣaṇam lakṣyam eva ca ||

LA, X. 21.

lakṣyalakṣaṇavarjitam.

Op. cit., X-224.

68-70

yathā svapnamayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

yathā nirmitako jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca |
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ||

‘As a creature formed of dream, or made of illusion or supernatural power (*nirmitaka*¹) takes birth and dies, even so all those creatures exist and do not exist.’

The word *nirmita* or *nirmitaka* in the above sense is frequently used mainly in Buddhist works. Among many others the following may be quoted here :

nirmītopamāḥ pratibimbopamāḥ sarvadharmaḥ jñātavyāḥ.
SR, p. 27.

acintiyān nirmita nirminotyā-
deśeti dharmāṇ bahu prāṇakoṭināṇ |

Ibid., p. 23.

yathā nirmitakāṇ śāstā nirmimītardhisampadā |
nirmito nirmimītānyāṇ sa ca nirmitakah punaḥ ||²
tathā nirmitakākāraḥ kartā yat karma tat kṛtaṇ |
tad yathā nirmitenānyo nirmito nirmitas tathā ||

MK, XVII. 31-32.

ekasmīm bhāṣamānasmīm sabbe bhāṣanti nimmitā |
ekasmīm tuṇhīm āśine sabbe tuṇhī bhavanti ca ||

DN, II. 212.

¹ S. says nirmitako mantrauṣadhyādibhir abhinispāditāḥ ‘created by incantation, herbs, etc.’

² Cf. *Śūnyatāsaptati* as quoted by Poussin in a note on MV, p. 330,

The following is the Sanskrit version :

'ekasya bhāṣamāṇasya sarve bhāṣanti nirmitāḥ |
ekasya tūṣṇīmbhūtasya sarve tūṣṇīṁ bhavanti ca ||

Quoted as in *Āgama* in MV, p. 331; DA, p. 166;
AKV,¹ p. 2

See *Āryaratnakūṭasūtra* quoted in MV, pp. 336 ff.
Āryagaganagañjasūtra quoted in SS, p. 270; BA, V. 57. Cf.
the *nimāṇakāya* of a Buddha. Poussin : *The Three Bodies
of a Buddha*, JRAS, 1906, (Oct.) ; JA, 1913, pp. 581 ff.
ERE, Vol. 9, pp. 852-853.

The use of such words as *nirmāṇa*, *nirmāṇakāya*, and
nirmāṇacitta occurs also in the Yoga system (YS, IV. 4, 5 with
scholiasts).

The use of the word *nirmāṇa* in almost the same sense
can, however, be traced back to Upaniṣadic texts :

sa yatra prasvapity asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrām upādāy
svayaṁ vihatya svayaṁ nirmāya° prasvapiti. BU, IV. 3, 9.

ya eṣa supteṣu jāgarfi kāmaṇi kāmaṇi puruṣo nirmimāṇah
KU, V.

It appears, however, that it is the Buddhists who first used
the word in that definite sense.

Now having thus established his thesis the author asserts
his conclusion in the following kārikā, which is already found
once more (III. 48) :

na kaścij jāyate jīvah¹ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate |
etat tad uttamam̄ satyam̄² yatra kiñcīn na jāyate ||

¹ Cf. SR quoted in MV, p. 109 : na hi kaści jāyati na ca mriyate.

² For the wording cf. etat tu paramam̄ satyam̄, MV, p. 120.

'No Jīva of any kind takes birth, nor is there any possibility of it. It is that highest truth in which nothing originates.'

See III. 48.

Now it is affirmed in the next kārikā that the world consisting of the subject and the object has no reality at all, it being the creation of the movement of mind which in fact has no object at all, and as such it is held to be always free from any sort of attachment or relationship to an object (*asaṅga*) :

72

cittaspanditam evedam grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam |
cittam nirviśayam nityam asaṅgam tēna kīrttitam ||

This duality which consists of the subject and the object (lit. the perceiver and the perceptible) is only the vibration of the *citta* 'mind'. *citta* has no object, therefore it is said to be always *asaṅga* 'having no attachment (or relation to an object).'

See IV. 79 (*nīḥsaṅga*). Cf. *anābhāsa* (= *nirābhāsa*), III. 46; IV. 48.

As regards *asaṅga* see LA, p. 157 : *asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam viśayavaicitryasaṅgalakṣaṇam vijñānam*, *asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānam*, *aprāptilakṣaṇam jñānam*.

The following lines also from the LA may be cited here :

cittamātram idam sarvam dvidhā cittam pravartate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmiyam na vidyate ||
brahmādisthāna(?)paryantam cittamātram vadāmy aham |
cittamātravīnirmuktam brahmādir nopalabhyate ||

cittamātram na dṛṣyo'sti dvividhā cittam hi dṛṣyate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena sāsvatocchedavavarjitaṁ ||

III. 65.

grāhyagrāhakabhāvena cittam namati dehinām |
dṛṣyasya lakṣaṇam nāsti yathā bālair vikalpyate ||

X. 58.

taraṅgā hy udadher yadvat pavanapratyeritāḥ |
nityamānāḥ pravartante vyucchedaś ca na vidyate ||
ālayaughas tathā nityam viṣayapavaneritāḥ |
citrais taraṅgavijñānair nityamānāḥ pravartate ||

II. 99; 100 ; X. 56, 57.

Cf. (i) spandāspandasvabhāvam hi cintmātram iha vidyate |
khe vāta iva tat spandāt sollāsam sāntam anyathā ||

cittvam (?) cittam bhāvitam sāt spanda ity ucyate budhaiḥ |
dṛṣyatvābhāvitam caitad aspandanam iti smṛtam ||

spandāt sphurati citsargo niḥspandād brahma sāsvatam |
jīvakāraṇakarmādyā cītpandasyābhidhā smṛtā ||

YV, III. 67. 6-8.

(ii) svabhāvād vyatiriktam tu na cittasyāsti cetanam |
spandād ṣṭe yathā vāyor antah kiṃ nāma cetyate ||

Op. cit., III. 66. 16.

Having shown that the duality consisting of the subject and the object is the creation of mind the author says in the next kārikā that its existence is only in empirical (*samvṛtti*) and not in absolute (*paramārtha*) truth. For a thing which is

dependent (*paratantra*) for its existence may exist in empirical and not in absolute truth:

73

yo 'sti kalpitasaṁvṛtyā paramārthena nāsty asau |
paratantro¹ 'bhisaṁvṛtyā syān nāsti paramārthataḥ ||

'Whatever exists in empirical truth (*samvṛti*) which is imagined (*kalpita*) does not exist in absolute truth (*paramārtha*), for one that is dependent (*paratantra*, for its existence or origination) may exist (only) in empirical truth which is the cause (of existence or origination), and not in absolute truth.'

For the first half of the kārikā see IV. 57a and 58a-b.

¹ Here the actual reading in all the editions and MSS. examined is *paratantrābhi*^o and not *paratantro'bhi*^o as given above. The reading in c of the next kārikā (74), too, is *paratantrābhi*^o in all of them excepting the MS. k of the Anandashram edition and the edition of Maheśacandra Pāla, both of which read here *paratantro'bhi*^o. As the sense requires and is supported by Buddhist works, as we shall presently see, the genuine reading here in the kārikā (73) must be *paratantro'bhi*^o (See the discussion in the body). Here *abhisamvṛti* in this kārikā (73) in meaning is, as appears to me, nothing but *abhiniṣpatti samvṛti* in kārikā 74. Now *abhiniṣpatti samvṛti* means *samvṛti* which is the cause of existence, or appearance of things (*abhiniṣpadyate 'nayā*). One should therefore read *paratantro'bhi*^o in 73 in accordance with the reading in 74. Otherwise the kārikās cannot properly be explained. One can hardly follow S who explains *paratantrābhisaṁvṛtyā* as *paraśūstravyavahāreṇa* and *paratantrābhiniṣpatyā* as *paraśūstrasiddhim apēkṣya* in 73 and 74 respectively. Whether one can read *hi* for *bhi* in c of the present kārikā may also be considered.

It follows from what is said above that a thing is to be regarded as having no origination (*aja*). Our author, however, says that this assertion can be made only so far as the empirical truth is concerned, but in absolute truth even this is not possible,

for a dependent thing comes into being only in empirical truth :

74

ajaḥ kalpitasaṃvṛtyā paramārthena nāpyajah ।
paratantro’bhiniṣpattyā samvṛtyā jāyate tu sah ॥

‘One (held) to be unborn (*aja*) is so in empirical truth which is imagined, but in absolute truth it is even not unborn; for that which is dependent comes into being in empirical truth, the cause of appearance.’

The words *samvṛti* and *paratantra* in kārikās 73. and 74 are very important and require some explanation. The first of them has, however, already been discussed above (IV. 56, 57) to some extent and the following may be added thereto. In the Mādhyamika system as in the school of Vedānta *samvṛti satya* is called also *vyavahāra* or *vyāvahārika* ('practical') *satya*. The two kinds of truth, *samvṛti*, or *vyavahāra* or *vyāvahārika* and *paramārtha* are regarded in Buddhism as the means (*upāya*) and the end (*upeya*) respectively.¹

¹ MA, VI. 80 quoted in BAP, p. 372 :

upāyabhūtam vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtam paramārthasatyam ।

See also MK, XXIV. 20 :

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate ।

paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamaye ॥

In Pali Buddhism *samvṛti satya* is *sammuti sacca* (Skt. *sammati satya*) ‘truth by general consent’. Poussin writes (JA, 1903, Tome II, p. 302) : “vérite conferme à l’assentiment universel mais erroné” ('truth conformed to universal assent but erroneous'). The literal meaning of the word *samvṛti* is that by which (the true nature of a thing) is ‘covered’ (*svabhāvā-*

varanāt) and it is regarded as truth because it brings to light what is covered (*āyataprakāśanāt*). See IV. 57, and BAP on IX. 2 (p. 352). The following may be quoted here from MA, VI. 23 as cited in BAP, p. 361:

samyagmīśādarśanalabdhabhāvam
rūpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ]
samyagdīśāṁ yo viśayah sa tattvam
mīśādīśāṁ samyutisatyam uktam ||

Now as regards *paratantra* ‘dependent’ it has a special significance as evident from Buddhist sources. In Buddhism there are three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) or natures (*svabhāva*) of a thing, viz., (i) *parikalpiṭa* ‘imagined’. (ii) *paratantra* ‘dependent’, and (iii) *parinīpanna* ‘perfect’.¹ Sometimes they are briefly called (i) *kalpiṭa*, (ii) *tantra*, and (iii) *nīpanna* respectively.² Any object, for instance, an elephant, according to Mādhyamikas or Yogācāras is *sūnya* or merely a creation of mind, yet we know it as a particular object. This characteristic of it is an imagined one (*parikalpiṭa*). Now the notion or imagination of the object depends for its being on its cause (or cause and conditions, *hetu-pratiyaya*), and so the characteristic is called *paratantra* (= *pratītyasamutpāna*). That the object is in fact always devoid of the imagined characteristics referred to above is *parinīpanna*. It is so also because there

MV¹, LXXXVII; Tk, 39; TSN, 1 :

kalpitāḥ paratantrāḥ ca parinīpanna eva ca |
trayah svabhāvā dhīraṇāṁ gambhirajñeyam iṣyate ||

MVST, I. 6 :

kalpitāḥ paratantrāḥ ca parinīpanna eva ca |

LA, X. 374 :

buddhyā vivecyamānām hi na tartram nēpi kalpitām |
nīpanno nāsti vei bhāvāḥ kathām buddhyā prakalpyate ||

is perfect invariance or because it is free from any change.³ They are called 'nature' (*svabhāva*) owing to such practice of the people though in fact they do not exist.⁴ V a s u b a n d h u gives here an example in his TSN, 27, 28: Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one's spell. There the elephant appears, but there is only the form of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the elephant is *parikalpita*; the form of the elephant is *paratantra*, and the absence of the elephant is *pariniṣpanna*.⁵

Of these three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas*⁶ the first, *parikalpita*, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedānta of Ś

³ Tk, 40: *avikārapariniṣpatyā sa pariniṣpannah* ; MVBT, p. 19 : *tasyā-*
sāṃskṛtatvān nirvikāratvena pariniṣpannatvāt.

⁴ Writes S th i r a m a t i in MVBT, p. 19: *sa punar dravyato 'sann api*
vyavahārato 'stī svabhāva ucyate.

⁵ *māyākṛtam mantravaśat khyāti hastyātmanā yathā |*
ākāramātram tatrāsti hastī nāstī tu sarvathā ||
svabhāvah kalpito hastī paratantras tadākṛtiḥ |
yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate ||

Cf. MSA, XI. 19 :

tadākṛtiḥ ca tatrāsti tadbhāvaś ca na vidyate |

⁶ For easy reference the following may be quoted here:

Tk. p. 39:

yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate |
parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate || 20

(This is based on LA, p. 163: *yat punar uktaṁ bhagavatā yena yena*
vikalpena ye ye bhāvā vikalpyante na hi sa teṣām svabhāvo bhavati parikalpita
evāsau.)

S th i r a m a t i : *ādhyātmikabāhyavikalpyavastubhedena vikalpānām*
ānantyām pradarśayann āha y e n a y e n a v i k a l p e n e t i . y a d y a d v a s t u
v i k a l p y a t e . *ādhyātmikām bāhyām vāntaśo yāvad buddhadharmaḥ api.*
p a r i k a l p i t a e v ā s a u s v a b h ā v a i t y a t r a kāraṇam āha na sa
v i d y a t a i t i y a d v a s t u v i k a l p a v i s y a s t a d y a s māt sattvābhāvān na v i d y a t e
t a s m ā d t a d v a s t u p a r i k a l p i t a s v a b h ā v a m e v a n a h e t u p r a t y a y a p r a t i b a d d h a
s v a b h ā v a m . *p a r i k a l p i t a n a n t a r a m p a r a t a n t r a s v a b h ā v o v a k t a v y a i t y a t a ā h a*
p a r a t a n t r a s v a b h ā v a s t u v i k a l p a h p r a t y a y o d b h a v a h |

with *prātibhāsika satya* 'the truth that exists only in appearance'; as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string; *paratantra* with *vyāvahārika satya* 'the practical truth' (this is called by the Buddhists *sāmūr̄ti* 'pertaining to *samūr̄ti*', or *vyavahāra satya*), the phenomena in the waking state are its examples; and *pariniśpanna* with *pāramārthika satya* 'supreme or transcendental truth', e.g., Brahman of the Vedāntins.⁷

S th i r a m a t i : atra vikalpa iti paratantrasvabhāvam āha. pratyod-
bhava ity anenāpi paratantrābhidhānaḥ rāvītinimittam āha.* parair
hetupratyayaais tantryata utpādyata iti paratantra ity arthaḥ. (As the
sense requires the order of the last four words is slightly changed.
See MVBT, p. 19: grāhyam grāhakam ca svabhāvaśūnyatvād abhūtam apy
astīti parikalpyata iti parikalpita ity ucyate. sa punar dravyato 'eann api
vyavahārato 'stīti svabhāva ucyate. paratantrāḥ paravaśo hetupratyaya-
pratibaddhajanmakatvāt. p. 20: parair hetupratyayaais tantryate janyate
na tu svayaṁ bhavatīti paratantrāḥ.) svato'nyahetupratyayapratibaddhā-
tmalābha ity uktam bhavati. uktāḥ paratantrāḥ. pariniśpannah kātham ity
ata āha

niśpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā || 21

(MVBT, p. 19:

kalpitena svabhāvēna tasya yātyantaśūnyatā |
svabhāvah pariniśpanno 'vikalpajñānagocaraḥ ||

V a s u b a n d h u says on the point, *Op. cit.*, p. 20: grāhyagrāhak-
bhāvah pariniśpannah. In TSN, 3 *sadā rahitatā* of Tk. 21, and *atyantaśūnyatā*
of MVBT referred to above are expressed by *sadā 'vidyamānatā'*)

S th i r a m a t i : avikārapariniśpattyā sa pariniśpannah. tasyeti para-
tantrasya pūrveṇeti parikalpitena. tasmin vikalpe grāhyagrāhakabhāvah
parikalpitāḥ. tathā hi. tasmin vikalpe grāhyagrāhakatvam avidyamānam eva
parikalpyata iti parikalpitam ucyate. tena grāhyagrāhakeṇa paratantrasya
sadā sarvakālam atyanta rāhitatā yā sā pariniśpannasvabhāvah.

According to Buddhists *nirodha*, *nirvāṇa*, and *ākāśa* are the examples of
pariniśpanna.

⁷ For a detailed discussion and bibliography and sources, ancient and modern, see ViS, pp. 514-561; TSN; LA, pp. 126, 127, 169, 170, 176, etc.; MSA, VI. I, XI. 13, 38-41, XIX. 51, 78, 79; SNS, VI.

It is to be noted that *samvṛti* consists in *parikalpita* and *paratantra svabhāvas* and *paramārtha* in *pariniśpanna*. Thus it is rightly said in the kārikā 73 that *paratantra* can exist only in practical truth (*samvṛti*) and not in any way in absolute truth. This is fully explained by Prajñākara mātī (in his BAP, pp. 354-355) saying that whatever comes into existence (*jāyate*) does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagrī*), and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in reality, like a shadow on a looking glass. Let the following be quoted here :

api tu hetupratyayasāmagrīm pratītya māyāvad utpadyate.
tadvai kalyato nirudhyate ca. hetupratyayasāmagrīm pratītya
jātasya parāyattālmalābhasya pratibimbasyeva kutaḥ satsva-
bhāvatā. na ca kasyacid padārthasya paramārthato hetupratyaya-
sāmagrītaḥ samutpattiḥ sambhavati.

Let us quote also the following few lines :

māyayā nirmitaṁ yac ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam |
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām ||

yad anyasannidhānena dṛṣṭaṁ na tadabhāvataḥ |
pratibimbasame tasmin kṛtrime satyatā kutaḥ ||

BA, IX. 144, 145.

yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto
na tasya utpādu sabhāvato'sti |
yaḥ pratyayādhīnu sa śūnya ukto
yaḥ śūnyatām jānati so 'pramattaḥ ||

Anvavataptahradāpasamkramanāsūtra
quoted in BAP, loc. cit. and MV, p. 239.

The subject under discussion is that nothing originates (etat tad uttamaṁ satyaṁ yatra kiñcīn na jāyate, III. 48, IV. 71). It has been shown in establishing it that the notion of origination is only in empirical reality and not in absolute reality in which we cannot assert the existence of even a thing that is without origination. The author now says in the next kārikā

that the notion of origination is due to a strong adherence (*abhiniveśa*) to the unreal (*abhūta*) referring hereby to the two (*dvaya*), i.e., the percipient and the perceptible (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*):

75

abhūtābhiniveśo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate |
dvayābhāvam sa buddhvaiva nirnimitto na jāyate ||

'There is a strong adherence to what has not been (*abhūta*¹), for the two² are not there. Just when he understands the non-existence of the two it goes beyond the range of its cause and does not come into being.'³

The cause of origination is *abhūtābhiniveśa*. When one clearly understands the true nature of the two which have no existence at all that *abhiniveśa* goes away and consequently the notion of origination does not arise.

S explains the word *he* (*sah*) in the original (c) in the following way : *dvayābhāvam buddhvā nirnimitto nivṛttamithyādvayābhiniveśo yaḥ sa na jāyate*—'He who having understood the absence of the two is beyond the cause and (thus) whose strong adherence to the two which are false has turned back, is not born.'

This explanation does not appear to be proper when one reads the karikā under discussion with the kārikā IV. 79, where the same phrase (*dvayābhāvam sa buddhvaiwa*, 75) occurs once more with a slight variation (*vastvabhāvam* for *dvayābhāvam*), there being no difference of meaning (*vastvabhāva*=*dvayābhāva*—S). Let the kārikā be quoted here :

abhūtābhinivesād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate |
vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiwa niḥsaṅgam vinivartate ||

¹ That is, 'unreal,' referring to the two (*dvaya*) that follows.

² The percipient and the perceptible (*grāhya-grāhaka*), see IV. 72.

³ See IV. 79.

How is it to be explained? The meaning is simple and clear. It says that it is only owing to one's persistent belief in unreality that it (*citta* 'mind') goes onward to a similar object (i.e., the mind relates itself to an unreal object), but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it becomes free from contact and turns back.

But here is a difficulty regarding grammar. In accordance with Pāṇini, III. 4. 21, the agent (*kartṛ*) of both the verbs *buddhvā* and *vinivartate* in the second half of the kārikā must be the same; but the fact is not so, for the agent of the former is *sah*, while that of the latter is *tat* in the first half.

This anomaly is however found in writings even of such great poets as Kālidāsa. He writes in his *Raghuvamśa*, I. 77 :

matprasūtim anārādhyā prajeti tvām śāśāpa sā |⁴

In defence of Pāṇini, or in other words, to meet the difficulty arising from his rule later grammarians say that such words as *sthita* and the like are to be understood in such cases, so that there may be the same agent of the verbs used.⁵

The use of the gerund in the Vedic language in this respect is not so strict as in the classical Sanskrit that follows Pāṇini. See the following sentences in which the verbs have different agents: *striyam dṛṣṭāya kitavam tatāpa* 'having seen

⁴ Mallinātha attempts to explain it away taking *anārādhyā* in the causative sense (*asevayitvā*). Similar instances are many:

- (i) *yaj jñātvā neha bhūyo 'nyaj jñātavyam avaśiyate* || BG, VII. 2.
- (ii) *tac ca saṃsmṛtya saṃsmṛtya rūpam atyadbhutam hareḥ* |
vismayo me mahān rājan hṛṣyāmi ca muhurmuhuḥ || BG, XVIII 77.
- (iii) *mṛtam dṛṣṭvā duḥkham bhavati*, (iv) *priyam dṛṣṭvā sukham syāt, sukham utpadyate*, etc.

⁵ See *Samksiptasāra* with Viṭṭi and Tīkā ed., Śyāmācarāṇa Kaviratna, Calcutta, 1818, B.S., Kṛdantapāda, 407; *Mugdhabodha*, ed., Subala candra Mitra, Calcutta, 1816, B.S., Sūtra, 1116; *Kalāpavygākaraṇa* with commentaries ed. Gurunātha Vidyānidhi Bhāṭṭācāryya, Calcutta, 1835 Śaka, Kṛdvīṭti, Sūtra 433.

a woman (it) pains a gambler' (RV, X. 34. 11). Similar uses are found also in the Brāhmaṇas. The following is from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* : te paśava oṣadhir jagdhvā apaḥ pītvā tata eṣa rasah saṁ bhavati 'the beasts having eaten the plants and drunk water—then the vital sap arises.'

Following this the line under discussion (IV. 79) would be explained by a grammarian thus : sa (yadā) vastvabhāvam buddhvaiwa (bhavati tadā) tan niḥsaṅgam vinivartate,—'just when he understands the absence of things it (mind) turns back being free from relation'. Now in the kārikā (79) the word *sa(h)* must refer to one (understood) whose *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* is stated.

In the same way, I think, the kārikā 75, too, should be explained : It is the *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* itself and not the person whose *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* is alluded to, that does not arise (*jāyate*).⁶

Naturally one has a persistent belief in the *abhūta* or unreal things, i.e., the percipient and the perceptible which have, in fact, no existence at all. So when one clearly understands their non-existence there is no room for that persistent belief to come into being.

Now, as regards *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* compare *abhūtāparikalpa* of the Buddhists. We read the following in the LA, pp. 149-150 :

abhūtāparikalpa 'bhūtāparikalpa iti bhagavann ucyate. katamasyaitad bhagavan dharmasyādhivacanāt yad utābhūtāparikalpa iti kiṁ vā prativikalpayann abhūtāparikalpo bhavati. bhagavān āha sādhu sādhu mahāmate° nṛṇām grāhyagrāhakābhiniṣeṣābhiniṣiṭānām ca° bāhyavicitrārthopalambhābhiniṣeṣāc cittacaittakalāpo vikalpasamśabditaḥ pravartamānah pravartata ātmātmīyābhiniṣeṣāt.

⁶ Or one may take here *nirnimitto na jāyate* with reference to *yo 'sti kalpita* (IV. 73) and it may be explained saying that which is or originates in the empirical truth does not do so when one has no notion of the two (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*), there being no cause (*nirnimitta*) for origination.

The *abhūtābhiniṣeṣa* in our work (IV. 75, 79) is, in fact *abhūta-parikalpa* of the Yogācāras. See the following line in the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* (l. 2^{a-b}) of Maitreyanātha:

· abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate |⁷

From this it is perfectly clear that the first half of our kārikā under discussion is in reality taken from Maitreyanātha.

The word *nimitta* in *nirnimitta* ‘devoid of *nimitta*’ has special sense in Buddhist literature. There is a very common phrase: na nimittagrāhi bhavati, Pali °ggāhi hoti, DS_ṇ, § 1345-6. It means that when a *nimitta* ‘specific appearance’ of a thing is grasped in the way such as a male, a female, pleasant, etc., a man is entangled in various worldly troubles and so it is advised that he should not be a *nimittagrāhi* ‘grasper of *nimittas*.’ As the specific appearances are the causes of attachment, aversion, and delusion (*rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *moha*) they are called *nimittas*.⁸ See AS, p. 400.

This special meaning seems not to have been intended in the present case. We may take the word here as well as in IV. 7 and 78 in the sense of ‘objective cause’ which is expressed by the word *artha* in IV. 24.

Having said as to how that persistent belief disappears, the author proceeds to discuss in the following kārikās how the non-origination (*anutpatti*) of mind is effected which is to be realized:

⁷ MVBT, pp. 9 ff. On b of the kārikā Sthiramati writes: svātmā avidyamānenā grāhyagrāhakāreṇa prakhyāte [na vyaktam bhrāntirūpatvam].

⁸ AKV as quoted in DS, p. 41: nimittam vastuno 'vasthāviṣeso nilatvādiḥ Tr., p. 21, l. 3: nimittam tad- (referring to *vिषया*) viṣeso nilapitādyālambana vyavasthākaraṇam. See AS, pp. 291, 308.

⁹ AS, p. 400: itthipurisanimittam vā subhanimittādikam vā kilesavatthubhūta nimittam.

76

yadā na labhate hetūn uttamādhamamadhyamān !
tadā na jāyate cittam̄ hetvabhāve phalam̄ kutah !

'When the mind does not have any cause, superior, inferior, or middle, it does not originate ; for how is there the effect in the absence of the cause?'

Here *hetu* is nothing but *nimitta* in the preceding kārikā. See IV. 77-78.

77

animittasya cittasya yānutpattiḥ samādvayā !
ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadrśyam̄ hi tad yataḥ !

This kārikā seems to have been handed down defectively. For, evidently in the first half the sentence is not complete, as the conjunctive pronoun *yad* (in feminine *yā*) requires the pronoun *tad* in feminine (in any case-ending), but it is not to be found in either of the two halves. Nor is there the antecedent of *tad* in the second half which clearly shows to have supported something stated before. But what is it? The explanation of Ś appears to be far-fetched and far from satisfactory, nor has he explained the word *tad* which has altogether been overlooked. It seems to me, therefore, that the above two lines are taken by mistake from two different kārikās of which the other two lines are lost. I leave the present kārikā, as it is before us, untranslated, as it does not give any complete sense, so far as I can understand. The first half may, however, be explained thus :

The non-origination (*anutpatti*) of the causeless (*animitta*)¹ mind (*citta*) is the same (*samā*, i.e., unconditioned—always in the same condition) and free from the two (*advaya*, i.e.,

See IV. 75.

free from the notion of the *grāhya* 'receptible', and the *grāhaka* 'recipient').

See kārikā IV. 80. For the word *sama* or *sāmya* see III. 2, 38 IV. 80, 93, 95, 100 with the author's explanation; and MuU, II 1. 3. cf. BG, V. 19 : *nirdoṣam hi samaṁ brahma*. See MV, p. 374-75 : *mañjuśrī āha. paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānupṭā samatayā paramārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājātisamatayā paramārthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*.

For *cittadṛṣya* in the second half see III. 31, IV. 28, 36.

78

buddhvā 'nimittatām satyām hetum pṛthag anāpnuvat¹ |
vītaśokam tadā 'kāmam abhayam padam aśnute ||

'When one understands its² true state of causelessness it (*citta*) does not have any other cause,⁴ and as such reaches then a position⁵ which is free from sorrow, desire, and fear.'

I read with MS. D² *anāpnuvat* for *anāpnuvan* in editor and other MSS., construing it with *citta* referred to in the preceding kārikā (77). It is to be noted that it is *citta* that is referred to in kārikās IV. 76-80. In kārikā 79 the pronoun *ta* refers to *citta*, as says Ś, too, expressly. One may naturally expect to have its mention or reference also in the present kārikā. To introduce a person who reaches the position is rather abrupt. It is also to be considered that it is *citta* and not the person that is concerned with the cause or causes (IV. 76).

In this case the grammatical difficulty is to be removed as in IV. 75.

¹ See the Variants.

² That is, of the *citta* 'mind.' See IV. 25, 26, 27, 75, 77.

³ That is, the state of being without the objective cause.

⁴ See IV. 76.

⁵ *pada=sṭhiti*, IV. 80.

Accepting the reading *anāpnūvan* the kārikā may be translated thus :

'Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear.'

79

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate |
vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiya niḥsaṅgam vinivartate ||

'Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity.'

The word *sadṛśa* means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief. *niḥsaṅga* means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object.

For c one is referred to IV. 75. See III. 45; IV. 72, 75, 96, 99.

80

nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya niścalā hi tadā sthitih |
viṣayah sa hi buddhānām tat sāmyam ajam advayam ||

'At that time when (the *citta*) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to (its object), its position is firm (*i.e.*, unwavering in the least). That is the field of activity of the Buddhas,¹ and that is the same,² unborn, and free from the two.'³

¹ Cf. III. 34: *pracāraḥ* sa tu *vijñeyah*.

² See III. 2, 38. See also Vch, p. 41: *api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte samāḥ* sa *dharma* na tatra kaścid *viṣamaḥ*. *tenocaye 'nuttarasamyaksambodhiḥ*. *nirātmatvena niḥsattvatvena nirjīvatvena niṣpudgalatvena samā sānuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ*.

³ The perceptible and the percipient (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*).

In c *viśaya* may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge.

See III. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the *summum bonum* of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call *nirodha* or *nirvāṇa* and *brahman* respectively. The Vedāntist commentator, Ś, writes here very clearly that this state of mind is *brahman*:

cittasya niścalā calanavarjītā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthitir
yaiṣā brahmasvarūpā sthitīś cittasyādvayavijñānaikarasaghana-
lakṣaṇā.

And again on IV. 77 he says :

animittasya cittasyeti yā mokṣākhyānupattih.⁴

That this state of *citta* is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works :

cittamātram nirābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmi ca |
etad dhi bhāṣitam buddhair bhāṣante bhāṣayanti ca ||

LA, X. 105.

arthābhāse ca vijñāne jñānam tathatāgocaram |
parāvṛttam nirābhāsam āryāṇām gocaro hy asau ||

Op. Cit., X. 148.

This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works : vijñaptimātratāyām cittam avasthitam bhavati. Tk., p. 43.

For the wording of c (*viśayaḥ sa hi buddhānām*) see CS, p. 497 : *viśayaḥ sa hi buddhānām*; V_k, p. 6 : *yo buddhānām viśayaḥ*; p. 11 : *buddhagocaraḥ*; SSP, p. 120, *5a : *yatpramāṇo buddhaviśayaḥ*; MSA, XX-XXI. 26 : *buddhānām viśayād api*; LA, III. 80 : *āryāṇām gocaro yathā*.

⁴ See cittam pravartate citram cittam eva vimucyate |
cittam hi jāyate nānyac cittam eva nitudhyate || Op. Cit., X. 145.

This state of mind to which the Buddhas aspire is further described in the following kārikā :

81

ajam anidram asvapnam prabhātam bhavati svayam |
sakṛd vibhāti hy evaīsa dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ ||

See III. 36.

'It shines forth itself having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream. Indeed, this object (*dharma*), the fundamental element (*dhātu*), is naturally illumined once for all.'

The word *dharma* in the second half of the kārikā may be taken in its general sense, an element of existence, an object, thing. But considering the views of the Yogācāras, and specially what Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati have said in describing this state of mind¹ it is to be taken in the sense of a special kind of *dharma*, i.e., āśrayaparāvṛtti 'revolution or change of the recipient (i.e., ālayavijñāna which is the seed of all, sarvabijaka).'²

A few words are here required with regard to the reading *dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ*. This reading is found in some of

¹ See Tk, pp. 43.44: yadaivam vijñaptimātratāyām cittam avasthitam bhavati tadā kathām vyapadiṣyata ity āha :

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānam lokottaram ca tat |
āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ || 29
sa evānāsravo dhātūr anityaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ |
sukho vimuktikāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yam mahāmuneḥ || 30

² For *parāvṛtti* in āśrayaparāvṛtti we have sometimes *parivṛtti* or *parivartana* (Tib. gnas. gyur. pa, or gnas. yoñis. gyur. pa, or gshan. du. gyur. pa. See Tib. translation of Tk, Tanjur, Mdo, Śi, Fol. 190a). For āśrayaparāvṛtti see among others Tk, loc. cit.; MSA, XIX. 54; LA, p. 338; DB, App. p. 27, pp. 190ff.: tasya tathā paribhāvitam tal laukikam pariśuddham dhyānam āpāyikakleśapakṣyam duṣṭhulyam āśrayād apakarṣati. acireṇa tasya prahānād āśrayo'sya bodhisattvasya parivartate pāpakasyāpāyikasya karmano 'tyantam akaraṇatāyai apāyāgamana-tāyai ca. For its different explanation see ViS, pp. 609-612.

the MSS. of the Anandashram edition and in some others, too, examined by me, while others read *dharma dhātusva*^o. Ś accepts the latter and Ā n a n d a g i r i supports it saying *dhātusvabhāvata* ity ekam padam gr̄hitvā vyācaṣte. This implies that the reading *dhātuḥ sva*^o was also known to him. But neither of them seems to be very satisfactory and this leads the present writer to amend the reading as *dharma dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ*. The reading *dharma dhātuḥ* appears to be due to the unfamiliarity of the commentators with the significance of the word *dharma dhātu* which is quite appropriate here. Let us therefore explain the kārikā in this light.

In accordance with this reading the second half may be translated thus :

'Indeed the essence of reality (*dharma dhātu*)³ is naturally illumined once for all.'

See I. 14, 16; III. 36, 37. For c see ChU, VIII. 4. 1-2 which is the same. See also NUU, 9; MkU, 2-23.

We take the next three kārikās together. The kārikā 82 is incomplete and as such should be construed with 83.

³ The word *dharma dhātu* may be translated by 'the essence of reality.' It is devoid of the characteristics of subject and object (*viyukṭo gr̄hyagrāhaka-lakṣaṇena*) or undifferentiated into subject and object (*gr̄hyagrāhakarahaṭita*). It is a synonym for *paramārtha* or *paramārthatattva*, MVt, § XCIX. 8; Tk, p. 41, l. 26; BAP, p. 354: parama uttamo 'rthaḥ. akṛtrimāṃ vasturūpaṃ yadadhigamāt sarvāvṛtvāsanānusandhiklesaprahāṇam bhavati. sarvadharmaṇīm niḥsvabhāvata śūnyatā tathatā bhūtakotīḥ dharmadhātūr ityādiparyāyāḥ. Again, p. 421: bodhir buddhatvam ekānekaśvabhāvaviviktam anutpannā-niruddham anucchedam asāśvataṃ sarvaprapāñcaviniṁuktam ākāśapratisamāṇa dharmakāyakhyam paramārthatattvam ucyate. etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā-śūnyatā-tathatā-bhūtakotī-dharma dhātūvādiśabda-cna saṃvṛtim upādāyābhidhiyate

Writes M a i t r e y a n ā t h a 'MVBT,¹ p. 41':

tathatā bhūtakotīś cānimittaḥ pa[ramārthakah] |

dharmadhātuḥ ca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ !

ananyathāviparyāsatannirodhāryagocaraiḥ |

hetūtvāc cāryadharmaṇīm paryāyārthaḥ yathākramam i 1. 15-16.

As regards *dharma dhātu* V a s u b a n d h u says here (pp. 41-42) - āryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātuḥ. āryadharmaṇīm tadālambanaprabhavatvād. hetvarthaḥ hy atra dhātvarthaḥ (see Tk, p. 44, II. 20, 21). On the last words

82

sukham āvriyate nityam duḥkham vivriyate sadā ।
yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheṇa bhagavān asau ॥

83

asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti vā punah ।
calasthirobhayābhāvair āvṛṇoty eva bāliśah ॥

84

koṭyaś catasra etās tu grahair yāsām sadāvṛtaḥ ।
bhagavān ābhīr asprīṣṭo yena dṛṣṭaḥ sa sarvadṛḍ ॥

'It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing—whatsoever it may be,¹ by which bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one (*dharmadhātu*)—

(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and is not (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not (i.e., not both)—with these (notions) the childish obscure it (respectively² in accordance with their own ideas of its being) (i) steady,³ (ii) unsteady, (iii) both,⁴ and (iv) the absence (of both).⁵

S th i r a m a t i comments: svalakṣaṇopādāyarūpadhāraṇo 'py ayam dhātuśabdo vartata ity āha hetvartho°. The word *dhātu* also means one that supports its own particularity (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the secondary qualities of matter (*upādāya* or *bhautika rūpa*), including evidently, as observes S t c h e r b a t s k y (MVD, p. 050) also the primary qualities of matter (*mahābhūta*). *Dharmadhātu* also means the mental state considered as element (*dhātu*) owing to its ultimate reality. See Pali Text Society's Dictionary, s.v. *dhamma*; Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 254-255.

¹ This adherence is mainly four-fold as shown in the next kārikā.

² In explaining *calasthira*° in c of 83 *sthira* is to be taken first as required by the sense (*arthakrama*) even discarding the order of reading (*pāthakrama*).

³ That is, permanent.

⁴ That is, steady and unsteady.

⁵ That is, neither steady nor unsteady.

These are the four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered, but (in fact) it is not touched by them. One who realizes it is omniscient.'

In *nāsti nāstīti vā* in c of kārikā 83 take the first *na* with both *asti* and *nāsti*, as *na asti* and *na nāsti*.

These four points are maintained by four classes of disputants according to their ideas of the Absolute, as it is permanent, not permanent, both, or not both. But some of the Buddhists (Vijñānavādins and Mādhyamikas) do not subscribe to any one of these views, their point is quite free from all of them, while in the Vedānta the first point is avowedly held; e.g., KU, VI. 12 and 13:

astiti bruvato 'nyatra kathaṁ tad upalabhyate |
astity evopalabdhavyah |

TU, II. 6. 1:

asti brahmeti ced veda santam enaṁ tato viduh |

MU, IV. 4:

asti brahmeti brahmavidyāvid abravīt.

As regards the position of the Buddhists it is also very clear :

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam |
catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduh ||

S a r a h a in SS, fol. 17.⁶

kāraṇaiḥ pratyayaś cāpi yeṣāṁ lokaḥ pravartate |
cātuṣkoṭikayā yuktā na te mannayakovidāḥ || LA, III. 20.

punar aparaṁ mahāmate bālapṛthagjanā anādikālaprapāñca-
dauṣṭhulyasvaprativikalpanā nātakē nṛtyantah svāsiddhāntanaya-
deśanāyām akuśalāḥ svacittadīsyabāhyabhāvalakṣaṇābhiniViṣṭā

⁶ See Muñeon, 1903, IV, p. 389. This kārikā is widely quoted : JS, 28 ; SDS, Bauddhadarśana ; SSS, III. 7 (with the reading *na cobhābhyaṁ vilakṣaṇam* in c); catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam śūnyam tattvam iti sthitam—*Ibid*, 9; BAP, p. 359; SāS, I. 44 (V i j n ā n a b h i k s u); Cf. BJS, II. 27 (=DN I, 27).

upāyadeśanāpāṭham abhiniviśante na svasiddhāntanayaṁ cātuṣkoṭikanayaviśuddhaṁ prativibhāvayanti. LA, p. 171.

yac ca mahāmate na kāryaṁ na kāraṇam tan na san nāsat yac ca na san nāsat tac cātuṣkoṭikabāhyam. cātuṣkoṭikam ca mahāmate lokavyavahārah. *Op. cit.*, p. 188.⁷

Cf. punar aparam mahāmate catuṣṭayavinirmuktā tathā-gatānām dharmadeśanā yad utaikatvānyatvobhayānubhaya-vivarijītā nāstyastisamāropāpavādavinirmuktā satyapratitya-samutpādanirodhamārgavimokṣapravṛttipūrvakā mahāmate tathā-gatānām dharmadeśanā. *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

It is to be noted here that according to Ś the word *bhagavat* 'the glorious one' in 82d and 84c refers to *ātman*. On the following grounds, however, I think, it is the *dharmadhātu* in 81c, which is alluded to.

The subject matter here in kārikās 80-84 is the unwavering or the firm state of the mind which has turned back from and does not go onwards again to its object—the state which is *dharmadhātu* and to which aspire the Buddhas. This is further dealt with in the following two kārikās (85-86). There is, therefore, no room for *ātman* to which the word *bhagavat* may refer.

An objection may be raised here that the word *bhagavat* is used with reference to a conscious or sentient being, and as such it cannot refer to *dharmadhātu* which is nothing but the *niścalā sthiti* of the mind. One can, however, meet it in the following way. Such common phrases as *bhagavatī śrutiḥ*, *bhagavān vedāḥ*, *bhagavatī bhavitavyatā*, etc., will show that the word under discussion is employed also to non-sentient

⁷ Sometimes instead of the four points (*catuṣkoṭi*) referred to there are only first three excluding the last. See MK, I. 7, VII. 20; CS, XVI. 25; LA, p. 156. Sometimes only the first two are mentioned. See my paper, *Catuṣkoṭi*, in the *Jhā Commemoration Volume*, 1937, pp. 85 ff. where similar passages are quoted from Vedantic texts.

beings. It is found that anything, irrespective of its being sentient or otherwise, that is powerful or commands respect, regard, faith, confidence, or reverence may be referred to by *bhagavat*.

It is also to be taken into consideration that this *dharmadhātu* is in fact Brahman of the Vedāntists as shown in the clearest possible words by the author himself in III. 46 which we have already discussed. Again, the *dharmadhātu* is the same as what we understand by the word *prajñāpāramitā*.⁷ And it is very well-known that *prajñāpāramitā* is reverently mentioned with the epithet *bhagavati*. Besides, this *dharmadhātu* which is the same as *prajñāpāramitā* is nothing but *advaya jñāna*, i.e., the *jñāna* which is free from the subject and the object, and this is identified with *Tathāgata* as is evident from the following couplet from the PAS of *Dinnāga* as quoted by *Haribhadra* in his AAA, p. 28.⁸

prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayam sa tathāgataḥ |
sādhyā tādarthyayogena tācchabdyam granthamārgayoh ||

The first half of this *kārikā* is based on such old texts as the following :

cittamātrāvatāreṇa prajñā tāthāgatī matā | LA, III. 43.

See *Ibid.*, pp. 187-190 ending with *yat sarvaprapāñcātītam* sa *tathāgataḥ*. See also pp. 191 ff.⁹

⁷ See BAP, p. 421 : etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā-śūnyatā-taihitā° ādiśabdena° abhidhīyate. This passage is quoted once more. See IV. 81, note 3, p. 189.

⁸ See E. Obermiller: DPP, pp. 7, 45; SS, p. 14.

⁹ Let us quote here another passage which is very significant, though a little lengthy, from the same work, i.e., LA, pp. 191-193 :

na hi mahāmate abhāvas tāthāgatagato° kintu mahāmate manomayadharma-kāyasya tāthāgatasyaitad adhivacanam yatra (yat?) sarvatīrthakaraśīvaka-pratyekabuddhasaptabhūmipratīśhitānām avīṣayaḥ. so(yo)? 'nutpādas tāthāgatasyaitan mahāmate paryāyavacanam. tad yathā mahāmate indraḥ śakraḥ purandaraḥ hastaḥ karaḥ pāṇis tanur dehaḥ śarīram pṛthivī bhūmir vasundharā kham ākāśam gaganam ity evamādyānām bhāvānām ekaikasya bhāvasya bahavaḥ

tathatākāreṇa tathāgataṁ paśyāmy avikalpākāreṇānupalambhayogena. evam anutpādākāreṇa tathāgatam paśyāmi, yāvad abhāvākāreṇa tathāgataṁ paśyāmi.^o SŚP, p. 119.

For *Tathāgata* see also MK, XXII.

No objection can therefore be raised here with regard to the use of the word *bhagavat*.

paryāyanācakāḥ saṅkē bhavanti vikalpitā na ca iṣṭā nāmaḥahutvād bhāvabahutvām vikalpyate na ca svabhr̥ito na bhavati, evam mahāmate aham api saṅkyāt lokadhātau tribhir nāmaṣṭamkhyeyasatasahasrair bālānāt śravaṇīvabhīṣeṇāgnacchāmi taikābhilapanti mām na ca prajñānti tathāgataasyaite nāmaparyāyāt iti. tatra kecīn mahāmate tathāgatam iti mām prajñānti. kecīt svayambhuvam iti nāyakām viśayakām pariṇyakām buddham rūpīm vṛṣabham brahmaṇām (v.l. brāhmaṇām, brahmāṇam?) viśvam īvaraṇam pradhanām kapilām bhrūtāntam arīḍām neminaṇam (arīḍaneminam?) somām bhrūskaram rūmām vyūsaṇam śukaṇam indram balīṇ varuṇām iti caike samījñānti. apare 'nirodhānuprādām śūnyatām tathātām bhrūtām bhrūtakōṭīm dharmadhātuṁ nīvīḍām nityām samatām advayam anirodhām animittām pratyayaṁ buddhalēśūpadēśām vimokṣām mīrgasatyāni sarvajñām jīnaṇam manomayam iti caike samījñānti. evamēdibhir mahāmate^o mām janāḥ samījñānta uḍakacandra ivāpravījñānirgatam. na ca bāla avabudhyante dvayāntapalitayā sāntalyā.

It is said in the preceding kārikā that one, who realizes that truth, becomes omniscient. The present kārikā tells us that omniscience being realized, there is nothing that can be desired, for every desire is fulfilled thereby :

85

prāpya sarvajñatām kṛtsnām brāhmaṇyām padam advayam |
anāpannādimadhyāntām kim atah param iha te ||

'Having realized the full omniscience and (thereby) that state which is befitting a Brāhmaṇa,¹ and free from the

¹ In Buddhist literature a Brāhmaṇa is held in as much respect as a Śramaṇa, and this is evident from the well-known phrase śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa which is so frequently used. See DP, XXVI. Sometimes a true Brāhmaṇa is regarded as, or identified with a Buddha;

two,² and has no beginning, middle and end, what may one desire beyond it?'

It is to be noted that the final aim is described here to be the realization of omniscience (*sarvajñatā*, cf. *sarvākārajñatā* or *bodhi*) which can be asserted more preferably from the Buddhist point of view than from the Vedāntist.

usabham pavaram vīram mahesim vijitāvinam |
anejam nahatkam buddham tam aham brūmi brāhmaṇam ||

Op. cit., XXVI. 40.

It may be noted that according to Buddhists a Brāhmaṇa is so called because he is *vāhitapāpa* 'one whose sin is removed' (*Op. cit.*, XXVI. 6). This is, however, far-fetched. The following may be quoted here:

ye ca vāhitapāpatvād brāhmaṇah pāramārthikah |
abhyastāmalanairātmyas te muner eva śāsane ||
ihaiava śramaṇas tena caturdhā parikīrttyate |
śūnyah parapravādā hi śramaṇair brāhmaṇais tathā || TS, 3589, 3590.

K a m a l a s i l a writes on it in his *Pañjikā*: āta eva bhagavatoktam ihaiva śramaṇah ihaiva brāhmaṇah śūnyah parapravādāḥ śramaṇair brāhmaṇair iti.

² The subject and the object.

The following kārikā says that this realization of omniscience is the object of *vinaya* 'discipline' and real *śama* 'quiescence' and *dama* 'introversion' of the senses.

86

viprāṇām vinayo hy eṣa śamaḥ prākṛta ucyate |
damah prakṛtidāntatvād evam vidvān śamam vrajet ||

'This is, indeed, the discipline of the wise, and is said to be the natural quiescence, and the introversion (of the senses) owing to (their) being naturally introverted. Knowing thus one should become quiescent.'

The reality set forth in the preceding kārikās (IV. 80-86) is further described in the next three kārikās showing that that is the *lokottara* 'supra-mundane' knowledge through the realization of which one becomes omniscient :

87, 88

savastu sopalambham ca dvayam laukikam isyate ।
 avastu sopalambham ca śuddham laukikam isyate ॥

avastv anupalambham ca lokottaram iti smṛtam ।
 jñānam jñeyam ca vijñeyam sadā buddhaiḥ prakīrtitam ॥

'That which consists of the two, the object and (its) perception, is regarded as mundane ; one without the object, but with the perception is regarded as pure mundane ; while one without the object and the perception is said to be supra-mundane.— This is to be understood to be the knowledge and the knowable¹ as is always declared by the Buddhas.'

In our ordinary experience when one perceives a jar there are both the object, the jar, and its perception. This knowledge is called *laukika* 'mundane', i.e., belonging to or occurring in ordinary life. When one, however, in a higher grade of wisdom, with the clear knowledge of unreality or the imagined or imposed form of the jar, perceives it, that knowledge is with perception, but not with the object. This is called 'pure mundane', i.e., it belongs to ordinary life and is covered (*āvṛta*) ; it is pure,—'pure' because it is not so obscure as the mundane, its obscurity having been removed to a great extent. Finally when the reality is perfectly realized, when the mind rests on itself being completely suppressed (*niruddha*) there is neither the jar, nor the perception, and as such this knowledge is regarded as *lokottara* 'supra-mundane,' surpassing the ordinary life.

Of these three kinds of *jñāna*, viz., (i) *laukika*, (ii) *śuddha laukika*, and (iii) *lokottara*, the first is well-known to all and

¹ We have already (IV. I) seen that there is no difference between *jñāna* and *jñeya*. Or it may mean that whatever we may know by the terms *jñāna* and *jñeya* is only the three things mentioned in the kārikās.

is met with in every system ; and the last two are to be found in Yogācāra texts. For instance, MVT¹, p. 19 :

paratantrasvabhāvō hi śuddhalaukikagocaraḥ |

Tk, p. 40 : nirvikalpalokottarajñānadṛṣye pariniśpanne svabhāve adṛṣṭe apratividdhe asākṣātkṛte tatpr̥ṣṭhalabdhāśuddha-laukikajñānagaṇyavat̄ paratantro 'nyena jñānena na gṛhyate. na punar lokottarajñānapr̥ṣṭhalabdhēnāpi jñānena na dṛṣyate.

In LA, p. 156, these *jñānas* are found as (i) *laukika*, (ii) *lokottara*, and (iii) *lokottaratama* respectively. The difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important. The LA, p. 157, describes them very clearly in the following words which deserve here to be considered carefully :

(i) tatra laukikam jñānam sadasatpaksābhinivisṭānām sarvatīrthakarābālapīthagjanānām ca.

(ii) tatra lokottaram jñānam sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām svāsāmānyyalakṣaṇapatiṭṭasayābhinivisṭānām.

(iii) tatra lokottaratamaṁ jñānam buddhabodhisattvānām nirābhāsadharmapravicyād anirodhānuptpādarśanāt sadasat-pakṣavigataṁ tathāgatabhūminairātmyādhigamāt pravartate.²

This reality with which we are concerned here is described by V a s u b a n d h u in his Tk, verse 29 in the following words which may be quoted here :

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānam lokottaram ca tat |

S t h i r a m a t i comments :

tad anena ślokadvayena darśanamārgam ārabhyottara-viśeṣagatyā phalasampattir udbhāvitā vijñaptimātrapravīṣṭayogināḥ. tatra grāhakacittābhāvād grāhyārthānupalambhāc ca acitto

² Generally in Buddhist works things are divided into two categories, (i) *laukika*, and (ii) *lokottara* (see MV, p. 501); as for instance, all mental states are *laukika* excepting only nine, viz., four paths (*maggas*), four fruits (*maggaphalas*), and one uncompounded element (*asaṅkhatadhātu*), i.e., *nibbāna*, —these are *lokottara*. DSñ, § 1093, 1094.

'nupalambho 'sau. aparicitatvāt³ loke samudācārābhāvāt nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttīrṇam iti jñānam lokottaram ca tat.

So far as goes my information, such division of *jñāna* or *jñeyā* is not to be found in Upaniṣads.

S explains the above three kinds of *jñāna* as the conditions of (i) waking, (ii) dream, and (iii) sleep respectively (*jāgrat*, *svapna*, *susupti*).

³ The printed text reads *anucitatvāt*, but it does not give any appropriate sense. We should, therefore, read here *aparicitatvāt* with the Tibetan version which has *hṛis.par.ma.byas.pa*.

89

jñāne ca trividhe jñeye krameṇa vidite svayam |
sarvajñatā hi sarvatra bhavatiha mahādhiyah ||

'The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect.'

That the *jñāna* is *trividha* 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two kārikās. According to its function, too, it is *trividha*. We read in the LA, p. 157 :

tatra trividham jñānam svasāmānyalakṣaṇāvadhlārakam cotpāda-
vyayāvadhāraṇakāṇ cānutpādānirodhāvadhārakam ca.²

The omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) referred to is Buddhahood (*buddhatva*).³

¹ The word *mahādhī* is nothing but *dhīmat* which is a name for a Bodhisattva. See MSA, XIX. 73; MVt,¹ 627.

² As regards the nature of *jñāna* the following may be cited from LA, p. 157: asaṅgalakṣaṇam jñānam.° asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇam jñānam.° aprāptilakṣaṇam jñānam svapratyātmāryajñānagatigocaram apravesānirgamatvād udakacandravaj jalē.

³ See BAP, pp. 447-8; ASP, pp. 42-3. *Buddhatva* = *sarvajñatva* consisting in (i) *svākārajñatā*, (ii) *mārgajñatā*, and (iii) *vastujñāna*.

Ś explains *sarvajñatā* as *sarvaś cāśau jñāś ceti sarvajñah.*
tasya bhāvah sarvajñatā.

In the next kārikā the author tells his followers to understand certain things :

90

heyajñeyāpyapākyāni vijñeyāny agrayānataḥ¹ |
teṣām anyatra vijñeyād upalambhas triṣu smṛtaḥ ||

'That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the *Agrayāna*. It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known.'

The *Agrayāna* in the text is nothing but the *Mahāyāna*, as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for *Mahāyāna*.²

Now, what are we to understand by *heya*, etc.? As regards *heya* and *jñeya*, if we follow here A s a n g a, they are *paratantra* and *parikalpita svabhāvas* (see IV. 74-75) respectively.³ *Āpya* (= *prāpya*) 'attainable' implies *dharma*

¹ All the editions and MSS examined have 'yāṇa instead of 'yāna as expected.

² MSA, p. 53: piṭakatrayam sūtravinayābhidharmāḥ. tad eva trayam hīnayānāgrayānabhedena dvayam bhavati. See SP, III. I, V. 61; MSA, p. 83; SRS (R a j e n d r a l a l M i t r a's *Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal*), p. 229; LV, p. 408; VCh., pp. 30, 33. Sometimes it is also called *Sreṣṭhayāna*, Vch., p. 30.

³ Let us quote here the following from the MSA. XI. 13 (p. 58) : where *heya* and *jñeya* are explained :

tattvam yat satatam dvayena rahitam bhrāntes ca saṃniśrayah
śakyam naiva ca sarvathābhilapitum yac cāprapañcātmakam |
jñeyam heyam atho viśodhyam amalam yac ca prakṛityāmalam
yasyākāśasuvaramāvirisadīśi kleśad viśuddhi matā ||

dhātu or *dharma-dhātu* already alluded to (IV. 81),⁴ which is *pariniṣpanna*, and *pākyā* ‘to be matured’ refers to the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the Absolute. The last is not only for others, but also for one’s own self.⁵

The second half of the kārikā says that among these four things only three, i.e., *heya*, *āpya*, and *pākyā*, can be perceived, but not the *jñeya* or *vijñeya*. For it is *parikalpita* ‘imagined,’ and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it

satataṁ dvayena rahitaṁ tattvam̄ parikalpitaḥ svabhāvo grāhyagrāhaka-lakṣaṇenātyantam̄ asattvāt. bhrānteh̄ samnīśrayaḥ paratantras tena taṭpari-kalpanāt. anabhilāpyam̄ aprapañcātmakam̄ ca pariniṣpannah̄ svabhāvah̄. tatra prathamam̄ tattvam̄ pariñneyam̄ dvīśyaṁ praheyaṁ ṛtīyaṁ viśodhyam̄ cāgantukamalād viśuddham̄ ca prakṛtyā. yasya prakṛtyā viśuddhasyākāśa-suvarṇavārisadūṣī kleśād viśuddhiḥ. na hy ākāśadīni prakṛtyā aśuddhāni. na cāgantukamalāpagaṇamād eṣām̄ viśuddhir neṣyate.

⁴ MSA, XIX. 56 : prāpyam̄ dharmādhātuḥ.

⁵ MSA, XX.XXI 42 : sattvaparipākacaryā dvayor eva paripācanārthaṁ. paripācanam̄ hy atra vinayanam; XVII. 3, 22, 36; XIX. 56; DA, p. 125; BBh, p. 22. As regards the maturation of one’s own self (*ātmaparipāka*) the following may be quoted from MSA, VIII. 1 :

rucīḥ prasādaḥ praśamo ’nukampaṇā kṣamātha medhā prabalatvam eva ca |
ahāryatāṅgaiḥ samupetatā bhīṣam̄ jinātmaje tat paripākalakṣaṇam !!
rucir mahāyānadeśanādharme. prasādas taddesike. praśamaḥ kleśānām. anukampā sattveṣu. medhā grahaṇadhāraṇapratibedheṣu. prabalatvam adhigame. ahāryatā mārapravāḍibhiḥ. prāhānikāṅgaiḥ samanvāgatatvam. bhīṣam̄ iti rucyādinām adhimātratvam̄ darśayati. eṣa samāsena navaprakāra ātmaparipāko veditavyah.

See also, VIII. 11 :

iti navavidhvastupācītātmā paraparipācanayoga atām upetaḥ |
śubhamayatasatapratavardhitātmā bhavati sadā jagato ‘grabandhubhūtaḥ ||

KP, § 31 : tad yathā kāśyapa tejodhātuḥ sarvasasyāni paripārayati evam eva kāśyapa bodhisattvasya prajñā sarvasattvānām̄ sarvaśukladharmān pari-pācayati.⁶ See also the stanza which follows it.

In BBh, a whole chapter named *Paripākāpaṭala* (VI) is devoted to it giving particulars.

Cf. *lokapākti* ‘maturation of the world’ in the SB, XI. 5. 7. 1.

has no existence, it is merely an imagination, simply a word, only a name; it is not perceived, and hence there is no perception.⁶

⁶ It may be noted that sometimes five jñeyas are found (BAP, p. 447 : jñeyam pañcavidham), as says Sthiramati in MVT¹, p. 6, viz., (i) the worlds (lokadhātu), (ii) the living beings (sattva), (iii) the elements of existence (dharma), (iv) the discipline (vinaya), and (v) the means (upāya). These seem to have no connexion herewith.

In the next few kārikās the author gives some leading thoughts of the Agrayāna alluded to above:

91

prakṛtyākāśavaj jñeyāḥ sarve dharmā anādayaḥ ।
vidyate na hi nānātvam teṣāṁ kvacana kiñcana ॥

'All the elements of existence are without beginning, and by nature they are to be known like the sky. Verily they have nowhere any variety.'

For the first half of the kārikā see IV. 1, where we have already seen that things are just like the sky as said in such texts as the ASP, p. 297 : yathākāśam° already quoted there.

For the second half where it is said that there is no variety of things see the well-known Upaniṣadic texts : neha nānāsti kiñcana, BU, IV. 4. 19 ; KU, IV. 11 ; KtU, III. 8 ; NS, IV. 1. 34 ff (with Vātsyāyana). See also our own text, II. 34, IV. 94, 100.

92

ādibuddhāḥ¹ prakṛtyaiva² sarve dharmāḥ suniścitāḥ ।
yasyaivam bhavati kṣāntīḥ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate ॥

¹ See ādau buddhāḥ, IV. 98; cf. ādīśānta, IV. 93, Tib. gzod ma.nas.shi.ba, from this one is to take ādī- here for āditāḥ meaning 'from the outset.'

² See IV. 93.

'By the very nature all elements of existence are well ascertained as originally knowledge. One who has such acquiescence is fit for immortality.'

The word *buddha* in *ādibuddha* means here *bodha* 'knowledge,'³ i.e., *advaya jñāna* which is called Tathāgata as we have already seen (IV. 82-84). See also SŚP, p. 124:

tathāgatam bhadanta śāradvatīputra paryeśitukāmenētmē
paryeśitavyaḥ. ātmeti bhadanta śāradvatīputra buddhasyaitad
adhivacanam.

All phenomena are only in their imposed or imagined forms, they being *buddha*, or *bodha* or *jñāna*.

Cf. here the well-known phrase in later Vedāntic works⁴: *nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasatyasvabhāva* for Brahman.

As regards the meaning of the word *kṣānti*⁵ a few words are required here. Generally, *kṣānti* means 'patience.' In Buddhism there are different *kṣāntis* of which the following three are often mentioned : (i) *duḥkhādhivāsanekṣānti* 'patience accepting miseries,' (ii) *dharmanidhyāna*⁶ 'patience by meditating upon the elements of existence,' and (iii) *parāpakāramarsaṇa*⁶ 'patience bearing injuries done by others.'

Besides, in Buddhism it has other meanings. In explaining *kṣānti* (Pali *khanti*) in AN, I. 94, the commentary, *Manorathapūraṇī*, writes: *khamatīti adhivāsanakhanti*. It says that *khanti* means *adhivāsana* 'acquiescence,' 'consent.' or 'acceptance.' Again, we read in the AN, III. 118 :

imesam āvuso tīṇam puggalānam katamo te puggalo khamati abhikkantataro ca paṇītataro ca.

³ Ś explains: *ādibuddhāḥ nityabodhasvarūpāḥ*.

⁴ Such as VeS, pp. 38-39 (§28).

⁵ Ś: *bodhakartavyatānirapekṣatā*.

⁶ As described in BA and BAP, VI (pp. 172 ff); SS, IX (pp. 179 ff).

Cf. DS, CVII,

The commentary explains *khamati* saying *khamatīti ruccati*. Accordingly the passage quoted above may be translated thus :

‘Which of these three persons is, O friend, agreeable to you as the most excellent and exalted?’

Here evidently *kṣānti* is *ruci* ‘pleasure’, ‘liking.’ This is quite clear also from a passage of the SNt, 897,⁷ where the commentator in his MNs explains *khanti* (*kṣānti*) in the text by *pema* (*preman*) ‘fondness, predilection,’ *chanda* ‘desire,’ and *rāga* ‘lust,’ which are in fact, the same as *ruci*.⁸

Again, in Buddhist texts (CN, p. 164, see Vbh, p. 245) *kṣānti* is described as synonymous with the following words : (i) *dṛṣṭi* (Pali *diṭṭhi*) ‘view,’ ‘belief,’ ‘theory,’ (ii) *ruci* ‘pleasure,’ ‘liking,’ (iii) *labdhi* (Pali *laddhi*) ‘view,’ ‘belicf,’ ‘theory’ ; (iv) *adhyāśaya* (Pali *ajjhāsaya*) ‘intention,’ ‘thought,’ and (v) *abhiprāya* (Pali *adhippāya*) ‘intention,’ ‘opinion.’ It is therefore quite clear from the above that *kṣānti* sometimes means *dṛṣṭi* ‘view’.⁹ And so far as I can understand in the present case it is used in this sense.

See SP, p. 136 ; MSA, XI. 52; SRS, VII ; DS, p. 63 ; Poussin : MV, pp. 362ff., and AK, VI, pp. 165 ff., as well as the works quoted herein ; St. LA, p. 396.

⁷ yā kāc'īmā sammutiyō puthujjā sabbā 'va etā na upeti vidvā |
anūpayo so upayam kim eyya diṭṭhe sute khantim akubbamāno ||

⁸ See SN, IV. 348 : bhūtapubbam bhante cattvāro satthāro nānādiṭṭhikā nānākhantikā nānārucikā ; MN, I. 487, II. 43. See also the *Sumāṅgalavilāsinī* on DN, II. 213 : khantīti taṭtha katamā khanti yā khamanatā adhivāsanatā acandikkam̄ anasuropo attamanatā cittassati evam vultā adhivāsanakhanti.

⁹ It may be noted that in Sanskrit, too, √*kṣam* is not always used in the sense of ‘to be patient,’ or ‘to endure,’ etc. Cf. UC, I. 14 : tan no yad uktam aśivam̄ na hi tat kṣamam̄ te. Here *kṣama* has nothing to do with ‘patience’ or ‘forbearance,’ etc. In Pali (DhA, I. 40) √*khama* is said to mean ‘to be fit,’ ‘to seem good,’ specially in such cases as *yathā te khameyya* ‘as may seem good to you.’

It is well-known in *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and the works based thereon that all elements of existence are devoid of the characteristics of their own (*niḥsvabhāva*), they neither originate (*anutpanna*), nor disappear (*aniruddha*), and as such they are quiescent from the outset (*ādiśānta=prakṛtiśānta*), and by the very nature they are merged in *nirvāṇa* (*prakṛtinirvṛta*). This point is mainly described in the following kārikā :

93

ādiśāntā¹ hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ |
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajam sāmyam² viśāradam³ ||

'All elements of existence are quiescent from the outset, non-originated, and by the very nature perfectly merged in *nirvāṇa*; they are all equal and not different. (The absolute) is unborn, equal and fearless.'

Let us quote here the following from MSA, XI. 51 :

niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniśrayāt |
anutpannāniruddhādiśāntaprakṛtinirvṛtāḥ ||⁴

Here follows the commentary :

niḥsvabhāvatayānupādādayāḥ. yo hi niḥsvabhāvāḥ so 'nutpanno yo 'nuppannāḥ so 'niruddho yo 'niruddhaḥ sa ādiśānto ya ādiśāntāḥ sa prakṛtinirvṛtāḥ.

¹ Tib. gzod.ma.nas.shi.ba, lit. āditāḥ śāntāḥ.

² See III. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 95, 100.

³ See the note on *vaiśāradya* in the next kārikā. Cf. *nirbhaya* in I. 25, III. 35; and *abhaya* in IV. 78, and Upaniṣads, ChU, I. 4. 4, 5; IV. 15. 1. etc.

⁴ This is as reconstructed by Lévi according to the Chinese version. The original Sanskrit is lost. The scribe has, however, given here a corrupted kārikā and it is as follows :

niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniśrayāḥ |
anutpādo 'niruddhaś cādiśāntīḥ parinirvṛtīḥ ||

See MSA., Tome II (French Translation), p. 122.

'Owing to the absence of nature there are no origination, etc. That which is devoid of nature is not originated ; that which is not originated is not suppressed (destroyed) ; that which is not suppressed is quiescent from the outset ; and that which is quiescent from the outset is naturally merged in perfect nirvāṇa.'

In the text *sānti* (connected with *ādiśānta*) and *nirvṛti* or *nirvāṇa* (connected with *sunirvṛta=parinirvṛta*) are actually nothing but *apraवṛtti* meaning 'not coming forth,' 'not arising,' 'not originating.' Elements of existence are *ādiśānta* and *su-*(=*pari-*) *nirvṛta*; it implies that originally they do not originate, and so to speak, they are in *sānti* and *nirvāṇa*. For the above explanation of the two words see MV, p. 529 : *yā'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam iti vyavasthāpyate* ; p. 538 : *ya upaśamo 'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam..*

Poussin observes (ERE, Vol. 9, p. 851): "From an absolute point of view (*paramārthatas*) there is no difference (*nānābhāva*)⁵ among things and the characters of things. Things are void (*śūnya*) like the daughter of a barren woman ; characters are void like the beauty of this unreal daughter. Things are void, because there is no real origination of things —if no origination, no destruction, an eternal non-existence. There is no difference between existence (*samsāra*) and *nirvāṇa*. Not being produced (*anutpanna*), not being destroyed, things are from the beginning quiescent (*ādiśānta*), they are really, naturally (*prakṛtyā*) in *nirvāṇa* (*parinirvṛta*)."

For the wording and thought of the first half of the kārikā the following passages, besides MSA, XI. 51 already cited (p. 204), may be quoted :

(i) *ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ | dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakra pravartane||⁶*

⁵ See our text : *vidyate nahi nānātvam teṣām kvacana kiñcana*, IV. 91, and also II. 34; III. 24; IV. 93-94.

⁶ Quoted in MV, p. 225, and SuS, p. 20 from *Āryaratnameghasūtra*. See Poussin : JRAS, 1910, pp 138-39; Sylvain Lévi : MSA, Tome II (French tr.), p. 122.

(ii) aṭāḥ sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ | BA, IX. 104.

(iii) tasmāt sarvadharmanā anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatayā adiśāntāḥ prakṛtinirvṛtāḥ. BAP, p. 589.

(iv) paramārtha-satyataḥ prakṛtinirvāṇatayādiśāntatvāt. prakṛtinirvṛtavat̄ sarvadharmanāñām iti.

Ibid, p. 385.

(v) ādipraśāntā imi sarvadharmaḥ | SP, II. 68.

The next kārikā is in support of what is said in the preceding one :

94

vaiśāradyaṁ tu vai nāsti bhede vicaratām sadā |
bhedanimnāḥ pṛthagvādāḥ tasmāt te kṛpaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ ||

'But verily those who always move following difference have no intrepidity. Those who maintain that a thing is diverse¹ (*pṛthagk=nānā*) are prone to difference, and are, therefore, regarded as pitiable.'

The word *vaiśāradya* in IV. 93 of which the noun, *vaiśāradya*, is used here requires some explanation. According to Ś they mean 'pure' (*viśuddha*) and 'purity' (*viśuddhi*) respectively. It is supported by Bhojarāja saying in his vṛtti on YS, I. 47 that *vaiśāradya* means 'clearness' (*nairmalya*). This exposition is based on that of Vyāsa on the same YS.² The idea behind it may be explained in another way.³

¹ See IV. 91 and note 5 on IV. 93.

² aśuddhyāvaraṇamalā-petasya prakāśatmano buddhisattvasya rajastamo-bhyām anabhibhūtaḥ svacchaḥ sthitipravāho vaiśāradyaṁ. Wood translates it thus : 'When freed from obstruction by impurity the *sattva* of thinking substance, the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not overwhelmed by *rajas* and *tamas*'.

³ As in India the season *sārad* 'autumn' is particularly clear, anything in that season (*sārada* 'autumnal'), such as the moon or water, is also clear. Thus *sārada* with the prefix *vi-* which here simply emphasizes the idea might have gradually been employed in the sense of 'clear,' its noun *vaiśāradya* meaning 'clearness'.

The word *viśārada* is, however, of doubtful derivation.⁴ The prefix *vi-* only intensifies the meaning of *sārada* one of the meanings of which is 'mature,' i.e., 'rich in years' (*sārad* 'a year'), 'old.' Accordingly the secondary meaning with the prefix *vi-* is *pravīṇa* 'clever.' As boldness (*pragalbhātā*) generally depends on one's maturity *viśārada* also means 'bold' (*pragalbha*).

In both Sanskrit and Pali the word *sārada* (Pali *sārada*) means *apratibha* or *apragalbha* 'timid,' 'not bold,'⁵ and *viśārada* (Pali *visārada*) is used to mean 'scholar' (*pāṇḍita*) and 'bold' (*pragalbha*).⁶

In Buddhist writings *vaiśāradya* (Pali *vesārajja*) is explained as opposite to **sāradya* (Pali *sārajjā*)⁷ which means 'timidity.' That *vaiśāradya* is 'intrepidity' (*nirbhayaṭā*) is very clearly said in AKV², p. 646.⁸ In Buddhism *vaiśāradya* is four-fold, viz., the *vaiśāradya* regarding (i) the highest knowledge of all things (*sarvadharmaśabhisambodhivaiśāradya*), (ii) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions (*sarvāsravakṣayajñana*⁹), (iii) rightly describing the impediments (*antarāyikadharma-nanyathātvanīścītavyākaraṇa*⁹), and (iv) the rightness of the way leading to salvation (*nairyāṇikapratipattathātu*¹⁰).

⁴ It is read in the group of *dṛḍhādi* (Pāṇini, V. 1. 123), and Varadhamāna explains it in his GM, p. 221, taking it in the sense of *pravīṇa* 'skilful,' 'clever': *sāradaśabdah* *pratyaggravacī*. *yathā* *rajuśāradam* *udakam*, *dīśacchāradāḥ* *saktavāḥ*. *sadyo* *hi* *rajjvoddhītam* *udakam* *pratyagram* *anupahatam* *rajuśāradam* *ucyate*. *sadyas* *ca* *dīśadā* *piṣṭāḥ* *saktavo* *dīśacchāradāḥ*. *sārada(tva)m* *pratyagravam* *abhinavatvam*. *tad* *vigatam* *asya* *viśāradah* *pravīṇah*. *pravīṇo* *lakṣaṇayā*.¹⁰ He himself is, however, not satisfied with it and goes on to say: *athavā* *vyutpattiśūnyah* *pravīṇavacī* *viśāradāśabdah*.

⁵ See AmK, III. 3. 95: *dvau tu sāradau* | *pratyagāpratibhau* *vidvatsupragalbhau* *viśāradau* || AP, 984: *sārado* *saradubhbhūte* *appagabhhe* *mato* *tisu*,

⁶ AP, 228, 959: *vutto* *viśārado* *tīsu* *suppagabbhe* *ca* *pāṇḍite* ||

⁷ *vesārajjānīti* *ettha* *sārajjapatipakkho* *vesārajjam*. MP c n AN, II. 8 ff.

⁸ *nirbhayaṭā* *hi* *vaiśāradym* The Tib. term for *vaiśāradya* is *mi.kjigs.po* which means *nirbhaya* or *nirbhayaṭā*.

⁹ MVi², 8. In the same work (28) there is a different kind of *vaiśāradya* which is also four-fold. Again, the following four-fold *vaiśāradya* is enumerated

By modern scholars *vaiśāradya* is variously explained or translated. Childers says (*Dictionary*, p. 564) it is 'confidence or fearlessness,' evidently taking *viśārada* to mean 'bold' (*pragalbha*). Lévi explains it as 'assurance' (MSA, French tr., p. 319). Kern in his Eng. translation of SP¹ (SBE, Vol. XXI), p. 246, interprets (referring to Burnouf: *Lotus*, p. 396; S. Hardy: *Eastern Monachism*, p. 291) it as 'absence of hesitation.' But to be consistent with the explanations offered by Vyāsa and Bhōjarāja, Kern's exposition of the word in his *Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde* (French translation by G. Huett in the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, Tome X), Tome I, p. 283, deserves to be consulted in this connection.

in the MVu, Vol. II, p. 261: (i) *kāya*^o, (ii) *vācā*^o, (iii) *citta*^o and (iv) *pṛthu*^o. The last term is not clear, and Senart supposes (p. 545) that it is *pṛthag*. Still it is to be ascertained.

In Śilāṅka's ḥikā on SKr. XIV. 17, *viśārada* (Pkt. *viśāraya*) is explained as *pratipādaka*.

95

aje sāmye tu ye kecid bhaviṣyanti suniścitāḥ ।
te hi loke mahājñānāḥ tac ca loko na gāhate ॥

'But only those who are quite certain about the *aja* 'unborn' and *sāmya* 'same'¹ are possessed of great wisdom. The people, however, do not penetrate into it.'²

¹ For *aja* and *sāmya* see IV. 77, 80, 93, 100.

² It refers to *aja* and *sāmya* in the text. Ś explains *tat* taking it to signify the *vartman* 'way' of the sages which an ordinary man cannot grasp. Here Ś quotes the following from the MB(?):

sarvabhūtātmabhūtasya sarvabhūtahitasya ca |
devā api mārgē muhyanty apadasya padaiśiṇāḥ |
śakunīnām ivākāse gatir naivopalabhyate ||

The first two lines with some variations in c are quoted also by Śāyaṇa in his commentary on the TA, VIII. 2 (p. 547). For *śakunīnām*^o see Ś on BU, p 637: ta utsahante khe 'pi śakunām padām draṣṭum; DP, 92-93 (with Aīḍhakathā): ākāse 'va sakuntānām gati tesam durannayā; Again, antarikṣi śakunasya

Until and unless the knowledge becomes completely free from any relation to its object the highest cannot be attained. Therefore the knowledge must be *asaṅga*, i.e., detached from its objects. This state of its detachment is described in the following two kārikās (96, 97), the first of which runs :

vā padam, quoted from *Āryaratnākaraśūtra* in MV, 90; tad yathāpi nāmākāse śakunipadam, SŚP, p. 137; yathāntarikṣe śakuneh padam budhair, vaktum na śakyam na ca darśanopagam, quoted by Poussin in his French tr. of MA, p. 12 in *Le Muséon*, 1907, p. 261.

96

ajeśv ajam asaṃkrāntam dharmeṣu jñānam iṣyate |
yaṭo na kramate jñānam asaṅgam tena kīrtitam ||

'It is accepted¹ that knowledge which is unborn does not go (i.e., relate itself) to the elements of existence, which are (also) unborn. As the knowledge does not go (to the elements of existence) it is declared to be free from attachment (*asaṅga*, i.e., free from any relation to its object).'

See IV. 72, 79 (*niḥsaṅga*), 97, 99 ; cf. *agraha*, III. 32. See also IV. 72 :

cittam nirviṣayam nityam asaṅgam tena kīrtitam |

See IV. 1, note 5 where passages are quoted to show that *jñāna* is *asaṅga*.

¹ Lit. desired (*iṣyate*).

97

aṇumātre'pi vaidharmye jāyamāne 'vipaścitat |
asaṅgatā sadā nāsti kim utāvaraṇacyutih ||

'If there be even the least difference (of elements of existence¹ in the mind) of an unwise man, there is no state of

¹ It is to be remembered that all elements of existence are in fact non-different : sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnāḥ (IV. 93), as we have already seen.

(its) being always free from attachment (*asaṅgatā*), not to speak of the disappearance of the covering.'

The state of being always *asaṅga* of *jñāna* or *citta* is referred to in the preceding kārikā (96).

As regards *āvaraṇa* 'covering' or 'obstruction', it is two-fold, (i) *kleśa-āvaraṇa* and (ii) *jñeyā-āvaraṇa*². *Kleśa* literally means that which troubles one by the strokes of various kinds of misery, as Vācaspati Miśra would explain it (YS, I. 24). Accordingly, as sinful desires, vices, or passions are for misery they are termed *klesa*. For the same reason it also means 'impurity', 'stain'. Sometimes the word stands for 'lust' or 'sensuality' (*rāga*), 'aversion' (*dveṣa*), and 'bewilderment' (*moha*). There are also ten *klesas*, *lobha*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, *māna*, etc. (DSn, §1548).³ For further details see *Pali-English Dictionary*, PTS, s.v. *kilesa*, and MV, p. 361. *Kleśa-āvaraṇa* thus means the *āvaraṇa* 'covering' or 'obstruction' in the form of *klesas*. Until and unless they are destroyed (*klesaprahāṇa*) the truth is not manifested, nor can one attain to the highest bliss.⁴ *Klesas* are regarded as the mother of all miseries. Similarly *jñeyā* is also an *āvaraṇa*. The word *jñeyā* means 'knowable,' i.e., the *dharmas* 'elements of existence' which are not substantial and thus they have no reality. Yet one perceives them (*jñeyopalabdhī*). And as long as one continues to do so one is far from the goal. Thus *jñeyā* is regarded as an *āvaraṇa*,⁵

² DS, CXV; MSA, IX. 3, 12, XX-XXI, 44; BA, IX. 55.

³ In YS, II. 3, 5-9, there are five kinds of *klesa*, viz., *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveṣa*.

⁴ See MV, p. 538 : *kleśānām apravṛityā vā prapañcopaśamah*.

⁵ BAP, pp. 447 : *kleśā evāvṛtiḥ. jñeyam cāvṛtiḥ āvaraṇam. °jñeyam eva samāropitarūpatvād āvṛtiḥ. Sometimes jñeyāvaraṇa is explained as jñeyē āvaraṇam (Tk, p. 15 : jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmin jñeyē jñanapratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam), 'the obstacle regarding the knowable,' (i.e., the reality or the things in their true nature). See TSP, pp. 869-890. Sometimes (AN, III. 436; AK, IV. p. 201) there are three āvaraṇas, (i) *kleśāvaraṇa*, (ii) *karmāvaraṇa* (5 ānantaryas and 10 akusalā karmapathas), and (iii) *vipākāvaraṇa* (8 akṣayas).*

and it must be removed (*jñeyānupalabdhī*) for the realization of *nirvāṇa*. *Jñeyāvaraṇa* disappears by one's realizing the unreality of the elements of existence as separate entities (*dharma-nairātmya*), while *kleśāvaraṇa* goes away by the realization of the unreality of the individual ego (*pudgalanairātmya*).⁶ Or both the *āvaraṇas* can be removed by the meditation on *śūnyatā* (BA, IX. 55).

⁶ LA, VII, p. 241: *jñeyāvaraṇam* punar mahāmate dharmanairātmyadarśanavaiśeṣād viśudhyate. *kleśāvaraṇam* tu pudgalanairātmyadarśanābhyaśapūrvakam prahiyate. See S thiramati on Tk, p. 15.

The removal of *āvaraṇa* is referred to in the preceding kārikā, but in the next kārikā it is said that, in fact, there is no *āvaraṇa* at all :

98

alabdhaḥvaraṇāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ ।
ādau buddhāḥ tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ ॥

'All the elements of existence have always been without any covering and unsullied in their nature. From the beginning they are knowledge as well as in *nirvāṇa* (*mukta*)—this the Buddhas understand.'

For *ādau buddhāḥ* see IV. 92,93. Because the elements of existence do not originate they are said as *mukta*, i.e., in *sānti* or *nirvāṇa*. On this see IV. 93, p. 205.

For *prakṛtinirmala* see IV. 91 ; MV, p. 539 :

avāca 'nakṣarāḥ sarva śūnyāḥ sāntadinirmalāḥ ।
ya evam jānatī dharmān kumāro buddha socyate ॥

MV, p. 444 : *prakṛtiprabhāsvarāḥ* sarvadharmaḥ ; LA, X. 750, 753, 754 : *prakṛtiprabhāsvaram* cittam ; ASP, p. 47 : ādiśuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya ; CVP, 28 :

ādiśuddham anutpannaṁ niḥsvabhāvam anāvilam ।
jagad bhāvena sampaśyan na baddho na ca mucyate ॥¹

In the kārikā the word *nāyaka* is a name for the Buddha, MVt¹, §1. 20 ; AP, 4. 725; BA, II. 31, 66 ; SS, p. 5, l. 8.

¹ See Poussin, JRAS, 1910, p. 139.

Let us remember here that at the very beginning of the present Chapter (IV. 1) the author has told us, that in the opinion of 'the greatest of men' (*dvipadāṁ vara*), i.e. the Buddha, *jñāna* and *jñeyā* are identical. He has also repeatedly shown above¹ and specially in IV. 96, that *jñāna* is *asaṅga* as it does not relate itself to the *dharma*s or objects which have no reality. The author refers now to this fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that according to the Buddha there is in reality neither the *jñāna* nor the *jñeyā* or *dharma*s as he has said neither of them :

99

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānam dharmeṣu tāyinah |
sarvadharmās tathā jñānam naitad buddhena bhāṣitam ||

'According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (*tāyin*),² *jñāna* does not approach the *dharma*s (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects).³ But all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha.'

¹ See IV. 72, 79, 90. Cf. III. 32.

² The word *tāyin* is thus interpreted in BAP, p. 75 : *tāyinām iti svādhigatamārgadeśakānām*. *yad uktam tāyah svadīśtamārgoktiḥ* (PV, 2 145). See my paper, *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, IHQ, Vol. XIII, 1937. This explanation is partly followed by Udayanācārya in his *Tātparyasikā-parisuddhi*, Bib. Ind., p. 8 in explaining *tāyin* in Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyasikā*, 2 (akṣapādāya *tāyne*) : *tāyi tattvādhyavasāyasaṃprakṣaṇamasaṃpradāyapravartakah*. Prajñākaramati in his BAP, p. 75, offers another explanation : athavā *tāyah santānārthah*. *āsaṃsāram apratiṣṭhitānirvāṇatayā avasthāyinām*. This word is widely used both in Buddhist (LV, p. 421; BA, III. 2; SPI, pp. 25, 57, 67, etc.) and Jaina (YS, Vol. I, pp. 1, 47; DV, p. 115) works and is misunderstood. Sometimes it is read as *trāyin* 'protector,' and *tāpin* (as in the present case, see Variants!). The word *tāyin* as a name for Buddha is translated into Tibetan by *sky.b.pa* (MVtI, § 1. 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent *trāyin* 'a protector.' See JRAS, 1910, p. 140; JPTS, 1891-1893, p. 53; JA, 1912, p. 243; *Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference*, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 450-1.

³ See IV. 96.

What is the significance of the second half of the kārikā : 'all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha?' Let us quote here a few passages showing that the Buddha has never said a word.

(i) Nāgārjuna in his MK, XX, 25 :

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivah |
na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ ||

(ii) *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted in MV on the above :

yāṁ ca rātrīṁ tathāgato 'nuttarāṁ samyaksambodhim abhisambuddho yāṁ ca rātrīṁ upādāya parinirvāsyati atrāntare tathāgatena ekam apy akṣaram nodāhṛtam na vyāhṛtam nāpi pravyāharati nāpi pravyāhariṣyati.

(iii) LA, pp. 142-3 :

yāṁ ca rātrīṁ tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yāṁ ca rātrīṁ parinirvāsyati atrāntare ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam na pravyāhariṣyati. avacanam buddhavacanam.

(iv) Nāgārjuna in his NSt, 17 :

nodāhṛtam tvayā kiñcid ekam apy akṣaram vibho |
kṛtsnaś ca vaineyajano dharmavarṣeṇa tarpitah ||

(v) Bhagavat quoted in MV, p. 264 and BAP, p. 365 (with a slight variation) :

anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā |
śrūyate deśyate cāpi samāropād anakṣaraḥ⁴ ||

(vi) LA, p. 137 :

na me yānamahāyānam na ghoṣo na ca akṣarāḥ⁴ |

(vii) LA, p. 48 :

(a) tattvam hy akṣaravarjitam ; p. 194 :

(b) nirakṣaratvād dharmasya.

(viii) VCh, pp. 24 :

(a) tat kiṁ manyase subhūte asti sa kaścid dharmo yaś tathāgatena deśitaḥ. evam ukta āyuṣmān subhūtir bhagavantam evam avocat. yathāhaṁ bhagavan bhagavato bhāṣitasyārtham

⁴ Cf. IV, 60: yatra varṇā na vartante.

ājānāmi nāsti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathāgatenānuttarā samyak sambodhir ity abhisambuddhaḥ nāsti dharmo yas tathāgatena deśitah.

(b) p. 29 : tat kiṁ manyase subhūte api nv asti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāṣitah. subhūtir āha. no hīdaṁ bhagavan nāsti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāṣitah.

ix) LA, p. 144 :

yasyām ca rātryām d̄higamo yasyām ca parinirvṛtaḥ |
etasminn antare nāsti mayā kiṁcit prakāśitam ||

(x) MV, p. 539 :

avāca 'nakṣarāḥ sarva śūnyāḥ.⁵

Let us now make an attempt to understand the significance of such passages as cited above saying that the Buddha said nothing.

This statement is on two grounds, (i) *pratyātmadharmaṭā*, i.e., the nature of (the highest truth) which is realized in one's own self, and (ii) *paurāṇasthitidharmaṭā*, i.e., the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. This requires some explanation. As regards the first it is held that the transcendental truth (*paramārtha*) springs up only as an inward conviction (*pratyātmavedya*), it cannot be attained through instruction from another (*aparapratyaya* = *paropadeśāgamya*), for it cannot be expressed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence.⁶ This is well-known also in the Vedānta.⁷ Cāndrakīrtti writes (MV, p. 493) :

sarva evāyam abhidhānābhidheyajñānajñeyādīvyavahāro 'śeṣo lokasaṁvṛtisatyam ity ucyate. na hi paramārthata eva tat sambhavati. kutas tatra paramārthe vācām pravṛttih kuto vā jñānasya. sa hi paramārtho 'parapratyayaḥ śāntah pratyātmavedya āryāṇām sarvaprapāñcātītaḥ. sa nopadiśyate na cāpi jñāyate.

⁵ See IV. 98 where the kārikā is entirely quoted.

⁶ MV, p. 56 : paramārtho hy āryāṇām tūṣṇimbhāvah.

⁷ TU, II. 4. I : yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha; KU, II. 3; BS, III. 2. 17; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 19 ff.

Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, quoted in MV, p. 539, just after the passage (*ii*) cited above :

atha ca yathābhimuktāḥi sarvasattvā nānādhātvāśayāḥ tām vividhāḥ tathāgatavācāḥ niścarantīḥ samjānanti. teṣām evam pṛthak pṛthag bhavati. ayaḥ bhagavāḥ asmabhyaḥ imāḥ dharmāḥ deśayati. vayaḥ ca tathāgatasya dharmadeśanām śīnumah. tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati sarvakalpavikalpajālavāsanāprapañcavigato hi sāntamate tathāgata iti vistarāḥ.⁸

Continues MV :

yadi tarhy evam [na] kvacit kasyaci[t kaści]d dharmo buddhena deśitas tat katham ima ete vicitrāḥ pravacanavyavahārā jñāyante. ucyate. avidyānidrānugatānāḥ dehināḥ svapnāyamānānām iva svavikalpābhuyuda eṣāḥ ayaḥ bhagavāḥ sakalatribhuvanasurāsuranaranātha imāḥ asmabhyaḥ deśayatī.

The following may also be quoted here from the LA, p. 194 :

na ca mahāmate tathāgatā akṣarapatitaḥ dharmaḥ deśayanti.° punar mahāmate yo 'kṣarapatitaḥ dharmaḥ deśayati sa pralapati. nirakṣaratvād dharmasya. ata etasmāt kāraṇān mahāmate uktāḥ deśanāpāḥ he mayānyaiś ca buddhabodhisattvair yathaikam apy akṣaram tathāgatā nodāharanti na vyāharantīti. tat kasya hetor yad utānakṣaratvād dharmāṇām. na ca nārthropasamhitam udāharanti. udāharanty eva vikalpam upādāyānupadāyān mahāmate sarvadharmāṇāḥ sāsanalopah syāt.⁹

And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the sense and not on letters, for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot make others understand :

arthapratisaraṇena⁸ mahāmate bodhisattvena mahāsattvena bhavitavyaḥ na vyājanapratisaraṇena. vyājanānusārī mahāmate kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā svātmānaḥ ca nāśayati parārthāḥ ca nāvabodhayati. Op. cit., pp. 194-195.

⁸ In Buddhist Sanskrit texts we have often °śaraṇa for °saraṇa in such cases.

The second ground is this : The Buddha has said nothing, because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (*avacanam buddhavacanam*). Taking both the grounds together the LA, pp. 143-144, says :

yad idam uktam bhagavatā yām ca rātrīm tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yām ca rātrīm parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam na pravyāhariṣyati avacanam buddhavacanam iti. kim idam sandhāyoktam.° bhagavān āha. dharmadvayaṁ mahāmate sandhāya mayaitad uktam. katamad dharmadvayaṁ. yaduta pratyātmadharmaṭam ca paurāṇasthitī dharmatām ca.° utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānām sthitaivaiṣām dharmāṇām dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā paurāṇanagarāmaḥāpathavan mahāmate.° tad yathā mahāmate kaścid eva puruṣo ṭavyām paryāṭan paurāṇam nagaram anupaśyed avikalapathapraveśam. sa tam nagaram anupraviśet tatra praviśya pratinivīśya nagaram nagarakriyāsukham anubhavet. tat kiṁ manyase mahāmate api nu tena puruṣeṇa sa panthā utpādito yena pathā tam nagaram anupraviśo nagara-vaicitryam ca. āha. no bhagavan. bhagavān āha. evam eva mahāmate yan mayā taiś ca tathāgatair adhigatam sthitaivaiṣā dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā tathatā bhūtatā satyatā. ata etasmāt kāraṇān mahāmate mayedam uktam yām ca rātrīm tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yām ca rātrīm parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy akṣaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam nodāhariṣyati.

The following may also be quoted here from the VCh, p. 243 just after the passage (viii) cited above :

tat kasya hetoh. yo 'sau tathāgatena dharmo 'bhisambuddho deśito vā agrāhyaḥ so 'nabhilāpyaḥ. na sa dharmo nādharmah. tat kasya hetoh. asaṃskṛtaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāḥ.

It is thus quite reasonable that the author should declare at the end of his discussion the transcendental truth of *jñāna*

and *jñeya* or *dharma* which he begins the chapter with and discusses it throughout.

In the last kārikā of his work the author pays his homage to the highest truth to be realized, i.e., *nirvāṇa* of the Buddhists, and Brahman of the Vedāntins ;

100

durdarśam atigambhiram ajam sāmyam viśāradam ॥
buddhvā padam anānātvam namaskurmo yathābalam ॥

iti gauḍapādiya āgamaśāstre 'lātaśāntyākhyam
caturthaṁ prakaraṇam samāptam.

'Having understood that state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn,² equal,³ fearless,⁴ and free from variety,⁵ we salute it according to our power.'

Here ends, in the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda,

Book Four called the Cessation of the Fire-brand.'

The word *pada* 'state' in Buddhist literature is used also to mean *nirvāṇa*.⁶ But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature, for the word is employed in the similar sense, i.e., *mokṣa* or *Brahman* also in Brāhmaṇical works,⁷ one is inclined to take it in the sense of *nirvāṇa* considering all that is discussed in this chapter. The two epithets *durdarśa* and *atigambhīra* strengthen the view. In Buddhist literature

¹ See IV. 93d which is the same as b of the present kārikā.

² I. 16; III. 1, 19, 26, 33, 43, 47; IV. 11, 12, 13, 38, 46, 48, 57, 60, 74, 80, 93, 95, 96.

³ III. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95.

⁴ IV. 93. Cf. *abhaya*, IV. 78; *nirbhaya*, III. 35.

⁵ III. 13; IV. 91; BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 10-11.

⁶ AP, 819 : padam ṭhāne patittāne nibbānamhi ca kāraṇe.

⁷ For instance, KU, II. 15, III. 7-9.

sudurdṛṣṭa (Pali *sududdasa*) is given as a synonym for *nirvāṇa* (AP, 7) and the words *durdṛṣṭa* (Pali *duddasa*) ‘difficult to be seen’ and *gambhīra* ‘deep’ are frequently used in connection with it.⁸

The word *bala* ‘power’ in *yathābala* refers to the well-known five-fold *bala* in Buddhism, viz., (1) *śraddhā-bala*, (2) *vīrya*^o, (3) *smṛti*^o, (4) *saṃādhi*^o, and (5) *prajñā*^o, or the power of faith, energy, recollection, contemplation, and wisdom respectively.⁹ By using the word it is implied that *nirvāṇa* is realized by the exercise of the five-fold power referred to.

In the colophon for *alāta* ‘fire-brand’ see IV. 47-50. The use of the word *alātaśānti* ‘cessation of the fire-brand’ is very significant and appropriate indicating the quintessence of what is discussed herein.

Poussin has traced (JRAS, 1910, p. 135) the simile of the firebrand (*alātacakra*) in the MU,¹⁰ VI. 24.¹¹ But this simile can in no way be connected with the name of the present chapter, *alātaśānti*. For the use of the simile in that Up, is

⁸ See *nirvāṇarūpo dharmo gambhīro dурдṛष्टas ca*, LV, pp 509, 513, 515; *gambhīram dурdarśam sūkṣmam dharmacakram*, *Ibid*, pp. 422, 436 (gambhīro dурdṛṣṭo mama); ASP, p. 341: *gambhīram iti subhūte śūnyatāyā etad adhivacanam*^o *virāgasya nirodhasya nirvāṇasya vigamasyaitad adhivacanam yad uta gambhīram iti*; MVg, I. 5. 2 8: *ayam dharmo gambhīro dурdaso*. Cf. KU, II. 12 where *dурdarśa* is used as an adjective of the *deva* referring, according to the Commentators, to *ātman*.

⁹ AN, III. 12; DN, II. 120; etc., DS, XLVIII. These five are well-known also in the system of Yoga (YS, I. 20), though these are not described here as *bala*. According to scholars *śraddhā* implies the clearness (*saṃprasāda*, *prasāda*) of the mind. V a s u b a n d h u (AK, VIII. 9) is of the same opinion. See *ibid.* also II. 25.

¹⁰ *Maitrāyaṇa Brāhmaṇa Up.* is another name for it. But it does not show any Vedic traces. From its language, style, and contents it appears that it belongs to a considerably later period.

¹¹ It runs: *alātacakram iva sphurantam ādityavarṇam ūrjasvantam brahma tamasaḥ paryapaśyat*. Cowell (Bibl. Ind.) translates it: “he beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun, full of vigour.”

not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour. On the other hand, here in our work, as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality.¹² The following may be quoted here from CS, 325 :

alātacakraniimūnasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaiḥ |
dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrutkāmarīcyabhraiḥ samo bhavaḥ ||

Poussin observes (JRAS, 1910, p. 136) that the title of the fourth Chapter, *alātaśānti*, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase *alātaśānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books. We cannot however, think so. For, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brāhmaṇic work older than the ĀŚ.¹³ Now, it may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word *alāta* as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full,¹⁴ is very well-known. Gaudapāda himself has used it as such in his ĀŚ not less than four times (IV. 47-50). He has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible world comparing it with *alāta*, and finding out the cause of its appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases. And if it is so, we cannot say that the title of the chapter is not Buddhist.

¹² Such as *marumarīcikā*, *gandharvanagara*, *khapuspa*. See MVt¹, 139. 21.

¹³ A similar phrase, *mṛgaṭṣṇājalabhrāntiśānti*, occurs in YV, III. 6. 2.

¹⁴ See among others LA, pp. 9, 96, etc.

APPENDIXES

I

MĀNDŪKYA UPANIṢAD

A

TEXT

1

*om ity etad akṣaram idam sarvam tasyopavyākhyānam¹
bhūtam bhavad² bhaviṣyad³ iti sarvam oṅkāra eva. ya cānyat
trikālātītam tad apy oṅkāra eva.*

2

*sarvam hy etad⁴ brahmāyam ātmā brahma so'yam ātmā
catuṣpād.*

3

*jāgaritasthāno bahisprajñah saptāṅgo ekonavimśatimukhaḥ
sthūlabhug vaiśvānaraḥ prathamaḥ pādaḥ.*

4

*svapnasthāno 'ntaḥprajñah saptāṅga ekonavimśatimukhaḥ
praviviktabhuk taijaso⁵ dvitīyah pādaḥ.*

¹ ChāU, I. 1. I : *om ity akṣaram⁶ tasyopavyākhyānam*; cf. TU, I. 8. I : *om itidam sarvam.*

² A⁴ omits it.

³ Cf. BU, III. 8. 3, IV. 6. 7 : *yad bhūtam ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyac ca.*

⁴ For *hy etad* A⁴ *tad.*

⁵ A² adds *hiranyagarbho* after it.

5

*yatra supto⁶ na kañcana kāmam kāmayate na kañcana svapnam
paśyati⁷ tat suṣuptam. suṣuptasthāna ekībhūtah⁸ prajñānaghana
eva⁹ nandamayo hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñas tṛtiyah
pādah.*

6

*eṣa sarveśvara¹⁰ eṣa sarvajñā¹¹ eṣo 'ntaryāmy¹² eṣa yoniḥ
sarvasya¹³ prabhavāpyayau¹⁴ hi bhūtānām.*

7

nāntahprajñam na bahiṣprajñam nobhayataḥprajñam na
prajñānaghanaṁ na prajñam nāprajñam adiṣṭam avyavahāryam
agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyaya-
sāram¹⁵ prapañcopaśamaṁ śāntam śivam advaitam caturthaṁ
manyante. sa ātmā sa vijñeyah.

⁶ A⁴ suṣuptio for supto, adds tu before kañcana, and omits eva after °ghana.

⁷ BU, IV. 3. 19.

⁸ Cf. ekībhavati, PU, IV. 2; BU, IV. 4. 2.

⁹ BU, IV. 5. 13: ātmānantaro bāhyah kītsnah prajñānaghana eva.

¹⁰ BU, IV. 4. 22: sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā yo 'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu ya eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśas tasmiñ chete° eṣa sarveśvarah°.

¹¹ MuU, I. 1. 9: yaḥ sarvajñah; PU, IV. 10: sa sarvajñah.

¹² BU, III. 7. 3: eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmī.

¹³ Cf. bhūtayoni, MuU, I. 1. 6: yad bhūtayonim paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ.

¹⁴ A² prabhāvā°, D² prabhavo° for prabhavā°. KU, II. 2. 11.

¹⁵ A¹ reads nāntahprajñam na bahiṣprajñam after nāprajñam, and has na prajñam nāprajñam na ghanam na ghanaprajñam na prajñānaghanaṁ for na prajñāna° nāprajñam. A⁴ omits na prajñānaghanaṁ. After alakṣaṇam A¹ anigamano (? aliṅgam) adding to it bahiṣprajñam (Ś reads in his commentary · alakṣaṇam aliṅgam ananumeyam ityarthah) nāntahprajñam and reading cintyam for acintyam. D¹ and D² add aliṅgam before acintyam. A⁴ ekāntam for ekātma-°, T¹ and V¹ aikātmyapra° for ekātmapra°.

8

so 'yam ātmā 'dhyakṣaram oṅkāro 'dhimātram pādā mātrā
mātrāś ca pādā akāra ukāro makāra¹⁶ iti.

9

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kārah¹⁷ prathamā mātrāpter¹⁸
ādimattvād vāpnōti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādiśca bhāvati ya evam
veda.

10

svapnasthānas taijasa ukāro dvitiyā mātrotkarṣād ubhayatvād
votkarṣatīha vai jñānasantatiṁ samānaś ca bhavati nāsyābrahmavit
kule bhavati ya evam veda.

11

suṣuptasthānah prājño makāras tṛtīyā mātrā miter apīter vā
minoti ha vā idam sarvam apītiś ca bhavati ya evam veda.

12

amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapañcopaśamaḥ śivo 'dvaita
evam oṅkāra ātmaiva. saṃviśaty ātmanātmanām¹⁹ ya evam veda.

iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā.

¹⁶ A² A³ IO °raś ceti for °ra iti.

¹⁷ A¹ omits 'kārah.

¹⁸ A¹ prāptor (?) , IO āptor for āptor.

¹⁹ VS, XXXII, 11 : ātmanātmanām abhi saṃ viveśa. A² adds paśyati after
°tmānam. K¹ Ch M¹ repeat ya evam veda which follows.

B

TRANSLATION

1

Om, this syllable is all this. Its further explanation is : the past, the present, the future—all this is verily *om*. And whatever else that is beyond the three times, that, too, is verily *Om*.

2

Verily all this is Brahman ; this self (*ātman*) is Brahman. This same self has four fourths.

3

The first fourth is the *Vaīsvānara* 'common-to-all-men,' i.e., universal, (active) in the waking state, cognitive outwardly, having seven limbs¹ and nineteen mouths² enjoying the gross.

¹ According to Ś who follows here ChāU, V. 18. 2, these seven limbs are described thus : The very bright one (*sutejas*), i.e., the heaven is the head. One with various forms (*viśvarūpa*), i.e., the sun is the eye. That which has various paths, i.e., the wind is the breath. The extended space (*bahula*) is the body. Wealth (i.e., water) is the bladder. And the earth is the feet. Here in the ChāU the number is more than seven.

² I.e., the means for experience of objects. According to Ś these are the following : The five organs of sense (*buddhindriya*), the five organs of action (*karmendriya*), the five vital breaths (*prāṇa*), the mind (*manas*), the intellect (*buddhi*), egoism (*ahaṅkāra*), and thinking (*citta*). For an explanation of the last four one may be referred to the following :

mano buddhir ahaṅkāras cittam karaṇam āntaram |
'samśayo niścayo garvah smaraṇam viṣayā me ||

These are regarded as 'mouths,' because these are the instruments with which one experiences the objects.

4

The second fourth is the *Taijasa* ‘brilliant,’ (active) in the dreaming state, cognitive inwardly, having seven limbs and nineteen mouths, enjoying the subtle.

5

That is deep sleep in which one asleep desires no desire whatsoever, nor does he see any dream.

The third fourth is *Prājña* ‘wise.’ He is in the sphere of deep sleep, and just unified, a cognition-mass, consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss having the mind as mouth.

6

This is the lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the controller of all. This is the source of all, for this is the origin and end of beings.

7

Not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive, not both-wise cognitive, not a cognition-mass, not cognitive, not non-cognitive, not seen, not to be dealt with, not graspable, having no distinctive marks, not thinkable, not to be defined, the essence of the consciousness of the oneness of the self, the cessation of the expression,³ quiescent, blissful, without a second—(such) they think is the fourth. He is the self. He is to be realized.

8

The same self is *om* from the point of view of a syllable, and from the point of view of its measure, the fourths are measures and the measures are fourths, and they are A, U and M.

³ Or, the expansion of the universe, as explained generally.

9

Vaiśvānara 'common-to-all-men' who is (active in) the waking state is the first measure, A, on account of its obtaining⁴ (*āpti*), or on account of its being the first. Verily, indeed, he obtains all desires and becomes first, who knows thus.

10

Taijasa 'brilliant' who is (active in) the sleeping state is the second measure, U, on account of exaltation or intermediateness.

Verily, indeed, he exalts the continuity of knowledge, becomes equal,⁵ and none who does not know Brahman is born in the family of him who knows thus.

11

Prājña 'wise' who is (active in) the state of deep sleep is the third measure, M, on account of measuring and immersing.

Verily, indeed, he measures 'all this and becomes (its) immersing—he who knows thus.

12

The fourth is without any measure, with which there can be no dealing, it is cessation of expression, blissful, without the second. Thus *om* is the self, indeed. Enters he with his self into the self—he who knows thus.

Here ends the Upaniṣad called Māṇḍūkya.

⁴ Or, pervading.

⁵ See the note in Hume's translation.

II

VARIANTS

BOOK I

1. a. All excepting A⁴ *bahiḥprajño* for *bahiṣprajño*. d. A⁴ PU¹ PU² *smṛtaḥ*, N Th *mataḥ* for *sthitaḥ*.

2. a. A² *dakṣināgni°*, V^g *dakṣinēkṣi°* for *dakṣinākṣi°*; D² °*mukho* for *mukhe*. b. T^e °ś *ca* for °s *tu*. c and d are omitted in A².

3. a and b excepting *pravivikṭabhuḥ* are omitted in A². d. A² adds *tan* before *nibodhata*.

4. b. A² *ca* for *tu* which is omitted in A⁴. c. A¹ A² K³ IO ānandam for ānandaś; V^g A¹ *tu* for *ca*; IO *prājñāḥ* for *prājñat*. d. A³ *trividhā* for *tridhā*; A² tṛptīm for tṛptim; A¹ A² A⁴ K³ *vijānata*, KN *vijānatha* for *nibodhata*.

5. a. A¹ *dhāmasti* for *dhāmasu*. b. K³ *yas tu* for *yaś ca*. c. D³ V^g *vāstu* for *yas tu*.

6. a. K³ °bhūtānām for *bhāvānām*. b. D¹ D² °ity eva niścayah for °ili viniścayaḥ; D³ sa niścayah for viniścayaḥ. c. D¹ sarve for *sarvam*; D¹ D² prāṇā, A¹ prāṇām° for *prāṇa°*; A¹ °ś cetostana, D³ PU² °ś ceto'msūn for °ś ceto'msūn.

7. a. A⁴ D² *vibhūti pra°*, A³ *vibhūtiḥ pra°* for *vibhūtim pra°*; KN, *prabhavam* for *prasavam*; K⁴ *pravadanty anye* for *prasavam tv anye*. c. A° °sarūpeti for °svarūpeti. d. V^g *vikalpyate*, IO *vikalpitāḥ* for *vikalpitā*.

8. b. A² omits *vi* of *viniścitāḥ*; V^g sṛṣṭir vi° for sṛṣṭau vi°. c. K³ adds *bhūtim* before *bhūtānām*. d. A¹ *matyante*, K¹ *mānte* for *manyante*.

9. At the end of the kārikā IO adds the first two ślokas of Ś's commentary, viz., *prajñānāṁśu°* and *yo viśvātmā°*.

10. a. A¹ *nivṛtih*, T^r *nivṛtte* for *nivṛtteh*. c. A^e °*bhūtānām* for °*bhāvānām*. IO omits the kārikā here, but reads it just after kārikā 12.

11. a. A¹ A² A³ D² °*buddhau* for °*baddhau*. d. A^e M^e V["] D³ V["] A⁴ K³ *dvau tau*, PU² and the MSS ABCDF of NSi (pp. 194, 246) *dvau tu*, A¹ A² D¹ *dvaita*, PU¹ *dvaitam*, K³ PU² *dvau tu* for *dve tu*, while for this line K³ reads *dvau turye na tu sidhyataḥ*.

12. a. V["] *parai*^o for *parām*^o. b. V["] *vāṇī*^o for *cāṇī*^o, PU¹ *cāpi nāṇītam* for *nāpi cāṇītam*. d. K³ A^e A¹ A² A³ D¹ D³ V["] *turyaṁ tat* (cf. Š), KN *tūṇīyaṁ* for *tūṇīyāḥ*.

13. d. K³ *tu* for *ca*.

14. c. *svapnam* *tu* for *ca svapnam*.

15. a. D² PU¹ *grahataḥ* for *gṛhataḥ*. c. A¹ 'nayoḥ for *tayoh*.

16. b. A¹ *sa bu*^o, A² *svabu*^o for *prabu*^o. c. D¹ *asuptam* for *asvapnam*. c and d. A⁴ *advaitam asvapnam* for *asvapnam advaitam*.

17. a and b. A⁴ *vidyate vivartate* for *vidyeta nivarteta*. c. A⁴ *sarvam* for *dvaitam*.

18. a. K³ *na nivarletā* for *vinivarteta*; K¹ omits it. b. K¹ *vikalpito* for *kalpito*.

19. a. A⁴ °*syādīvi*^o for °*syātvavi*^o.

20. a. All excepting A^e V["] V["] *vijñāne* for *vijñāna*. b. A¹ A² A⁴ *sphuṭaḥ* for *sphuṭam*. c. A² *saprati*^o for *samprati*^o. d. A¹ °*vidhim* for °*vidham*.

21. b. D² PU² *mānam sā*^o for *mānasā*^o. c. A² *saprati*^o for *samprati*^o. d. A⁴ *laye sā*^o, D² *layaḥ sā*^o for *layasā*^o.

22. a. All excepting PU¹ *yat* for *yāḥ* supported by Š. b. D¹ IO PU² *vetti*, K³ *ceti* for *vetti*; A⁴ *tadvataḥ*, K³ *niścītam*, PU¹ *niścītaḥ* for *niścītaḥ*. c. M^e *sampū*^o for *sa pū*^o. d. M^e °*caīṣa* for °*caiva*.

23. a. D² *nayati* for *nayate*. d. M and KN 'gatiḥ for *gatiḥ*.

24. a. A⁴ *oīkāro* for *oīkāram*.

25. a. *praṇavo* for *praṇave*.

26. a. For this K¹ *praṇavo brahma* paraḥ *brahma*. b. A¹ A² A³ D¹ D² M^e V^g Vⁿ paraḥ for *param*; IO paraḥ smṛtaḥ for *param smṛtaḥ*.

27. d. A² °tarah̄ for °taram.

28. a. A⁴ omits *hi* before īśvaram. b. A¹ A⁴ Gh Ch J N V^g hṛdaye sthitam for hṛdi saṃsthitam.

29. b. A⁴ smṛtaḥ for śivah̄.

Colophon :

A⁴ māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā.

D¹ D² māṇḍūkyopaniṣadvyākhyāne gauḍapādabhagavataḥ kṛtau oṅkāranirṇayaḥ prathamaṁ prakaraṇam.

IO iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā.

K¹ iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣadgauḍapādavyākhyāne oṅkārākhyāprathamaṁ prakaraṇam samāptam.

K³ iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptam (*sic*). hare kiṣṇa hare kiṣṇa°.

PU¹ prathamaṁ prakaraṇam.

PU² iti śīgovindapūjyapādaśisyasya paramahāṃsaparivrājak- cāryasya śaṅkarabhadragavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivaraṇe prathamaṁ prakaraṇe māṇḍūkyavyākhyānaṁ saināptam.

V^g māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā.

Vⁿ iti māṇḍūkyākhyānaṁ prathamaṁ prakaraṇam.

Book II

1. a. A² °bhūtānām̄ for °bhāvānām̄. c. A¹ A² Conc. *bhedānām* for *bhāvānām̄*.

2. b. V^g D^e dehān̄ for deśān̄. c. V^g prabuddhaś for *pratibuddhaś*.

3. Before this kārikā B² reads here the kārikā 4 once more.

4. b. A³ A^e B² IO K¹ M^e PU² tasmāt for tathā. d. All *saṃvṛfatuena* for *saṃvṛfatvam̄ na*; A³ *vidyate* for *bhidyate*.

5. a. A² omits *svapna*°; A^e A³ B² D¹ D² IO PU² V^g Vⁿ °rīlasthāne for °iite sthāne.

7. b. PU² *svapno* for *svapne*; V^g ca *prati*°, all others *viprati*° for 'pi *prati*.°

8. a. A² A³ B² apūrvasthānidharmo, A¹ B¹ D¹ D² M^e PU¹ PU² V["] Vⁿ apūrvam̄ sthanidharmo for apūrvāḥ sthānidharmāḥ.
c. Vⁿ matvā for gantvā. d. K¹ Vⁿ yadaive° for yathaiwe.°

9. a. A¹ °vṛttāv ayam̄ tv anta°, A² °vattāv artheṣv ānt°, B¹ J Jh V["] °vṛttāv apy anta°, Gh C °vṛttāpy anta°, IO °vṛttāv apy anta° for °vṛttāv api tv anta°; K¹ °svanta° for °tv anta°. b. V["] kalitam̄ for kalpitam̄; B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ asat, A² IO tad asat, A¹ tad idam̄ asat for tv asat. c. A¹ A² B¹ CD¹ D² IO Jh K¹ N PU² Vⁿ °ś cetasā for °ś ceto°, A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi and C J Jh N add ca after gṛhitam̄. d. Vⁿ vaitathyam ubhayor apि omitting dr̄ṣṭam̄, A¹ K¹ sadasator vaitathyam omitting dr̄ṣṭam̄, B¹ C D¹ D² IO J Jh N sadasator vaitathyam̄ dr̄ṣṭam̄, A² sadasator vaitathyam̄ yuktaṁ.

10. a. A² D¹ D² anta°, V["] hy anta° for tv anta°. b. B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ Vⁿ asat, A¹ A² tad idam̄ asat for tv asat. c. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh K¹ PU¹ PV² Vⁿ °ś cetasā for °ś ceto°, A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi, the last one omitting sat, C J Jh N add ca omitting sad, A¹ A² B¹ Gh J Jh add hi after gṛhitam̄. d. A¹ A² sadasator vaitathyam̄ dr̄ṣṭam̄, B¹ D¹ D² Gh J Jh Vⁿ sadasator vaitathyam̄ yuktaṁ, K¹ satyadator vaitathyam for yuktaṁ vaitathyam etayoh. IO and P omit the kārikā entirely.

11. a-b. A² adds tad after vaitathyam̄, Vⁿ bhedānām̄ vaitathyam̄ for vaitathyam̄ bhedānām̄. c. Vⁿ ekatān for ka etān.

12. a. P ātmāni as a different reading for ātmānam. b. K M^e ātmadehah̄ for ātmā devah̄. c. V["] bhogān for bhedān.

13. b. All except P vyavasthitān for 'vyavasthitān. c. A¹ A² B¹ IO °ś cittam̄ for °ś citta, B² first °ś cittam̄ then the anusvāra is struck off.

14. a. B¹ °lāś ca for °lā hi, K¹ yetas for ye'ntas. b. D² ya for ye.

15. d. A² viśeṣā mānyahetuḥkah̄ (evidently for viśeṣo nānya-hetuḥkah̄) for viśeṣas tv indriyāntare. After that reading the MS reads asti tv indriyāntare.

18. d. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² PU¹ ātmāvi° for ātmavi°.

19. a. A^e A² B¹ M^e Vⁿ °ś ca for °s tu. b. D² kalpitā for

kalpitah. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² IO K¹ PU¹ *sammo*^o, V^o *yan mo*^o for 'yam mo^o supported by Š.

20. a. A^e A³ B² D¹ K¹ IO PU¹ PU² Vⁿ *prāṇa* for *prāñā*. b. D² *bhūtā iti* for *bhūtānīti*. c. B¹ *guṇa* for *guṇā*. d. K¹ *tadvivah* for *tadvidah*.

21. b. A¹ *vिषया i bhūtānīti ca*, A² *bhūviṣayātī ca* for *vिषयां iti*; PU¹ adds *ca* after *iti*. c-d. A² *vedā iti vedavido yajñā*^o (i.e., a and b of the next kārikā) for *lokā iti lokavido*.

22. a-b. A² *lokā iti lokavido devā iti ca tadvidah* for the whole line. M^e adds *ca* after *iti* in a. c. A² omits *ca*. d. M^e V^o *jya* for *°jyam*. K¹ omits c and d.

23. d. V^o *amūrta* for 'mūrta' omitting *ca* after *iti*.

24. a. IO *kālā* for *kāla*. c. V^o *pata iti vāta*^o for *vādā iti vāda*^o. d. B¹ Vⁿ *bhuvanāni ca* for *bhuvanānīti*.

25. a. V^o *ca tadvido*, Gh C Ch *mana*^o for *mano*^o.

27: a. D¹ D² *lokāloka*^o, IO *lokāl lokā*^o for *lokā lloka*^o. b. IO adds *ca* after *iti*. c. D¹ D² *°napumṣakapum̄liṅgāḥ* for *°puṇ-**napumṣakam laiṅgāḥ*; PU¹ *liṅgāt*, PU² *liṅgā* for *laiṅgāḥ*. d. D¹ D² *parasparam* for *parāparam*; B¹ *atho*^o for *athā*^o.

28. d. A^e M^e Vⁿ *sarve* for *sarvam*; Vⁿ *tehe tu samyatāḥ* for *ceha tu sarvadā*.

29. a. K¹ *yad* for *yam*. b. *tad* for *tam*; A² *san* for *sa*. c. A¹ *vāvam* *vipra bhū* for *cāvati sa bhū*^o; *vāvati* for *cāvati*.

30. d. V^o *°yed yo vi*^o for *°yet so 'vi*^o.

32. Before this kārikā A¹ B¹ and Vⁿ read :

tamah svapnanibham dṛṣṭam varṣabudbudasaṁnibham |
nāśaprāyam sukhāddhīnam nāśottaram abhāvajam ||

(a. C *nabhasy abhra*^o for *tamah svapna*^o; A^e *śvabhra*^e for *svapna*^o. d. A^e B¹ *abhāvagam*, Vⁿ *abhāvataḥ* for *abhāvajam*). It is quoted by Š in his commentary on the preceding kārikā as from the *Vyāsasmṛti*. P takes it as one of the verses included in the text and comments upon it.

b. V^o *baddho* and *sādhyaṅkāḥ* for *bandho* and *sādhakāḥ* respectively.

33. c. A¹ *atha dva°*, A² *artha dva°* for *apya adva°*. d. A² *yasmā°* for *tasmā°*, *śivah* for *śivā*.

34. a. A² *nātmābhāvena*, all others *nātmabhbāvena* for *nānyabhbāvena*; J *nābhedaṃ* for *nānedaṃ*. c. A² *pṛthaktvāt pṛthak ki°*, A³ *pṛthaktvāt pṛthaktvāt ca*, D¹ *pṛthan nāpṛthat ki°*, D² *pṛthaktvāpṛthak ki°* for *pṛthān nāpṛthak ki°*.

36. b. B² *yojayot* for *yojayed*.

37. a. PU¹ *niḥstutir* for *nistutir*, A² °*stuto* for °*skāro*.

38. a. K¹ *mātattva°* for *tattva°*.

Colophon :

B¹ iti śīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśisyasya paramahamṣa-parivrājakācāryasya śrīsaṅkarabhagavatpādasya kītāv āgamaśāstravivaraṇe dvitīyam prakaraṇam vaitathyākhyam samāptam.

K¹ iti śrimāndūkyopaniṣadgauḍapādavyākhyāne vetadhāsa (*sic*) dvitīyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

PU² iti śīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśisyasya paramahamṣa-parivrājakācāryasya śrīsaṅkarabhagavataḥ kītāv āgamaśāstra-vivaraṇe dvitīyam prakaraṇam vaitathyākhyam samāptam.

V[”] °āgamaśāstre vaitathyākhyam dvitīyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

V[”] °vaitathyākhyam dvitīyam prakaraṇam.

BOOK III

1. a. A¹ *upāsāśri°* for *upāsanāśri°*. b. A¹ A² A³ Gh N J *jñāte* for *jāte*.

2. b. D² °*sajāti* for °*m ajāti*; A¹ A² IO *yathā* for *gatam*. c. A¹ A² *tathā* for *yathā*.

In D¹ the leaf containing kārikās 2-7 is missing.

3. c. K¹ *ghaṭārvahavac ca* for *ghaṭādivac ca*. d. °*tāv evan ni°* for °*tāv etan ni°*.

4. b. V[”] °*kāśoda°* for °*kāśāda°*. c and d are omitted in V[”]. d. M^e *jīva* for *jīvā*.

6. a. For it K¹ *nūparāgasamasmāc ca*; V[”] °*s tu* for °*s ca*.

7. c. V[”] *naivanmanah* for *naivālmanah*. d. V[”] °*rāvayau* for °*rāvayavau*. c and d are omitted in V[”],

8. b. A¹ *gagamanam* for *gaganam*; A² *malino* for *malinam*.

9. c. All *sthitau* for *sthitah* in V^g. c-d. V^g Jh °rīreṣu hy ākā°, A¹ Vⁿ °rīresv ākā° (but on margin °rīreṣu ākā°) for °rīreṣu ākā°.

d. A² °vicakṣaṇah for °vilakṣaṇah.

10. b. A¹ A² B¹ (on margin *visa*°) IO *vivarjitāḥ* for *visarjitaḥ*; V^g ātmā° for *ātma*° and °rjitaḥ for °rjitaḥ. d. A¹ *bhidya*te for *vidyate*.

11. d. A² *svayam* yā, A^e B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V^g kham yathā for *sa-yathā*; A¹ A² kham *samprakṛti*°, D¹ D² Vⁿ kham *prakāśi*° for *samprakāśi*°.

12. d. IO °kāśapra° for °kāśah pra°; V^g prakāśam for *prakāśitah*.

13. a. A² °tmāno for °tmano°, A¹ *ajanyatvam* for *ananyatvam*. c. A³ IO *bhidya*te for *nindyate*. d. A³ B² C D¹ D² M^e eva for evam.

14. c. Ch. *gaunatvam* for *gaunam tan*. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² D¹ D² IO JN PU¹ PU² V^g Vⁿ hi na for na hi.

15. a. A¹ A² °liṅgais tu for liṅgādyaiḥ. b. A² voditā for coditā.

17. a. A² *susi*° for *svasi*°; A³ sumiddhāvadāvasthāstu for a,

18. b. *sad* for *tad*. c. IO *ubhayatā* for *ubhayathā*.

19. c. °māno for °māne.

21. b. *yathā* for *tathā*. See IV. 7^b.

22. d. A² *sthāsyā* viṇīscitam for *sthāsyati niṣcalah*.

23. a. K² bhūto 'bhuta° for *bhūtato 'bhuta*°.

24. a. A¹ A² cāśrīyat for cāmnāyād.

25. c. A¹ A² *kas tv enam* for *ko no enam*.

26. c and d are omitted in A². The examination of K² shows that the order of the kārikās Nos. 25, 26 and 27 is actually the same as in other MSS, but owing to a mistake of the scribe in copying the commentary that order has been changed, they being copied as Nos. 25, 27 and 26 respectively.

27. a and b are omitted in A².

28. c. A¹ C D¹ D² P Vⁿ °suto for °putro.

31. a. A¹ A² °mukha° for °dṛṣya°; B¹ *sarvam* for *dvaitam*.

c. A² *manasā* for *manaso*; B² *unmanī*° for *amanī*°.

32. c. A² *amanaskam* for *amanastām*. d. D² *grāhyabhbā°* for *grāhyābhā°*.

33. b. A¹ A² *jñeyam bhi°* for *jñeyābhi°*; *pracakṣyate* for *pracakṣate*.

34. c. A¹ *pravārah* for *pracārah*.

35. a. Ch *suṣuptau* for *suṣupte*. b. V^o *suṣuptasya ni°* for *suṣupte tan ni°*; A¹ A² *na ni°* for *tan ni°*.

36. c-d. K¹ *sarvajñopacārah* for *sarvajñam nopacārah*.

37. a. A¹ A² °*bhimānavimataḥ*, IO V^o °*bhilāśavigataḥ* for °*bhilāśavigataḥ*. b. V^o °*mujjhitaḥ* for °*mutthitaḥ*. d. A¹ 'i**bhavaḥ**' for 'i**bhayaḥ**'.

38. b. B² *citā* for *cintā*. c-d. A¹ *jñāyam ajñātih*, A² *jñāyanajñātih* for *jñānam ajāti*.

39. a. IO V^o °*yogo nāmāyaṁ*, A¹ A² °*yogī nāmāyaṁ*, PD °*yogo nāmaisah* for °*yogo vai nāma*. d. A¹ *bhayadarśataḥ*, A² *tattvadarśinah* for *bhayadarśinah*.

40. a. A¹ IO *nigraho yat tad*, A² *nigraho yat tam* for *nigrahāyattam*.

43. b. A¹ A² °*bhogam* for *bhogān..*

44. b. PU¹ *samayet* for *śamayet*. d. B² *samam prāptam*, all others *samaprāptam* for *śamaprāptam* (= °*t śama°*) in VeS, § 33 and supported by *Vidvanmanorañjanī*; C *vicālayet* for *cālayet*.

45. a. VeS with *Subodhinī* and *Vidvanmanorañjanī*, loc. cit., *rasam* for *sukham*. c. A¹ A² *niścītām ci°*, IO *niścītam ci°*, B² *niścaramś ci°* for *niścarac ci°*.

46. b. A¹ A² PU¹ *manah* for *punah*. c. A¹ *aniṅgita°*, A² *anaṅgita°*, B¹ D² *aliṅgana°* for *aniṅgana°*. d. K M^e *tathā* for *tadā*.

47. d. A¹ A² *sa sarvajñah parīkṣite* for *sarvajñam paricakṣate*.

48. b. B¹ *sambhāvo* for *sadbhāvo*.

Colophon :

B¹ PU² iti śrigovindabhagavatpūjyapādaśisyasya paramahamṣa-parivrājakācāryasya śaikarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamasāstravivaraṇe advaitākhyam tṛtīyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

PU¹ iti śrīgauḍapādācāryaviracitam advaitākhyam tṛtiyam prakaraṇam.

V² āgamaśāstre advaitākhyam tṛtiyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

V² gauḍapādiye advaitanirṇayo nāma tṛtiyam prakaraṇam.

BOOK IV

1. c. A¹ *samvṛddha*^o, A² *sambhinna*^o for *sambuddha*^o. d. PU² °ntaram for *varam*.

2. d. V² *darśata*^o for *deśita*^o.

3. a. V² *jāta*^o for *jāti*^o. b. B¹ first *sarva* then corrected to *kecid* as in the text.

4. a. All excepting D^e GP M^e *dvayā* for 'dvayāḥ. d. A¹A² na *jātim*, V² °ajātam for *ajātim*.

6. d. A² *martya nu* for *martyatām*; A¹A² *iṣyati* for *eṣyati*.

7. a. D¹ *marlye* for *martyam*. b. D¹D² *mṛtyu*^o for *martya*^o; A¹A² Jh V² *yathā* for *tathā*. See III. 21^b.

9. a. A¹ *nīsvābhāvīkī* for *svābhāvīkī*. b. IO *kṛtā*, B¹ B² K¹ GP Me V² *akṛtā*, A¹ A² *amṛtā*, Jh *kṛtakā*, C °py ākṛtā for °py akṛtā; Jh *yathā* for *ca yā*. c. A¹ °s *ceti*, A² *sveti*, A³ °s *seti* for *seti*. K¹ reads only *d* omitting other lines altogether.

10. b. A¹ A² ' *sarva*^o for *sarve*. d. A¹ A² *tanmayā api* for *tanmanīṣayā*.

It is to be noted that in D¹ kārikās from 10 to 53 are wanting.

11. d. B¹ *nityam bhinnam* for *bhinnam nityam*; A¹ A² *yat* for *tat*.

12. a. A¹ A³ A^e B¹ B² M^e D² V² *yady ananyatvam*, A² *yayam ananyatvam*, V² *yad anyatvam* for *yad ananyatvam*. As the word *yadi* occurs in *b* here in *a* one should read *yad* as actually found in V² though it reads in *b* *tava* for *yadi*.

13. c-d. A² °*mānas tasya vyavasthā* for °*mānasya na-vyavasthā*. d. V² *prajāyate*, PU¹ PU² *prasajjate* for *prasajyate*.

14. a. A² °*di samam* for °*dīḥ phalām*. IO omits the kārikā.

15. b. V² ādihetuḥ for ādir hetuḥ; A¹ A² IO *phalām ca yat* for *phalasya ca*. d. A¹ *putra*^o for *putrāj*^o.

16. b. V^g °eṣitah, B¹ K¹ °iṣitavyah for °eṣitavyah. d. A² viṣayāvat for viṣāṇavat.

17. a. B² phalātanupa° for phalād utpa°. b. A¹ A² to for te.

18. b. A¹ hetuh, A² hetusu for hetutah; C Jh phalāsiddhih for phalasiddhih. c. A¹ A² param tat for katarat.

B² gives the number of the kārikā as 16 instead of 18 and henceforth the scribe counts the following kārikās accordingly, i.e., 17, 18, etc.

19. a. A² atroktti° for aśakti°; A¹ A² °pavijñānam for °parijñānam. d. A¹ A² °jāti for °jātih; A¹ °vāpitā for °dīpitā.

20. b. A¹ A² °tamo for °samo; A^g A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ IO PU¹ PU² V^g Vⁿ sah for naḥ in CD². c. A^g A³ B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V^g Vⁿ hi for ca in A¹ A² supported by Š.

21. a. Gh °parapari° for °parāpari°. b. V^g °dīpikam for dīpakam.

22. a. IO omits vā after svato.

23. b. A^g A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ IO M^g PU¹ PU² cāpi for vāpi. d. PU¹ on the margin jātīr for hy ādir.

24. d. A¹ A² parataṁ nāsti nāma tā (the former °tāḥ for °tā) for the line; Vⁿ °matāṁ for matā.

25. a. A¹ A² prajñapte for prajñapteḥ. b. A¹ bhukti° for yuktti°; A² °anyathā dvayanāśataḥ for b; K¹ bhūta° for yuktti°. c and d are omitted in K¹.

26. a. V^g °arthān for °áṛtham. b. A² nābhāsaṁ, V^g arthābhāsa ta° for nārthābhāsa ta°. d. A² IO °bhāsaṁ for °bhāsa; A¹ tata, C tathā for tataḥ.

27. a. A³ sahā for sadā. b. pañcasu for °ty adhvāsu. c. A¹ viṣaryātsaḥ for viṣaryāsaḥ.

28. b. cittam for citta°. c. A¹ jāti, A² yānti for jātim. d. V^g te for khe and khe for te.

29. a. A² tasmād for yasmād. b. A¹ A² D² tathā for tataḥ. c. A² °nyathā for °r anyathā.

30. c. A¹ anantabhbāvādimato, A² anantatā vādimate, CD² anantatā ādimato for anantatā cādimato.

31. c-d. A² *santyevi*^c, A³ D² *santo vi*^o (in the latter between *santo* and *vi*^o there is an *avagraha* mark above the line and it seems to have been struck off) for *santo 'vi*^o; A² D² *lakṣitā* for *lakṣitāḥ*.

32. b. All excepting D² *vipratipadyate* for 'pi *pratipadyatc*. See II. 7.

33. a. All *sarve dha*^o for *sarvadha*^o in A¹; PU² *mṛṣāḥ* for *mṛṣā*. b. A² V^o *kāryasyā*^o for *kāyasyā*^o. c. B¹ B² M^e Vⁿ *samvṛte* for *saṃvṛte*.

34. a. A² *jñātvā* for *gatvā*. b. A² *kālālaisyā*^o for *kālaysyā*^o. d. IO *darśe* for *deśe*.

35. b. A^e A³ B³ B² K¹ M^e *sambuddho* for *prabuddho*. c. A² D² *vāpi* for *cāpi*.

36. b. D² °s *tadarśanāt* for 'sya *darśanāt*.

37. c. A^e B¹ B² PU¹ Vⁿ °*tvāt tu* for °*tvāc ca*. d. A¹ A² D² *sajāga*^o for *sajāga*^o.

38(39). b. A¹ *tanmayā* for *tanmayāḥ*. c. A¹ A² *dṛṣṭāc ca* for *dṛṣṭvā ca*.

39(41). b. A² °*cintyāt* for °*cintyān*. c. Gh *yathā* for *tathā*; A¹ A² *viparyāsam* for *viparyāsāt*. d. A¹ A² *tatra ca* for *tatraiva*.

41(40), c. B² *sa* for *sac*.

42. a. A² *upālambhāt* for *upalambhāt*. d. A¹ A² °s *ca satām*, B¹ °s *trasyatām* for °s *trasatām*.

43. a. A¹ °s *tv asatyām*, A² °s *tu satām*, D² *susatām*, B¹ °s *trasyatām* for °s *trasatām*. b. A¹ D² *te* for *ye*; Vⁿ first *te* then corrected to *ye*.

45. a. A¹ A² *vastvabhāsam* for *vastvābhāsam*. d. A¹ *śāntim*, B² *śāntam* for *śāntam*; D² *avyayam*, Vⁿ *sadvayam* for *advayam*.

46. a-b. B² *cittacintām* for *cittam evām*. c. Vⁿ °m a;ānanto. PU² *jānanto*, C *vijñāto na* for *vijñānanto*. d. A¹ *tapati*, A² A³ *tapanti* for *patanti*.

47. d. All excepting B¹ C Jh PU¹ *vijñānaspa*^o for *vijñānam spa*^o

48. a. A^e A³ D¹ IO M^e PUⁱ PU² *alātam* for *älātam*. In A¹ a and b are omitted, c. A¹ °*māna vi*^o for °*mānam vi*^o.

A² reads c-d as a-b, and a-b as c-d with the following variants : c. °māna vi° for °mānam vi°, and °prajam for °m ajam. V^g is damaged here.

49. b. D² B² nābhāsa for nābhāsā; A¹ A² A³ Kh Gh J N °s cānyato for anyato. c-d. A¹ nispandāṇī nā°, A² nispandā na, Gh nispandan nā° for nispandān nā°.

50. a-b. B² °nirgatālātā dra° for nirgatā alātāt te dra°. c-d. A¹ °vāsyā nābhāsasthāvi° for °va syur ābhāsasyāvī°.

51. c. A¹ A² A³ nispandam for nispandān na.

52. a. K Jh °rgatā vijñā° for °rgatās te vijñā°; K Jh M^e V^g °tā vijñānāt te, B¹ °tā vijñānas te, B² °tā vijñānā te, PU¹ °t te vijñānāt for °tās te vijñānād. b. A¹ A² A³ dravyatvam bhā° for dravyatvābhā°. c-d. A¹ °yogādānovittāḥ, A² yogād ato cittāḥ for °bhāvād yato 'cintyāḥ; A³ cintyā for 'cintyāḥ; A¹ A² hi for te.

53. c. A² °m anyathābhā° for °m anyabhā°.

54. b. A² B² D¹ V^g cāpi for vāpi; A³ dharmajāḥ for dharmajam. c. A² °jātiḥ for °jātīḥ.

55. a. V^g yād dhetu°, PU¹ yāva hetu° for yāvad dhetu°. c. D¹ D² °hetuh for hetu°.

56. d. A^e A³ B¹ B² D¹ D² M^e PU¹ V^g V^g samsāram na prapadyate, A² samsāran nopapadyate for samsāro nopapadyate in A¹ and IO.

57. a. A¹ A² svapnam for sarvam. b. A^e B¹ B² M^e PU¹ PU² nāsti tena vai for tena nāsti vai. c. All sadbhāvena for svabhāvena. d. A² nāsmi for nāsti.

58. b. All excepting V^g jāyante for samvṛtyā supported by S.

59. a. A² °yā jātā° for °yād bījā°. c. A¹ A² na sa for nāsau; A¹ bocche° for cocche°.

60. a. A¹ nādyeshu, A² nājyeshu for nāješu. b. A¹ śāśvatā nāsti dhīyate, A² śāśvatāśāśvato'bhidhā for this line. c. V^g °nyamūdyante vartante for na vartante.

62. a. V^g tu for ca. b. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ D² manah for cittam. c. V^g tu for ca. d. A¹ jāgram na, A² jāgreṇa for jāgran na.

63. a. A¹ A² *pracalan*, C *kvācaran* for *pracaran*. b. A¹ *disam uithitān*, A² *diśamurcchitān* for *daśasu sthitān*. c. A¹ *añjanān* for *añdajān*; B² *svapne* for *vāpi*.

64. a. D¹ *svapne* for *svapna*^o; A¹ A² °*kīm na*, A³ D¹ °*kitta*^o for °*citta*^o. b. A¹ A² *bhidyante* for *vidyante*. c. A² *na dṛṣya*^o for *taddṛṣya*^o, A¹ °*m etedam* for °*m evedam*. d. A¹ *kīm ta*^o, A² *kāmī ta*^o, A³ D¹ *kittā*^o for *citta*^o; K¹ *jāgrataś ci*^o for *svapnadṛk ci*^o.

65. a. A¹ A² *varaṇ* for *carañ*. a-b. Vⁿ *tasmā dikṣu* corrected to *tac ca tyakṣu* for *jāgrad dikṣu*. b. A² *dasmutthitān* for *daśasu sthitān*. c. D¹ *cāpi* for *vāpi*.

66. a. D¹ °*kṣinīyās*^o, Vⁿ °*kṣanīyām*^o for °*kṣanīyās*^o. b. A¹ *bhidyante*, A² *bhidyanti* for *vidyate*. c. A¹ *dṛṣyam idam vedam* for *tad dṛṣyam evedam*. d. B¹ *jāgrac* for *jāgrataś*.

67. c. C °*dṛṣyeta* for °*dṛṣye te*. b. A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² C Ch D¹ D² G IO K M^e PU¹ PU² V^g *ca* for *na*. After this kārikā D² adds :

pramāṇasūnyam ubhayam cittam caittam dvayam yataḥ |
tanmatenaiva tac cittam tayaiva ca tad gīhyate ||

There are different readings for which see Ś's commentary (A^e) from which it is taken. Here *d* is defective of metre.

68. d. Kh Gh N Jh *na bhavanti* for *bhavanti na*.

69. A¹ A² omit it. In A³ it is not in the body but on the margin by a second hand. b. K¹ *mriyate jāyate* for *jāyate mriyate*. d. Kh Gh N J *na bhavanti* for *bhavanti na*.

70. A² Vⁿ omit the kārikā. a. A¹ K¹ Vⁿ *nimittako*, B¹ B² *nirmittako* for *nirmitako*. b. A^e D¹ D² M^e *vā* for *ca*.

71. c. A² *ya etad u*^o for *etat tad u*^o; A² Vⁿ *sarvam*, K¹ *patram* for *satyam*.

72. a. For this A¹ A² *cittam spandati me sarvam*. b. D¹ D² *grāhyam grā*^o for *grāhyagrā*^o.

73. c. All *paratantrābhi*^o for *paratantra bhi*^o. d. For this Vⁿ *paramārthena nāsty asau*. Then again it has c and d.

74. a. A¹ °*samvṛttāḥ* for °*samvṛtyā*. b. A² °*rtho na* for °*rthena*. c. A^e A¹ A² A³ B¹ B² D¹ D² V^g Vⁿ *paratantrā*° for *paratantrō*° in K M^e.

75. c. V^g *dvayābhāṣāṇ* for *dvayābhāvam*. d. A¹ A² *tannimitto* for *nirnimitto*.

76. a. PU¹ *labhyate* for *labhate*. c. A² *tam* for *tadā*. d. *hetubhāve* for *hetvabhāve*.

77. c. A² *pūrvasya* for *sarvasya*.

78. a. A² *satyāṇ* for *satyām*. b. For this A² *hetunyapthagate bruban*; V^g *hetu - thag*°, IO *hetuprathag* for *hetum pṛthag*°; Vⁿ °*nāpnuyāt*, others °*nāpnuvan* for *nāpnuvat* in D². c. All excepting A² V^g *tathā* for *tadā*; A^e M^e *kāmam* for 'kāmam'.

79. a. A¹ °*niveśyādbhiḥ*, IO °*niveśyāddhiḥ* for °*niveśad dhi*. c. A¹ *yas tva*°, A² *yat tva*°, B¹ *vastvā*°, V^g *dvayā*° for *vastva*°; all excepting A¹ and A² *sa buddhvaiva*, A¹ *subuddhyaiva*, A² *subudhyeva* for *sa buddhvaiva*; A¹ adds *ca* after *buddhvaiva*. d. A¹ *na nīva*°, A² *hi nīva*°, Vⁿ *ca nīva*° for *vinīva*°.

80. b. Gh *niścalāṇ* for *niścalā*. c. A³ D¹ V^g *sā* for *sā*; A¹ A² Vⁿ *tu* for *hi*. d. K M^e *svāmya*° for *sāmya*°; Vⁿ °*jadvayam* for °*jam advayam*.

81. a. A² *unnidram* for *anidram*. b. A¹ A² *prabhāvam* for *prabhātam*. c. A² *vibhānto* for *vibhāto*. d. A^e B¹ V^g *dharma* *dhātusva*°, Gh *dharma* *dhātum sva*° for *dharma* *dhātiḥ sva*°.

82. a. A¹ A² °*āśrayate* for *āvriyate*. b. A² *va vriyate*, B² *vriyate*, D² *vā vriyate* for *vivriyate*; A¹ *tadā* for *sadā*. c-d. For this A¹ A² IO *yasya dharmasya grahaṇāṇ bhagavān api so śnute*.

83. b. V^g *vai* for *vā*. c. A¹ A² °*bhāṣair* for °*bhāvair*.

84. a. A³ *catasro* for *catasra*; A¹ A² °*ś ca*, B¹ °*su* for °*s tu*; C °*ś ca tatparāyā*° for °*ś catasra etā*°. b. A³ *gr̥hai*° for *grahai*°; C °*s tāsāṇ* for °*r yāsāṇ*.

85. a. D² *kṛṣnakṛtāṇ* (corrected by a second hand to *sarvajñatāṇ*) *sarvāṇ* for *sarvajñatāṇ* *kṛtsnāṇ*. b. A¹ *agrayāṇ*, D¹ D² *avyayam* for *advayam*. c. A¹ *annā*° for *anā*°.

87. a. A¹ *avastu*, A² *suvastu* for *savastu*. c and d are omitted in K¹.

88. a. Vⁿ °*palam* for °*palambham*.

89. a. B¹ *dvidhe* for *trividhe*. b. D¹ *vindate*, D² *vidate* for *vidite*.

90. a. A¹ A² °*jñeyasya vākyāni*, IO °*jñeyāpavākyāni* for °*jñeyāpyapākyāni*. d. D² °*lambho* for °*lambha*°.

91. a. A¹ A² A³ °*vijñeyāḥ* for °*vaj jñeyāḥ*. a-b. Ch reads *sarve* before *jñeyāḥ*. b. All *sarve dharmā* excepting A¹ Vⁿ which read *sarvadharma*. c. Vⁿ *ca* for *hi*.

92. b. All *sarve dharmāḥ* excepting Vⁿ which reads *sarva-dharmāḥ*.

93. b. A² *prakṛtau va* for *prakṛtyaiva*; A² J *sunirmitāḥ*, Vⁿ, *suniścitāḥ* for *sunirvṛtāḥ*. c. A² Vⁿ *sarvadha*° for *sarve dha*°. d. A¹ A² *śyāmatā* for *sāmyam*; A² °*radām* for °*radam*. For d B² *prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ* repeating c and d as in the text.

94. c. A¹ *vedabhinnāḥ*, A² *vedābhinnāḥ*, Vⁿ *bhedanīśṭhā* for *bhedanimnāḥ*.

95. a. A¹ A² *ajam* for *aje*; A¹ *sāmyam* for *sāmye*. b. A¹ A² *vipaścītam*, IO *viniścītaiḥ* for *suniścītāḥ*.

96. a. A¹ *ajetyojam*, M^e *aje* 'py *ajam* for *ajeṣu ajam*; D² *ajam krāntam* for *asamkrāntam*. D¹ and D² add here *sarvabhūtātma-bhūtasya sarvabhūtahitasya ca* which is found in Ś's commentary on the preceding kārikā.

97. a. IO *vaidharme* for *vaidharmye*. d. A² *udāharane* for *utāvaraṇa*°; D¹ °*varaṇā*° for °*varaṇa*°.

98. c. A¹ *budhās*, A² *buddhas* for *buddhās*; A¹ *yukta*, A² *yukta* for *muktā*. d. A² *budhyanti*, IO *budhyante* for *budhyanta*.

99. a. A¹ *budhasya* for *buddhasya*. b. A¹ *no manāḥ*, A² first *bodhināḥ* then corrected to *vyāpiṇināḥ*, D¹ D² K¹ M^e PU¹ *tāpiṇināḥ*, A^e *tāpi(yi)naḥ* for *tāyināḥ*. c. All excepting A¹ A² *sarve dha*° for *sarvadha*°. d. A¹ *budhena* for *buddhena*.

100. a. Vⁿ *durdāśam* for *durdarśam*. b. A¹ *śyāmatā* for *sāmyam*; A² °*radām* for °*radam*. d. A¹ *manāḥ kurmo*, A³ *manaskurmo*, A² D² Vⁿ *namāḥ kurmo* for *namaskurmo*.

Colophon:

A¹ A² ity upadeśagranthe 'lātaśāntyākhyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

A³ adds to the above only *caturtham* after *prakaraṇam*.

B¹ B² iti śrī govindabhadragatpūjyapādaśiṣyaśāṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivaraṇe alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam (B² sampūrṇam).

D¹ D² iti śrīgaudapādabhadragavataḥ kṛtau āgamagranthe upadeśagranthe vedāntamūle gauḍapādiyam caturtham prakaraṇam.

IO ity alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam upaniṣat samāptam (*sic*). Śiva Śiva ... (17 times).

K¹ iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣadgauḍapādavyākhyāne.

PU¹ iti śrīmadgauḍapādācāryakṛtau māṇḍūkyavārttike alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam. prakaraṇa-catuṣṭayātmakaṁ sāstraṁ sampūrṇam.

PU² iti śrīgovindabhadragatpūjyapādaśiṣyasya śrīśāṅkarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamaśāstravivaraṇe alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraṇam samāptam.

V¹ iti śrīgauḍapāda-āgamaśāstre alātaśāntyākhyam caturtha-prakaraṇam samāptam.

V² iti śrīgauḍapādiye upadeśagranthe alātaśāntyākhyacaturthaprakaraṇam.

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XI

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akṣara, imperishable, cxxxviii.	Agrayāna, same as Mahāyāna, cxxxvi, 199.
akṣipuruṣa, eye-person, lxxxvii, lxxxxviii.	acittatā, mindlessness, cxxxvi.
akṣipta, not distracted, cxxxvi.	acyuta, stable, cxxxviii.
	ajarjara, not decaying, cxxxviii.
	ajāta, unborn, 140.

ajāti, non-origination, cxlii, 100,
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 —vāda (P.), S. ātmavāda, 26.
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 two, i.e., the two extreme
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 anantavat, endless, c.
 anāgama, not coming, 103.
 anādi, without beginning,
 cxxxii.—nidhana, without
 destruction, cxli.
 anābhāsa, having no appear-
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 anāmaka, without a name, 70.
 anānārtha, not diverse, 103.
 anāsrava dhātu, undefiled ele-
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apṛthak, not diverse, 41.

apragalbha, not bold, 207.

apratisibha, not ready-witted, 207.

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abhūtvā bhāvah, coming into
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avayava, a part, cxxxiv.

avayavin, a whole, 90.

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ādītya, to be preferable, civ.

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āniñjya, immovable, 99.

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gandharvānagara, an imaginary town in the sky, cxix, 38.

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guṇas, qualities, ingredients, 30. 36; identity with dravya, of, 91 guṇin, one with guṇas not different from guṇas, qualities, 91.

grahaṇagrāhakābhāsa, with the appearance of the percipient and the perceptible, 155.

grāhaka, percipient, 24.

grāhya, perceptible, 24.

catuṣkoṭi, four points, 191, 192. calācalaniketa, with an unfixed home, 46.

citta, mind, cxxx, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxlii; it does not relate itself to an object, 135, 137, 138; it is the seed of all, 137; it has no origination, 137, 154; it is not found, 139, 168; duality is only it, 172; all this is it, 167, 172; without the objective cause it is mokṣa, 187; when without an objective cause it has no origination, 184; this non-origination is unconditioned and always the same and free from the

two, 185 ; nothing to be seen by it, 137, 138 ; no Brahman (creator), etc., excepting it, 172 ; nothing visible excepting it, 173 ; it is in the form of the subject and the object, 173 ; it is with and without movement (spandita), 173 ; the creation is owing to its movements, 173 ; cessation of its movements is Brahman, 79 ; *asaṅga*, without relation, 172 ; *ākāśasama*, like the sky, 169 ; *nirviśaya*, without the object, 172 ;—*abhiniveśa*, adherence to, 167 ;—*īkṣaṇiya*,—*dṛṣya*, (*cf.* *mano dṛṣya*, 67) to be seen by, cxxiv, 145, 166, 184 ;—*dhārā*, continuity of, 139 ;—*nāśa*, disappearance of, cxxxii ;—*mātra*, pure, 186-187, 167 ;—*spanda* (or *cit*^o) is expressed by such terms as *jīva*, etc., 173.

cinmātra, pure thought, cxxxvii, *chāyātman*, ātman in the form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, lxlxxxviii.

chāyāpuruṣa, a person in the form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, lxlxxxviii.

janmasamkleśa, impurity through the birth, 131.

janya-janaka, to be produced and the producer, 118.

jāgarita, wakefulness, 145-147. *jāgrat*, wakefulness, 165, 167. *jāti*, birth, origination, 50, 108 ; dispute on, of the existent, and of the non-existent, 101 ; neither of the existent nor of the non-existent, 101 ; of different things, 149 ; teaching of and its significance, 149. —*vāda*, theory of, 104, 128, 148 ; refutation of, 105ff. *jīva*, cxxx 50 ; neither a transformation nor a part of Ātman, 7 ; *nirmitaka*, i. e., made by supernatural power, 170 ; *māyāmaya*, i. e., made of illusion, 170 ; *svapnamaya*, i.e., made of dream, 169. *jñāna*, knowledge, civ, cvi, cxxxv, cxxxviii, 68, 83-85, 88 ; *akalpaka*, 68, 83 ; *aja*, 68, 209 ; *anutpannapradhvāṇsi*, 85 ; *anutpādarūpa*, 85 ; (*cf.* *anutpādalakṣaṇā prajñāpāramitā*, 85;) *aprapti-lakṣaṇa*, 85, 198 ; *asaṅga*, 68, 85, 209 ; *asaṅgalakṣaṇa*, 68, 85, 172 ; *asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇa*, 85, 172, 198 ; *ākāśakaṭpa*, 83 ; *ātmasaṃsthā*, 72-74 ; *ālambanaṃ nopalabhatē*, 73 ; *ālambanaṃ arthaṃ nopalabhatē*, 73 ; *jñeyābhinna*, 68, 83 ; *trividha*, *viz.*, *svasāmānyalakṣaṇāvā-*

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jñeya, knowable, 68, 83, 84, 88, 198, 199; referring to Brahman, 68; referring to the objective world, 83, 87. —*abhinna*, not different from, cxxxvi, 68, 83; is transformation of *vijñāna*, s. v., 85, 86; —*āvaraṇa*, covering of, 210; —*anupalabdhi*, non-perception of, 210; —*upalabdhi*, perception of, 211.

jyotiṣmat, luminous, c.

tattva, category, 30, 31, 35; truth, 37, 44, 47, 65, 66; same as dharma in Buddhism, 90-92. —*agrahaṇa*, non-grasping of, 5; —*apratibodha*, non-realization of, 6, 7; —*avatāra*, causing descent or leading to, 155; —*avatāranābhishandhi*, intention of leading one to, 150; —*pratyātmagatika*, knowable only by oneself, 151.

tathatā, suchness, highest truth, 189, 193, 194.

tathāgata, Buddha, 151, 215; is *advaya jñāna*, knowledge having not the two as its

object; is *prajñāpāramitā*, the highest excellence of wisdom; ātman, 193, 194, 202.

tantra, same as *paratantra*, q.v., 176.

tanmātra, a subtle and primary element, 35.

tamas, darkness, one of the three constituents of the primeval cause in the Sāṅkhya, 31.

tāyin, one who instructs the way known to oneself, 212.

turiya, same as *turya*, q. v., lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, ci, cxv, 5, 7.

turya, fourth, referring to the Self in its unconditioned state, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, ci, cxv, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12.

taijasa, brilliant, referring to the Self in the dreaming state, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, lxxxxviii, c-cii, cxiv, cxv, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10-12, 31.

teachers, pre-Śankara, of the Vedānta, ciii.

trasat, being terrified, 149, 152.

trāsa, terror, 150.

trilakṣaṇa, doctrine of three characteristics, cxxxxv.

trisvabhāva, doctrine of three characteristics, cxxxxv.

darśana, view, 130; —*mārga*, path of illumination, cxxxxv.

dauṣṭhulya, bad condition of the mind, 188.—See kleśa- and jñāna-āvaraṇa,
dravya, substance, identical with guṇas, qualities, 91.—tva, the state of, 156.

draṣṭavyopasama, cessation of the visible, 103.

dvaya, the two, referring to grāhya, perceptible, and grāhaka, percipient, 24, 66, 67, 132, 165, 172, 180; referring to the two extreme views, 102. See advaya. —abhāva, absence of, 180; —ābhāsa, appearance of, 66, 67, 165-166;—niśrita, P. nissita, regarding to, 103.

dvicitītā, the state of with two minds, 139.

dvipad or dvipada, biped, man, 83. —uttama, —vara, greatest of men, referring to the Buddha, 83.

dveṣa, aversion, one of the ten impurities, 210.

dvaita, duality, 67.

dharma, duty, 34, 48; same as the tattva of the Sāṅkyas 92; an element of existence, a thing (artha, padārtha) 89; definition and explanation of, 89; details thereof, 87-88; like sky, 83, 87, 88; anutpanna, not produced.

204, 206; alabdhāvaraṇa, without covering, 211; ādinirmala, unsullied from the beginning, 211; ādiśuddha, originally pure, 211; ādipariśuddha, perfectly pure from the beginning, 211; ādibuddha, originally knowledge, 201-202, 211; ādiśānta, quiescent from the outset, 204-206; niḥsvabhāva, without innate characteristics, 204; prakṛtinirmala, naturally unsullied, 211; prakṛtinivṛta, naturally merged in nirvāṇa, 204-206; prakṛtiprabhāsvara, naturally shining, 211; sunirvṛta, well merged in nirvāṇa, 204-205; equal, not different, without origination and disappearance, 204-205; not mentioned by the Buddha, 212; use of, in the sense of element of existence, in Brāhmaṇical works, 93; significance of the use of, in Book IV, 92; same as bhāva in meaning, 93; dharma and dharman are two different words for the same thing, 92.—kāya, cosmical body of the Buddha, 307.—dhātu, essence of reality, cxxvi, 188-190, 192-194, 199, 200.—nairātmya, unreality of, 211.

dharmin, according to the Buddhists there are only dharmas and no dharmin as a separate entity, 89-90; views of the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas on, 90.

dhātu, organs of sense, their objects, and the consciousnesses arising from their contact, 141.—vāda, alchēmy, 34.

dhyāna, meditation, twofold, of rūpa and arūpa, each of four kinds, 95-96.

dhruva, enduring, cxxxviii, cxxxix, cxl, cxli.

dhrauvya, the state of being enduring, cxl. See sthiti and avasthīti.

na-vyavasthā, absence of finality or conclusion, 114.

nāmaṇi, 129.

nānā, manifold, 41.

nidrā, sleep, 6, 7, 294.

niḥsaṅga, free from attachment, cxxv, 79, 180, 186.

niḥsvabhāva, without innate characteristics, 87, 137; —tā, 189, 204.

nigṛhita, suppressed, cxxii, cxxxv.

nitya, eternal, cxxxviii, cxxxix, cxli, cxliv. —tā, eternity, cxli. kuṭastha°, as unchangeability, clxxxxi; santati°, as continuance, cxxxxi,

nitya-anitya, eternal and not eternal, 103.

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nirālambavāda, the theory advocating the absence of the support of mind, 86.

nirākāra, formless, cxxxvi.

nirābhāsa, without any sense-image, cxxxvi, 80, 81, 172, 187. See anābhāsa.

niruddha, completely suppressed, cxxxv.

nirodha, disappearance, 39, 105; briefly for samjñāvedita-nirodha, an intense abstract meditation, 100. —sāmāpatti, a kind of intense abstract meditation, 99.

nirnānākaraṇātmaka, essentially not diverse, 50.

nirmāṇa, magical creation, 171. —kāya, supernatural body of the Buddha, 171; —citta, mind of, 171.

nirmita or nirmitaka, created by supernatural power, 170, 171.

nirvāṇa, apravītti, not coming forth, not arising, cxxxviii, cxlii, 50, 81, 205.
 nirviśaya, objectless, cxxxvi.
 nirvikalpa, indeterminate, cxxi, cxxxvi.
 niṣpanna, =pariniṣpanna, cxxxv.
 nairātmya, the state of being without ātman, i.e., svabhāva, nature, 149. A.
 Nyāya, 91.
 pañcavimśaka, a collection of twenty-five, 35.
 pañjikā, commentary, 43.
 paññatti (P.), S. prajñapti, q. v.
 pada, state, 194.
 paratantra, dependent, 132, 174-177, 179.—lakṣaṇa,—svabhāva, characteristic of, nature of, 176, 177, 199, 200.
 paranirapekṣa, independent of others, 111.
 paramārtha, absolute truth, 49, 87, 108, 205, 214.—naya, view;—satya, truth, 162, 163, 173, 189; as upeya, to be approached, 175.
 parikalpita, imagined.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic,—svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 199, 200.
 parinirvāṇa, 99.
 pariṇāma, transformation, cxxxxi.—nityatā, eternity as, cxlxxxii;—vāda, theory of, cx.

parinirvīta, perfectly merged in nirvāṇa, 204, 205. See su-nirvīta.
 pariniṣpanna, perfect.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic,—svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 197, 200.
 paripāka, maturation, 200; ātma°, of one's own self, 200; sattva°, of the people, 200.
 paripācana, maturation, 200.
 para°, of others, 200.
 paśu, a person in bondage, 35.
 pākya, to be made matured, 199, 200.
 Pāśupata, a philosophical system, 35.
 pāṭhakrama, the order of reading, 190.
 pāda, quarter, 9, 31.
 pudgalanairātmya, unreality of the individual ego, 211.
 purāṇasthitidharinatā, the nature of the elements of existence, that remains from the past, 214.
 puruṣa, person, 35.
 purvāparakoṭiparikṣā, examination of the first and the last points of the world, 123.
 purvāparakoṭyaparijjñāna, absolute ignorance of the first and last points of the world and things, 123.
 pṛthak, different, 41.

prakāśavat, shining, c.
 prakṛti, primeval cause of the
 Sāṅkhyas, 31; nature, 61, 109,
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 pracāra, state, 69.
 prabhu, powerful, 22.
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 not attachment or relation,
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 pratīcchāyā, reflection, 80.
 pratītyasamutpāda, dependent
 origination, 47, 103, 176.
 Pratyabhijñā, a school
 of Indian Philosophy,
 lxxx.
 prapañca, expansion of the
 universe, visible world, ex-
 pression, 8, 42, 43-45, 47.—
 upaśama, cessation of, cxix,
 42-45, 47. —vilaya, dissolu-
 tion of, 43.—vilayavāda, 301.
 prabodha, awaking, 75.
 pravīṇa, clever, 207.
 prastha, a special standard of
 measure, 11.
 prājña, intelligent, the self in
 the state of deep sleep,
 lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, lxxxxviii, c,
 ci, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 11, 12.
 phassa (P.), S. sparśa, touch,
 contact, 97.
 phāsu (P.), pleasant, 97. —
 vihāra, state, 97.
 bāhya, external, 47. —artha,
 a thing, is vijñānapariṇāma,
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 ness, 87.
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 activities of Buddhas, 187;—
 viśaya, province of Buddha,
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 bijāṅkuradṛṣṭānta, the illustration
 of the seed and its sprout, 125.
 buddhi, intellect, 34, 73.
 bhaktivāda, secondary sense of
 a speech, 10.
 bhañjikā, explanation, com-
 mentary, 43.
 bhāva, object, 17, 23, 26, 28,
 29, 41, 60, 61, 108.—kalpanā,
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 kalpanā, imagination of an
 object and non-object, 133;
 —abhāvadarśana, the view
 of an object and non-object,
 104;—niṣṭhā, firm adherence
 to, 162.

bhāvanā, meditation, 130.
 bhuvanakośa, the system of the world, 34.
 bhūta, existent, cxxi, cxxii; elements, cxviii, 30, 35; object, 17, 144. —koti, highest point of truth, 189, 194.
 bheda, object, 17, 18, 22.
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 Mathurā, a city, lxvi.
 majjhimā paṭipadā (P.), S. madhyamā pratipad, middle path, 102, 104.
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 Madhuvidyā, a particular Brahmavidyā, cxxxv, 55.
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 madhyasta, standing on an intermediate position, 10.
 manana, thinking, cxxi.
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 manovijñānavyavṛtti, ceasing to exist of the consciousness of the mind; this is nirvāṇa 81.
 mantravāda, formulas of sacred texts or the science of magic, 34.
 martya, mortal, 108-110.
 mahat, the second tattva in the Sāṅkhya system, 35, 36.
 mahājñāna, with great wisdom, 208.
 mahākāśa, cxxxvi.
 mahādhī, one with high intellect, Bodhisattva, 198.
 Mahāyāna, 39, 199.
 mātrā, measure, 9, 12.
 māna, measure, 11.
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 mūḍha, stupefied, cxxxvi, 77, 294.
 mṛditakaśaya, one with passions removed, 78.

mokṣa, 43, 47.

yuktiyukta, reasonable, cxxvii, 61.

yoga, 35, 77.

rajas, one of the three constituents of Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas, 31.

rāga, lust, 210.

lakṣaṇa. characteristic, 168 ; not taught, absence of, 169.

lakṣaṇaśunya, without any characteristic, 168.

lakṣya, to be defined, 169 ; not taught, absence of, 169.

laya, disappearance, 11, 37 ; the sleeping state of the mind, cxxxv, 69, 76, 77, 294.

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loka, people, 36.—anurājana, pleasing of, 36 ;—avatāraṇa, making descent of, 150 : See tattvāvatāra, sattvāvatāra.—uttama, supra-mundane, cxxvi, cxxxix, 195-198 ;—uttama, above supra-mundane, 197 ;—dhātu, the world, 201 ;—pakti, maturation of the world, 201 ;—saṃvṛti satya, practical or empirical truth of the people, 214.

laukika, mundane, 196, 197.

suddha°, pure, 196, 197.

vastu, a thing, the real, cxxiv, 198.—abhāva, absence of, 180.—jñāna, the knowledge of, 198.

yādṛcchika, accidental, 46.

vāsanā, impression on the mind of the past ideas, cxxxiii, cxxxiii, 87.

vikalpa, false idea, creation, 8.

vikṣipta, distracted, cxxxvi, 77, 79.

vikṣepa, distraction, 79, 295.

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vijñāna, P. viññāna, consciousness, cxxxii, cxxxiii, cxlii, 68, 73, 85, 87, 154-57 ; there is only it, and nothing else, 153 ; utpannapradhyāmsi, 85 ; nimittālambana, viśayavaicityasaigalakṣaṇa, 85 ; synonymous with ālaya, citta, ceṣṭā, tribhava, manas, vikalpa, vijñapti, 68, 153-154, as well as with jñapti.—nirodha, suppression and nirvāṇa, extinction of, is puruṣārtha, 82, 81 ;—parināma, transformation of, 87 ;—vāda, cxxxii, cxxxii, cxlii, 86, 136 ;—spandita, vibration of, 155.

vidyā, one of the tattvas in the Pāśupata system, 35.

viparyāsa, false notion, 136, 137.

viprañāsa, disappearance, 162.

vibhu; all-pervading, 1, 4.

vibhūti, expansion, 3; manifestation, 35.

vivacana, synonym, cxxxx.

Vivartavāda, the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman, cx.

viśārada, scholar, bold, 207.

Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda, cix, cx.

viśva, the embodied self in the waking state, lxxxiv-lxxxviii, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 9, 11, 12, 31.

viśaya, field of activities, 69, 187; object of senses, 31.

vihāra, field of activity, 69, 187.

vṛttikṣaya, loss of the action of the mind, 82.

vṛddhasammati, approval of the old teachers, lxix.

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vedapāra-ga, 44.

vevacana (P.), S. vivacana, q.v.

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vesārajja (P.), S. vaisāradya, q.v.

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vaisāradya, P. vesārajja, intrepidity; derivation and meaning of; four-fold, 206-208.

Vaiśvānara, belonging to all men, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, c, ci. vyaya, change, 158.

vyavadāna, purification, 103, 129.

vyavahāra, common use, 129.—naya, practical point of view, 162;—satya, empirical truth, 162, as upāya, means, 175.

vyāvahārika satya, empirical truth, 175, 178.

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saṃkleśa, impurity, 129, 130.

śama, equanimity, 77.—prāpta, one that has reached, 77.

śānti, peace, 75.

śārad, autumn, 207.

śārada, timid, not bold, 207.

śāradya, P. sārajja, timidity, 207, 308.

śārira ātman, incorporated soul, lxxxxii, lxxxxviii.

śāstra, Chinese lun, Tib. bstan.bcos, lxii.

śāsvata, eternal, always existing, cxxv, cxl, 160.—aśāsvatābhīdhā, appellation of eternal and non-eternal, 164.—vāda the theory of eternity, cxliv, 162.

śiva, one of the tattvas in Pāśupata system, 35 ; calin, 50. sadā°, one of the tattvas in Pāśupata system.

Suddhādvaitavāda, the theory of the Pure Monism, cx.

śuddhi-aśuddhi, purity and impurity, 104.

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śruti-prasthāna, the Course of Revelation, ciii.

Śreṣṭhayāna, same as Mahāyāna, 199.

śaḍvimśa, consisting of twenty-six, the philosophical system of Patañjali, 35.

śamvitti, consciousness, 86.

śamvīti, covering, i.e., empirical truth, 161, 163, 173, 175. —satya, empirical truth, 162. See kalpitasamvīti, satya.

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sakaśaya, with passions, 77.

sakkāyadītti (P.), S. satkāyadīṣṭi, the theory of individuality, 26-27.

saṃkleśa, impurity, 129, 130. 131.—upalabdhi, experience of, 131, 132.

saṃkhyā, understanding, 129.

sa-ce (P.), in the sense of tac cet. See sa-yathā, sa-yadi. 55.

saṃjñā. consciousness, 96; designation. 129.—veditanirodha, a samādhi in Buddhism, 96, 99, 100. See saññāvedayita° S. saṃjñā°, q. v., 96, 99, 100. According to Chinese P. sammā°, S. samyak° for saññā°.

sati (P.), S. smṛti, meditation, 45.

sat, existent, not arising from the existent or the existent, cxxi, 147-148.

satkāyadīṣṭi, P. sakkāyadītti, q.v.

satkāryavāda, the theory that the effect exists in its cause, 101, 102; Buddhist views on, 101.

sattva, one of the constituents of Prakṛti in the Sāṅkhya system, 31; people.—avatāra, causing the descent of, or leading the, 150.—paripāka, the act of maturing the, 200.

satya, truth, 162; *vyavahāra*^o, practical; *paramārtha*^o or *pāramārthika*^o, transcendental, 162, 175, 178; *prātibhāsika*^o, existing in appearance, 178; *vyāvahārika*^o, 162, 175, 178; *samvṛti*^o, empirical, 162. *sadbhāva*, 161.

sanimitta, with (objective) cause, 131.

sanirvāṇa, extinct, cxxxvi, 81.

santati, continuance, cxli.—*nityatā*, eternity as continuance, cxliv.

sandhi, = *abhisandhi*, intention, 150.

sama, always in the same condition, 73, 184, 185.—*tā*, 49, 72, 73, 194;—*prāpta*, 78, . *See samaprāpta*.

samādhi, intense abstract meditation, 70-72, 74. *vajropama*^o, thunderbolt like, 307.

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sambhava, origination, 63, 115; is not of the non-existent from the existent, 147; possibility, 171.

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sammuti (P.), S. *sammati*, general consent, 162.—*satya*, truth by, 175.

sa-yathā, in the sense of *tad yathā*. See *sa-ce*, *sa-yadi*. 55.

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sarva, all.—*jñā*, knower of, omniscient, 70;—*tā*, *tva*, 194, 195, 198, 199. *sarvajñatva*—*vāda*, cxxxxv. *sarvabija*, seed of all, 136;—*ka*, 188.

sahaja, innate, 111.

samvṛta, pertaining to *saṃvṛti*, q. v., 178.

sāṃsiddhika, self-existent, 111.

Sāṅkhya, 101, 102.

sādhyasama, that which is yet to be proved, 125.

sāmānyadharma, common quality, 9.

sāmya, = *sama*, q. v., 208, 217.

sukhasthiti or *sukhāvasthiti*, pleasant state, 97.

sunirvṛta, perfectly merged in *nirvāṇa*, 204, 205.

suṣupti, referring to *Prajña*, lxxxxvi; deep sleep, 34.—*stha*, one in the state of deep sleep, lxxxxviii.

suṣupti, deep sleep, 34.

sūtraprasthāna, the Course of

Sūtras, civ.

sṛṣṭi, creation, 37.

stabdhībhāva, stiffness, 78.

sthitī, continued existence, 37; the position, of citta, 186; the niścalā or unwavering position of the citta is the field of the Buddhas, 186.

sthānidharma, 20.

sthira, cxxxix. See dhruva.

spandita, vibration, cxxv.

sparśa, P. phassa, touch or contact, 99; is three-fold, ānījya, ākiñcanya and ānimitta, 99.—vihāra, (for P. phāsu°, Tib. bde. gnas. pa), pleasant state.

smṛti, meditation, 45; codes of law handed down memoriter, 45.—piasthāna, the Course of Tradition or Remembered Texts, ciii.

svadhā, kāra, the exclamation svadhā, 46.

svapna, dream, cxix, 6, 7, 15—19, 38, 66, 67, 143-146, 165, 166, 295.—ātman, in the state of, lxxxxviii.—dṛś, dreamer, 166.

svabhāva, nature, no origination of, through cause and condition, 110; cannot be artificial, 110; is always non-origination, 111; refutation of, 140. svarūpa, natural state, cxxxvii. svalakṣaṇa, own characteristic, 89.

svastha, resting in itself, cxxxvii, 81.

svābhāvika, natural, 111.

hetu, cause; nirvartaka, bringing about, 128; nimitta, objective, 184.—pratyaya, condition, 176.;—sāmagrī, totality of, 179.—phala, effect of cause, 159; their relationship is not possible, 115-121;—bhāva, causation, cxxiv; not possible, 125, 158;—āveśa, adherence to, 159, 160;—udbhava, arising of, 159;—vyavasthā, a settled rule of, there is none, 126.

heya, that which is to be abandoned; 199.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

INTRODUCTION

P. xl ix, note 2. Certainly this reason *dṛṣyatva* is not in our text, but in Śaṅkara's own commentary (II. 4 : *dṛṣyatvād iti hetuh*). It may be noted here in this connexion that in the later Vedāntic works *dṛṣyatva* is one of the main *hetus* for inferring that the outward world is false (*Advaitasiddhi*, Advaitamañjari ed., p. 2 : *vimatam mithyā dṛṣyatvād*).

P. lxxxix. As regards the commentary on the NUTU, I am thankful to Śaṅkara Nath Ghose of Benares for his kindly sending me a transcription of it made by himself in Bengali characters from a MS in the library called *Mālatīśāradāśadana* of Ray Govindchandji in Benares. It is not complete and runs up to *pratyagekarasah* of the original text in the ninth and the last section. Yet, it contains a separate loose page in which the last portion of the commentary is copied. Here in some of the colophons it is called *Vivaraṇa*, while in others *Vivṛti*. According to the present MS this commentary is by Gaudapāda as is quite clear from the colophons, some reading Śrīgauḍapādiya^o and others Śrīśukayogīndraśiṣyaśrīgauḍapādācāryakṛti^o. It begins thus :

śrīgaṇeśāya namah. śrīnṛsiṁhāya namah.
nirastasakalānartha paramānanda rūpiṇe |
nṛsiṁhāya namaskurmaḥ sarvadhīvṛttisākṣine || 1

yatpādābjarajoleśasamparkat sahasā sakṛt |
 sarvasaṁsārahino 'ham tān nato 'smi gurūn sadā || 2
 tāpaniyarahasyārthavivṛti[x] leśato mayā |
 kriyate 'lpadhiyāmī taśmāt kṣantavyam kṣatam
 uttamaiḥ || 3

iha pūrvasmin granthe nṛsiṁhākārabrahmaviṣayā
 nirupādhikabrahmavidyāphalādhigatā. taṭhā hy uktam
 vārttikakṛdbhīḥ

nṛsiṁhabrahmavidyaīśā vyākṛtā jñānasiddhaye |

And it ends thus :

tāpaniyarahasyārthadīpikā timirāpahā |
 gurvanugrahalabdhaiśā satām astu sukhāptaye ||
 saccidānandapūrṇāya pratyagekarasātmane |
 tejase mahate bhūyān namaḥ pum̄siṁharūpiṇe ||
 yasya saṁsmṛtimātreṇa taranti bhavasāgaram |
 tān nato 'smi gurum bhaktyā dhiyā vācā ca
 karmaṇā ||

iti śrimatparamahāṁsaparivrājakaśāryaśrimacchuka-
 munindraśīya-śrimadgauḍāpādamuniviracite uttaratāpa-
 niyavivarane navamāḥ khaṇḍaḥ. śubham astu. śrī-
 lakṣmīnṛsiṁho rakṣatu mām. nṛsiṁhārpaṇam astu.

tāraṇe vatsare māsi śrāvaṇe 'sitapakṣage |
 pañcamirevatīyukte titthau kumbhesapattane ||
 nṛsiṁhatāpaniyākhyātikāmī gaudābhidhāmī satīm |
 vyāseśvaro 'likhat svasti[y]ai

nṛsiṁhas tēna nuṣṭha(tuṣya?)tām ||

It is interesting to note that the following passage
 from this *Vivarana* (pp. 25-26) is identical with that in

Sāṅkāra's commentary on the MāU, 11, excepting a few unimportant variations as noted in the foot-notes :

mīyate iva hi viśvataijasau prājñena pralayotpattyoh
praveśanirgamābhyaṁ prastheneva yavāḥ. tathoṅkāra-
samāptau punah punah¹ prayoge ca praviśya nirgatāv²
ivākārokārau makāre 'ntye 'ksare ekibhūtāv ivākārokārau.
tathā suṣupte prājñe viśvataijasau³.⁴ minoti jāgradādi-
yāthātmyam jānātīty arthāḥ.⁵ apītiś ca jagatkāraṇātmā ca
bhavati.

P. cxxxv. Regarding the identity of *citta* and Brahman, see YV, III. 64. 31 ; 65. 3 ; 66. 14 ; 96. 56, 66, 73 ; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20. From these verses we can gather that *jīva*, *cit*, *ātman*, *brahman*, *śūnya*, *nairātmya*, etc., are the different expressions of *citta*. From the same authority (III. 122. 35) we also know that such names are made by the authors of *śāstras* in order to supply some terms required by them :

śāstrasamvyavahārārtham tasyāsyā vitatākṛteḥ ||
cidbrahmātmeti nāmāni kalpitāni kṛtātmabhiḥ ||

P. cxxxvi, note 8. For *manahkṣaya* there is *manah-parikṣaya* in YV, III. 116. 13. It has also *manonāśa* (III. 95. 35-36) and *manahpraśamana* (III. 122. 27).

¹ Ś omits it.

² Ś nirgacchata.

³ For suṣupte °taijasau° Ś has viśvataijasau suṣuptakāle prājñe.

⁴ Ś minoti ha vā idam sarvam jagad.

⁵ Ś omits it.

BOOK I

5. It is quoted in ŠV, p. 27.

6. On the creation from Prāṇa see KtU, III. 3 and BS, I. 1. 23, 28. Here in the kārikā we have an Idealistic view (Vijñānavāda).

9. For *āplakāma* see BU, IV. 4. 6. For *bhogārtham* *sṛṣṭih* see Śridhara svāmin on BP, III. 7. 4: avidyopādher jīvasya bhogārtham iśvarah sṛṣṭyādi karoti.

10. See BU, IV. 2. 4; 4. 22; 5. 15.

12. The word *sarvadṛś* in sense is the same as *sarvajña* ‘omniscient’ (III. 36). His omniscience is, according to Śaṅkara (BS, I. 1. 4), on account of his capacity for all knowledge (sarvajñānaśaktimattvenaiva sarvajñatvam abhyupagantavyam), or owing to the fact that he is never dissociated from his intelligence, i.e., all-embracing knowledge (Op. cit., I. 3. 42: sarvajñatvalakṣaṇayā prajñayā niyatam aviyogāt).

On this kārikā as well as on I. 15 see *Upadeśasāhasrī*, XVIII. 26.

13. In this and the following kārikās *nidrā* in sense is, in fact, *suṣupta*. Here *nidrā* is said to be *bīja* ‘seed’, i.e., origin, because *nidrā* being non-realization of truth is the cause of both dream and waking. See *Upadeśasāhasrī*, XVIII. 26 as quoted in NSi, IV. 43: suṣuptākhyam tamo 'jñānam bījam svapnaprabodhayoh | ātmabodhāgnidagdham syād bījam dagdham yathābhavam ||

This explanation of *bīja* slightly differs from the one given before on p. 6.

14. See I. 16; III. 35. 36; IV. 81. In the fourth state, Turva there is no *nidrā* nor *suṣupta*. In such cases

while *nidrā* means the *laya* or *mūḍhā* ‘infatuated’ state of the mind, *svapna* indicates the state called *vikṣepa* ‘distraction’. This state of Turya is the state of Brahman.

15. For *b* of the *kārikā* cf. YS, I. 10 : abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir *nidrā*. This *kārikā* is quoted in NSi, IV. 42.

16. This *kārikā* is quoted in MnU, I. 13, with the reading *ajanmanidram* for *ajam anidram* in *c*.

17. The following is quoted as from Gauḍā-pāda in Śaṅkara’s *Viṣṇusahasranāma-bhāṣya*, Mysore ed., p. 18 :

yad yad dvaitam prapañcasya tan nivartyam hi cetasā |
manovṛttimayam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ ||

19. The Praṇava-upāsana referred to here is well-known in Upaniṣads, older and later alike (ChU, I. 1. 1, 4. 1; PU, V. 1-2 ; TU, I. 8. 1; MuU, II. 2. 6; MU, IV. 4. 37). Here a few words are necessary for the real significance of *upāsana* (sometimes *upāsanā*), which is enjoined (*yuñjīta praṇave cetaḥ*, I. 25) and described to some extent here by our author. The word *upāsana* is derived, as well-known to all, from *upa-*√*as* literally ‘to seat near at hand (in order to honour or wait upon)’, and figuratively ‘to do homage, worship, be devoted to’, etc. But in such Upaniṣadic texts as *mano brahmety upāsita* (ChU, III. 18. 1), or, *sa yo nāma brahmety upāste* (Op. cit., VII. 1. 5), it has some special meaning. The first sentence quoted above does not mean ‘One should worship the mind as Brahman,’ nor do we understand from the second sentence ‘He who worships the name as Brahman.’ In both of the cases *upa-*√*as*

or *upāsana* gives the sense of meditation (*dhyāna*). It is in the words of Śaṅkara a continuous flow of one and the same idea having an ālambana 'support' recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas. (BS, IV. 1. 7 : upāsanam nāma samānapratyayapravāha-karanam. See ChU, I. I. 1 and our text, p. 48). The best ālambana for the *upāsana* of Brahman, as in the present case, is Om. We read in the KU, I. 2. 17 :

etad ālambanam śreṣṭham etad ālambanam param |
etad ālambanam jñātvā brahma-loke mahiyate||

The meditation of Om as Brahman, just as the meditation of an image (*pratimā*) as Viṣṇu 'the all-pervading one', is the means for the realization of Brahman. It is to be noted, according to Śaṅkara's school, that while *Brahmajñāna* leads one immediately and directly to *mokṣa*, *Brahma-upāsana* does not do so, it helps one in gradually attaining to it and to prosperity. Śaṅkara says, it effects the purity of the mind and making the truth clear thereby helps us in acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. Besides, there being an ālambana 'support' it is easy to make an *upāsana*.

It is to be further noted that there are two kinds of *upāsana*, that involving the contemplation of the Self (*ahamgrahopāsana*), and that which is symbolical or concerned with external symbols (*pratikopāsana*). In the former, the Self, the Paramātman, is contemplated in his conditioned form (*saguṇa*) with the idea that 'I am he'. For instance, we read in the TA, VII. 6 :

sa ya eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśah, tasmin ayam puruṣo
manomayo 'mṛito hiraṇmayah.

'It is that space within the heart. Here is the Person, formed of thought, undying and golden'.

Here the person (*i.e.*, Paramātman) within the space of the heart with those qualities is to be meditated with the thought that 'I am the Person'.

But where a worldly or external thing which is other than Brahman is contemplated being regarded as a higher god or Brahman himself that contemplation or *upāsana* is symbolical (*pratikopāsana*). For instance, in the case of the text, *mano brahmety upāsita* (quoted above), the mind is to be contemplated as Brahman. So here is another instance of *pratikopāsana*. For details see BS, III. 3 and IV. 1.

Now with regard to our own case, Om is to be meditated as the Self, and so we have also here an instance of *pratikopāsana*. The three measures (*mātrās*) of Om are to be meditated as Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña respectively. And that Om which has no measure (*amātra*), *i.e.*, the measures of which are not considered separately, and which is thus immeasurable (*amātra*), or which, in other words, is with unlimited measure (*anantamātra*) is to be meditated as Turya.

It is said that in an *upāsana* one thing is to be viewed as another thing; for instance, here the first measure of Om, *a*, is to be regarded as Viśva. It amounts to saying that these two things are identical. But how can this identity be possible? The answer is this that such identity is by no means actual, but owing to some common quality (*sāmānyadharma*) of the two the identity of which is intended. This is a well-known

practice among us. We say of a brave lad that he is a lion (*śimho māṇavakāḥ*), though in fact he is not so. It is only on account of the common quality, bravery, of the lad and a lion that we identify them employing the phrase. Simply following this method of expression our teacher has shown some common qualities of the Puruṣa and Om (l. 19 ff.) owing to which their identity has been made possible. Let us remember here the following line of Yāska in his Nt, VII. 24 : bahubhaktivādīni brāhmaṇāni bhavanti. It means that the Brāhmaṇas have a great deal of *bhaktivāda*. But what is *bhaktivāda*? Durgācārya says in explaining the above line of Yāska : bhaktir nāma guṇakalpanā. tena kenacid guṇena brāhmaṇam sarvam sarvathā varṇayati. tatra tattvam. anveṣyam. It says that *bhakti* means assumption or consideration of a quality by which a Brāhmaṇa describes all things in all kinds of way. But the truth must be investigated there.

I. 20. Evidently the meaning ‘subsequence’ of the word *utkarsa* as given in the translation (p. 10) is far-fetched. The explanation as offered in the *Vivarāṇa* attributed to Gaudapāda on the NUTU, 2 (see pp. 291 ff.) seems to be better. Besides ‘excellence’, the word *utkarsa* means ‘attracting’ or ‘pulling upwards’. Taking this last sense the *Vivarāṇa* says that among the three components, *a*, *u* and *m* of Praṇava *a* is guttural and *u* is labial. So while *a* is pronounced from the lower part (throat) of the mouth, *u* is done from the upper one (lips). Such being the case, in pronunciation *u* is, as it were, pulled upwards,

Or it may be that *u* is higher than *a*, because the former is manifested on the lips filling completely or stepping beyond the throat, and because it is manifested with an effort more than that required for the latter. Let the passage be quoted here as it is in the transcription (p. 25) :

akārād utkarsa ūrdhvam ākṛṣṭa iva hy ukāra [h] prāṇave dṛṣyate. taijasaś ca viśvata [h]. svapnādiṣū akārata utkṛṣṭah. uitamo vā ukārah vyāptyatiśayād balatiśayāc ca. akārasthānam kanṭham vyāpya atikram [y?] a oṣṭhasthāne hi tasyābhivyaktih. tenākārādhikavyāptimattvenokta ukārah virāja iva hiranyagarbhah. balatiśayatvam ca kharaprayatnavyaṅgyatvāt prāṇavasthokārasya mandaprayatnavyaṅgyam akāram apekṣya.

The *utkarsa* 'excellence' of Taijasa in this respect in relation to Viśva is this that the former is nearer by one step than the latter to Turiya.

26. See MU, VI. 5; PU, V. 2 : etad vai satyakāma param cāparam ca brahma yad omkārah.

28. Note 1. Add ŠU, III. 13 ; IV. 17.

Note 2. Read 21 for 22.

BOOK II

1. The phrase, āhur maniṣināḥ, is often used not only in our text (II.5, IV. 54), but also in an Upaniṣad (KU, III.4) itself and the BG (XVIII.3).

4. It may be noted that *samvṛtatva* is referred to by Š in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 3.

5. Cf. MnU, I. 8-11 :

antar asminn ime lokā antar viśvam idam jagat |
 bahirvan māyayā bhāti darpaṇe pratibimbitam ||
 svapne svāntargatam viśvam yathā pṛthag avekṣyate |
 tathaiva jāgratkāle 'pi prapañco 'yam vivicyatām ||
 svapne svasattaivārthānām sattā nānyeti niścītā |
 ko jāgrati višeṣo 'sti jaḍānām āśunāśinām ||
 svapne prakāśo bhāvānām svaprakāśān na hītarah |
 jāgraty api tathaiveti niścinvanti vipaścitah ||

For *prasiddha* see Ś on BS, I.1.22.

7. P. 20, l. 1. Read 'That for 'that.

9-10. Cf. MnU, I. 7-8.

21. P. 31, l. 17. For 6.3, 8.3 read 6—8.

24. P. 34, l. 16. Read *jyoti*^o or *yoti*^o.

32. P. 41, l. 1. Read *kārikā* for *kāṅkā*.

34. For *anyabhāva* see IV. 53.

A piece of crystal which is naturally white becomes red in contact with a red flower, yet, it cannot be said that it is red either in its own nature (*svabhāva*) or in the nature of other (*anyabhāva*). It is true that under the circumstances it looks red, yet it is actually not so, it only appears to be so, for its innate whiteness does in no way change. See Śaṅkara on BS, III. 2. 11 : na hi svacchāḥ san sphāṭiko 'laktakādyu-pādhiyogād asvaccho bhavati, bhramamātrātvād abhiniveśasya, upādhīnām cāvidyāpratyupasthāpitavāt.

35. P. 43, l. 5. Read *NPTU*, *NUTU* and *RUTU* for *NPU*, *NUU* and *RUU* respectively, and ✓*paj-pañj* for ✓*paj-pañj* in l. 10.

For the *Prapañcavilayavāda* showing the relationship between the *karma-* and *jñāna-kāndas* in connexion with *niyoga* one may be referred to Hiriyanna : *Journal of Oriental Research*, 1927, pp. 109 ff., and the original authorities cited therein.

36. The *smṛti* quoted here is *Vasiṣṭhasmṛti* or *Vasiṣṭha-dharmaśāstra*. It quotes here also the following couplet which is not traced :

yam na santam na cāsantam nāśrutam na bahuśrutam |
na suvṛttam na durvṛttam veda kaścit sa brāhmaṇah ||

38. For the stanza, *śūnyam ādhyātmikam*° see AK, IX. 250. For *paśya* the reading is also *paśyan*.

BOOK III

1. The *upāsanā* mentioned here may refer also to *Praṇava-upāsana* in I. 19 ff. See III. 16. For the true significance of *upāsana* or *upāsanā* see pp. 295 ff., and modify the Annotation here in accordance with it.

3. See MnU, III. 9 :

ghaṭākāśo mahākāśo ghaṭopādhikṛto yathā |
dehopādhikṛto bhedo jīvātmaparamātmanoh ||

and III. 25-26 :

dehendriyamanobuddhiprāṇāhamkārasaṁhatam ||
ātmasaṅkalanād ajñair ātmavām pratipādyate |
vahnidhīḥ kāṣṭhalohādau vahnisaṁkalanād iva ||

According to Brahmadatta, one of the Samuccayavādin Vedantist, Brahman has both origination (*utpatti*) and disappearance (*laya*). See Proceed-

ings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Congress, pp. 188-89 ; *Sribhāṣya*, I.4.2 ; *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, 1.4 ; ViP, VI.40.39.

4. Cf. BP, XII, 5.5 :

ghaṭe bhinne ghaṭākāśa ākāśah syād yathā purā |
evam dehe mṛte jīvo brahma sampadyate punah ||

6. P. 52, l. 26. Read 11 for 12.

11. This kārikā supports Śaṅkara's second interpretation (idaṁ tv iha vaktavyam^o) refuting that of the Vṛttikāra in the *Ānandamayādhikarāṇa* of the BS, I. 1. 12-19. On this see MnU, III. 27-31 also :

deham annamayaṁ kośam āviśyātmā prakāśate |
sthūlo bālah krśah krśno varṇāśramavikalpavān ||
prāṇakoṣe 'pi jīvāmi kṣudhito 'smi pipāsitah |
saṁśito niścito manya iti koṣe manomaye ||
vijñānamayakośastho vijānāmīti tiṣṭhati |
ānandamayakośākhye tv ahaikāre purākṛtaih ||
puṇyair upāsanābhiś ca sukhito 'smīti modate |
evam kañcukitah kośaiḥ kañcukair iva pañcabhiḥ ||
paricchinna ivābhāti vyāpto 'pi parameśvarah |

12. Cf. ChU, I. 9. 1, VIII. 14. 1 ; BS, I. 1. 22, 3. 41.

14. See RV, I. 164. 20 ; ŠU, IV. 6-7 ; MuU, III. 1. 1-3.

15. P. 58, l. 18. Omit IV.2.14.

16. P. 59, I. 14. Omit etc.

17. See IV. 5.

23. Gauḍapāda says here that between the

two statements in the scripture that which is with a reason is acceptable. Cf. S on BS, II. 1. 4 :

yathā ca śrutinām parasparavirodhe saty-ekavaśeneta-
rā niyante evam pramāṇavirodhe 'pi tadvaśenaiva śruti-
niyeta. dr̥ṣṭasāmyena cādr̥ṣṭam artham samarthayanti
yuktir anubhavasya saṃnikṛṣyate, viprakṛṣyate tu śruti-
aitiḥyamātreṇa svārthābhidhānāt.

On reasoning (*tarka*) see S on BS, II. 1. 11. With regard to *yukti* we may remember here what is said in YV, II. 18. 2-4 about the two *śāstras*, *ārṣa* ‘derived from *r̥isis*’ and *pauruṣa* ‘derived from men’. The author says that a *śāstra*, though it is a *pauruṣa*, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father :

api pauruṣam ādeyaṁ śāstram ced yuktibodhakam |
anyat tv ārṣam api tyājyam bhāvyam nyāyaikasevinā ||
yuktiyuktam upādeyaṁ vacanam bālakād api |
anyat tṛṇam iva tyājyam apy uktam padmayoninā |
yo 'smattātasya kūpo 'yam iti kaupam pibaty apaḥ |
tyaktvā gāṅgam purastham tam ko na sāsty atigarhitam ||

27^b. Read *yujyate* for *jujjyale*.

29, P. 66, l. 19. Add *the* after *with*.

30. Here is the Tibetan version :

gñis. min. yid. ni. rmi. lam. na |
 gñis. su. snañ. ste. the. tshom med |
 de. bshin. gñid. kyis. ma. log. tshe |
 gñis. min. gñis. snañ. the. tshom. med ||

P. 67, l. 5. Read *the two* for *a second*.

31. For *manodṛśyam* see *cittadṛśyam*, IV. 28, 36,
77.

P. 67, l. 13. Read *perceptible* for *perceived*.

2. P. 68, l. 2. Read *ViS* for *Vis.* and add 38
after III.

35. Note 1.. Add 44, 46 after 42.

36. Note 3. Add cf. *sarvadṛś*, I. 12 ; IV. 84.

P. 70, l. 6. Read *TAk* for *TA*.

39. Read *vai nāma* for *nāmaiṣa*.

46. P. 80, l. 24. Read *buddha°* for *baddha°*.

P. 81, l. 13. S shows here the Buddhist views. On
the next line read 549 for 587.

BOOK IV

1. P. 86, last line. Read *TA'* for *TA¹*.

P. 89, l. 6. Add *a* after *is*, and *sva* before *lakṣaṇa°*
on l. 14.

P. 91, ll. 29, 32.° Read *SāS* for *SS*.

P. 92, note 30. On the word *dharma* quoted from
KU see Glasenapp: *Buddhism in Kāṭhopaniṣad* in the
New Indian Antiquary, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 138 ff., and
Stcherbatsky, Op. cit., p. 68 ff; SMV, pp. 136-7,
See also MV p. 355 : nāstiha sattva ātmā vā dharmās tv
ete sahetukāḥ.

2. The word *asparśayoga* is found at least once in a Buddhist work. See *Bauddha Gāna O Dohā*, Sāhityapariṣad Granthāvalī 55, 1323 B.S., p. 19. Here the Sanskrit tīkā which is not edited critically and full of mistakes reads referring to a yoga *aspriśayogotvāt* for which the Tibetan version (Tanjur, Narthang, Rgyud, Tsi, 175^a. 4) has mi.. reg. paḥi. sbyor. baḥi. phyir. te clearly suggesting its Sanskrit equivalent *asparśayogat*. The only notable difference between the two versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, is this that while the former has *aspriśa* the suggested reading in the latter is *asparśa*. But considering the uncritical way in which the edition of the Sanskrit text is prepared and the well-known occurrence of the word *sparśa* it naturally occurs to one's mind that the reading *aspriśa* for *asparśa* is a misprint or a mistake of the scribe of the MS used for that edition. Another difference is the use of *-tva* in the Sanskrit text, which is not to be found in the Tibetan one. According to the former the latter should have been written sbyor. baḥi. ñid. kyi for sbyor. baḥi. But it is often found in Tibetan versions of Sanskrit texts that ñid for *-tva-* (or *eva*) is not used even when it is necessary; on the contrary, it is employed when it is not required at all.

4. P. 102, l. 6. For our MS. *Me and some* read *Me and some other*.

11. P. 113, l. 5. Read *kārana* for *karana*.

12. Note 1. Here 'elsewhere' refers to *Variants*, p. 237.

20. P. 125, last line. Read *cākramakāḥ*.

23. Note 1. PU actually has *jātir* in the margin for *hyādir* in *d*. Read here *edition* for *editions*.

P. 130, I. 31. Read *AS* for *ASh*.

24. P. 132, note 3. Add 62 after 61 and omit 79.

28. P. 138, I. 26. Read *MuU* for *MU*.

30. Note 1. The couplet is from VM, Simon Hewavitarane Bequest ed. p. 407 with the variant *khandhānam ca paṭipāṭi* in *a* as in Bhāratīya Vidyā Series ed., Part I, p. 282.

31. The first half of the kārikā is identical with that of YV, IV. 45. 45.

33^a. In such cases (viz., IV. 10, 91-93) one may be inclined to read with some of the MSS (i.e., A¹, A², V²) *sarvadharmāḥ* for *sarve dharmāḥ* agreeing with Buddhist works.

38. Note 1. In *b* read *pratibuddhavantah* as in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. II, p. 100.

42. P. 150, note 5. Read *MSA* for *MS*.

51^c. Read *nispandāt* for *vijñānāt*.

58. For the first half see IV, 57^a. For *d* see LA, pp. 28-49: *vicitrā hi yathā māyā dṛṣyate na ca vidyate*. See our text, p. 151, note 8. Read *BA* for *BC* on p. 164, I. 5, and *kṛtaś* for *tanmayo* on I. 19.

60^c. See IV. 99.

71. Note 2. It is a speech of Bhagavat.

72^a. See LA, II. 151-152: *vijñānabijam spandate*⁰.

74. P. 177, I. 16. Read *nāsti* for *nāstī*.

81^c. Read *vibhāto* for *vibhāti*.

P. 188, Note 2. For the meaning of the word *parāvṛtti* see P. C. Bagchi: *Studies in the Tantras*, Calcutta University, 1939, pp. 87 ff.

83^{a-b}. Read ^o*asti-nāstīti nāstī-nāstīti*^o for ^o*asti nāstīti nāstīti nāstīti*^o.

84^d. For *sarvadrś* cf. *sarvajñā* (I. 12, III. 36) and *sarvajñatā* (IV. 85. 89).

On this see E. Obermiller (*The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā*, etc., p. 44): “When the Bodhisattva has attained the highest of the Unimpeded Paths in the Path of Concentrated Contemplation, he is considered to have terminated his course of training in the path. This last moment of Concentrated trance called the ‘thunderbolt-like’ (*vajropama samādhi*) is characterized by the removal of the most subtle forms of defilement and of ignorance. It is simultaneous with the final momentary Illumination (*ekaksana-abhisambodha*), and the culmination of the Bodhisattva’s intuition of the absolute. All the factors for the attainment of the Omniscience of the Buddha are now brought to accomplishment. Owing to this, the representation of the Absolute appears in its full light ; the differentiation to subject and object ceases to exist, the accidental obscurations which had hitherto separated the Germ of the Absolute in the living being now completely vanish, and the Germ now coalesces with the Unique Ultimate Essence which is personified as the Cosmical body (*dharma-kāya*) of the Buddha”.¹

¹ “At the second moment we have the last Path of Deliverance (*vimuktimārga*). At that time the double representation (i.e., of subject and object) disappears, and the object of Concentration (in its true aspect) becomes one with the knowledge cognizing it like one particle of water uniting with another (*chu-la chu bshag-pa-ltar=jale jalanikṣepavat*). In the aspect of this intuition all the things cognizable in their varieties become directly perceived like a myrobalan (*āmalaka*) fruit on the palm of the hand (*karatalāmalakavat*).”

The special Omniscience which is peculiar only to the Buddha (*sarva-ākāra-jñātā*) is the knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an independent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the Absolute". *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

See Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyaśāṅkā* (Reprint from the *Pandit*), pp. 110, 147, 205.

90. See MSA, XIX, 56: pañcavidham hi vastu bodhisattvānām aprameyam. paripācyam vastu satvadhatur aviśeṣena. viśodhyam lokadhatur bhājana-lokasamgrīhituh. prāpyam dharmadhātuḥ. paripācanayogyaṁ vineyadhātuḥ. samyagdeśanāvastu vineyopāyadhātuḥ.

94. P. 206, note 2. Read *W o o d s* for *W o o d*.

P. 207, I. 13. The word *śāradya* actually occurs in Sanskrit as in *pariśacchāradya*. It means *saṅkoca* 'shrinking'. In Tibetan for it we have *bskumps*. *pa* from *skum*. *pa* 'to contract.' See MV, p. 46; SS, p. 296.

99. P. 212, note 2, l. 31. Read *skyob*. *pa* for *skyb*. *pa*.

100. For *durdarśa* see KU, l. 2. 12.

For *alāta* see MV, p. 219: pūrvāparakoṭyanupalam-bhād [alāta]cakravat (mgal. mehi. hhkor. lo. bshin. no); p. 221: ādimadhyāvasānavirahitatvād alātacakravat.

